Chapter 140 Volume Four, Chapter Thirty, Final Formation of the Torch Operation Plan

General Eisenhower in command Accommodating the American generals requires a simple order to drop an explosive from Washington The United States has serious concerns about access to the Mediterranean. August 27th. My telegram to President Roosevelt. August 30th. Telegram America Believes French Army Will Not Attack U.S. Army Sept. 1 My Telegram to the President Sept. 3 President's Telegram I Suggest Eisenhower Fly to Washington to Explain I Wrote a Letter to Harry Hopkins But Did Not Sent An Observation of the Stalemate and Its Causes Better News from the President on the Fourth of September We agree: Hooray!Okay, come on, let's go plan and time to discuss with Generals Eisenhower and Clark. On September 15th, I will call the President for an American military operation. We will serve as assistants in this operation. The date of the torch is set for November 8th. Cairo's last march to Alam Khail was fought.

When I left London to go on missions in Cairo and Moscow, the Commander for Operation Torch had not yet been selected.I suggested on July 31 that, should General Marshall be named Supreme Commander of the 1943 Trans-Channel Operation, General Eisenhower should be in London as his deputy and forerunner, and plan the Operation Torch.Eisenhower would serve as commander of Operation Torch, with General Alexander as his deputy.The American side gradually agreed with this opinion; and before I set out from Cairo for Moscow, President Roosevelt sent me the following two telegrams: President Roosevelt to former Navy personnel (in Cairo)

August 6, 1942 The British Chief of Staff proposed on August 6 to appoint General Eisenhower as Commander-in-Chief of Operation Torch. The American Chief of Staff and I agreed with this proposal.We are studying the official directives of the Chiefs of Staff of the British Armed Forces to guide General Eisenhower's operations, and should report on this matter shortly. On the 8th, another telegram was sent: I completely agree that the dates for the Operation Torch Program should be moved up, and I'm asking for three weeks before the original date. The proclamation announcing the appointment of Eisenhower as commander-in-chief was deliberated by the chiefs of staff in both London and Washington.

When I arrived in London from Cairo on the 24th of August, our plans were not yet finalized, and many questions remained to be decided.The next day Generals Eisenhower and Clark came to dinner with me to discuss the operation. During this period I had very close and pleasant contacts with these American officers.Since their arrival in June, I have made it a rule to have lunch at Number 10 Downing Street every Tuesday.These rallies appear to have been successful.I almost always talked to them personally, and we discussed all our affairs over and over as if we were fellow-citizens of one nation.I find these personal contacts extremely valuable.My American guests, especially General Eisenhower, were fond of Irish stew.My wife is able to come up with such dishes almost every now and then.Before long I was calling Eisenhower Ike.

I also nicknamed Mark Clark and Bedell Smith, who came here in early September as Eisenhower's chief of staff, the American Eagle and the American Bulldog.Why take such a nickname, you can understand by looking at their photos.We also had many informal meetings downstairs in the dining room, starting around ten o'clock at night and sometimes going into the night.American generals also came to Checkers for overnights or weekends on several occasions.On these occasions, we will not talk about other issues except our personal business. One of General Eisenhower's aide-de-camp, a friend who was a layman, said in one of his books that all these meetings were a heavy burden on the overworked American officers.If so, how polite they are, and how good at concealing their true feelings.In any case, I am convinced that these close relations were necessary to the conduct of the war, without which I could not have grasped the whole situation.At a meeting on September 28th I did do a good thing to Beadle Smith and his officers.It was still dark that night, but I noticed that the short-sighted people also told Smith that he looked very tired and sick.

I suggested he go to bed, but he insisted on not going.For a moment I thought he was going to faint and fall off his chair.So I end the discussion.Ask Eisenhower to come alone to the Cabinet Room while I go upstairs.I shut the door and said to him: If you're going to take Biddle to this fight, you're going to take him to the hospital tonight, whether he wants to or not.Otherwise you lose him entirely.Eisenhower, in accordance with his decisive habits, did just that.Bedell Smith was in the hospital the next day and had two blood transfusions in two days.He was completely recuperated for two weeks, sleeping in bed most of the time.In this way he was able to make an important contribution to the battle plan which occupied all our thoughts.

After my meeting with the American generals, I telegraphed to President Roosevelt: former navy personnel to president roosevelt August 26, 1942 From now on, my main thoughts have been concentrated on the operation plan of the torch; You can trust me to do my best to bring your great strategic thinking to a decisive victory.I think, after talking with Eisenhower, Clark, and our people here, that the best, and indeed the only, way to carry out this mission is to fix a date for the war and to have everything related to it Act, not just say everything is ready and start fighting.It would be very helpful if you and I could give Eisenhower the following order: On October 14th you will begin the Operation Torch Plan to attack with the forces available and where you deem appropriate.This order will change the nature of all preparations.Eisenhower would truly have the powers of an Allied Commander in Chief.Endless objections, doubts, and well-meaning suggestions for improvement will fall back into place; instead of almost endless indecision will be action.

I think Eisenhower would have welcomed such an order, which finally gave him an opportunity he hadn't had yet. 2. As far as I know, the basis of this combat operation is mainly political. The first kind of victory we should have is bloodless; the second, if fighting cannot be avoided, is to be won.To have the best chance of winning the first class, we must: (1) At the beginning of the attack, try to use overwhelming force; (2) As many attack locations as possible.It was absolutely different from the nature of the Dieppe Landing War, and from anything like the Bash Plan.In Plan Bash we were dealing with a capable German army and a steely fortified French coast.In the torch operation plan, we must encounter very weak and scattered resistance, and there are many places to choose from for our landing attack points.Slow action would multiply the dangers and difficulties so that no amount of additional combat troops could help.

In order to cope with all kinds of conceivable adverse accidents, it is required to carefully plan every detail, put safety first in every plan, and make long-term preparations like a long-term combat operation. These requirements are theoretically reasonable. It is grandiose, but it will actually make this battle a failure.To start the campaign at a later date than I have indicated would greatly increase the danger of giving away the secret and giving the enemy a first hand. 3. In order to lessen the responsibility of the commanders, it is my opinion that you and I should fix the political arguments and take the risk on our own.I think it is reasonable to make the following assumptions:

(1) Spain will not fight against Britain and the United States because of the Torch Operation Plan; (2) It would take at least two months before the Germans could force their way through Spain, or obtain supplies from Spain; (3) The resistance of the North African Army, which is mostly symbolic, can be subdued by a sudden and large-scale attack. After that, the North African Army may be able to actively support us under its own commander; (4) The Vichy government will not declare war on the United States and Britain; (5) Hitler will put great pressure on Vichy, but in October he has no troops with which to garrison unoccupied France, while we have him pinned down at the Pas de Calais, etc.All these arguments may prove wrong; in which case, we would have to wait to fight a bad fight.We are already prepared for this situation.But if at the outset of the battle we venture to win it without blood, by risky and daring actions, it will bring us great spoils.I am personally prepared to accept any responsibility for taking a political risk and being wrong in political judgment.

4. Clearly, a successful campaign in the Western Desert would greatly assist these political assumptions.Either Rommel attacked us on a moonlit day in August, or we attacked him at the end of September.For any kind of attack, there must be a decision. I firmly believe that it is much easier to have a decision. 5. You know, the reason I'm not going into specifics here is because I feel that we have to execute this war plan now with unwavering determination and superhuman ability. However, at this time an explosive was dropped from Washington.The British and American staffs were seriously at odds over the nature and extent of our plans for the capture of French North Africa.The chiefs of staff of the US armed forces are extremely dissatisfied with their task of conducting large-scale combat operations in the area east of the Strait of Gibraltar.They seemed to feel that their forces might be cut off in the inner sea.On the contrary, General Eisenhower fully agreed with the British side, believing that a strong combat operation in the Mediterranean, especially in Algeria, was extremely important to victory in the war.Although he made his case to his superiors, his views did not seem to have had much effect.His plans were also hampered by the insistence of the American authorities that everything must be postponed until the ships carrying men and food from both sides had actually sailed.In the course of an operation of this magnitude there must be delays, but waiting for these problems to be resolved would only delay indefinitely the date of launching the operation. The Chiefs of Staff of the United States Armed Forces are still holding their own, and my advisers and I disagree with them. former navy personnel to president roosevelt August 27, 1942 The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff presented us with a memorandum on the Torch Operation Plan on the 25th, which made us very embarrassed.I think that if we do not take Algiers and Oran on the first day of the war, the significance of this operation will be completely lost.In Algiers, where we were most likely to receive a friendly reception, even if we got nothing but Algeria, a most important strategic victory had been achieved.General Eisenhower, with our enthusiastic support, was actually making plans to land at Phillipville and Booney on the third day of the offensive.Of course we cannot be sure of reaching Tunisia before the Germans, but we are also not sure that the Germans will be well received by the French in Tunisia, even though the Vichy government allowed them to enter there. 2. After we have established our foothold in Algeria and cleared the lines of communication in Oran, even if the German army reaches Tunisia, we will be able to compete with them.But if you don't go east from Oran, it is tantamount to giving Tunisia and Algiers to the enemy.Limiting operations to Oran and Casablanca certainly does not give the impression of our military power and of the simultaneous widespread offensive which we are trying to rely on to exert a favorable influence on the North African Army.We are all convinced that Algiers is the key to the entire military operation.General Anderson had accepted the task from Eisenhower, confident of his ability to take Algiers.Occupying Algeria and advancing towards Tunisia and Bizerte is an essential step in the attack on Italy, which is the best chance for French cooperation and one of the main objectives of our future campaign. 3. We have unanimously agreed to take Oran, and of course we also want to take Casablanca, but if there is a choice between Algiers and Casablanca, Algiers is undoubtedly incomparably the more promising and effective goal.Landing operations in the Mediterranean were possible four out of five days in October, but on the Atlantic coast of Morocco the ratio was reversed, with only one day out of five possible. 4. However, if the military operations at Oran and Algiers had a good reaction and result, then an army appearing on the sea off Casablanca might easily enter the city, so a feint would certainly be correct.However, Casablanca was an extremely difficult point of attack and the furthest from the main targets in the Mediterranean.Casablanca might easily have been the only place where we suffered a defeat, thus exposing us to all dangers for this little gain; dangers, of course, are always inevitable in such a large-scale operation.As far as Algiers is concerned, all we ask of you is an American liaison team under the (American) flag.However, we (by ourselves) cannot occupy Algiers and Oran at the same time.If you are therefore willing to attack Casablanca with a large force and risk all dangers, the U.S. military must continue to point directly at Oran as the Allied Commander-in-Chief now plans. 5. If, as the memorandum proposes, a total change is made to the plan of this operation, it will of course be necessary to change the date of the attack, which may deal a fatal blow to the whole plan.Hitler did not have the strength to march on unoccupied areas of Spain or France in October.Come November, his power over Vichy and the Madrid government will grow rapidly week by week. 6. Mr. President, I want you to remember those promises I made to Stalin, which Harriman agreed to with your full approval.If Operation Torch is not successful, or reduced as it is now proposed, I feel that my position will be terribly affected.For all these reasons, I urgently ask you to reconsider this memorandum, and to allow the Commander in Chief, United States Allied Forces, to complete his plans on which we are now working day and night.Staff officers here are informing their American colleagues of this opinion. On August 30th I received a reply from the President. President Roosevelt's Message to Former Navy Personnel August 30, 1942 I have carefully considered your telegram concerning the Operation Torch Plan.I am eager to launch an attack as soon as possible.Time is an element and we are speeding up preparations as much as possible. I deeply feel that the initial attack must be undertaken entirely by American ground forces, supported by British naval, transport and air forces.We should conduct this landing on the assumption that the French will not resist the Americans as violently as they resist the British.I would go so far as to say that I have reason to believe that the simultaneous landing of British and American forces would be met with fierce resistance by all the French forces in Africa; but that the initial landing of American troops, without participation of British ground forces, would have resulted in real French non-resistance, or only symbolic sexual resistance.After we have landed, I will need a week, if possible, to obtain a pledge of non-resistance from the French to strengthen our positions.I really wish I could do this. Then your troops can move east.I am fully aware that your landing must precede the arrival of the enemy.We believe that it is unlikely that the Luftwaffe and paratroopers could reach Algiers or Tunisia in large numbers at least within two weeks of the initial enemy attack.We hope that in the meantime your troops will land without much resistance and will be able to advance eastward.As for the landing site, I think we must establish a stable and permanent base on the northwest coast of Africa, because our common strength is limited, and it is very dangerous to rely on Gibraltar as a single line of communication. I therefore suggest: (1) The simultaneous landing of U.S. forces near Casablanca and near Oran; (2) They should build parallel roads and railways behind the hills, with a total length of more than three hundred miles.Such a transportation facility would allow the landing operation to have a supply base in Morocco; this supply base is outside the Strait of Gibraltar and can be used to reinforce and support operations in Algiers and Tunisia.The real problem seems to be that there was not enough cover, and that there was not enough combat material transported to cover more than two landings.I think it would be best to have three landings; and a third from the east a week after ours. For this purpose, I think we should re-examine our human and material resources and make great efforts to make the third landing successful.At that time, we can temporarily suspend the Russian convoy and risk stopping other merchant shipping. All ships that have been allocated to Eisenhower for his two landings must of course not be used for other purposes.The ships needed for the eastern landing must therefore utilize ships not currently requisitioned by Operation Torch.On our part, it will be up to me to study the matter.Can we get an answer in forty-eight hours or less? Let me stress that, whatever the circumstances, one of our landings must be in the Atlantic Ocean. Operational orders to the Commander-in-Chief should state that the attack should begin at the earliest practicable date.This date should coincide with the preparations necessary to make this landing a very likely success, and should therefore be decided by the Commander-in-Chief; but it must not be later than October 30.I still hope to launch on October 14th. We can see from this telegram that another series of difficulties arose as a result of the insistence on the part of the United States.Their view is: the French army may not resist the US military and let it land, and even welcome it to land, but when it sees the British army, it will resist violently and tenaciously.Old animosity over Oran, Dakar, Syria and Madagascar and the blockade we have imposed must have been a serious cause of the antagonism between England and Vichy.On the other hand, the American ambassador, Admiral Li Hai, was close and friendly with Petain.We have been eager to make this expedition American, and I have been anxious that the Americans would agree to it, so from the beginning I welcomed President Roosevelt to lead.However, when the plan was drawn up, it was discovered that a large number of troops, most of the transportation tasks, at least the same number of air forces, and two-thirds of the naval forces must be borne by the British side.The U.S. believes that the U.S. military is loved by Vichy, while our army is hated by them. This will result in a different situation between fighting against our army and submitting to the U.S. military.I do not quite agree with this opinion; but I am very willing to do so: if the necessary troops are already in motion, and the operation is not bound to a certain range, in this case we should stand behind Try to give material help as much as possible.I would even agree that the British troops who had to take part in the initial attack could wear the uniforms of the American troops.As long as you win, nothing else matters.However, the lack of necessary troops or unreasonable restrictions on the deployment of troops cannot be accommodated.Since no agreement could be reached between the British and American staffs, the matter had to be settled by the President and myself. former navy personnel to president roosevelt September 1, 1942 We have considered your recent call carefully.The chiefs of staff of the three services have also discussed the matter with Eisenhower. 2. If you want the United States to bear all the political and military burden of this landing, we cannot raise any disputes.Like you, I attach great importance to the political significance of this combat operation.I don't know what information you have on the attitude of Vichy and North Africa, but it would certainly be great if you could land safely where necessary, or meet only token resistance.We cannot foresee how such a possibility is. 3. However, I hope you have considered the following points: (1) Since the British small ships and aircraft had assembled in Gibraltar for a period of time in advance, will the situation of the British troops participating in the landing be leaked? (2) No matter what kind of flag the British army used when they landed, would the participation of the British army be leaked? (3) When the battle begins, is it necessary for our planes to fight against French planes, and for our ships to fight against French batteries? (4) Given the arrival at the beach and the landing in the dark (which again is essential for a surprise attack), how can the American and British forces be distinguished?At night, cats are all gray. (5) I think the odds of landing are four to one, but what if the waves prevent us from landing on the Atlantic beaches? 4. Moreover, if things go against our wishes, and the landing is met with stubborn resistance, or even fails to land, we will not be able to come to meet us for a considerable period of time, because our assault ships have been requisitioned by the U.S. Army, and our reinforcements will only use ships Can sail into occupied ports.Therefore, if such a political bloodless victory is lost, I agree with you, and think that such a victory is very likely to be followed by a very important military defeat.We would have been able to attack Dakar in September 1940 if we had not been initially disturbed by some compromise.It was that relentless experience that made our military experts attach importance to the unity of the army.Will you have enough trained and equipped American troops to carry out this landing alone, or, at any rate, will there be a large force to overwhelm the enemy? 5. This sudden abandonment of the operational plan which we have hitherto been working on will inevitably cause serious delays.General Eisenhower said October 30 was the earliest possible launch date.In my own opinion, this probably means mid-November.The order to halt the military movement was issued yesterday to allow for rescheduling if necessary. I am afraid that the replacement of October by November will create a new set of dangers far greater than those we would have to encounter anyway. 6. Finally, I would like to say that no matter how difficult the situation may be, we believe it is important to occupy Algiers at the same time as Casablanca and Oran.Algiers is the friendliest and most promising site, where the political reaction will be most decisive for all of North Africa.We considered it a serious decision to abandon Algiers in doubt about the possibility of landing at Casablanca.If this allowed the Germans to strike first not only in Tunisia but also in Algeria, the balance of power throughout the Mediterranean would have to be sad. 7. Mr. President, in summary: The Torch Program, like the Athletic Program before it, has always been considered a primarily American mission.We have accepted the command of the United States and your leadership, and we are willing to do our best to make any plan you decide to succeed.We must, however, say quite frankly that we are convinced that the most correct course of action is to adhere firmly to the general policy clearly laid down in the mutually agreed directive to General Eisenhower on August 14th.I am sure that if we both do our best, as you say, we shall be able to obtain enough naval cover and war supplies to land three simultaneous landings at Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers. President Roosevelt to Prime Minister September 3, 1942 The September 1 call has been received and carefully considered. 2. You agreed that the initial landing operations should be undertaken entirely by US ground forces, and expressed your willingness to cooperate. I am extremely grateful.Yes, the United Kingdom participated in the landing with naval and air support, and the defenders would be informed as early as the beginning of the landing.However, I don't think this approach has much of the same impact as the British landing on the beach from the start. 3. The rough waves on the Atlantic beach are the expected danger.It may be necessary to take advantage of the many small, lightly defended ports. 4. At the beginning of the attack, it is necessary to make use of all available warships. The assault force (whether British or American) had to capture a port before follow-up troops landed.This should be done for any troops that arrive after the first landing. 5. In view of your urgent desire to capture Algiers while conquering Casablanca and Oran, we hereby propose the following method: (1) Landing at Casablanca, Oran and Algiers at the same time, the general situation of its assault force and its follow-up force is as follows: (a) Casablanca (U.S. Army): 34,000 men participated in the assault, followed by 20,000 follow-up troops who landed in a port. (b) Oran (U.S. Army): 25,000 men who participated in the assault, followed by 20,000 follow-up troops who landed in a port. (c) Algiers (U.S. and British troops): 10,000 U.S. troops landed on the beach, followed by British troops within an hour. The purpose was to ensure the safety of the landing, and the follow-up troops were determined by the commander-in-chief.Follow-up troops disembarked in a port by non-combat ships. (2) ‧Department ‧ Team.For the above landing operations, the U.S. side may provide: (a) Provision of troops landing at Casablanca from the continental United States. (b) To supply troops from the United Kingdom for the landing at Oran, and 10,000 men for the landing at Algiers. We have an armored division in the US and an armored division in the UK (both weak and not strong enough for the assault echelon) which can be used as a follow-up force, plus support units and services including the air force ground echelon force.Thereafter, additional infantry and armored divisions could be provided by the United States, as could the rest of the United States forces in the United Kingdom. (3) ‧Shanghai‧Transportation.The following ships are available from the United States, starting from October 20th from US ports: (a) Combat transports capable of carrying 34,000 men. (b) In addition to the combat transports, there are transports for fifty-two thousand men, with supplies sufficient to supply these men.In addition to these transport ships, already in the United Kingdom, there will also be US transport ships capable of carrying 15,000 people and nine cargo ships.According to previous agreements, these nine cargo ships were originally scheduled to undertake the task of transporting US troops from the United Kingdom to participate in combat.After a rough calculation, the transport ships that the United States can provide are estimated to be enough to transport the first, second, and third batches of troops that landed in Casablanca. (4) ‧Navy‧Army.The convoy and support naval forces that the United States can provide in this landing battle cannot exceed the existing forces in the Atlantic Ocean, and all the ships currently preparing to be transferred to carry out the mission. 6. The above is the total strength of the ground forces, naval forces and transport ships that the United States may invest in this landing operation.If this landing is carried out according to the established policy, that is, landing at Casablanca, Oran and Algiers at the same time, the remaining required manpower and material resources must be taken from Britain.In our opinion, you probably need to provide the following strengths: (a) the United Kingdom is required to provide all transports (including combat transports) for the troops landing at Oran and Algiers, in addition to the US transports now designated in the United Kingdom for Operation Torch; (b) Reserve forces required by the Algiers Shock Force and follow-on forces; (c) All naval forces required for landing operations other than those of the U.S. naval forces mentioned above. 7. Please confirm by submarine cable that the United Kingdom is indeed prepared to provide the necessary delivery of landing craft, army and naval forces and transports referred to in this cable, so that I may continue to actively prepare for the early implementation of the Operation Torch Plan. 8. I reiterate the opinion expressed in my telegram of 30 August that the Commander-in-Chief should be instructed to carry out the operational plan at the earliest possible date and it should be up to him to determine this date.I am convinced that an early decision on this matter is absolutely imperative.I think that the plan of operations which I have outlined here has been drawn up to suit your intentions. I think this is a practical solution, which preserves the operations at Algiers, but which is sufficiently strong, and which promises victory everywhere. 9. The most favorable information we have recently received from North Africa is as follows: An American expedition commanded by American officers on all three fronts would encounter little resistance from the French in Africa.On the other hand, a battle commanded by a British officer in any field or an attack by a British army in cooperation with the de Gaullists would meet with determined resistance. Because of this information, I think it is necessary to assign some high-ranking American officials the task of contacting the military and civilian authorities of African France. You and I decided long ago that we would deal with the French in North Africa and you would deal with the situation in Spain. former navy personnel to president roosevelt September 3, 1942 We spent a day studying the possibility of manpower and material resources.We accept the outlines of your plan, but think that the plan of action can be determined on the basis of a slight shift in emphasis and a reduction of the landing force at Casablanca by 10,000 or 12,000 (to be made up by follow-on troops) .These armies, with their own combat transports, will give full play to their strength after landing, so that the assault force will be composed entirely of American troops.Such a change would balance the strength of the three landings, and give the necessary force to all important points.Without this change, the landing at Algiers would have been hopeless because of the shortage of combat transports and landing craft.We all agree that this is a major shortcoming of the plan. 2. We suggest that General Clark or General Eisenhower should come to your place tomorrow with Admiral Ramsey, who knows all our convoys, convoys and naval conditions, and Mountbatten, to discuss the specific issues of landing. They and their party will meet on Sunday Come to see you in the morning.We have no idea here how much naval force you can provide.Please inform Admiral Cunningham of these circumstances.In view of the importance of this landing, we recommend that he assume command of the navy, under the command of the Allied Commander in Chief. 3. Due to the change of plan, the launch date of landing has been postponed for three weeks.The Free French have received information which they cannot keep secret.Time saved every day is precious.We have therefore ordered all parties to work as intended, but the final decision is of course yours. With all this up in the air, I felt it appropriate to make all my thoughts known to Harry Hopkins, and to leave it to him to decide for himself what influence he should have on the President. Prime Minister to Mr Harry Hopkins September 4, 1942 I now ask Dickie Mountbatten to forward this letter to you personally, knowing that you have devoted your whole heart and soul to this cause and have made an incomparable contribution to it.Whether this letter needs to be read by our great friend is for you to decide.If you think it will disturb him in some way, then don't show him.This is entirely an informal document and it is up to you to decide what to do with it. 1. The Torch Program is suffering setbacks, especially its unnecessarily delayed implementation. These have greatly increased our common difficulties, and I am very disturbed by this.It was a long and slow process to cancel Operation Bash, but when you left London on July 25, everything was going on and I certainly think that Marshall has followed the President's final decision.We readily accepted General Eisenhower as Allied Commander in Chief, and he and Clark, two very fine officers, went to work immediately.However, it was not until August 14 that a clear order was received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington.We have concentrated all our efforts on planning this landing.Such an amphibious operation must be coordinated like a jeweled bracelet; for each particular landing site, appropriate ships must be selected, and the loading of these ships must be adapted to the specific mission requirements of each landing force.This is not necessarily the case for all jobs, of course, since many ships can be used for general tasks, but a considerable number of ships can only be used for specific purposes, and can only adapt to the slope and seaside draft of the beach they are about to attack.I do not intend to exaggerate the extent of the work in this direction, for it is natural to want to choose a favorable opportunity in many situations, but the more carefully the work is arranged, the better will be the effect. 2. All in all, everything was going on at that time, and until a week ago, there was no reason why October 15 was not determined as the launch date.Then, with a thunderbolt from the blue, the chiefs of staff of the United States Armed Forces sent a memorandum that shattered the plan, changing the whole character and emphasis of the landing campaign, abandoning the easy and inexpensive site of Algiers, and sending all significant forces to As far as Casablanca and the Atlantic coast are concerned; where we have long studied the landings, we consider them very unlikely, because of the high winds and waves, and the probability of success must be four to four, even in October. compared with one.放棄阿爾及爾；把力量轉移到卡薩布蘭卡；再從其他方面調撥力量來攻打奧蘭，這些的話說起來當然是很容易，但是，看看它對各項業已完成的工作起了多大的影響啊。我目睹你們兩位卓越的將軍由於發動作戰日期的推遲，以及美國三軍參謀長政策的改變，心情十分沉重。艾森豪威爾的處境的確困難。一方面，他手下的英美參謀人員吵吵嚷嚷地要求對各項具體問題作出決定；另一方面，大西洋彼岸對於作戰計劃控制得很嚴格，同時又是說變就變。設置一個盟軍總司令或最高統帥，如果不給他一點自由來擬定計劃，來決定如何、何時、何處應用他的部隊，那麼又起什麼作用呢？我們是準備接受他的決定，願意服從他的指揮的。在向你說明了這些情況之後，即使我們有不同意見，我們還是服從他的指揮。我們只有在各方面努力幫助他，以實現總統的偉大戰略思想。現在全部問題必須由大西洋彼岸重新考慮，我們當完全按照新的計劃行事。但是假若最高統帥無法行使自己的權力，我不了解聯合司令部能發揮什麼作用。 三‧坦率地說，我實在不了解所有這些問題產生的原因何在。我認為此事業已得到馬歇爾的同意，而且已補償了金海軍上將在太平洋作戰中所需要的人力物力。但是現在美國軍界方面出爾反爾的情況看來很嚴重，我深深擔心，而且日益擔心，總統的全部作戰計劃或許會一點一點地遭到破壞。隨之俱去的將是盟軍最光明的、也是今年唯一的希望。計劃一次又一次地改變，將使登陸日期推遲；我們兩國廣大人民在風聞進行中的情況以後，一定會認為敵人將要獲得情報。登陸日期一天天地推遲，德軍將獲得對我們進行先發制人的更好機會。現在可望的最早日期是十一月分的第一周，但是，如果到最末一周還不行，我就要感到非常驚奇了。誰也說不上那時候別的地區將發生什麼情況。 四‧特別使我大惑不解的是，我不知道美國參謀人員為什麼不願進入地中海，尤其是阿爾及爾，卻急於要把一切力量集中到卡薩布蘭卡方面。讓我們先來談談法軍的抵抗問題。一般說來，我是同意總統在這個問題上的看法和希望的。我認為法軍在北非海灘上不使美軍流血、不屠殺美國青年的可能性，至少有百分之五十。法國過去不允許發生這樣的事，將來更是不會允許發生這樣的事。無論如何，我認為冒這樣的險還是值得的，而且是應該的，因為戰利品的確很大。但是，假使這種假設不錯，法軍不抵抗，或只作象徵性的抵抗，其後又站到我們這邊來（他們不抵抗，就一定會站過來），那麼這種情況一定會同時在卡薩布蘭卡和奧蘭，尤其會在氣氛有利於我的阿爾及爾發生。倘若你們在第一天就順利而迅速地佔領了這些港口（必須做到這點），那麼就在全世界創造了一種新的事實，同時我們也就無需擔心西班牙方面會出現任何麻煩了。為了解放法屬北非，將實行和平佔領；下一步就是準備襲擊西西里和意大利以及在隆美爾背後的的黎波里了。 五‧但是，我們再看看另一種可能性。假定打起來，炮台開了火，港口不許登陸，法國空軍轟炸直布羅陀海港，就像達喀爾那一場戰鬥一樣。那時，西班牙人的確有可能會在德方的威脅利誘之下，插手進來，使直布羅陀防守不住。我個人認為，他們要等到局勢確實已惡化之後才會改變觀望態度，使自己成為我們的仇敵。在這種情況下，我們的希望當然是放在這樣一點上：以盡量多的兵力、盡快的速度在地中海內登陸，制止法軍的抵抗，登上海灘，並佔領若干港口。這也就是我們弄不懂以卡薩布蘭卡登陸為重點的原因所在，因為在那裡登陸將以犧牲地中海內的登陸為代價；而且假如在地中海內登陸遭到抵抗，那麼有充分理由可以說，在大西洋海岸也會遇到抵抗，但有這點不同就是你能打敗地中海內的抵抗，但不能打敗大西洋海岸的抵抗，除非風平浪靜，而風平浪靜的日子與壞天氣之比是四與一。總之，決定法軍行動的地點是在地中海內，如果認定在地中海內作戰是有利的，那麼以後經由雙方協議，佔領卡薩布蘭卡並不困難。另一方面，假若在卡薩布蘭卡遭到挫拆，會遇到怎樣的情況呢？假如所有軍隊都不能通過海浪登上海灘，又不能乘著他們橫渡大西洋時所使用的大船進入小河和小港，他們要想對卡薩布蘭卡進行正面進攻，面對的則是海岸炮台和海港的機槍防禦陣地，在這種情況下這些軍隊該怎麼辦呢？ 這封信一直未送給霍普金斯，蒙巴頓也無需到大西洋彼岸去。我在需要發出這封信之前，收到總統的最有幫助的充滿希望的下列電報： President Roosevelt's Message to Former Navy Personnel 一九四二年九月四日 我們正在密切無間地合作著。我願意減少在卡薩布蘭卡登陸的軍隊，減少的數字是按照能載運一團戰鬥隊伍的戰鬥運輸艦隻計算的。大約為五千人。由於原來準備用於奧蘭的突擊部隊也已減少了這麼多的人數，因此，騰出的全部英美戰鬥運輸艦隻可以運送一萬人左右，供阿爾及爾登陸之用。載運美國軍隊的這些戰鬥運輸艦隻可以用作建立戰鬥運輸艦隊的核心。我深信，再要增加部隊可以從聯合王國調來。 我看不出艾森豪威爾或克拉克這時來此有什麼好處。我知道，他們對於編成遲遲來到的美國軍隊，負有重大而又急迫的責任。我也相信，我們已完全了解他們的觀點，而且我想將來在最後開始進攻之前會見艾森豪威爾，因此兩次旅行看來是不必要的。我們很想見見拉姆齊和蒙巴頓，如果你願意派他們前來的話；但我不希望因此而推遲登陸日期。我正對各項準備工作進行指導。我們應該立刻以最後的決定來解決所有這些問題。 我希望今天用海底電報將一份可供這次戰役使用的美國海軍艦艇名單發給你。 former navy personnel to president roosevelt 一九四二年九月五日 我們同意你所建議的軍事計劃。我們有許多受過很好的登陸訓練的部隊。假如方便的話，他們能穿上你們的服裝，他們對這樣改裝會感到光榮的。海上運輸將無問題。 二‧我剛才收到你的電報【１】，你們顯然也已調撥一空了。我們認為，除非我們的P‧Q‧運輸船隊遭到了嚴重的損失，現在聯合提供的海軍力量完全可以使我們全速進行這些戰役。 【１】羅斯福總統致前海軍人員 一九四二年九月五日 據金（海軍上將）報稱，美國能夠用於火炬作戰計劃的海軍艦隻的最高數額為：現代化戰列艦一艘、舊戰列艦兩艘、航空母艦一艘、經過改造的小型航空母艦兩艘（假定它們載運的飛機共為戰鬥機七十八架、俯衝轟炸機三十架）、具有八吋口徑大炮的巡洋艦兩艘、六吋口徑大炮的大型巡洋艦三艘、驅逐艦四十艘、快速掃雷艇六艘；總共艦隻五十六艘。 三‧經過艾森豪威爾將軍同意，我準備馬上派遣拉姆齊海軍上將【１】前來，為坎寧安上將提供他要同你討論海軍具體計劃時需用的那些資料。現在必須加緊工作，爭取每一小時的時間。只有這樣，我們才能實現你的戰略計劃，才能實現在今年做些真正像樣工作的願望。 【１】拉姆齊海軍上將自這次大戰開始以來，在多佛海峽擔任指揮工作，顯示了卓越的才能；在火炬作戰計劃中，他被遴選為海軍行動計劃的負責人。 四‧據了解，艾森豪威爾已請求馬歇爾，把你從卡薩布蘭卡登陸部隊中撥出的兵力連同它的一團戰鬥隊伍全部調到這裡，我們對這個要求完全同意。 順致親切的問候。 President Roosevelt to Prime Minister 一九四二年九月五日 勝利萬歲！ former navy personnel to president roosevelt 一九四二年九月六日 好，加油幹吧。 現在還須推動一下這次作戰行動的計劃工作，並力爭盡早執行。 首相致霍利斯准將一九四二年九月六日 我們大家都不要由於擔心火炬作戰計劃會過早執行而有所不安。必須加緊努力，爭取在十月三十一日開始進攻。為了保證這一點，最好以十月二十九日為目標。我建議給總統發一個電報，談一談這個意見。假如美國方面能作好準備，我們方面是否確實也能作好準備？ 我們必須注意避免發出可能導致推遲整個行動的命令。 倘使你宣佈十月三十一日是最早的日期，那麼肯定會拖到十天之後。 九月八日，艾森豪威爾和克拉克同我共進晚餐。那是我們星期二的例會。晚餐之前，我剛從下院報告了我最近旅行的結果。我們那晚談話的主要目的在於討論攻擊北非的最後日期。制定計劃的人仍然主張選定十一月四日。我問艾克的意見。他答稱，十一月八日離今天還有六十天。【１】這一次新的延期顯然是由於需要裝備美國的一團戰鬥部隊。我像過去那樣，建議使英國受過高度訓練的突擊隊穿上美國服裝，以免進一步拖延。然而艾克卻很想使這次登陸是清一色的美軍。 【１】哈里‧C‧布徹：《同艾森豪威爾在一起的三年》（英文版），第一百八十二頁。 九月十五日我打電報給總統： former navy personnel to president roosevelt 一九四二年九月十五日 我完全同意你對於火炬計劃的政治觀點。除非敵人先發制人，這個觀點是正確的。現在絲毫沒有敵人已經發覺的徵象，法國的態度也很不錯。我在計日以待。 我認為，我在整個火炬計劃中，在軍事和政治方面，都是你的副手，我只要求能把我的意見在你面前明白地提出來。我們將有一座力量極大的無線電台，戰鬥開始時即可啟用，因此如果你預先把你對法國的呼籲書和其他宣傳資料灌好錄音，那麼這些聲音在播音時將嘹亮已極，壓倒一切聲浪。 我們英國人只有在你認為適宜時，才參加戰鬥。這是一次美國的軍事行動，我們在這次行動中當你們的助手。 不過，我自己對西班牙仍是放心不下。 首相致外交大臣，並請霍利斯准將轉參謀長委員會 一九四二年九月十六日 我們要密切注意西班牙對於火炬計劃準備工作的反應，這種反應在直布羅陀將會明顯看到。我希望看到一份關於在準備火炬計劃時我們將在直布羅陀採取什麼措施的簡略報告以及其時間表。這些準備工作比開往馬耳他的一支大型運輸船隊的標準實力大多少？ 二‧運到大量飛機將是這個問題的重要關鍵，中立地區的利用問題也是很重要的。 三‧假如在火炬作戰計劃開始執行前兩星期左右，德國人迫使西班牙說明我們這些準備工作情況，並且要求西班牙拒絕我們借用中立地，或者允許德軍自己的飛機利用巴倫西亞機場，那將如何處理？西班牙對於德國的壓力會有怎樣的反應，我們的態度應該如何？在出現這樣麻煩的時候，我們或許不得不就這個問題同佛朗哥攤牌。我認為，我們應當準備好我們的計劃。 九月二十二日，在我主持的、並有艾森豪威爾參加的三軍參謀長會議上，作出了最後的決定。火炬的日期定為十一月八日。 在我們同總統就我們主要的作戰行動進行緊張通信之時，隆美爾已向開羅進行堅決的、也是最後一次的進軍。在這次戰役結束之前，我的注意力一直放在沙漠地區以及將來在那裡進行的較量上。我十分信任我們新任的司令官們，並且確信我們在部隊、裝甲和空軍力量方面的優勢已有了空前的增強。但是，經過過去兩年不愉快的意外事件，心中還是難以消除顧慮。由於我剛剛視察過這個即將作戰的戰場，心目中又生動地展現出崎嶇曲折、岩石重疊的沙漠景象，那裡隱藏著炮台和坦克，我們的陸軍埋伏在陣地上，伺機反攻整個戰場情景令人觸目驚心。如果再有一次挫折，不僅挫折本身就是災禍，而且在同盟邦美國正在進行的談判中，也會使英國的威信和影響大受損害。反過來說，假如隆美爾被擊退了，日益增長的信心和形勢好轉的情緒將會有助於我們在各項問題上達成協議。 亞歷山大將軍答應在戰鬥開始時發來齊普（這個字是我從時常穿用的衣服上想到的【１】）的電報。我在八月二十八日問他，你現在認為有可能在本月分發來齊普電報嗎？軍事情報處方面認為並不急迫。I wish you success.他答稱，從現在起，齊普每一天都像錢一樣的寶貴。敵人發動進攻的可能性日見減少，到九月二日，看來已是不可能了。三十日，我接到了單音節的信號齊普後，便打電報給羅斯福和斯大林，隆美爾已經開始了我們等待已久的進攻。重要的戰鬥目前也許正在進行。 據蒙哥馬利的正確推斷，隆美爾的計劃是要使他的裝甲部隊穿過英軍陣線南部設防薄弱的佈雷地帶，然後向北移動，從兩翼和後方包圍我們的陣地。這次作戰的關鍵地帶是阿拉姆海爾發山脊，而蒙哥馬利的部署主要是保證這個地方不致陷入敵人手中。 【１】齊普，英文zip，打開拉鎖的意思。translator 八月三十日夜間，德國非洲軍團的兩個裝甲師突破佈雷地帶，次晨進入德爾拉吉爾。我們第七裝甲師在他們進犯之前已逐步撤退，此時駐防在東面的側翼。德軍裝甲部隊的北面，還有兩個意大利裝甲師和一個意大利摩托化師也企圖越過佈雷陣地。他們獲得了微小的勝利。佈雷陣地比他們所預料的深得多，他們發覺已受到新西蘭師縱射炮火的猛烈襲擾。然而德軍第九十輕裝師已成功地突破我方陣地，為裝甲部隊的北進打開了門戶。在戰線的另一端，敵軍同時對第五印度師和第九澳大利亞師進行牽制性攻擊；他們在經過相當猛烈的戰鬥後，被迫後撤。德意裝甲部隊想從德爾拉吉爾向北進擊阿拉姆海爾發山脊，或向東北進軍哈曼。蒙哥馬利希望他們不採取後一路線。他願意在他所選中的戰場山脊地區作戰。有一張地圖欺騙了隆美爾，這張地圖表明向山脊地區進攻，坦克可以順利通過，再向東進，就不易通過了。兩個月後被俘的馮‧托馬將軍說，這一個假情報起了它預想的效果。現在的戰事肯定是準確地按照蒙哥馬利的意圖進行的。 三十一日晚間，敵人向北的進攻被擊退，敵軍裝甲車群進入了車陣，這一夜他們接二連三地遭受大炮的轟擊和猛烈的空襲。次晨，他們向英軍戰線的中部前進，第十裝甲師現在正集中在這裡迎擊他們。沙地比他們想像的更為堅實，抵抗比他們預料的更為堅強。這天下午雖然他們重新發動進攻，但遭到失敗。隆美爾現在已把全部力量都用上了。意大利人已經潰不成軍。他已無法增援他的冒失的裝甲部隊，而裝甲部隊又因整日開動而大量耗費了原已不足的燃料。他也許已聽說又有三艘油船在地中海中沉沒，因此在九月二日他的裝甲部隊採取守勢，準備迎接我們的進攻了。 蒙哥馬利沒有接受這一誘惑，因此隆美爾只有撤退，別無他法。九月三日，敵軍開始撤退，其側翼遭受英國第七裝甲師的襲擊，敵方無裝甲的運輸車輛損失慘重。那夜英軍反攻開始，但不攻擊敵方裝甲部隊，而攻擊第九十輕裝師和的裡雅斯特摩托化師。假如這些師能被擊潰，那麼，我方佈雷陣地的缺口就可能在德國裝甲部隊回到這裡以前堵住。新西蘭師發動猛烈攻擊，但也受到猛烈的還擊，德國非洲軍團在還擊後逃走了。蒙哥馬利現在停止追擊。他計劃時機一到便爭取主動，但是，時機尚未成熟。他已擊退了隆美爾最後一次向埃及的進軍，使他受到這樣慘重的損失，因此他感到很滿意。第八集團軍和沙漠空軍以較小的代價予敵人以沉重的打擊，並使敵人的軍需供應面臨新的危機。我們從後來繳獲的文件知道，隆美爾已陷於極端困窘的境地，他在不斷地要求援助。我們也知道那時他已疲憊不堪，苦惱已極。這次戰鬥叫阿拉姆海爾發戰役，兩個月以後便見到這次戰役的效果了。 我們損失軍官一百一十名，士兵一千六百四十名。其中英國人九百八十四名，澳大利亞人二百五十七名，新西蘭人四百零五名，南非人六十五名，印度人三十九名。這確實是一次英帝國的戰役，在這次戰役裡，母國擔當了主力。