Chapter 123 Volume Four, Chapter Thirteen, Madagascar

We are concerned about Madagascar General de Gaulle's wishes My memorandum of March 12th March 12th Coincidental meeting at Hitler's headquarters I asked President Roosevelt for naval aid in the Atlantic He agreed to reinforce the British home fleet I March 24th Telegram to General Smuts to General Smuts on his delight to promote the morale benefits of cooperation with the United States to the Madagascar defenders The President is concerned about his relationship with Vichy the importance of our limited operations I reassure General Wavell to General Auchinleck Telegram May 5th Landings at Madagascar Successful campaign well under way May 15th Telegram to Admiral Sifleet General Smuts intends to take more places An embarrassing accident The island surrenders.

Although the vast Indian Ocean separated Madagascar from Ceylon, fears of Japanese raids and Vichy treachery were often haunted.We are already overwhelmed and resources are thin, so it is difficult to make immediate decisions. On February 7, 1942, when I received news that pending talks between the United States and Vichy might lead to the recognition of Vichy's continued control of Madagascar, I immediately telephoned President Roosevelt. I wish not to make any pledge not to occupy Madagascar and Réunion.The Japanese might well come to Madagascar one day, and the Vichys were not going to put up any more resistance there than they had in French Indochina.

If Japan set up an air force, submarine or cruiser base in Diego Suarez, as long as there is a base, our entire Middle East and Far East shipping routes will be paralyzed.For some time now we have planned to go out from the Nile or South Africa, to occupy Diego Suarez, and to establish a base in this port.However, due to our busy schedule, this operation has been delayed indefinitely at present, but I don't want it to be forever.I will be sure to inform you before any action is taken. The reply I received included the following assurances: You can be sure that there will be no guarantees against taking Madagascar or Réunion.

Smuts was as appalled as I was by the negotiations with Vichy over Madagascar.In his February 12th telegram, he was extremely worried, giving up our freedom of action in exchange for a meager reward.He went on: "I think Madagascar is the key to security in the Indian Ocean.Just as Indochina played a role in Vichy's dealings with Japan, so Madagascar can play an equally important role, putting our security in the Indian Ocean at risk.Our entire line of communication with the battlefields and with the British Empire in the East may be affected. To reassure him, I forwarded to him my telegrams with the President.

As early as December 16, 1941, shortly after Japan entered the war, General de Gaulle had strongly advocated a military operation for a free French occupation of Madagascar.He wrote to me again on 19 February 1942, urging a decision and presenting to our Chiefs of Staff a plan for an expedition of Free France with the cooperation of the British Navy and Air Force. I have always been in favor of de Gaulle's presence in Madagascar. Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary and Chiefs of Staff Committee February 21, 1942 If it were possible for the Free French to take control of Madagascar, I would strongly support it.But how to make it happen?

The Chiefs of Staff pointed out in their advice to me that the capture of the island by us alone would require so many British troops that such a movement would jeopardize reinforcements from India, Ceylon, and the bases in the Indian Ocean. I didn't push for the offensive in the first place.My memo is as follows: prime minister to chiefs of staff committee March 1, 1942 I agree that the action on Madagascar should still be put on hold. Under no circumstances shall we permit the formation of a mixed expedition. Either, when the Free French troops landed, they fought alone; or, it was carried out by the British Empire itself.

I don't want to reject de Gaulle's plan right away.Remember, sixteen men took French Cameroon. prime minister to general smuts March 5, 1942 We have carefully considered General de Gaulle's proposal to occupy Madagascar by the Free French forces.This plan depends on the support of the British navy and air force, and we also worry about whether the Free French will be able to obtain the necessary troops.We hope that the plan proposed by de Gaulle will not be rejected immediately, especially from the current attitude of the Vichy government, we cannot afford to risk failure. Finally, with Ceylon at stake due to the developing threat of the Bay of Bengal, we resolved to secure the excellent port of Diego Suarez.Most of the rest of the island was strategically secondary, but letting the Japanese set up submarine bases in Madagascar would have been a colossal disaster.The steady stream of reinforcements going around the Cape of Good Hope to India seems to be able to carry out this task without wasting much time.Our memories of Dakar were still fresh and, therefore, the Free French could not be involved so as not to complicate the operation, so it was decided that the attack would be entirely British.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, Transfer to the Chiefs of Staff Committee March 12, 1942 Particular attention must be paid to studying the situation in Madagascar.To this end, the following measures should be taken: (1) Fleet H (the powerful British squadron defending the western Mediterranean) is moved from Gibraltar; (2) I will ask the President tomorrow to send an American Mobile Fleet to take over if it is deemed necessary; (3) The 4,000 soldiers and ships mentioned by the Commander of the Combined Forces (Lord Mountbatten) should also be used at the same time; (4) The launch date of the attack should be around April 30; (5) As soon as the attack is successful, the commando should be taken over by the defending force as soon as possible.The Foreign Secretary suggested that they could be replaced by Belgian troops from the Congo, which were said to be not only good and numerous, but also available immediately when needed.Doubtless some sporadic British or South African troops could be found.In order to assuage French public opinion, the question of allowing the Free French troops to enter with strict conditions after the battle should be considered.It is of great advantage that the United States Fleet temporarily be stationed at Gibraltar, as the First Sea Lord has pointed out, so that it may be spared the retaliatory bombing of the port which may arise from the bonus [1] operational plan.

[1] This is the telegram code used in the original plan to attack Madagascar.Later renamed the Ironclad Ship. The above points appear to be in harmony.Please give me a battle plan, or an argument against it.In short, we need a group of such commandos in the East. Those who pay attention in this direction are not limited to us.At dusk on the same day, there was also a meeting at Hitler's headquarters, and the Admiral of the Navy made the following report to the Führer: Japan has recognized Madagascar's enormous strategic importance to naval warfare. They are reported to be planning to establish a base in Madagascar beyond Ceylon, thereby disrupting sea traffic between the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea.From these bases they were equally able to attack ships round the Cape of Good Hope at will.Japan needs Germany's approval before establishing these bases.From a military point of view, it should be agreed.What should be noted is that this action has great political significance, because it will involve the basic problems of France's relations with Germany, Italy, Japan and Britain.Such actions by Japan will encounter opposition from mainland France and African colonies, as well as Portuguese East Africa.

Hitler said he did not think France would agree to the Japanese occupation of Madagascar. The scope of the naval operation was so extensive, and the threat of the Tirpitz entering the inland waters so serious, that I was obliged to ask President Roosevelt for assistance in giving us temporary reinforcements in the Atlantic.I can't judge how this operation will fit into some of his own problems, however, I know he will do his best to assist us. former navy personnel to president roosevelt March 14, 1942 We decided to implement the bonus battle plan.Since it will not weaken our Eastern Fleet in the slightest, we must all call on Fleet H, which is currently stationed in Gibraltar.This would leave the western Mediterranean access without cover, which is not what we want.Can you send two battleships, an aircraft carrier, and a group of cruisers and destroyers from the Atlantic to temporarily take over the defense of fleet H?

The H fleet will leave Gibraltar no later than March 30th, and it is unlikely to return to Gibraltar before the end of June.Between April 1 and the end of June, we did not plan any operations by H-Fleet in the Mediterranean.Even if France retaliates against the bonus operation plan, it will never bomb the American ships.The presence of American ships in Gibraltar would, in itself, have a great effect on morale across the Channel.Unless you can do this, the bonus campaign won't work.From another point of view, if this operational plan fails to be realized and Japan acquires the base, it will be in great danger.We haven't talked to anyone about our plans.Our strike force will easily mingle with our March convoy heading east. Although different from the way the Navy Department asked me to give advice, the President responded satisfactorily.He would rather send his latest battleship, and several other important ships, in our Home Fleet, than garrison the American Squadron at Gibraltar. The ironclad battle plan, as a step in the general reinforcement of our positions in the Far East, has now begun to be worked out in detail.The strength included the 25th Independent Brigade and a commando unit, both of which had received special amphibious warfare training; and two brigades of the Fifth Division, which had been ordered to leave with the transport convoy to the Middle East.The troops, to be commanded by Rear Admiral Sturgess of the Royal Marines, are due to leave the UK on March 23. Even if our plans were not leaked, I still harbored a vague apprehension that, from the general course of events, a Vichy reinforcement of Madagascar from Dakar might occur.At Dakar, a group of leaders and troops particularly hostile to us gathered there.So I ask all our convoys and ships passing through Dakar to Madagascar to be particularly vigilant, because our troops are about to set off for the island.The navy's preparations to intercept the Vichy ships at the Cape of Good Hope naturally attracted the attention of General Smuts.In fact, he didn't know what to do with it. So I called him: prime minister to general smuts March 24, 1942 1. Since the Japanese occupation of Madagascar will not meet effective resistance from the Vichy government, and will cause serious disasters to the safety of our Middle East transport fleet, and will also pose a great threat to South Africa, we have decided to attack Digosu Vares went on the assault and took over.The attacking force will set off tonight, and they will be mixed with a transport fleet of 50,000 people to the east.We believe that this combat operation is large enough to be successful. 2. In the future, we will inform you of the password code for this combat operation shortly.The specially needed naval escort fleet needs to dispatch the Gibraltar Squadron, various aircraft carriers and tank landing craft.All this has been arranged.To facilitate this operation, President Roosevelt has dispatched his newest battleships and several other important ships to reinforce our Home Fleet.Part of the Home Fleet will go to defend Gibraltar. 3. We cannot have French troops coming from Dakar to reinforce the island.Our plans were never leaked, but as the island's port was well known in a strategic sense, there was no protection against German vichy-schemes or speculation in the British press.Nevertheless, if we can stop the French forces at Dakar, we will have a head start; and it will be to our advantage if this task is successfully accomplished. 4. Although we have been studying this plan for several weeks, we cannot make a decision until President Roosevelt gives us the necessary naval supplement.The matter was only resolved last weekend, and I would like to find an appropriate time to tell you all about it.I have of course not gone into the technical details, but as far as I know, a lot of work was done, and the Chiefs of Staff were convinced that the forces used were strong enough to bring the local defenders to their knees.We have carefully studied all the reactions on the part of Vichy.In my opinion, they couldn't be more angry than the bombing of the Paris factories. After all, didn't they also suffer? 5. Please be sure to sponsor this project.You will also facilitate our indispensable arrest of French ships at the Cape of Good Hope if necessary.We should deal with them as carefully as possible, but under no circumstances should we sail to Madagascar. 6. My life is still difficult at present, but it is much better than when we were alone and helpless a year ago.Especially in this period of dark clouds, we should not lose the spirit of daring to do anything. Smuts immediately replied: General Smuts to Prime Minister March 24, 1942 Your call changed the whole situation.From previous correspondence, I concluded that the Madagascar plan would be delayed until the situation in Ceylon had stabilized.Under such circumstances, intercepting the Vichy convoy would accelerate the immature crisis with Vichy and possibly cause misunderstandings with the United States.Both of these apprehensions are now gone, and I will give all necessary support to intercept the convoy. I really admire your perseverance.I am sure you will overcome all these difficulties. Smuts was enthusiastic about the project.He immediately began preparations for the occupation of the entire island and mobilized South African troops to assist the indefinitely delayed plan. It should be remembered that the occupation of a naval base on Madagascar, or of the entire island, in itself, though necessary, is in the end only an incidental product of our main policy, that of reinforcing India and preventing Japan from seeming possible attack. Prime Minister to General Ismay, Transfer to the Chiefs of Staff Committee April 2, 1942 1. Ironclad battle plan.I wonder if we have any plans for the propaganda and leaflet work carried out by the Vichy defenders?According to reports, the French navy was hostile to the British, while their army units were against Vichy.We must not ignore this point. I telegraphed President Roosevelt to ask his permission if we could say it was a joint Anglo-American attack.In any case, the defenders there should be made to understand that the object of our attack is to prevent the island from falling under Japanese control and, after defeating the Axis powers, ensure its return to France.If the leaflet has been written, I should like to see it, and if not, time will still allow General Smuts to draw it up for printing in Cape Town.Unless the President strongly disagrees, I am prepared to declare that the island is to be jointly protected by the United Kingdom and the United States until the liberation of France.This issue must be consulted with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2. In the actual landing operation, can a small boat with a white flag sail into the port first, and offer the most attractive surrender conditions to the defenders under the superior force?All of these must be carefully studied. prime minister to president roosevelt March 27, 1942 We respect your connection with Vichy and think it is worth paying them some sort of price.However, consider: For our current ironclad battle plan, we must not allow it to be hindered.The United States should not accept French demands to guarantee the protection of their colonies as they did in the defense of Indochina, so as not to leave them room to complain of treachery. Our combat operations are carefully planned.These include two well-trained and powerful brigades, and one brigade as a diversion force, in addition to tank landing craft, two aircraft carriers, a battleship, and some cruisers.All of these were additional forces for the growing Eastern Fleet.It would be of great convenience to us if, during the attack, we could distribute leaflets stating that this is a joint Anglo-American expedition.I don't know if you agree with this approach. The President, who was obliged to keep in touch with Vichy for the sake of the larger project, had no intention of accepting my offer to distribute leaflets. President Roosevelt to Prime Minister April 3, 1942 In your call, I feel inappropriate to point out as a method of joint attack.Because our country is the only country that can successfully conduct diplomatic mediation with Vichy.I think it is extremely important that we be able to mediate and not complicate the situation by handing out leaflets or other informal methods associated with your war effort.I sincerely hope you can agree with this view. I buy the president's arguments. By April 22nd the entire attacking force was assembled at Durban, including the battleship Lamily, the aircraft carrier Radiant, two cruisers, and eleven destroyers from Admiral Somerville's fleet. , in addition to a large number of minesweepers and submarine destroyers, as well as fifteen attack ships and transport ships carrying the army.In addition, the aircraft carrier Intrepid will also come to participate, replacing the sunk Helmiz.The tense days followed.Many of the ships' supplies had to be repacked to suit the attack; the planning had to be done to the last detail; and when orders were given, the troops, after long sea voyages, began to practice their special, and largely unfamiliar, tactics. Task. This was our first major amphibious assault since the twenty-seven years since the Dardanelles, the tactics of which have now been completely revolutionized.Army and navy commanders, staff officers, and soldiers are inexperienced in this most difficult of operations. I am particularly apprehensive whether, after taking the main naval port, it will be drawn deep into the jungles of Madagascar. Prime Minister to General Ismay, Transfer to the Chiefs of Staff Committee April 30, 1942 Do not place too much emphasis on controlling the entire island.Since the island is nine hundred miles long, only two or three centers matter, especially Diego Suarez.We are not going to conquer Madagascar, but only to control some important areas for our side, so that it will not be subject to widespread Japanese attack.One main purpose is to transport our elite troops to India and Ceylon as soon as possible, and let a few battalions of garrisons from East or West Africa take their place.Getting this place will be an advantage to our side, not a new burden.The Eastern Fleet stationed in Colombo and Addu Atoll (Port T), together with an appropriate air force, will undertake the actual defense of Madagascar.I shall be glad if the following point of view is accepted.Portsmouth was able to hold in spite of the enemy in Caithness County; so, while Antananarivo and Tamatave were held by the enemy, Diego Suarez was able to hold. As General Wavell was under the threat of a Japanese invasion of India, he asked for more information on the overall situation, and I had to reassure him. Prime Minister to General Wavell May 5, 1942 Madagascar is extremely important to India. If Japan passes through Ceylon and obtains the acquiescence of France in Indochina to allow them to settle on this island, then our entire line of communication with you and the Middle East, if not cut off, will also be at risk.Naturally there was also the danger that our side would be dragged there, making the island a burden rather than a help.We wish to minimize such risks with strong forces and violent action. Once Diego Suarez is captured, full support will be brought to you as quickly as possible.We want two African brigades to guard Madagascar, one from the Belgian Congo or the west coast.Orders have been given for the two African brigades, one of which is due to depart on 1 June.They are the same in Africa or in Madagascar.The 5th Division immediately went into action alone. I agree with you that May and June are the most worrying months for us in the East, but I am fully confident that the Fifth Division will reach you in May and the Second Division in June.These will be our resolutions under any circumstances save the unforeseen events of war. I again explained the situation to General Auchinleck. Prime Minister to General Auchinleck May 5, 1942 In the next two months, there is no doubt that there will be great danger in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, because no one can predict with certainty where Japan's next offensive will be directed.The Australians naturally expected that they would be attacked on a large scale.It seems that Japan is really going to threaten or attack Port Moresby and Darwin.No doubt it was their object especially to keep our troops in Australia as far as possible.Japan transferred three divisions out of the ten existing divisions in the country to reinforce the twenty divisions that were originally on the front lines of the Soviet Union and Manchuria. This action is of great significance.Clearly, it was in Japan's interest to crush China, and their strong push north seemed to support that idea. One thing is for sure that Japan cannot attack in all directions.They will not be happy about the heavy losses in Colombo and Trincomalee, and all their aircraft carriers have returned to Japan or Taiwan[1] to replace the badly lost aircraft.If they launched a massive attack on Ceylon and/or India, it would make one wonder why they didn't do so sooner, when Java fell, or in early April, when their powerful naval and air forces invaded the Indian Ocean ?We have no particular reason at present to justify the imminence of a major invasion of India. [1] The original text is Formosa, and this volume is translated as Taiwan.translator We hope to capture Diego Suarez today, and a strong force has been assembled for this purpose.The British 8th Armored Division, which rounded the Cape of Good Hope in early July, could be used to support India, the Middle East or Australia in the event of a major invasion. The fast transport convoy carrying the attacking troops left Durban on 28 April.Slower ships carrying Army transports and supplies had already departed first.Admiral Seavert and Admiral Sturges were on board the Lamily, and on 4 May the whole expedition came within striking distance.Diego Suarez Bay runs deep into Madagascar's northeast coast, almost cutting off the island's northern tip land from the rest of the island.The fortified Anselang Harbor opposite the city controls the entrance.Approaching from the east, the place is reported to be well-defended, but to the west of the isthmus there are several bays which, though inaccessible, can accommodate larger ships.The area was not well defended; the approach at night would have been a surprise attack, and after landing the army was only eighteen miles from Anselang.Correll Bay, on the west coast, was therefore chosen as the starting point for the attack.The transport ships had to be guided through tortuous, potentially mineable straits in the dark to an unknown hostile coast.The first batch of troops landed at 4:30 in the morning on the 5th, without any loss, and quickly occupied the only fort that could be launched into the sea.Half an hour later, fleet aircraft attacked Diego Suarez airport and ships in the port.The cruiser Hermion made a feint attack from the east.Vichy France resisted, though completely unexpectedly.In the afternoon, the entire 29th Brigade and almost all its equipment had landed and moved forward. The commando reached the eastern end of the Andraka Peninsula, and the 17th Brigade also began to land. The vanguard of the 29th Brigade, supported by a dozen tanks and artillery, captured two blocking positions of the enemy, and was blocked by the main enemy position across the road two miles south of Anselang .The area is well-defended and has concrete bunkers.At dawn on the 6th, the 2nd South Lancashire Regiment broke through the enemy's left flank and established a position in the enemy's rear, dealing severe blows to the enemy all day long.Before the news of this success came, Admiral Sturges asked Admiral Severett to send a part of the marines to land at Anselong.This is a brave move.Fifty Royal Marines on the Lamiy, carried by the destroyer Anthony, wisely sailed into the harbor in the evening, and successfully transported the marines to the dock in the harbor. The destroyer escaped the blazing fire unscathed.Captain Price led fifty men groping their way into the city in the dark.They soon discovered and seized the Naval Ammunition Depot, where they found a large number of rifles, machine guns, and about fifty British prisoners of war.This is an excellent clamping attack.At that time, the 29th Brigade, supported by the 17th Brigade, was completely successful.Before dawn on the seventh day, the enemy commander abandoned Ansirang.The city and most of the fortifications are in our hands. The forts covering the entrance to the port still needed to be settled, but after a brief morning bombardment by the Lamiy, they also surrendered to us.All fighting ceased at 11 am, and the British fleet entered the port in the afternoon.The total casualties of the army were less than 400 people. Prime Minister's letter to Admiral Sievelet and Admiral Sturges May 9, 1942 I sincerely congratulate you on the swift and decisive action you have taken to accomplish a difficult combat mission.Please convey my best wishes to all officers and men, and please tell them that their deeds are a sincere aid to Great Britain and the United Nations. Another note to the 29th Brigade: When I saw you at Inverley, nine months ago, I knew that the 29th Brigade would do great things. Admiral Sievelet, formerly my Naval Secretary at the Admiralty, was also my friend.I gave him a full note on our policy. Prime Minister to Admiral Sievellite May 15, 1942 I want you to have a clear idea of ​​our operations in Madagascar.The island must be a help, not a hindrance; a security, not a burden.We cannot keep our powerful field troops there for a long time.The Thirteenth and Seventeenth Brigades should leave for India immediately.They can support you in this if you can take Tamatave and Mahajanga within a few days, but they will always leave. Since the ironclad battle plan was drawn up and executed, the situation in the Indian Ocean has turned in our favour.time has passed.The Japanese have not yet pushed their attack on Ceylon or India.On the contrary, the dangers do not seem any more near or probable than before.It is difficult to imagine that Japan would attempt to attack Diego Suarez, because it would require nearly 10,000 troops, and the transport ships carrying these troops, coupled with battleship and aircraft carrier escorts, would contain most of their limited fleet.They use every ship more carefully than we do.Your problem, therefore, is to hold this position with the least possible use of our limited resources. You might think that it would be better to wait for the situation to calm down and to reach some kind of interim agreement with the French authorities.Money and trade conveniences should also be used. The best support you can give to the war is to send the 13th and 17th Brigades to India as soon as possible, and the 29th Brigade to go there within the next two months. Of course, apart from the necessity to hold on to Diego Suarez, everything else is subordinate to this task. Admiral Sievelet immediately called back: May 15, 1942 The general situation you describe is very favorable to us.As far as our occupation of Diego Suarez is concerned, I think France will adopt a policy of living and letting others live.However, we will never gain further intimacy or extend our control unless Tamatave and Mahajanga are already occupied by us. I don't think it can be done except by force. I replied that the intention to occupy Tamatave and Mahajanga should be abandoned for the time being and that the minimum number of troops should be used to ensure the safety of Diego Suarez.However, General Smuts insisted on further operations, and with strong arguments. General Smuts to Prime Minister May 28, 1942 Tamatave and Mahajanga and other ports, often used by French submarines, could also be used by the Japanese.Although the local residents are not hostile to us, the Madagascar authorities are extremely hostile.Substantial resistance is not yet possible after the fall of Diego, but if they are given time to organize resistance, our task will be difficult.The control of Madagascar is of such importance to our lines of communication in the Indian Ocean that no risky action can be taken. The Foreign Office also expressed an eagerness to move forward.However, I had to keep in mind Wavell's needs and the threat of a Japanese attack on India. So far, everything had gone according to plan, but now a very embarrassing accident occurred.On May 29, a plane of unknown nationality appeared over the port and flew away.This seemed to be the prelude to the air force and submarine attack, so a special alert order was issued.The next evening, the Ramie and a nearby tanker were torpedoed.Where do they come from?What does it portend? General Smuts to Prime Minister June 1, 1942 Sincere condolences to Diego on his misfortune.This attack must have been carried out by Japan or a Vichy submarine under the intelligence and direction of Vichy.These phenomena show that all Vichy control over the island must be completely removed as soon as possible.In the present case, palliative measures are dangerous, as they have proved in every other case.I believe we will soon launch an operation to clarify the situation.My South African brigade is ready, just waiting for the transport ship.good luck. Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary June 2, 1942 The Admiralty's view of the Diego Suarez incident was that a larger Japanese submarine, carrying a smaller submarine, and a reconnaissance aircraft, came within striking distance of the port.After performing the mission, due to the critical situation, two Japanese crew members of the small submarine scuttled the submarine and went ashore, and were immediately killed by our patrol troops.Their documents were in Japanese, and an interpreter flew in immediately to read them.If this account is correct, then the Vichy French authorities in Madagascar are not necessarily involved. To our reassurance, this view soon proved to be correct.Those two Japanese officers served their country faithfully.The Ramie sailed safely to Durban on 9 June, but was out of action for several months. The story of Madagascar must now end.After the capture of Diego Suarez, the French governor was given a short period of time to change his pro-Vichy attitude.We need the ports on the west coast to control the Mozambique Channel, where our main eastern convoy is frequently harassed by submarines, but the French Governor remains stubborn.Operations must therefore continue and be commanded by General Pratt, the East African Commander.On September 10, the British 29th Infantry Brigade took Mahajanga after meeting light resistance.The 22nd East African Brigade then landed, passed through the 29th Brigade, and advanced along the road to Antananarivo, the capital and seat of the Governor's Palace.At the same time, other small groups of South African troops also advanced south along the coastal road.The 29th Brigade was again boarded and transported to Tamatave on the east bank, where it was captured without resistance on 18 September, and then advanced towards Antananarivo.The capital was captured on September 23rd. Our troops were welcomed by the population, but the governor with some of his staff retreated south with the army.We pursued him, and in a successful battle on October 19th captured 750 enemy troops without any casualties on our side.This is decisive.On November 5th the Governor accepted our terms of surrender.The island's government is still presided over by the French.As a result of these battles, and at the cost of over a hundred casualties, we have achieved complete military control of the island.This island is of great strategic importance for our lines of communication with the Near and Far East.This period of Madagascar's war history has become a typical example of amphibious assault due to the secrecy of the plan and the accurate execution of tactics.The news comes at a time when we desperately need good results.In fact, for a long time it was the only mark of effective operational command that the British public recognized.