Chapter 142 Volume 4, Chapter 32, Thank You from the Soviet Union

Determination and earnestness to assist Russia in British and American air support to Russia's southern flank: Operation Velvet, President Roosevelt's approval of Operation Torch, the recovery of the Arctic convoy fleet is expected September 6th I call Stalin My further efforts for Operation Cupid must include the Arctic fleet Suspension informs Stalin of communications with the President Danger in the Caucasus: My Confidence The treatment of our merchant mariners in Arkhangelsk and Murmansk Molotov's worst behavior October 5 to me by the President Telegram on aid to Russia Stalin's telegram October 5th October 7th I called the President to express my opinion I briefed Stalin on the Velvet Project his thank you Soviet suspicions and publicity for the heroic fighting of the Russian Army The Germans failed to capture the oil fields Stalin Göhler's Temptation Hitler Displaces Halder The Confluence of the Large-Scale Counter-Offensive Pincer Offensive of the Russian Army: The Destruction of the German Sixth Army on November 23.

I return from Moscow with a new determination to help Russia to the fullest.Obviously, the future winter campaign is an extremely critical period for fighting in the East. The southern flank of the Don River Basin and the Caucasus region of Russia will become battlefields. Seizing the Baku oil fields and controlling the Caspian Sea region will be the direct goal of the German army.I was moved by Stalin's firm confidence in victory, and from his conversations with me in the Kremlin, I knew that he had already planned a huge counteroffensive.We can do little to help this massive battle.What we have to do is to send aid to the Russian army from all sides regardless of the cost.We must also maintain the Arctic shipping fleet and develop the trans-Persian railway.The only direct military assistance we could give was a strong British and American air force in the Caspian region.Even this aid must wait for victory in the Western Desert.During this period, all preparations for this will be actively carried out under the name of the Velvet Project.

As soon as I returned home, I formally presented this plan to the President. former navy personnel to president roosevelt August 30, 1942 The plan to station a British air force on the southern flank of the Russian army, and immediately an American air force, must be considered as part of our long-term policy of co-operation with Russia and the defense of the Persian oil fields.The main reasons for this appear to lie in the following four points: (1) For the general strengthening of Russia's military forces; (2) To set up a forward defensive zone for all our interests in Persia and Abadan;

(3) In order to have a moral effect of camaraderie on the Russian Army, which far outweighs the forces we employ; (4) For instead of dispersing forces, it was more concentrated against the main objective of the Allied Air Forces, which was to wear down the Luftwaffe with daily fighting. 2. Based on the various materials we discussed on this issue in our correspondence, and your views on this issue in principle, when I discussed the general policy with Stalin, I have assumed obligations for His Majesty's government and declared You are also very interested in this.Mr. President, I am now submitting to you a formal draft upon which you may intend to make a decision for me.The draft is as follows:

(1) Propose the establishment of an Anglo-American air force in the Transcaucasus to aid the Russian Army and Air Force in holding the Caucasus Mountains and Black Sea coast fronts.The required air force will be drawn from Egypt as soon as the combat situation in the Western Desert permits, and will be concentrated in the Batumi area of ​​Baku within about two months from that time. (2) The essentials of this proposal have been communicated to Prime Minister Stalin, who readily accepts it, noting that the specific measures of the plan should be further studied.During discussions, the Chief of the Reich General Staff, Lieutenant General Ted and Marshal Voroshilov agreed to start joint planning and preparations immediately and suggested that representatives of the Allied Air Forces should travel to Moscow for this purpose.

3. The air force to be transferred, including the following units (but subject to the consent of the United States): eight squadrons of short-range fighters, one squadron of long-range fighters, three squadrons of light bombers, two squadrons of medium bombers, and one squadron of American heavy bombers , there may be a squadron of ordinary reconnaissance aircraft in the future. 4. Sustaining this force is extremely difficult due to the lack of good ground communications, necessitating a great deal of air transport.It is believed that a US transport fleet of nearly fifty aircraft can sustain the minimum requirements of the Air Force.

5. Therefore, the proposed US assistance is a heavy bomber group currently in Egypt, and a transport group that is not currently available in the Middle East.A bomber group needs to be supplemented by a sufficient number of aircraft and trained pilots.In addition, and above all, every effort should be made to ensure that at least the first-line and supplementary aircraft and crews decided to be assigned to the Middle East, together with the minimum maintenance units belonging to the United States Pursuit and Medium Bomber Groups, would be carried out in accordance with the prescribed The date in Egypt was ready for battle.Even if Rommel were expelled from Cyrenaica, we would still have a heavy responsibility for air defense of Egypt and the long lines of communication in the western deserts.It is also important that the American fighters allocated to the RAF in Egypt be made available in full and on time; for, we must expect a great deal of attrition in the Caucasus, not only in air combat, but also due to Traffic is difficult there, and proper repair equipment is lacking.

6. This air force relies mainly on Russian troops to defend its bases and lines of communication, but we should be prepared to send light anti-aircraft artillery units to defend the airfields.We should also send engineering units to work at the airport. 7. Since the ground crew of this air force can only be assembled and maintained by supplies to Russia brought in from the Persian Gulf route, it is important that this force should be as small as possible and as small as possible to meet the requirements of effective aircraft operations. good.Disruptions to these supplies will not be severe.The build-up of this Air Force ground crew will include moving 12,000 men, 2,000 vehicles, and 4,000 tons of supplies across the rail and sea lines of communication between Iraq and the Caucasus.Assuming that gasoline and lubricating oil can be supplied by the Russians, the future maintenance and maintenance of the Air Force will not exceed 200 tons per day, most of which should be supplied by air.

8. This air force would operate under the strategic command of the Russian High Command, but would remain an all-Allied air force under the command of a British Air Force officer, with claim to its own government. 9. The above matters should be the basis for instructions to be sent to a mission composed of officers of the British and American Air Forces; this mission should immediately be dispatched to Russia to carry out with the Russians the necessary planned reconnaissance and practical preparations.It is extremely important that this matter proceed without delay. The President, who is busy with the congressional elections at this time, gave me a brief answer as follows.

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister August 31, 1942 I shall answer your telegram by Tuesday.I completely agree with the idea you talked about in the telegram and will try to make this idea work with other action plans. We are also working on the Persian Railway, and I will advise you. I am very anxious that we should do our best to send convoys to Stalin. Prime Minister to First Sea Lord August 26, 1942 No one can tell now how far a battle plan like the Torch, once it begins, will take us.Nevertheless, we should now draw up plans for the recovery of the P‧Q‧transportation fleet by the end of October or the beginning of November.The loss of the Operation Torch program (or a significant and promising development in the area of ​​the program) would force (or induce) us to concentrate all forces in the Mediterranean.

Everything will be clear at the end of the campaign, and we will have to act according to the situation at that time. 2. Although I have hinted in my talks with Stalin and put it on the record that Operation Torch would affect the P‧Q‧ transport fleet, I think it is important to tell him something like this at this critical juncture: It is extremely wrong to get nothing after a convoy of convoys.We should therefore try to get the maximum amount of assistance from the President and push the P‧Q plans forward until (or unless) we have to abandon these convoy plans due to the main forces.I still think there might be a way to restore those shipping fleets.If there is no way, it is necessary to find a tenable reason to explain why it cannot be done. In early September, another Arctic convoy set sail.Its adventures have been discussed in a previous chapter [1].I informed Stalin of this operation. 【1】See Chapter 15. Prime Minister to Premier Stalin September 6, 1942 The forty ships of P‧Q‧Transport Fleet No. 18 have set sail.Since we cannot place heavy ships within range of coast-based enemy aircraft, we are manning a strong combat force of destroyers to deal with enemy surface ships should they attack east of Bear Island.To help defend against air attacks, we're also adding a newly constructed Auxiliary Aircraft Carrier to the convoy.Moreover, we are setting up a strong submarine patrol line between the convoy and the German bases.The danger of attack by enemy surface ships remains serious.This danger can be effectively prevented only by having an air shock force in the Barents Sea strong enough that the Germans would no longer venture in that area with their heavy ships, whereas we dared to use them. Our heavy ships operate there. For reconnaissance we are deploying eight Catalina seaplanes and three Spitfires of the Photographic Reconnaissance Team, flying from northern Russia.Thirty-two torpedo planes have been dispatched to extend the attack; they have been lost en route, but we hope to have at least twenty-four still operational. These, together with the nineteen bombers, ten torpedo planes, and forty-two short-range and forty-three long-range fighters which we already know to be supplied by you, will almost certainly not be sufficient to deter enemy activity.More long-range bombers are needed.We are well aware that the intense pressure you are under on the main front makes it difficult for you to supply any more long-range bombers for the Russian Army.But we must attach great importance to this transport fleet. In this fleet, we have dispatched seventy-seven warships, and we need to add 15,000 tons of fuel during the voyage.If you can temporarily move more long-range bombers north, please do so.This is desperately needed for our common good. 2. Rommel's attack on Egypt has suffered serious setbacks, and I am full of hope that we will achieve a decisive victory there this month. 3. The Operation Torch Plan, although three weeks behind the earliest date I suggested to you, is now in full swing. 4. I have expressly proposed to the President that a detachment of British and American Air Forces should be sent this winter to operate on your southern flank, and I am now awaiting his reply.He has agreed in principle and I am looking forward to receiving his concrete plans.Call again when you receive it.In the meantime, as regards the airfield and traffic plans, I wish to proceed as agreed (subject to your approval) by your officers when I visited Moscow.For this purpose, we are eager to send staff officers from Egypt to Moscow as soon as you are ready. 5. We watch with admiration the Russian army's continued brilliant achievements in the War of Resistance.The losses of the German army must be heavy, and winter is approaching.I will report on this visit to Moscow in the House of Commons on Tuesday.I still have the fondest memories of this visit, and I hope you will also find the wording of my report friendly. 6. Please pay your respects to Molotov and express your gratitude for his congratulatory message on my safe return to China.May God bless all our endeavors with success. Prime Minister Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill September 8, 1942 Received a call on September 7th.I understand the paramount importance of the safe arrival of the convoy P‧Q‧18 to the Soviet Union and the necessity of taking measures to defend the convoy.Although we currently have difficulties in bringing in additional long-range bombers to escort, we have decided to do so.An order was issued today for more long-range bombers to carry out the missions you mentioned. I wish you success in the campaign against Rommel in Egypt and a great success in Operation Torch. Arctic Transport Fleet (including twelve ships of P‧Q‧Fleet No. 18) The heavy losses at the time, the deteriorating situation in the Atlantic, and the increasing demands placed on our shipping by Operation Torch forced us to consider whether we could still maintain shipping on the northern route to Russia.I have warned President Roosevelt on this matter. President Roosevelt's Message to Former Navy Personnel September 16, 1942 We are getting ready to take over the Persian Railway, all planning is going on.We are carefully studying the issue of stationing the British and American air forces in southern Russia.Regarding this question, I hope to answer you soon.I highly value the importance of Stalin understanding that we mean what we say.If it is decided not to continue sending convoys, of course I will try to convince Stalin. Now that I am following Cupid's plan with ever-increasing closeness, the urgency of the convoy problem is lagging behind.The reader will recall that I asked the Canadian Commander-in-Chief in England, General MacNaughton, to report on this plan.On September 16, I commented on his report to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Services. Prime Minister to General Ismay, Transfer to the Chiefs of Staff Committee September 16, 1942 Cupid's Battle Plan Keeping in touch with Russia, equipping the Russian army with uninterrupted supplies, and continuing to fight must be considered one of the three or four most important problems facing us.Allies must make the ultimate sacrifice and effort for this.The total collapse of Russia, or the reduction of Russia to military insignificance, would free the entire German army to attack us.The President has said that he considers maintaining the P‧Q‧ transport fleet as a military operation as important as the Operation Torch, although he is prepared to forego one or two transportation missions for the Torch. 2. Therefore, there are two choices before us: (1) Throughout 1943 our task, apart from the Torch Campaign and all military operations connected with it, was to continue to maintain the P.Q. convoy (perhaps with a cut or two).The size of the fleet will indeed have to increase.The Russians have been solemnly assured that they will acquire more supplies, and that, as Russia's territory is reduced by enemy invasion, they will be more dependent on imported arms; (2) Eliminate German forces in northern Norway by using the Cupid plan or similar. When we take into account the losses suffered by these convoys which are dispatched at least three times every two months, and, on the other hand, the serious consequences of declaring that no further convoys can be sent, then Cupid's plan (regardless of its at what cost and risk) is likely to be necessary and the best payoff in the long run. 3. I have now read McNaughton's report, and it certainly does not underestimate the difficulties we face.With this in mind, this report can serve as a basis for further discussions. 4. When winter comes, the Russian army will definitely take an offensive against the German front.The situation in northern Norway is as good as anywhere; and, in view of the fact that the Russian army desperately needs the arms of the Allies, I am convinced, after talking to Prime Minister Stalin, that the Russian army will not only resist the attack on the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk railways, And to start a fierce attack on Bitsammo.In any case, we must know how the Russians are prepared to fight before we can make a definite claim.I imagine, however, that, as McNaughton suggested, the Russians would not only send sufficient forces to northern Norway to attack the enemy, but would also, if necessary, take part in the landings themselves. 5. If the Cupid operation plan is to be included in our plan, it must be considered together with the torch operation plan.We can't yet tell how much of an area the Operational Torch plan will cover.If the French sided with us, the entire Torch region would become a war zone against Germany within a week, or even overnight.If so, we shall have well-fortified ports, airfields, eight or nine French divisions, a considerable air force, and perhaps a French fleet at Toulon.In this situation, the British army can be quickly transported by rail and attack Tripoli from the west.The Germans could not have been armed for a fortnight, or even a month, for a violent attack during this period.They especially couldn't spare the air force.We must hope that the fighting in Egypt and Libya is already raging.Therefore, I think that if the situation on the coast of North Africa is in my favor, a large number of assault ships and tank landing craft may be released and transferred to the north for Cupid.To this would be added all new additions of tank landing craft and attack ships not allocated to the Operation Torch program, which were only being shipped to the UK under the Pollyer program for use in the Encirclement and Extermination program.It is useless to say that the Americans have canceled these supplies, since we have not presented them with a case against such an expensive operation.I firmly believe that I can request from the United States that all the ships originally prepared under the Boli Le plan to supply the April division plan be allocated to the Cupid plan, at least a sufficient number can be obtained.I admit, escorting is difficult. 6. On the other hand, if the French attack the U.S. Army during the Torch Landing and ask the Germans to help them, and the Germans come, or the Spaniards rise up and attack us, then we will have to fight to the death in the Torch Project area; In this case, there is naturally no need to discuss the Cupid plan. 7. I am convinced that we can get two Arctic-trained American divisions, plus the Canadian Corps and several Russian divisions, so that apart from the Russian offensive, we can muster sufficient forces to take the area of ​​Cupid's plan . But if we don't prepare now, not only with written plans, but also now with ordering equipment, training troops, etc. (which will not be available until 1943-44 anyway), we will lose even freedom of choice. No. 8. If the Cupid plan and the torch plan are carried out, then the encirclement and annihilation plan cannot be carried out before 1944.The United States already has such a view, but the Torch Operation Plan itself can never replace the Encirclement and Annihilation Operation Plan. I thought it best to send the plan to Stalin and suggested that MacNaughton be sent to explain it to the Russian High Command himself.At the same time, Stalin must be made to understand that although we are prepared to consider taking action in the Cupid region, due to the preparation of the torch plan, this will inevitably temporarily reduce the number of aid to Russia, and the fleet is about the same size as the P‧Q‧18th fleet Another convoy will definitely have to be cancelled.On September 22nd I sent the following telegram to the President: former navy personnel to president roosevelt September 22, 1942 (I intend to send the following telegram to Stalin:) 1. As I said in Moscow, we were convinced that the most effective contribution we and the United States could make to the defeat of Germany in 1942 lay in launching the Torch Campaign as early as possible. 2. Now the date for the final decision between me and the President is early November. 3. The effect of the Operation Torch Plan must be: (1) to compel the Germans to divert a portion of their air and land forces to counter our actions; threat of attack, this new situation creates further diversionary actions for them. 4. The reason for the considerable success of the last convoy was simply that at least seventy-seven warships were employed in this convoy.Close security on this scale will not be possible before the end of the year, when naval escorts currently assembled for Project Torch will be able to sail to the northern seas again. 5. In the meantime, we are doing our best to make small deliveries of supplies to you via the Northern Sea Route during the remaining months of 1942. 6. We plan to resume the bulk shipment of supplies from January 1943 onwards. 7. In order to reduce the loss of merchant ships from enemy sabotage and thereby maximize the efficiency of the transport fleet in 1943, we would like to study with you the possibility of carrying out Operation Cupid this winter. 8. I therefore propose to you that I send General MacNaughton, Commander-in-Chief of the Canadian Army, to Moscow in early October in order to have a full discussion of the matter with your General Staff.He has made a preliminary inquiry into the matter. This is a tricky problem I'm facing.The President had not returned to Washington at this time, and it was not until September 27 that I received the following reply: President Roosevelt to Prime Minister September 27, 1942 I agree with you that the actual situation requires us to abandon the P‧Q‧19th convoy.Although I also felt that this was a heavy blow to the Russians, I still think that the effect of this convoy, in terms of time and place, compelled us not to take this decision.However, convoy P.Q. Nineteenth will not set sail in any case for ten days, and I feel strongly that the Russians should not be notified when that day comes and until we know for certain that this convoy will not be able to proceed. people.There is no need to inform Stalin too early, and I see no advantage, and it will certainly do great harm.What's more, I believe that within ten days we will be able to reach a final conclusion on the issue of the British and American air forces stationed in Transcaucasia, and Stalin should also be informed about this at the same time. From the point of view of safety, I do not think it advisable to discharge any vessel in Iceland.While we do have a shortage of ships, we may not need the ones dedicated to the Operation Torch program.And I think it would be better for us to make the sacrifice of leaving the ships unused in Iceland than to risk the enemy knowing that we will not send another convoy.I don't think the Torch Program should be delayed for a single day.We will put all our energy into this plan, and I have great hopes for it. I am scheduled to return to Washington on Thursday, and I will send another telegram at that time regarding the stationing of the British and American Air Forces in the Caucasus.I'm having a very good trip.The training of our army is progressing very well and morale is strong.Production is good, but needs to be better. former navy personnel to president September 28, 1942 The earliest departure date for Convoy P.Q. No. 19 is October 2nd, which is only five days from the date stated in your telegram of September 27th.However, if you think it appropriate, we can postpone the notification to Russia until the 7th or even later, as if it had actually sailed. Most of the ships are in Scottish ports.I agree that a firm proposal for air support on the Caucasus side is paramount. Although I do not believe that the German army will reach Baku, the situation in the Caucasus still makes me feel uneasy.I have always made a bet with the Chief of the Reich General Staff on this question, and I used to joke with him at the weekly cabinet meeting: How did our bet go this week?Whether General Wilson's Tenth Army in Persia moves forward depends on our view of the situation in the Caucasus. It's all about timing. Prime Minister to General Ismay, Transfer to the Chiefs of Staff Committee September 28, 1942 General Wilson's proposal to occupy the Persian forward positions was correct in theory, and it appeared that it would go well in practice. Cutting back on supplies to Russia came at a huge cost.The moment of cancellation of convoy P.Q. 19 was by no means the most opportune time to inform the Russians.The question is therefore a matter of timing, and the answer depends on the German advance into the Caucasus.In the six weeks since the Chief of the Reich General Staff and I arrived in Moscow, the situation in the Caucasus has improved markedly.Premier Stalin told me that he must stick to it for 60 days, and now more than 40 days have passed.The Russians have put up the fiercest resistance.Their artillery still controls the borders of Novorossiysk.The invaders did not move forward on the mountain road.It is snowing in the Caucasus mountains.The Grozny oil field has not yet been lost.The fortresses which the Chief of the Imperial General Staff had seen beginning to be built along the Caspian Sea must now be greatly strengthened.Personally, I have always believed that the Russian army will definitely hold its position in the Caucasus Mountains until the spring, and that Baku will not fall this year.I must admit that this opinion is based on emotion rather than scientific basis.However, we must be fully aware that the situation has turned out to be much better than many expected. 2. Based on the above, we can certainly wait another half month before the Tenth Army begins to move forward.By mid-October we should be able to see the whole situation more clearly, and I propose that we then discuss with the Russians and Americans how much to send by the Trans-Persian Railway. 3. President Roosevelt has promised to give an answer to the Velvet Project by October 7 at the latest, and it is estimated that he will agree.The timetable should be based on the assumption that the response was yes.I do not know whether the twenty squadrons called for by Project Velvet included all aircraft, including Army aircraft commanded by our Tenth Army.These air units must be the vanguard of this army group, and they are the forces that defend it, and fall back to it if the situation is unfavorable.Air Force units could be put on a chart even before the presidential call back. 4. If the German attack on Russia in 1942 had been judged to be a failure, it would not be necessary and impossible to decide to mobilize the Tenth Army. However, we are seeing the short-footed combat plan (desert offensive) and This question will be more accurately judged when the progress of the Operation Torch Program is made. The attitude shown by the Russians neither valued our efforts nor understood our difficulties; the following small incident is a sombre example of our relationship. Prime Minister to Molotov September 27, 1942 The Foreign Secretary has told me that he has sent you a cable about the British Naval Hospital in Wayanga being ordered to close and withdraw to the country.It would be my pleasure if you could intervene in this matter yourself.Severely injured people whose limbs were amputated due to frostbite are being transported back here.I must always think of the morale of the merchant mariners, who were quite willing to go to Russia in merchant ships until now.British medical units were sent in only to help, and there was no condemnation of Russian mismanagement due to the pressure of the air raids.The sick and wounded find it difficult to find nurses in the hospital who speak their language.In any case, I would like you to give me some practical reasons for me to be able to answer when this question is raised in Parliament (and it is likely to be raised). All I get is this reply: Molotov to Prime Minister October 2, 1942 In my letter to Mr. Eden, I asked him to inform Mr. Prime Minister of the content of my reply concerning the British medical personnel in Arkhangelsk and Vayenga (Murmansk).I think that if you look at the memorandum of the Soviet Foreign Office of August 27th and my letter to the British Ambassador of September 12th, you will fully understand the truth of the matter and be able to understand the truth of the matter. In particular, it is necessary to draw conclusions about the misconduct of the British naval authorities concerned. This posturing shows clearly how bureaucratic rhetoric is used to destroy all connections between people, even thought itself. On October 5, I received the President's comments on my draft letter to Stalin dated September 22. President Roosevelt to Prime Minister October 5, 1942 I have carefully read your letter to Stalin dated September 22. I strongly believe that we should firmly take responsibility for having an air force in the Caucasus, and that such military operations should not be affected by any other military operations. The Russian battlefield is our greatest reliance today.We do have to figure out ways to provide direct assistance in addition to supplying dwindling supplies.For our part, we will guarantee to replenish the planes we transferred from the Middle East, and will try our best to help you solve your air force problems in the Middle East. As for the question of the convoy P‧Q‧No. 19, I firmly believe that we should not tell Stalin that the fleet will stop.After my talks with Admiral Kim, I wanted to encourage them to adopt a different method of navigation, the main principle of which is to avoid the enemy and disperse oneself.According to this method, the P.Q. Nineteenth Flotilla set sail in batches, each batch consisting of the fastest ships now loaded or loading for Russia.Each batch has two or three cargo ships, escorted by two or three escort ships, and sails every 24 to 48 hours.They would probably have to travel without adequate naval cover, and thus would not be immune to attack from Tirpitz or the heavy cruisers, but it was indeed an adventure we had to undertake.We know that weather conditions cannot be against us every day from the air raid point of view, and that the longer nights are favorable. I believe we will encounter a good opportunity, as we did in the past with the P‧Q‧18th fleet, so that a high percentage of ships arrive safely.I think it is better to take the risk, and in any case not to jeopardize our whole relations with Russia at this time.I know that you and Pound will consider this suggestion of mine carefully.I should tell you that our Ambassador (Admiral Standley) has requested to return home to report some very important news in person; what it will contain I am somewhat apprehensive. Regarding the Velvet Project, the President suggested that I should send the following telegram to Stalin: You will remember our talk about deploying an Anglo-American air force in the Caucasus. I have studied this issue with the President, and we have decided to proceed with this program without delay.I will inform you of the maximum strength of the Air Force that we can muster, and of our plans for building it up in the coming months. He concluded by saying: Please tell me when you wrote to Stalin; I will write him a similar letter immediately.But I am sure that the wording of both of our letters should leave a lingering taste in his mouth. Over the next few weeks I continued to discuss with the President the possibility of Operation Velvet and the ways and means of sustaining the Arctic convoy.On October 5, after almost a month of silence, I received from Maisky the following telegram from Stalin: October 5, 1942 I have to inform you that the situation in the Stalingrad area has deteriorated since the beginning of September.The Germans were able to muster large air reserves in this area in order to achieve a two-to-one air superiority by this means.We don't have enough fighter jets to protect our troops from the air.Even the bravest military would feel powerless without air protection.We especially need Spitfires and Air Cobras.I have fully informed Mr. Wendell Wilkie of these circumstances. 2. Ships carrying arms have arrived in Arkhangelsk and are being unloaded. This is a huge aid.However, given the limited tonnage, we would rather temporarily forego several aid items in order to acquire more fighters. 3. The information from your intelligence service says that Germany manufactures no more than 1,300 fighter jets per month, which is different from our information.According to our information, the aircraft factories in Germany, together with those in the occupied countries engaged in the manufacture of aircraft parts, can produce at least 2,500 fighter jets a month. I send this letter to the President with the following instructions: former navy personnel to president roosevelt October 7, 1942 It is impossible for the P‧Q‧Nineteenth convoy to set sail continuously in batches with fewer escorts as you suggest.It was also impossible to hide from the Russians the fact that the fleet was about to stop.Although Maisky had not been formally notified, he already knew about the situation, and I presume he had reported the general situation to Stalin.We are going to send ten ships separately during the dark period of October. 【1】They are all British ships, and the crew must be voluntary; the navigation is extremely dangerous, and the only hope for the crew is that if they are sunk at sea far from the rescue point, they can wear arctic suits, and the lifeboats are Heating equipment can be installed.If experience proves that the chances are very good, there is really nothing we can do but ask you to help supply some American ships for separate voyages after November 9th. [1] At this time, there were thirteen merchant ships sailing to Russia, but only five arrived. 2. I think dealing with Stalin requires telling the truth, but you suggest that it would be more beneficial to delay telling him for two weeks.I firmly believe that he should be told now. 3. With regard to the Velvet Project, no activities can be carried out before the Egyptian campaign begins.There was a danger that the Germans would draw air from the Russian battlefield to Egypt.It is also possible that they would have to draw a large number of air forces for the Torch Campaign. Although we cannot set an earlier date, I think we can define the composition of this air force with some certainty.Twenty squadrons have been definitely allocated to us for several weeks now, but this can only be finalized with your consent and assistance.I would like to give details of this air force and the times when it is required to go out and engage in combat. 4. I cannot guess what news Admiral Standley will return to report to you, but I cannot believe that there is any danger of a separate peace.俄國戰役一直對希特勒非常不利，雖然俄國人對我們兩國都有怨氣，然而他們並沒有絕望。 五‧因此，假如我們把現在擬定的天鵝絨計劃提出來，加上運送更多的飛機，並在P‧Q‧航線上分批航行的船隻，我相信完全可以在火炬計劃開始之前彌合裂痕。 十月九日我致電斯大林，扼要介紹了天鵝絨計劃。 Prime Minister to Premier Stalin 一九四二年十月九日 我們將在本月底在埃及發動進攻，火炬作戰計劃將於十一月初開始。這些作戰行動必然產生以下效果： （1）或是使德軍派遣空軍和陸軍對抗我們的行動； （2）或是迫使他們接受我們的勝利所造成的新形勢。由於西西里和南歐將受到攻擊的威脅，這種新形勢會使德軍受到牽制。 二‧我們在埃及進行攻擊將使用雄厚的兵力。火炬將是一次重大的作戰行動；參加這次行動的除了美國海軍以外，還有二百四十艘英國戰艦和五十多萬兵員。無論如何要使用這麼多的兵力。 三‧總統和我迫切希望在你們的南翼部署一支英美空軍，並使它在蘇聯最高統帥部的戰略指揮下作戰。我們已發出命令使這支空軍集中並開往駐地，以便他們能在明年年初參加戰鬥。大部分空軍解除在埃及的戰鬥任務後，便可立即從那裡調來我們相信，埃及戰鬥的勝利必屬於我。 四‧十月五日由麥斯基先生轉交的來信中，你要求我國和美國大量增加供應俄國戰鬥機的數量。我們將盡早經由波斯灣航線運來噴火式飛機一百五十架以及相當於五十多架飛機的備用零件。這些飛機及零件一俟準備停當即運送前來，它們是特殊增援，今後我們不可能再提供這種特殊增援了。這是在北方航線原定供應以外的特殊增援（北方航線能使用時當然盡量使用）。關於美國的援助，羅斯福總統當另電奉告。 五‧最近一次船隊中有這麼多船隻安全到達阿爾漢格爾斯克，我極為欣慰。七十七艘軍艦護航，是這次成功的唯一原因所在。在我們即將進行的戰役完成以前，將不能再用海軍護航。等到火炬戰役不再需要護航艦以後，才能再度將它們派往北方海域。 六‧儘管如此，我們打算在此期間盡力經由北方航線運送物資給你們，所用的辦法是使船隻分別航行，而不採用護航隊的方式。我們已作好安排，準備在十月二十八日至十一月八日無月光時期使船隻駛出冰島。除了美國方面的船隻以外，我們自己的十艘船隻已在準備中。這些船隻將單獨駛出，各船之間的距離約為二百哩，有時距離更遠，它們依靠的就是這種躲避敵人、分散行駛的方法。 七‧我們希望從一九四三年一月起恢復採用強大的護航隊的辦法運送物資。 八‧假如不讓德軍利用挪威北部的機場，那肯定會對你們和我們都有很大的好處。倘使你們的參謀人員能擬出一個妥善的計劃，總統和我當立刻研究盡力合作的可能性。 總統已採取了同樣的步驟。 President Roosevelt to Prime Minister 一九四二年十月九日 今天我已向斯大林總理發出下列電報： 英國首相已將他給你的電報的副本寄給我。我們將盡快在高加索部署一支空軍，在戰略上受你們的指揮。我現在正努力為你尋求更多的飛機，並將在不久以後將情況告知。我也正設法把我們的一些商船移交給你們，以便增加你們在太平洋方面的物資運輸。我剛剛發出命令，要求一家汽車輪胎廠為你們進行生產。我們正運送很重要的增援物資到波斯灣，以便增加經由這條航線的供應物資，深信這是可能做到的。我們正在運送大批發動機，各種裝備和人員。我確信我們籌劃已久的作戰行動將獲得成功。斯大林格勒的英勇保衛戰使每一個美國人都熱血沸騰，我們深信保衛戰將獲得勝利。Roosevelt. 十月十三日，我收到斯大林的來電。它既沒有說出什麼情況，也沒有使人得到什麼幫助。 Premier Stalin to Prime Minister 一九四二年十月十三日 我收到你十月九日的來電。Thank you. 這時的氣氛中充滿了懷疑。莫斯科的報紙竟對已是昨日黃花的赫斯事件大加渲染。十月十五日莫洛托夫發表公開談話，要求把赫斯作為戰犯，由國際法庭立即進行審訊。十月二十七日，蘇聯一位主要政論作家在演講中指責阿斯特夫人和克利夫頓集團的陰謀，說他們企圖單獨媾和。 這類無稽之談絲毫沒有影響總統或我自己的觀點或情緒。我們正作出我們的最大努力。十月二十七日，我給外交大臣寫了一個備忘錄： 我確實認為，跟在俄國人的情緒後面跑是十分錯誤的，更不用說跟他們一起獵取荒誕不經的奇聞了。務必讓掌璽大臣（斯塔福德‧克里普斯爵士）使我們集中注意並重溫一下赫斯的故事。材料準備好了以後，戰時內閣就可考慮應否把事實通知俄國政府。我確切地對你說，唯一有利的事是艱苦作戰，爭取勝利。我們正在進行許多戰鬥，將來還要進行更多的戰鬥。假如我們的努力得到勝利，你會發現我們的地位將完全改觀。在此期間，我們應該冷靜地對待俄國人，不因他們胡說什麼而激動，而要堅決地執行我們的任務。你必須記住，布爾什維克已用謊言和捏造的宣傳破壞了許多強有力的政府，他們或許認為他們用這些方法會給我們帶來某些影響。 二‧我已向總統詢問他是否得到斯大林對他的和我的電報的答覆；我正等候他的回電。接到回電後，我將親擬一封電報給斯大林。電文很簡單，我要問問他，他的謝謝你是不是就是對我那封很長電報的答覆，假如如此，那麼他對於南翼方面的二十個空軍中隊，正在運送中的追加的噴火式飛機，以及北極黑暗時期準備一隻一隻地駛往俄國的運輸船等等，打算採取什麼措施。提爾皮茨號現已到特隆赫姆以南去了，因此在火炬計劃第一部分過去之後，或許有可能要重行考慮運輸船隊的問題，但是，問題仍然在於護航艦隻。 與此同時，總統給我發來下列電報： President Roosevelt to Prime Minister 一九四二年十月二十八日 我對莫斯科是否給我們答覆並沒有感到過分煩惱。我肯定他們使用語言的目的和我們不同。 關於在俄國南翼上設立機場的問題，我並未聽到我方有何困難，但我將立即調查我方的情況。 我深信，俄軍能夠熬過今年冬季，我們應該積極進行我們對他們的供應以及派駐一支空軍和他們共同作戰的計劃。 我希望我們能夠對斯大林先生說，我們已百分之百地履行我們的責任了。 冬季幾個月的緊張情況，由於阿拉曼和火炬作戰計劃以及俄軍在斯大林格勒的偉大勝利而有所緩和。在今年年底以前，北極方面的一次輝煌的軍事行動在於使一支船隊安全到達。回想起來，蘇聯之所以有那樣的行為，部分原因在於這樣一種情緒：如果他們能熬過冬天，他們就能拒絕西方的任何直接軍事援助；他們認為這種援助是一種傳染性的接觸，對於他們的威望也是一種打擊。我覺得我們在遭受這樣一個政府的不斷侮辱之後所表現出來的耐心，至少也是值得稱道的，這個政府一直希望同希特勒合作，直到它受到攻擊幾乎被消滅時方才打消希望。 然而談到這裡，卻要簡略地談談俄國陸軍的輝煌戰鬥事跡和決定性的勝利。 德軍為了掃清道路，以便從東南向高加索地區挺進，必須佔領羅斯托夫，肅清在頓河下游彎曲地帶內的俄軍。第一次推進在五月二十八日，是從庫爾斯克和別爾哥羅德的北面發動的。到七月七日，從庫爾斯克北面出動的一支隊伍抵達羅斯托夫的郊外，但未能佔領羅斯托夫。從奧勒爾到沃羅涅日的漫長側翼的防禦任務主要由匈牙利軍隊擔任，而德國第四裝甲集團軍則從頓河西岸南下。後來的一次進攻突破了伊宗前面的俄軍防線，並與向南挺進的部隊會師。最後，從斯大林諾發動的第三次攻擊，迂迴地到達羅斯托夫以北的頓河下游一帶。所有這些行動雖然不如希望的那麼快，卻是大體上完成了計劃。俄軍的抵抗非常激烈，但是，由於敵裝甲與摩托化部隊幾次深入他們的戰線，使他們受到很大困擾，才不得不全面撤退到頓河流域的後面。 三個星期之後，第一階段的戰鬥實際結束，因此，希特勒下令進行第二階段的戰鬥。南路集團軍群現在分成兩部分，一支是由利斯特指揮的A集團軍群，一支是由博克指揮的B集團軍群。希特勒七月二十三日的指示給他們下達了任務。A集團軍群的任務是佔領整個黑海東岸。在佔領邁科普油田之後，一支機動部隊將佔領格羅茲尼。隨即沿裡海挺進以佔領巴庫區域。B集團軍群已在頓河沿岸建立側翼防線，將向斯大林格勒挺進，以粉碎正在該處集中的敵軍，並佔領該域。機動部隊將沿伏爾加河而下直指阿斯特拉罕。 中央集團軍群將進行局部的軍事行動，以便阻止俄軍從該戰線撤走。在北方，九月初將佔領列寧格勒。為此目的，希特勒命令由於佔領塞瓦斯托波爾而騰出手來的第十一集團軍的五個師與北路集團軍群會師，卻沒有考慮到這會削弱他主要攻擊的力量。他們及時趕到，但不是展開進攻，而是防禦由於俄國進攻而被突破的德軍戰線。 德國A集團軍群向高加索的進軍，是由克萊斯特的第一裝甲集團軍的十五個師打先鋒的。他們一過頓河，便沒有遇到什麼抵抗，進展很快。八月九日到達邁科普，發現油田已被破壞無遺。另一支縱隊於八月二十五日拿下莫茲多克，但在捷列克河被阻，未能進抵格羅茲尼油田。巴庫油田是所有油田中最大的油田，尚在三百哩以外。黑海岸邊的諾沃羅西斯克於九月十日被攻佔；俄國黑海艦隊在塞瓦斯托波爾陷落後曾躲避在那裡，現已駛往圖阿普謝，並留在該地。希特勒要求拿下全部黑海沿岸的命令未能實現。在中路，德軍已進抵高加索山麓，但未能繼續前進。俄軍的抗戰，在得到由黑海西岸的鐵路運去的生力軍的增援以後，全線都趨於穩定。克萊斯特的部隊由於分兵攻打斯大林格勒而遭到削弱，他一直打到十一月。十一月二日他佔領了納爾奇克。此後，冬季條件妨礙了行動，克萊斯特便智窮力竭了。 在德國B集團軍群的前線發生了比失敗更糟糕的事。斯大林格勒誘惑了希特勒；這城市的名稱就是對他的挑釁。這個重要城市是一個工業中心，也是防止他強行突入高加索側翼防線上的一個強大據點。這個城市成為一塊吸鐵石，把德國陸軍與空軍的主力都吸引過去了。 德國第四裝甲集團軍轉身南下企圖幫助A集團軍群渡過頓河，也招致了嚴重的後果。它推遲了向斯大林格勒的進攻，在它再度轉向東方之前，業已退往頓河對岸的俄軍正進行整頓。俄軍的抵抗日漸堅強。直到九月十五日，德軍在頓河和伏爾加河間進行了激烈戰鬥之後，才進抵斯大林格勒的郊區。十月間，德軍以巨大的傷亡作代價在攻城戰鬥中獲得了一些進展。但是，俄軍以熱情的獻身精神在城市廢墟中進行激烈戰鬥，什麼也制服不了他們。 早已心神不安的德國將領們當然是更加焦急了。經過了三個月的戰鬥，這次戰役的主要目標高加索、斯大林格勒和列寧格勒仍在俄軍手中。德軍傷亡慘重，而補充力量又不足。希特勒不但不派新兵去補充傷亡的人員，反而用新兵組成為新的未經訓練的師。軍事專家們認為，這正是住手的時候，但是，這個啃地毯的人是聽不進去的。九月底希特勒的參謀長哈爾德終於因抗拒他的主子而被撤職。希特勒鞭策他的部隊繼續進軍。 到十月中旬，德軍的處境顯著地惡化了。B集團軍群的正面戰線延伸七百哩。保羅斯將軍的第六集團軍已在斯大林格勒耗盡了力量，現在已疲軟無力，而保衛它的側翼的卻是戰鬥力十分可疑的盟邦軍隊。冬季臨近了，俄軍必然會進行反攻。如果頓河前線守不住，高加索方面德軍的安全就不能維持下去。但是希特勒不同意任何撤退的建議。十一月十九日，俄軍進行了他們準備已久的英勇的包圍戰，猛撲斯大林格勒南北兩面的防衛薄弱的德軍側翼。四天以後俄軍的鉗形攻勢會合了，德國的第六集團軍被圍於頓河和伏爾加河之間。保羅斯建議突圍。但希特勒卻命令他堅守陣地。日子一天天過去，他的部隊的地盤越縮越小。十二月十二日，天寒地凍，德軍拚命突破俄軍的包圍圈，力圖解救被圍的第六集團軍。他們失敗了。此後，保羅斯和他的部隊雖然熬過了七個可怕的星期，然而他們覆滅的命運已經肯定了。