Chapter 141 Volume 4, Chapter 31, Anxiety and Tension

A difficult transition period A series of disasters The pinnacle of the Hill Road Unity and strength of the War Cabinet Lord Trenchard advocated the concentration of air power My reply on 4th September Sir Stafford Cripps criticized our Discussions I had with him on the methods of war He wished to resign from the Government My letter to him dated 22nd September My colleagues advised him to put off his resignation He decided to stay on until the end of the campaign He was appointed Minister of Aircraft Production Corresponding changes in the Government IV Great Power Plan October 21st Memorandum to the Foreign Secretary I wish to form a United States of Europe.

Although our great plans of operations on both ends of the Mediterranean were drawn up, and preparations for these plans were in progress, the period of waiting was difficult and extremely tense.Those inside who know are worried about what will happen, while everyone who is not is worried that nothing will happen. During the twenty-eight months now that I have presided over the government, we have suffered almost continuous military defeats.France collapsed, Britain was bombed, but we survived.Our homeland has not been invaded.We still hold Egypt.We're alive, but in a difficult situation; but that's about it.On the other hand, how many disasters are pouring down on us like waterfalls!The fiasco of Dakar, the loss of all the deserts we had captured from Italy, the tragedy of Greece, the fall of Crete, the inexcusable defeat of the war with Japan, the fall of Hong Kong, the American, British, Dutch , the ravages of the vast land in the Australian theater, the disaster in Singapore, the Japanese occupation of Burma, the defeat of Auchinleck in the desert, the surrender of Tobruk, and the considered failure of the Battle of Dieppe, all these are unprecedented in our history. The most harrowing link in a long series of disasters and setbacks.We are no longer alone, but have the two mightiest nations in the world allied with us in the decisive battle, and this indeed assures us of final victory.But now that the mortal danger is gone, the situation only invites freer criticism.Is it any wonder that the whole policy and method of the war command I am responsible for must be met with suspicion and opposition?

One thing is indeed strange: During this bleak respite, I have not been forced to resign, nor have I been asked to change course.I was known to never accept such a request.If I were forced to resign, I would have to withdraw from the political arena, carry disaster on my back, and the final outcome of the war (as it always will) would be due to my resignation at such a late hour.Indeed, the whole situation is about to change.Henceforth we are destined to achieve more and more, which cannot be spoiled by one unfortunate incident.Although the war is long-term and arduous, and requires great efforts from all sides, we have reached the top of the mountain road, and we are not only sure of our victory, but in fact, exciting events have often occurred up.I did not lose my right to work in this new phase of the Great War because of the unity and strength of the War Cabinet, the confidence of my political and professional colleagues, the unwavering loyalty of Parliament and the everlasting friendly concern of the nation.All of this shows that there is a lot of luck in people affairs, and that we can only do our best in everything without worrying about it.

Several well-known people with varying degrees of close relations with me have keenly felt the tension of the situation in the past two months.One of our most important and able Dominion High Commissioners wrote me a weighty letter, which has been circulated as far as we have appointed.The document begins with the words: Mr. Churchill's contribution to raising spirits is undoubtedly great, but what follows is a long list of my failures, and some rich content that required me to lighten my burden by surrendering power. suggestion. Lord Trenchard is a friend with whom I have known and worked together for over twenty-five years.He wrote a very substantial document advocating mass bombing, a copy of which he also gave me:

August 29, 1942 We and the Americans are raising enormous armies (perhaps six to eight million men in the United States alone).These armies required a lot of material and industrial manpower to maintain; a lot of merchant ships were needed to carry supplies and other ships (and planes) to protect the shipping.It is questionable whether all the raw material resources of the Allies would be sufficient to equip these armies, and whether these resources would, in the event of setbacks and great expenditure, support the intensity of fighting. Time is short, and we are at the moment when we need to make a decision.The danger is this: We will try to go both ways; our Air Force is bound to be inextricably locked in a protracted battle of grand schemes and two-fronted wars.

Our country's involvement in a land war on the Continent this year or next will give the Germans an advantage. This is a repeat of 1914|1918.This will allow the enemy side (ie the German Army) to turn against us the enormous military power they retain.Our strength over and superiority over Germany is in the air force of the British and American Air Forces. The strategic changes in modern warfare are far greater than those caused by the invention of gunpowder and the modern warship.The strength of the Air Force is increasing day by day.Since 1939, the Air Force has developed rapidly.Today's bombs and bombers are very different from those used when the war broke out.

The British and American air forces are growing day by day.There is no limit to the power of our Air Force weapons if we focus our efforts on those aspects of our policy that can and will be achieved quickly. Adopting a policy of using the army to win will result in a great depletion of material and manpower.The Air Force is the new frontier, the powerful weapon of military science that has brought great new ways of winning to the Allies.If we had decided decisively to concentrate our air force, not only would we have saved millions of lives, but we could have shortened the war by months, perhaps years.

Just as the enemy conquered Poland and France with a tank blitz, we can crush German institutions with a bomber blitz. Finally, the implementation of this policy required a head responsible for the purely military (in the broadest sense) strategic thinking of European warfare, assisted, of course, by a representative of the armed forces.The commander had to be someone who believed in the weapon of his air force, and someone who had command experience in this war.There are many such people. I understand that the shoemaker does not say that his hides are good, but I still think that this document, written by a man of such high authority as Lord Trenchard, is still a very important document.I therefore printed it and sent it to the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff, together with a similar document written by Air Vice-Admiral Harris, with the following note:

I do not adopt or endorse these opinions myself.However, since these documents are plausibly written, I thought that my colleagues might be of some interest.These documents are a powerful answer to those who attack our bombing policy. I wrote the following letter to Lord Trenchard: Prime Minister to Viscount Trenchard September 4, 1942 Thank you for your interesting documents.As you may know, I am a supporter of Bomber Command, and I do everything possible to strengthen it and prevent it from being unreasonably hindered. While acknowledging and admiring your succinct arguments, I think you are exaggerating and therefore not helpful.You must have advanced the argument to the point where only a few people here or in the United States can agree.But I am eager to refute the so-called indiscriminate bombing of Germany, and the campaign to discredit it on many fronts, so I circulate your paper to the War Cabinet as I did with the recent paper of Lieutenant-General Harris.

With regard to the last paragraph of the document, it is difficult to separate the head of administration of any country from those primarily responsible for conducting the war.The executive heads of the United States and Russia were also commander-in-chief, although neither Mr. Roosevelt nor Premier Stalin had any military experience or training.In England it is even more difficult to separate the constitutional head from all the organs of command of war, which are in harmony with the life and destiny of the country.Taking an Airman, giving him carte blanche, and asking him to win the war is certainly one way, but I doubt you ever think about the problems that arise.He is bound to be difficult to get along with the other two services.The same is true when dealing with allies. The systems of allies are different, especially in the United States. The Air Force is only a subsidiary unit, and this relationship is very strict.It may also be difficult to get along with the House of Commons, the Cabinet, and all such institutions.However, if the right candidate is found, many of these difficulties may be overcome by his simultaneous appointment as Prime Minister.If I believe that this solution will lead to a quick victory, I will give way to him.Am I asking too much for the candidate you have in mind?You said that there are many such people.I didn't know we were so rich in our army that so many officers had been commanders in the Great War and had the same view as you about the Air Force that they could be a purely military (in the broadest sense) of the war in Europe on) Head of Strategic Thinking Responsible.

Sincerely best wishes. Trenchard wrote back to me on September 8th: My papers are not addressed to you, for I know very well that you are eager to strike at our main enemy in Germany.It was written to certain people; I think the opinion of a pure outsider like myself might be able to sway them. My last paragraph was not intended, in any form or manner, to mean what you said.I am not suggesting that chief executives should be freed from primary responsibility for directing war.I have never expressed, nor have I ever had such a view.What I'm trying to say is this.It has been suggested in many papers and discussions that a Commander-in-Chief in Europe, like Marshall and Wavell, be appointed. I object to the suggestion that this Commander-in-Chief must be a general of the army.If the Air Force is the power that counts, the power that will enable us to win, then why must the Commander in Chief ‧ be an Army general?Now that we know that it is the Air Force that decides the outcome of the battle, why should our strategy be based on a land-based point of view? But the harshest critic of our methods of warfare was Lord Stafford Cripps, Lord Seal.As Speaker of the House of Commons, his opinion is extremely important.It was his duty to explain to the House of Commons our successive failures and setbacks; and he did so with tact and devotion.During this suffocating interlude, the breakdown of his relationship with me would create a political crisis, and so, on my return from abroad at the end of August, I noted with great concern his impact on national morale and command of operations. Great doubts arose about the efficiency of the central agencies. In domestic public opinion he detected a widespread sense of defeat and discontent.He believed that the workers showed helpless depression when they heard that the weapons they had worked so hard to produce could not meet the needs of the Libyan side.Scientists and technicians who really want to manufacture new weapons and equipment are not encouraged.Merchants were outraged at official delays, indecision, and the wasteful duplication of committees.In the military, officers and soldiers are distressed by inappropriate military leadership.He believed that there was an urgent need to imbue the nation's war effort with a new and vigorous spirit.To this end, he proposes a series of reforms in our government institutions.Some of these proposals I myself fully agreed with, and set about to work upon, but I disagreed with the Keeper of the Seals on the main question concerning the technique of directing operations.It is true that he did not suggest that I should be removed or removed from office; on the contrary, he suggested that, as Secretary of Defense, I should support as my advisers three men of the caliber of the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Services, who would oversee the Joint Planning Commission, And can devote their full time to military programs in the broadest sense.These three persons should form an independent Directorate of Operational Planning, responsible for examining all strategic aspects of the war and studying future operational plans; for this purpose they will replace the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff.Each theater must have a commander who has full command of the sea, land, and air forces.These commanders, advised by a small Joint Staff, report directly to the Operations Planning Directorate.In short, the idea is that the Secretary of State for Defense should himself be the supreme commander, with direct command of the land, sea and air forces throughout the world.In this way all foresights, plans and actions from the Minister of Defense onwards will become a coherent whole. In fact, it's a planner's dream.The new Directorate of Operations Planning was the sole agency responsible for planning, while at the same time having full command and control authority, so that it would work freely and not become entangled in the day-to-day affairs of the service chiefs of staff in the management of the forces they command.These miscellaneous businesses were still handled by the Chiefs of Staff of the three services and their staffs (individually or collectively), while the Supreme Command worked out its strategy and plans behind closed doors.I do not believe that such a double system can succeed; and I express my opinion with enthusiasm on the proposal of the Keeper of the Seal.I concluded that his proposals did not work in theory, nor in practice.In my opinion, the guiding principle of commanding operations is that the plan of operations should be drawn up by those who have the authority to carry out the plan.Under the system which we have developed by painstaking experience, the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff and its subsidiary bodies are fully adapted to the drawing up of plans for the Armed Forces, in which those responsible for execution come together to draw up plans to be carried out by them.It would be wrong in principle to have a war planning directorate separate from the operational staff, since it would create two opposing institutions, one responsible and the other irresponsible, but nominally equal .This makes it often necessary for ministers to disregard advice from one of these two bodies.This too immediately causes immediate and severe friction.Does a naval admiral sent to OPP have the right to tell the Secretary of the Navy how to move the fleet, or does an air general of equal caliber sent to OPP have the right to implicitly criticize the Chief of Air Staff? Woolen cloth?The inherent dangers and contradictions of this system are obvious.Any intelligent person can devise plans for winning a battle if there is no duty to carry it out.Such ingenuity should be encouraged in the planning staff so long as they are truly subordinate in position to the chief of services with executive responsibility.However, I am not going to have a figurehead think tank poring over our secrets, nor am I going to add this think tank and their reports to the already plentiful number of committees and reports.I know from long experience in these matters that a Secretary of Defense must work with and through responsible advisers, those military chiefs who carry out resolutions and are accountable for their results.Never, in this or the last war, has there been such a period as the present, when the relations between the Prime Minister and the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces are so good and harmonious, and there is complete agreement on the resolutions to be adopted.Why, then, should I withdraw confidence from what I consider to be the best professional advisers in the armed forces at the present time, in order to give at least some confidence to officers who are not only less responsible, but less capable?It is an illusion to think that there are a large number of officers of equal caliber who can fill the ranks of the officers I have chosen to serve as Chief of Staff of the Armed Services. With these arguments, and similar ones, I argued with the Keeper of the Seal, and tried to convince him of my views.This serious debate took up most of September.But I could not persuade him; on September 21st he informed me that he felt it his duty to resign from his important position in the government.He said that since his return from India he no longer felt that I needed his help; Clearly.He was deeply concerned about the state of the war, and, in view of the developments of the last few months and the great responsibility which had been placed upon the entire War Cabinet, he was keen to know my views on the future.To this I replied: dear cripps September 22, 1942 After reading the letter, I was surprised and somewhat saddened.I really don't know of any changes in our relationship since your original tenure seven months ago.When I set off on my trip in early August, I thought we were on good terms.Seven weeks have passed since then, during which time I was away for almost a month and you were away for over a week.With the exception of the Cabinet meetings (three in the past twenty-four hours, which lasted six and a half hours), I have been trying to see as many of my key colleagues as I can.I often find our conversations pleasant and exciting.I hope you will come and see me whenever you like. I hereby submit to you another memorandum dealing with all the institutions and methods in existence, whether good or bad, which are the instruments with which I employ in the discharge of my task of leading government and conducting war; I As you can see from this memo, no one knows better than you that the issues you write about are polemical.I also have my own beliefs about these issues, which are the result of long experience and a great responsibility.Others are definitely different. I do not wish to enter into a debate here, which would be endless; but I am sure that if you co-operated with the First Sea Lord as closely as I have with him in the busy business of this war, you would not would have underestimated his intelligence, knowledge and thoughtfulness.I really cannot but say that you are not very lenient about the exploits of the Admiralty on which we depend. You ask me how I feel about the future.I look to the future with hope, and, I am sure, with steadfastness.A large-scale battle is coming, which is completely in line with your own concept, and it is also agreed by us.We must endure the postponement of the campaign with perseverance and wait for the results.I myself find it much more difficult to wait than to fight, so I fully understand your uneasiness. yours sincerely Winston Churchill In spite of writing this letter, I realize that he will no longer have full confidence in me, nor will he be able to share the responsibilities as a colleague of the War Cabinet for long. I am well aware that if he therefore resigns from the government, a sharp political struggle will inevitably ensue; and although I am determined to face this political struggle, I hope that it will not happen while the affairs of Africa are still in the air.Several colleagues in the War Cabinet urged him to consider whether, as the war drew closer to a decisive moment, he would not interfere with the public interest by resigning at this juncture.Although it was obvious that my position would be immensely enhanced and his would be correspondingly weakened if we were victorious in the impending fighting in North Africa, his patriotism controlled his behaviour. my dear prime minister October 3, 1942 In accordance with the promise I made when I met you yesterday, I am writing to you about my position in the War Cabinet, which we have been discussing during the last few days. You have not convinced me of the necessity of those reforms which I have proposed for the principal command problems of the operation.I am convinced that reforms of that kind are necessary if we are to realize our full war potential. If it were not for the exceptional circumstances brought to my attention by you and other colleagues, the above beliefs would lead me to ask you to forward my resignation to His Majesty the King. However, as a result of your description, I am well aware that this is an extremely tense time for our country and government.In view of the circumstances, it is evident that, in these days of particular peril, anything which might reveal disunity or disagreement in the vital lines of command of the operation should be avoided if possible.Otherwise it will hamper our morale, or increase our international difficulties. It seemed to me that these temporary considerations might negate the necessity of the reforms I suggested; I therefore decided that, in order to facilitate the smooth conduct of the coming battle, it would be my duty to postpone the Go further until these campaigns are at least well underway. When the time comes, I will raise this question again. I am convinced, needless to say, that I will do my best to help you during this period, and will do my best to support you wherever and whenever possible. EDIT: I have given this letter to Anthony Eden and Clement Attlee and have communicated my general course of action to the rest of the War Cabinet. my dear stafford cripps October 3, 1942 You have decided to withhold your resignation until those major campaigns which we all agree to (in your terms) at least go well, and I am sure you are right.Discussion of your resignation from government will not at this time be without prejudice to the public interest and the safety of the British and American armed forces.It is very difficult for me to participate in a discussion without saying something which leads the enemy to draw inferences.On the other hand, you have every right to bring our differences to a conclusion at a later stage.At the same time, I am grateful for your pledge to give me all possible help during this period, and I will of course fully repay your help and kindness. As a result, Sir Stafford Cripps did not leave the government entirely.Although he would no longer assume the full responsibilities of his qualifications as a War Cabinet member, I would very much like to find other positions within the Government in which to continue to employ his talents and energies.When the war in Africa started smoothly in November, I advised him to take up the post of Minister of Aircraft Production. In this job, his ability and efficiency increased day by day, and he served until the end of the war.I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to him for his loyal and effective service as Minister of Aircraft Production during these three difficult years.Elsewhere in this book, I have said that ministers who do not manage the work of specific departments often have such a situation: they are complacent when talking about the work of others. For a man of his intellect but little administrative experience, his lofty ideals, his capacity for theoretical analysis, and his modus operandi had a powerful but dangerous appeal.Given his great intellect, he needed to be given a more practical task; his success as Minister of Aircraft Production and his failure as Lord Seal only served to deepen my guilt.He should have resigned from my initial offer, and should have joined the Government first as Minister of Munitions. It would also be convenient if, at this point, I go a little out of chronological order and conclude my story on this side by noting the other cabinet changes which had to be made at the end of November.I have long felt the need for a resident Secretary in Washington who would deal with many of the supply problems with the United States Government which are best dealt with at the ministerial level.Colonel Llewellyn readily agreed that Sir Cripps should take over as Secretary of State for Aircraft Production, and that he would go to Washington to assume the responsible post.Viscount Cranborne, who held the important position of Speaker of the House of Lords, relinquished his Colonial Office to Colonel Oliver Stanley as Lord Seal;Mr Eden agreed to serve as Speaker of the House of Commons in addition to his job as foreign secretary. When Sir Stafford Cripps became Minister of Aircraft Production, the post of war cabinet was replaced by Mr Herbert Morrison.In the past, as Home Secretary and Home Security Secretary, he has used his great administrative skills to enable our Civil Defense Organization to meet the challenges of 1940 and 1941, and now he has an even better opportunity to come Use his political acumen.Our colleagues in the War Cabinet were very keen to have his help in their councils. At a time of these political pressures at home, I take comfort in reviewing the proposals for a postwar world government drawn up by the Foreign Office in negotiations with the State Department in Washington. In October, the Foreign Secretary distributed to the War Cabinet an important document entitled the Four Powers Plan, which stipulated that a committee composed of Britain, the United States, Russia, and China should form the highest guiding body.It is my great pleasure to have my opinion recorded in the following memorandum. Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary October 21, 1942 Although I am busy, I will do my best to answer.It seems very simple to single out these four major countries.Yet we do not yet know what kind of Russia and what kind of Russian demands we have to face.Maybe it will become clear after a while.Speaking of China, I don't think the government in Chongqing represents a great world power.The United States will definitely try to disintegrate Britain's overseas empire by buying people who are not eligible to vote and making them eligible to vote for themselves. 2. I must admit that my thoughts are mainly in Europe to restore the glory of Europe as the mother of modern states and civilizations.It would be a calamity immeasurable if Russian barbarism ravaged the culture and independence of the ancient states of Europe.It's hard to say right now, but I'm confident that the European family will act in unison under a European Commission.I hope for a United States of Europe where borders between nations will be greatly reduced and unrestricted travel will be possible.I would like to see that the European economy will be studied as a whole. I would like to see this committee consist of perhaps ten units, including the former Great Powers, and some of the Union Scandinavian, Danubian, Balkan states, which have an international police system and are empowered to disarm Prussia.Of course, we must cooperate with the Americans in many ways, and in the most important ways, but Europe is our main concern.When the Swedes, Norwegians, Danes, Dutch, Belgians, French, Spaniards, Poles, Czechs and Turks turn to us with urgent problems and demand the utmost strength to make their voices heard Of course we don't want the Russians and Chinese to close the door on us.There is much more to discuss about these issues.Unfortunately, the issue of war is a priority for both you and me. Thus we are approaching the great military climax in which our lives and our deaths depend.