Chapter 128 Volume 4 Chapter 18 Immediately open up the second battlefield!

April 1942 The President's Solemn Plans Generals Hopkins and Marshall Arrive in London Their Memorandum: Operational Plans in Western Europe Our Chiefs of Staff Consider American Plans My Telegram to the President of the United States April 12th April 14th National Defense Council Meeting General Marshall's Statement I Emphasize the Dangers in the Indian Ocean Hopkins Supports General Marshall The American Plan Is Welcomed April 17th My Report to the President of the United States His Satisfactory Reply General Marshall's plan for a partial offensive in 1942: Operation Bash Plan Other Operations: Attack on French Northwest Africa and Northern Norway Summary.

At the time, the president of the United States was also worrying about Russia.Together with his staff he was drawing up plans for lifting the burden from Russia's shoulders. President's message to former Navy personnel April 2, 1942 I have come to certain conclusions as a result of my examination of a number of immediate and long-term issues in the military situation facing the United Nations.I think these conclusions are crucial, so I hope you get the full picture, and I hope you agree.As the whole matter depends on full cooperation between the United Kingdom and the United States, Harry and Marshall will be traveling to London in the next few days to present you with the main points of the matter first.I hope the Russians will warmly welcome this plan; after meeting Harry and Marshall and hearing from you, I intend to ask Stalin to send two envoys to me immediately.I think that this plan will be worked out in full conformity with the movement of public opinion here and in England.Finally, I would like this plan to be called the plan of the United Nations.

Soon I received the following letter from the President of the United States: washington White House April 3, 11:00 p.m. Dear Winston: Everything that Harry and George Marshall have to tell you is from my heart.You and my people demand a battlefield that will take the weight off the shoulders of the Russians.The people of both countries are wise enough to see that the Russians today have killed more Germans and destroyed more equipment than you and my two countries combined.Even if it wasn't a complete success, it was a huge gain. This plan must be realized!Only in this way can Syria and Egypt be safer.Even if the Germans find out about our plans, they have nothing to fear.

I wish you all the best.Telling Harry to go to bed early and putting him under the instructions of U.S. Naval Medical Officer Fulton, I dispatched him as Special Care with full authority. always loyal to you F‧D‧Roosevelt On April 8, Hopkins and General Marshall arrived in London.They brought with them a detailed memorandum; it was drawn up by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the President. Western Europe Operations Plan In April 1942 Western Europe was chosen by the United States and Great Britain as the theater of the first major offensive. Only in Western Europe can the combined land and air forces of the United Kingdom and the United States be brought into full play, and moreover, can Russia be given maximum support.

The decision to launch this offensive had to be taken immediately, as extensive preparatory work was necessary on many fronts.Before this offensive is launched, it is necessary to contain the enemy forces in Western Europe, and at the same time to use tactics and organize surprises to make the enemy unpredictable; the result of this will give us useful information and valuable opportunities for training. The combined force for the attack should consist of forty-eight divisions (including nine armored divisions), and the British should undertake eighteen divisions (including three armored divisions).The air force supporting the attack required 5,800 fighters, of which 2,550 were to be supplied by the British.

The crux of the matter is speed.The main factors limiting our pursuit of this plan are the lack of landing craft for the attack and the lack of ships to transport the necessary troops from the United States to the United Kingdom.These units could be loaded by April 1, 1943, without affecting major operations on other theaters; to complete.If this movement were to rely solely on American ships, the date of the offensive would have to be postponed until late summer 1943. Since approximately 7,000 landing craft are required, the present construction program must be greatly accelerated to achieve this number.For the time being, preparations for receiving and mobilizing large contingents of the US Army and Air Force must be accelerated.

The location of the attack should be the beach between Le Havre and Boulogne. At least six divisions should be invested in the first offensive, and the cooperation of airborne troops should be required.After this offensive, an average of at least 100,000 people were thrown every week.After the beachhead has been consolidated, the armored forces are to move quickly to occupy the Oise-Saint-Quentin line.Then, the next target is Antwerp. Since an offensive of this magnitude cannot be undertaken before January 1943 at the earliest, a plan should be drawn up and constantly adapted to the needs of the situation so as to use readily available forces for current operations.This action should be carried out as an emergency measure (1) to take advantage of the possible sudden collapse of Germany, or (2) to make sacrifices in order to reverse the possible imminent collapse of the Russian Resistance.In any case, local air superiority is important.On the other hand, it may not be possible to field and maintain more than five divisions in the autumn of 1942.The main burden during this period will fall on the United Kingdom.For example, on September 15th, out of the five divisions required, the United States could provide only two and a half divisions, and only 700 combat aircraft; thus, the United Kingdom would be required to provide up to 5,000 of the plane.

Hopkins was exhausted by the trip, and he was ill for two or three days, but Marshall immediately had a meeting with our chiefs of staff.on the fourteenth (Tuesday) Previously, formal meetings with the Defense Council could not be arranged.During that time, I spoke with the chiefs of staff of the armed services and my colleagues about the whole situation.The United States clearly had a strong desire to get involved in Europe and made defeating Hitler a top priority, to the comfort of all of us.This has always been the basis of our strategic thinking.On the other hand, neither we nor our military advisers could formulate any realistic plan for the landing of British and American forces across the Channel in France before the end of summer 1943.What I wrote on my trip to Washington in December 1941, and which was recorded in the papers I presented to the President of the United States, have always been my goals and timetable.Also before us was a new American idea of ​​launching a much smaller but quite powerful preparatory emergency landing in the fall of 1942.For the sake of Russia, and for the sake of fighting in general, we are eager to study this new plan, as well as any other plans of diversion.

After careful consideration of the President's Memorandum and the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff of the United States, I have sent the following telegram to the President of the United States: April 12, 1942 I have read with earnest attention your excellent papers on the prospects of the war and on the vast scheme of operations proposed.In principle, I fully agree with all your proposals, as do the British Chiefs of Staff.While preparing for the main offensive, we must of course meet the daily emergencies in the East and Far East.We quickly worked out all the details, and where action was clear, preparations were already under way.The whole affair will be discussed by the Defense Committee on the evening of Tuesday the 14th, and Harry and Marshall will also be present at this meeting.There is no doubt that I will be able to send you the documents we fully agree to.

I may say that I believe that all the difficulties and uncertainties encountered in the proposal of a temporary offensive this year to meet some contingency have been resolved in an absolutely perfect manner.If, as our experts think, we succeed in carrying out the whole plan, it will be a momentous event in the history of warfare. On the evening of the 14th, the National Defense Committee met with our American friends at 10 Downing Street.The discussion seemed so important that I invited General Ismay to take the record in advance.The main points of the record are as follows: In his opening speech, Mr. Churchill said that a committee had met to consider the huge plan brought by Hopkins and General Marshall, and that the plan had been fully discussed and studied by the chiefs of staff of the three services.He had no hesitation in accepting the plan enthusiastically.The concept underlying the plan was in perfect harmony with the typical principles of warfare, which is to concentrate forces on the main enemy.However, we must make one clear reservation that the defense of India and the Middle East is of the utmost importance.We must not lose an army of 600,000 men and the entire manpower of India.also.Australia and those island bases that link the country to the United States must not be lost either.That is to say, we must not pursue the main plan proposed by General Marshall without completely throwing everything else aside.

General Marshall said that there was complete agreement on what should be done in 1943 and on launching the most powerful air offensive against Germany.There is no problem with supplying the army.The main difficulty lies in providing the necessary tonnage, landing craft, aircraft and sea escorts. During his discussions with the British Chiefs of Staff, two doubts arose.The first is whether the US can provide enough supplies to support the Middle East and India.The second point is whether it is actually possible to land on the mainland in 1942, apart from launching a large-scale assault.We may be compelled to do so, and in any case we must be prepared for it.He believes that difficulties should not be unsolvable, just as we can control the air to a large extent.The size of our common air force program shows that this can be done, especially since a German attack on Russia would draw down enormous forces and thereby reduce the danger for us to fight.In this way, the Germans will also get a taste of fighting without the support of the air force.There was not much time before he left the United States to study the problem of launching a new campaign in 1942, and, on the basis of available information, he concluded that the operational plan could not be put into effect before September.If these programs have to be implemented by September, the US contribution will not be large.But by then, the entire armed forces of the United States here can be fully utilized.The President has made a point of saying that he wants his armed forces to be as committed as possible in whatever they do. Sir Alan Brooke said that the Chiefs of Staff of the British Armed Forces fully agreed with General Marshall on the 1943 Operation Plan.Military operations on the Continent in 1942 would depend on the degree of success the Germans had in attacking Russia.We think things can always be figured out before September. The chiefs of staff of the three services fully agree that Germany is the main enemy.At the same time, it is extremely important to block the Japanese and ensure that there is no connection between them and the Germans.If the Japanese took control of the Indian Ocean, not only would the Middle East be seriously threatened, but we would also lose our oil supplies from the Persian Gulf.The consequence would be that Germany would get all the oil she needed, the southern route to Russia would be cut off, Turkey would be isolated and defenseless, the Germans would have unimpeded access to the Black Sea, and at the same time Germany and Japan will also be able to exchange supplies they sorely need. Mr. Churchill then added that we would not be able to deal with the Japanese naval power in the Indian Ocean without support within the next two or three months. At present, we do not fully understand the intentions and movements of the U.S. Navy in the Pacific. In that area, the first priority was to overwhelm the Japanese in aircraft carrier aircraft.We ourselves will soon have three aircraft carriers sailing to the Indian Ocean, and these three aircraft carriers will join the Fury in due course. Mr. Hopkins said that if American public opinion prevailed, then most of the American power would be used against Japan.Nevertheless, after intense discussions, the president and America's military leaders had decided that it was right to use America's armed forces against Germany.However, it should not be assumed that there are any misunderstandings in the thinking of the US government with regard to the situation in the Middle East and other major theaters in Russia, Australia and the Pacific.The U.S. decision was driven by two main factors.The first factor is that the United States wants to fight not only at sea but also on land and in the air.The second factor was that they wanted to fight where it mattered most and where they could gain the upper hand, and they especially wanted to fight with Great Britain.If such a battle can be waged this year, then no matter when it happens, the United States is willing to make the greatest contribution possible.The reason they propose September as the earliest date for action is largely because they fear waging a fight in which they will not be able to play an adequate role. He had learned a little about public opinion in the United States and the United Kingdom, and he also found that public opinion was uneasy about what the United States Navy was doing.On this point there should be no doubt.The American Navy must cooperate fully with the British Navy to compel the enemy to take action.They only hope that they can fight under favorable conditions. When it comes to Australia and other theaters, the US will certainly fulfill their obligations. However, all their energies will be focused on the huge plans currently being proposed.America desperately wanted to join forces with Britain in the fight. Sir Charles Porter (Chief of Air Staff) said the difference between launching an air offensive across the Channel and landing in Europe with an expeditionary force must be remembered.The previous event can continue or stop as one wishes.In the latter case, however, we cannot do exactly what we want.As long as troops remain on the mainland, we must maintain the strength of the Air Force.Therefore, if an expeditionary force of ours is called out, we must ensure that we have sufficient air power to carry the fight to the end. Finally, Mr. Churchill said that although the details of this plan (crossing the strait to attack the mainland in 1943) have yet to be decided, in general, we have reached a complete consensus.These two countries will inevitably march forward hand in hand with lofty brotherhood.He was to prepare a telegram to the President of the United States, conveying to him the conclusions reached and at the same time making a demand of him for the urgent needs of the Indian Ocean, the failure of which would necessarily seriously impair the whole project.Comprehensive preparations can begin now, and we will do so with the utmost determination.The fact that the English-speaking peoples have resolved to wage a great campaign for the liberation of Europe will gradually become known; and we should consider whether a declaration should be made at the proper time. This plan now has a name: the Encirclement and Annihilation Operation Plan, but I did not invent the name.All work on this basis with the utmost confidence and good intentions.I reported to the President of the United States. former navy personnel to president roosevelt April 17, 1942 1. Your envoy will bring back a copy of the full minutes of our important meeting last Tuesday, as well as the detailed comments of our Chiefs of Staff on your proposal.However, I trust that you would like to have at once a brief account of the conclusions we have reached. 2. We wholeheartedly agree with your idea of ​​concentrating all our efforts against the main enemy, and we warmly accept your plan, but with one major condition attached. As you can see from my telegram of April 15th, it was of the utmost importance to prevent the Japanese from joining forces with the Germans.Therefore, for the time being, we must retain some of our forces to stop the advance of the Japanese army.This point had been fully discussed at the meeting, and Marshall felt confident that together we could provide the necessary manpower and supplies for the Indian Ocean and other theaters, and at the same time prepare your major plans immediately. 3. The operational plan for 1943 was simple and clear, and we immediately began preparations for a joint plan.However, we may feel compelled to act this year.Your plan reflects this, but with an earliest action date of mid-September.Before mid-September, things in all aspects may be well figured out.Marshall had explained that you don't want to launch a campaign of grave danger and dire consequences unless you can provide enormous power in the air force.He does not, however, lead us to doubt that you, Mr. President, would be earnestly willing to devote every morsel of available manpower and material resources to the campaign if advance action were to be required.We plan and start preparations on this basis.broadly speaking, the plan we have agreed on is a plan for a gradual intensification of operations on the continent, beginning with a gradual intensification of day and night air offensives, with increasingly frequent large-scale air strikes, in which American forces will also participate . 4. I agree with your suggestion in your telegram of April 2 that you should ask Stalin to send two special envoys to visit you.It is impossible under any circumstances to conceal the large-scale necessary preparations, but since we have before us the entire European coastline from the North Cape to Bayonne, we must, in our plans of attack, seek to deceive our enemies in terms of power, timing, and direction.We should indeed consider whether we should issue a public statement stating that our two countries are determined to join hands in high brotherhood and send a great crusade to the liberation of suffering peoples. Europe enters.I will also send you another cable on the last point. President Roosevelt replied: President Roosevelt's Message to Former Navy Personnel April 22, 1942 I am most pleased with the agreement you have reached with your military advisers and with Marshall and Hopkins.Marshall and Hopkins have reported to me that there is unanimous support for their proposal to take to London, and I am most obliged to you for your own telegram to confirm this. I am convinced that this action will be very frustrating to Hitler, and I also believe that this action may well be the key to Hitler's downfall.I'm very excited about the prospect, and you can have every confidence that our military will do this work with enthusiasm and energy. As for the section on making public statements, I would like to give some thought.I'll let you know my thoughts on the matter shortly. I believe that it will take a lot of trouble to join hands between the Japanese and the Germans, but I also realize that there must be some attention to the future prospects of this matter. Meanwhile, as you will read in the papers, our Air Forces have dealt Japan a hard blow, and I am hoping that we can make it difficult for the Japanese to keep many large ships in the Indian Ocean.In a day or two I shall have a conversation on this subject with Pound (who is on his way to Washington). I have received an earnest telegram from Stalin telling me that he has sent Molotov and a general to see me.I suggest that they come to Washington first and then go to England.Please let me know if you have other thoughts on this point.Stalin's telegram made me very happy. Although we still have many difficulties in common, I would like to say frankly that my view of the war is better at the present time than at any time during the past two years. I would like to thank you again for your warm reception of Marshall and Hopkins. Now let me talk about my own views, I have a firm view of what has been decided and what I think should be done. It was impossible for us to push aside all other responsibilities while the great plans for 1943 were being drawn up.The first obligation of the British Empire which we have undertaken is to defend India against Japanese aggression, which already seems quite probable.Moreover, the task of defending India was decisive for the whole war.It is a disgraceful thing to allow the four hundred million Indian subjects of His Majesty the Emperor to be trampled and trod down by the Japanese as the Chinese are, to whom we have a lofty duty.What is more, to allow the Germans and the Japanese to join hands in India or the Middle East would inevitably cause immeasurable disaster to the cause of the Allies.In my mind, the hand-in-hand of Germany and Japan, the retreat of Soviet Russia to the back of the Urals, and even a separate peace with Germany are almost equally important.At present, I do not think that these two unexpected events are likely to happen.I have faith in the strength of the Russian army and people to fight for the defense of their homeland.Yet our Indian Empire, though full of glorious history, is likely to be an easy prey for the enemy.I had to make this point in front of the US envoy. Without active assistance from Great Britain, India could well have been conquered within a few months.Hitler's conquest of Soviet Russia took much longer and, for him, a costly task.Before all this can be achieved, British and American air supremacy must be established and must be so strong that it is invincible.Even if all else fails, this will be decisive in the end. I completely agree with what Hopkins said: launch a frontal offensive against the enemy in northern France in 1943.But what should be done between now and the offensive?The main army launching the offensive could not have been prepared solely for this task.Here a significant difference of opinion occurs.General Marshall suggested that we should try to take Brest or Cherbourg, preferably the latter or both, in the early autumn of 1942.This operation must be entirely British.The navy, the air force, two-thirds of the army, and all available landing craft must be provided by us.The United States can only supply two or three divisions.We must remember that these troops were all recently recruited.To become a first-class army, it takes at least two years to train with a professionally very strong cadre.It was therefore natural that this plan should be subject to the advice of the British General Staff.Clearly, a rigorous technical study of this issue is necessary. Although, from the very beginning, I have no objection to this idea.However, there are other alternatives in my mind.The first was the landings in French Northwest Africa (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia), which was then called Operation Sportsman and eventually developed into the great Operation Torch.There is a second alternative, which I have often longed for, and which, I think, is as acceptable as the invasion of French North Africa. This is Cupid's plan for the liberation of northern Norway.This is direct aid to Russia.This is the only way of direct coordination with the Russian air, naval and air forces.This was the way to occupy the northern tip of Europe and open the way for a steady flow of supplies to Russia.Since the battle must be fought in the arctic region, this is a military solution that requires neither a large number of troops nor a large consumption of supplies and ammunition. The Germans took these vitally important areas through the North Cape at no cost at all.These areas can also be retaken with little cost compared to the present scale of the war.Personally I was in favor of Operation Torch; if I had my way, I would try Operation Cupid in 1942, too. It seems to me that establishing a bridgehead at Cherbourg would be more difficult, less popular, not immediately helpful in terms of time, and would have little effect in the end.It would be better to keep our right hand in French North Africa and our left in the North Cape, and wait a year before risking a fortified German front across the Channel. The above are my views at the time, and I have never regretted these views.However, I am very willing to let the planning committee discuss the name of the military operation against Cherbourg and other options for the operation thrashing plan.I am almost certain that the more thoroughly the plan is discussed, the less popular it will be.If I had the authority to issue orders, I would necessarily choose the Torch and Cupid plans, and execute them both properly in the fall, while letting the Bash plan leak out through rumor and bluff preparation as a diversionary action.But I had to work through political influence and diplomacy in order to achieve consistent and harmonious action with our valuable allies.Without the help of our allies, the world faces destruction.For this reason, I did not propose any of these alternatives at the meeting on the 14th. On the most important questions, we welcome with ease and joy the decisive proposal of the United States to launch a large-scale offensive against Germany as soon as possible, using Britain as a springboard.As we shall see below, we could easily run afoul of American plans that prioritize helping China and defeating Japan.But from the beginning of our alliance after Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt and General Marshall followed the strong current of public opinion and saw Hitler as the main enemy.Personally, I am eager to see British and American troops fighting side by side in Europe.But I myself have little doubt that the study of the details of the landing craft, etc., and the consideration of the main strategy of the war will inevitably overturn the plan of the battering operation.As a result, the military authorities on both sides of the Atlantic, the armed forces, the air, the navy, and the air force found themselves unable to prepare the plan, or, so far as I know, unwilling to accept the responsibility for carrying it out.Shared desire and good will cannot overcome unforgiving facts. In conclusion, I have always maintained the theory set out in my December 1941 memorandum to President Roosevelt, namely, that (1) Anglo-American liberation forces should land in Europe in 1943.How could they transport all their forces to Europe except by landing from the south of England?Nothing that would hinder the achievement of this action must be done; and anything that would advance it must be done. (2) At the same time, we cannot stand idly by while the Russians are constantly fighting on a colossal scale with the main body of the German Army.We must fight the enemy.This determination is basically the same as that of President Roosevelt.But what should we do in the year or fifteen months before the great offensive across the Channel?It was evident that the plan for the occupation of French North Africa was itself possible, correct, and in line with the general strategic plan.I hope that the above plan of operations will be combined with the invasion of Norway, and I still believe that it is possible to carry out both plans simultaneously.But there is always a great danger of losing the simplicity and uniqueness of purpose in the tense discussion of these immeasurable matters.Although I hope to implement both the Torch and Cupid's battle plans at the same time, I have no intention of letting Cupid destroy the Torch's plan.With all the difficulties of concentrating and coordinating the whole forces of two powerful nations in one violent offensive, we must not allow the situation to be further confused by vague phrases. (3) The only way, therefore, to fill the vacancy before the British and American armies could meet the Germans in Europe in 1943, was by the forcible occupation of French North Africa by Anglo-American The advancing British troops in Tunisia cooperated. In the end, when all other plans and arguments faded away, the said plan became a common resolution of the Western Allies.