Chapter 145 Volume Four, Chapter Thirty-Fifth, Darlan's Interlude

Status of General de Gaulle and Free France My telegram to President Roosevelt November 11 His reply November 12 Eisenhower to Algiers French in North and West Africa following Darlan's orders The general disquiet I reminded the President of his public statement on November 17 of Marshal Smuts's views expressed locally from the sentiments expressed in Britain by the Darlan affair and the secret meeting of the House of Commons on December 10 of French military and civil officials. State of mind The House of Commons in the name of Marshal Pétain was persuaded that Darlan was assassinated on December 24th for his tragic life.

The facts presented in the previous chapter are only a brief account of events and their sequence in the Middle East.Although these events were political, they were as much a part of the campaign as the actions of troops or ships.When dealing with Darlan, General Clark adopted the only method consistent with the main purpose of this campaign, which was to try his best to win the support of the French and avoid bloody conflicts between the French and Allied forces.He displayed boldness, tact and decisiveness.It was Eisenhower's responsibility to accept and support what Clark was doing.The two American officers, both brigadier generals a year ago, acted with a high degree of courage and wisdom.Nonetheless, their actions have raised questions which, by their moral and emotional nature, are extremely important to the American and British peoples.Their actions also reverberated among the Allies.Since I had always been confident that I knew the soul of France, I was naturally concerned at the President's extreme hostility to de Gaulle and his movement.Because after all, de Gaulle and the movement he led were the core of the French resistance and the flame of French honor.

former navy personnel to president roosevelt November 11, 1942 It is undoubtedly of the utmost importance that every effort be made to unite all French who hate Germany.Hitler's invasion of non-occupied France would be an opportunity for this unity.I am sure you will realize that His Majesty's Government has a very clear and sacred obligation to de Gaulle and the movement he leads.We must give them a fair deal.I think that you and I should do everything we can to avoid setting up two opposing governments in exile under your sponsorship or mine.We must try to unite all French parties opposed to Germany and form a coalition government.It may take time, and nothing should stand in the way of military action; but we should make it clear what our goals are and what we are working for.

In the meantime we have evidently won a decisive victory at El Alamein. President Roosevelt to Prime Minister November 12, 1942 It is with great joy to receive the latest news of your glorious success in Egypt and of the joint landings of our two countries in West and North Africa.In this case, it is timely to consider the next step to be taken once the enemy forces on the southern Mediterranean coast have been cleared and brought under our control.Preferably you and your Chiefs of Staff are in London, where my Joint Chiefs of Staff and I can study the possibilities, including marching into Sardinia, Sicily, Italy, Greece, and other parts of the Balkans, and trying to Turkish help in order to include the possibility of attacking the German flank through the Black Sea.

With regard to de Gaulle, I have so far been quite at ease in entrusting him to you. Apparently now I'm having the same problem with Brother Giro.I fully agree that we must not pit the French émigré parties against each other, and I have no objection to de Gaulle sending an envoy to Algiers to meet Giraud.It must not be forgotten that a bitter quarrel was going on between Giraud and Darlan, both of whom claimed command of all the French troops in North and West Africa. The main thing is to make these three protagonists realize that the current situation is purely in the military category. Whether it is a decision made by any one of them or a decision made by the three of them, it is all important. Subject to review and approval by Eisenhower.

I also thought it best to find out exactly what instructions de Gaulle had sent before his emissaries set off for Africa. On November 13, General Eisenhower flew from Gibraltar to Algiers to assume responsibility for the matter Clark had just negotiated with Darlan and assume direct command.Local Allied generals and officials agreed that Darlan was the only Frenchman capable of winning Northwest Africa to the Allies' side.The myth that Giraud could make the French loyal to him had been debunked by this time, so he expressed his willingness to cooperate with Darlan after hearing that Germany had invaded the unoccupied areas of France.Darlan's power has been demonstrated by the fact that Oran, Morocco and all of Algeria obeyed his ceasefire order.So on this day, Darlan and Eisenhower signed a final formal agreement.In London, I think Eisenhower's actions were well justified militarily.On November 14, I sent him a telegram saying:

Military first, but political issues must be resolved in the future. I sent the following telegram to the President: former navy personnel to president roosevelt November 15, 1942 We do not believe that the solutions proposed have allayed our doubts and concerns, and that the solutions are not permanent or sound.Nevertheless, in view of the paramount importance of a rapid advance, and of the strength and articulateness of the Supreme Allied Commander, our generals present, including Admiral Cunningham, All agree.We see no alternative but to accept the proposal proposed by General Eisenhower in order to maintain the temporary stability of the place and to acquire the important places in Tunisia.

2. Convinced that you will consult with us to formulate long-term measures based on the consistent policy of uniting all French people who are willing to fight Hitler. When the facts of the Darlan Agreement were made public, it aroused widespread anxiety in Britain.I also felt the growing agitation of public opinion around me.Many of my close friends also considered it a vile business, directed against an enemy with whom we had a mortal feud, and in the eyes of many of my close friends the key to our unprecedented campaign Victory, and that of Alamein, have been overshadowed by it; and I was very sorry to find this out.I find their attitude unreasonable and inconsiderate of the brutality of war and the lives of soldiers.As their criticisms grew sharper, I grew angrier and a little scornful of their short-sightedness.But I know why they are so angry, and I feel the same way myself.Although the reaction in the United States was not as strong as in the United Kingdom, many people were very excited.I don't think President Roosevelt cared much about the excitement, let alone the excitement of the British.

former navy personnel to president roosevelt November 17, 1942 I should let you know that the agreement with Darlan aroused great anger.The more I thought about it, the more I was convinced that it could only be an expedient resorted only to the exigencies of war.The perception that we are willing to compromise with the local Quislings has negative political consequences for our common cause, not only in France but throughout Europe, and we must not ignore it.Darlan was notorious.It was he who, by raising his subordinates to command the French navy, made the French navy ill-willed against us.It was he who sent the French navy to fight your fleet off Casablanca, and killed these French sailors.This matter seems like yesterday, and now Darlan has turned to us again for the sake of power.A permanent agreement with Darlan, or a Darlan government in French North Africa, would be beyond the comprehension of the millions of ordinary people whose sincerity is our strength.

2. I personally believe that we should continue to fight first, and put negotiations in the second place; after hearing the news that General Eisenhower is expected to send the vanguard of my First Army to attack the German forces in Tunisia and Bizerte within a few days, We are extremely happy. The President replied as follows: President Roosevelt to Prime Minister November 18, 1942 I also ran into a strong rage against Darlan.I think I should have acted sooner, so I have made a statement at the press conference, which I hope you are satisfied with, and which I hope people will not doubt the sincerity of.

He telegraphed this public statement [1] to me.I was relieved after reading this statement: 【1】Excerpt. I agree with the temporary political arrangements made by General Eisenhower in North and West Africa.I fully understand and agree with those in the United States, Great Britain, and all the other allies who feel that, given the history of the past two years, no permanent agreement should be entered into with Admiral Darlan.The peoples of the Allied Powers would also never understand why a revamped Vichy government should be recognized in France or any French territory.We have always been against the French who supported Hitler and the Axis countries. No one in our army has the right to discuss the future government of France or the French Empire.The future French government must not be formed by any individual in France or abroad, it can only be formed by the French people themselves after they have been liberated by the victory of the Allies.The present arrangement in North and West Africa is merely an expedient measure necessitated by the urgency of the war. His statement went on to say: Our primary military purpose is to save the lives of the American and British troops as well as the French.The second is the important factor of gaining time. Every day of delay in the present war gives the Germans and Italians an extra day to prepare themselves for resistance, to dig trenches for their defense, and thus necessitate a large-scale battle for our side to win.This once again shows that the current swift offensive can save more lives than we are forced to delay for more than a month.The reports I have received show that the French in North Africa put all political questions in the background, giving priority to a common front against a common enemy. This public statement both agrees with me and pleases the public. former navy personnel to president roosevelt November 19, 1942 Your public statement about Darlan is the best solution to the problem.But I also share your and Eisenhower's eagerness to hope that we will gain the greatest benefit from the cooperation of the French in the operations ahead.I also fully realized that if Darlan and his men had really done their best in the battle, they would naturally be credited.I am convinced that we are completely in agreement on this point.Best regards. General Smuts was with us at home at this period, and I took great comfort in my views being so close to his.After a long talk with me, he was already on his way back to the battlefield in South Africa by plane, and after a full discussion in Algiers, he expressed the following opinion in a matter-of-fact manner: Field Marshal Smuts to Prime Minister November 20, 1942 After I arrived here in the morning, I had a long conversation with Eisenhower and Cunningham. The results of this long conversation are briefly reported as follows.On the question of the operations to be fought next Sunday or Monday, it was doubtful whether Anderson would be strong enough to take Bizerta, but Tunisia seemed more certain.In any event, every effort will be made to compress the enemy's forces into an as small an area or bridgehead as possible to destroy him by air or other attack.Further south from this point our army will attempt to clear out small isolated groups of the enemy at Sfax and elsewhere, but at present no large forces are prepared to be used against Tripoli.Losses at sea have so far been compensated.Our loss of troop carriers was replaced by an equal number of French ships, and for every merchant ship we lost, a submarine was sunk. With regard to Darlan, the French leaders there have been greatly disturbed by the declarations which have been made. It is dangerous to go too far. Noguet has threatened to resign. A move may cause serious consequences.From the point of view of securing French cooperation and stabilization, the worst thing is to give the French the impression that we are only using these leaders to achieve our own ends, and once our ends have been achieved , kick them away.There can be no doubt that Darlan and his comrades have sunk their boats in this war and are doing their best to fight the Axis and rally the French to our support.The French are cooperating with us on non-combat tasks and even on small-scale operations, but due to the lack of regular weapons, their combat effectiveness is not high at present. Darlan is not led by Eisenhower, but by other French leaders. Those chosen, some of whom were also his enemies, were our supporters; they agreed that his leadership and co-operation were necessary to our war effort.It would be a serious mistake to give the impression that he will be kicked away anytime soon. The military situation may require his retention for a long period during which an impression to the contrary should not be given publicly. I explained to Eisenhower that I did not think it would be possible to repeat the statement already made or even make it more egregious, since that statement was intended only to reverse the impression that we had come to terms politically with the Vichy elements.Future political arrangements should be determined by the consensus of the governments concerned and the French people. I think it would be best for you to convey my strong impression to President Roosevelt that further statements against Darlan might be detrimental to our cause and are actually unnecessary.We're leaving this evening and I'll be calling again from Cairo.I was fortunate enough to have a one-night chat with you yesterday, and I benefited a lot.Thank you very much. The president kept telling me how he felt. President Roosevelt to Prime Minister November 20, 1942 Yesterday I spoke privately to the press of a maxim of the ancient Greek Church in the Balkans, as it seems applicable to our present Darlan-de-Gaulle problem: My children, in times of calamity, you may Walk with the devil until you get off the bridge. Regarding North Africa and other areas that may be added in the future, I think you and I could consider appointing a British and an American who have no power over civil affairs but have veto power over French executives and order in rare cases They carry out certain policies.For example, I have informed Eisenhower that all political prisoners in North and West Africa must be released.If Darlan did not carry out this order, Eisenhower must immediately assume the authority of his Supreme Commander to act alone on this issue. General Eisenhower telegraphed me on December 5th: I assure you again that we are not part of a conspiracy (except for the local establishment) to put Darlan at the head.He is indispensable here, for all practical help we have received has come through him alone.If you only consider the five hundred miles of communication that stretches from here through the mountains to Tunisia, you will see that the French there could have bludgeoned us so hard that we Quickly withdraw to those ports where supplies can be obtained from the sea.Giraud quickly gave up trying to do us any favors; thanks to Darlan we are now fighting the Germans in Tunisia instead of near or even further west than Bounay.In our opinion, Boisson and Darlan have irretrievably pledged their allegiance to the Allies. The expediency mentioned by the President distressed Darlan deeply, and he began to feel that he was increasingly isolated.At this time he wrote to General Clark the following letter: Your Excellency General: From here and there, sources have confirmed the perception that I am nothing more than a lemon to be thrown away after being squeezed dry by the Americans. I don't care about personal status, otherwise why should I take such a step in the pure patriotism of a Frenchman when it is easy to ignore the situation and let it go its own way, and it is extremely unfavorable to me personally? action. I did this solely because the United States government had solemnly promised that it would restore the integrity of French sovereignty to what it was in 1939; Marshal Pétain has solemnly protested against this being completely occupied and torn. I did this not out of pride or ambition or any intention, but because I held a position of authority in my country and it was my duty to do so. All my life I have been loyal to my country, and I am determined that when the sovereignty of France becomes a fait accompli, I hope this will be achieved in the shortest possible time and I will retire and live in seclusion for the rest of my life. The admiral remained in office only because he believed that the Allied High Command in North Africa at the time could not do without him, and that he was the man in power.On November 22, the so-called Clark-Darlan Agreement was signed, establishing a provisional body to administer the area.Two days later, under the lobbying of Darlan's representative, the Governor-General of Boisson led the French West Africa and Dakar, an important base, to revolt and belong to the Allies. But the deal with Darlan sparked outrage in Britain.It was the indignation of some of my friends who had been most indignant at the Munich Agreement which inspired me to act in those critical moments before the war.Is that what we fought for?they asked.Many of my most like-minded people are extremely distressed.That de Gaulle committee and organization is also sowing discord among us, fanning the flames.Newspapers fully reflected the sentiment.This must be a good opportunity to make a big fuss.Not only the parliament, but also compatriots all over the country can hardly believe that de Gaulle was ostracized and Darlan was supported.However, neither the facts can be publicly stated nor debated openly. In my mind, I have never had the slightest doubt (whether rightly or wrongly) that it was my duty to support General Eisenhower and save the lives of the soldiers who gave their lives in this war, but I have no doubts about arguments to the contrary. Extremely sensitive, and, though I despise this contrary belief, which I have given up, I can understand it. On December 9th, I communicated my unease to the President: former navy personnel to president roosevelt December 9, 1942 In recent days I have been troubled by reports received from North Africa concerning the situation in French Morocco and Algeria.These reports from various reliable sources are consistent in describing the consequences of our failure to exercise adequate control over the internal administration of the French authorities in the present circumstances.I am sure that you are well aware of the situation, but I consider it my duty to let you know the situation as it appears in our own reports. 2 These reports show that Legionnaires (a Vichy organization for veterans) and similar fascist organizations are still at work persecuting former French sympathizers, some of whom have not yet been released from prison.The first reaction of these groups to the Allied landings was, of course, fear, but they now seem to have plucked up their nerve, regrouped, and continued their activities.Those well-known German sympathizers who were expelled are now reinstated.In this way, we not only strengthen the prestige of our enemies, but also make our friends feel helpless and depressed.There have been several instances of French soldiers being punished as fugitives for attempting to support the Allies when we landed. The next day, December 10th, a month after landing, feeling the increasing pressure from all walks of life, I attempted to get out of my predicament by conclave of the House of Commons.My sole purpose in delivering that speech was to reverse the prevailing opinion at the time, and I chose carefully the points I presented. I began by saying some harsh and cautious words. The question we ask ourselves should not be whether we like what is happening but how we intend to treat it.In wartime, things don't always go exactly how you want them to be.In cooperation with allies, it sometimes happens that they have their own views.We have not been able to determine American policy since 1776.This is an American expedition, for in this expedition their ground forces will end up being double or triple ours, and their air forces will end up being triple ours. This was true at the time, but it was soon refuted by the facts, as we shall see. At sea, our forces undoubtedly accounted for a far greater proportion than the US military, and of course we carried out a lot of organizational work and assistance in all aspects.Nevertheless, the United States still considers the expedition to be an expedition of American troops under the principal command of the President of the United States, and the United States considers Northwest Africa to be a theater under their care, just as we regard the Eastern Mediterranean as a theater for us.We have acknowledged this from the beginning and are now fighting under their command.That doesn't mean we don't have a great voice, and, of course, I have the closest relationship with the president.However, this does not mean that we directly control the development of events, either militarily or politically.Because public debate on American policy or Anglo-American relations is so detrimental, His Majesty's Government has asked the House of Commons to call this private meeting.The only way to discuss this in a secret meeting is to avoid offending our great ally and complicating our relationship with the French who, whatever their past, are now firing on the Germans . I am by no means defending Admiral Darlan.Like me, he was the object of the slanders of Herr Hitler and of Mr Laval.Other than that, I have nothing in common with him.But the House of Commons must recognize that the American government, and most of the American people, see Darlan differently than we do.He has not betrayed them.He has not broken any treaty with them.He didn't hurt them.He didn't abuse any of their citizens.They didn't think much of him, but they didn't hate him and despise him so much as we English do.Many among them believed that the lives of their soldiers were more important than the past resumes of French politicians.Besides, the Americans maintained to the last moment a very close relation with Vichy, which I think was beneficial to our general interests.At any rate, the position of the Americans in Vichy at least gave us a window into that courtyard which did not exist. Until recently, Admiral Lehai was ambassador to Vichy.He had a close relationship with Marshal Petain.He has been using his influence to keep Vichy France from becoming an ally of Germany, or the Vichy government when we have to fire on Vichy forces in Oran or Dakar, in Syria or Madagascar. We declare war.On all the occasions above mentioned, I believed that France would not declare war on us, and it is well documented that I expressed my opinion in advance; but one of the reasons for my opinion, It is the enormous influence of the Americans on the French as a whole, which naturally became even greater after the United States entered the war.Admiral Lehigh was a close friend of President Roosevelt and had recently been named the President's personal chief of staff.It is necessary to start from such a situation to view the attitude of the US President and the State Department towards Vichy and all its actions. I shall now dwell at length on a peculiar state of mind of the French, which is in fact common to the great majority of the ruined French.I am by no means defending this state of mind of the French, much less praising it.But it would be foolish not to know what is going on in other people's minds, or the secret motives that make them react accordingly.The wise Almighty God believes that the French must not be pinched to look like the British. In France, which has undergone many great transitions monarchy, national assembly, directorate, consulate, empire, monarchy, empire, and finally a republic, a principle based on the rule of law (droitadministratif) has arisen , the actions of many French officers and officials in times of revolution and change undoubtedly followed this principle.It is an extremely law-abiding habit of thought, born of the latent consciousness of national self-defense against the danger of absolute anarchy.For example, any military officer who acts in obedience to the orders of his legal superiors, or what he considers to be his legal superiors, will never be punished in the future.Therefore, in the minds of French officers, the question is mainly whether there is a direct, uninterrupted legal chain of command. to be important.Therefore, although many French people admire General Gaulle and envy his current status, they still think that he is a person who rebelled against the French national regime; and these defeated people think that it is their Vernon who represents this country. Marshal Pétain, the hero of France and the only hope of France, the famous and venerable Marshal Pétain, an old defeatist. Yes, all this may seem comical to us.But it is very important to us in this matter that it was in accordance with the orders and instructions issued by Marshal Pétain, or allegedly issued by him, that the French troops stationed in North-West Africa ceased to continue to attack The British and American troops fired, and turned their guns on the Germans and Italians.I'm sorry to have to mention this, but to a soldier it makes all the difference whether a man shoots at him or at his enemy; even the soldier's wife or father must have felt the same way. All this was done in the holy name of the marshal who, when he feebly issued orders to the contrary or deprived Darlan of his nationality on the phone, the admiral felt at ease that regardless of Is it fact or fiction that the Field Marshal was under pressure from the invading German devils to do so, and he, Darlan, was still carrying out the Field Marshal's true wishes.To tell the truth, if Admiral Darlan had to shoot Marshal Pétain, he would have done so in his name. But I have to say that I personally think what General Eisenhower did was right in the circumstances; The big question depends on when, to block or stop him.I will never use the Americans or anyone else as my shield. The pressure I felt led me to say a few angry words at the end of my speech. To tell the truth, I think that if one were to be involved in an event of this magnitude in Africa (whether it be West or East Africa), there would be no other reason than the agreement reached between General Eisenhower and Admiral Darlan to cause him If you are not interested in something, then this person is a poor person who is prejudiced and does not know whose allegiance is due.The battle for the tip of Tunisia has now reached its climax and the Great War is imminent.On the border of Cyrenaica, there will soon be another contest.Both battles will be fought almost entirely by our soldiers.The British 1st and 8th armies would go all out.I cannot forget these men and their victories, and I hope the House of Commons feels the same way. I ask the House of Commons to give due rebuke to the few ill-intentioned and well-meaning men who have maliciously sought to spread such shameful and unfounded suspicions, that we may all unite to overcome the difficulties resolutely and successfully. I have given hundreds of speeches in my life, but never have I felt such a change in the opinions of the audience as in this one.This speech was not for applause, but only for results.The House of Commons was persuaded, and after this conclave there was no further opposition from Parliament, thus silencing the hostile press and reassuring the nation.At the same time, people feel all the more elated because a battle has been won after months of disappointment or defeat. General Eisenhower, in his book written after the war, confirms what I have just said, from his own point of view, factually and with military grace: It is understandable why the officers of the French Army did not like de Gaulle.When France surrendered in 1940, the serving officers of the French Army accepted the advice and orders of the French government and laid down their arms.In their view, if the path chosen by de Gaulle is correct, then all officers who obey the orders of the French government are greedy for life and afraid of death.If de Gaulle was a loyal Frenchman, they must consider themselves cowards.These officers naturally did not want to consider themselves cowards; on the contrary, they considered themselves loyal Frenchmen carrying out orders issued by a civilian government, so they were bound to regard de Gaulle as a deserter, both publicly and privately. At the end of 1942, the political situation in North Africa deteriorated rapidly, not only among Darlan, Noguey, Poisson and other people who had recently revolted, there was a violent rivalry against Giraud and for power and favor, And among those who had aided the Allied landings on November 8, and among the small but active group of enthusiastic de Gaulle supporters, discontent was palpable. There were also calls for the Count of Paris, now reclusive in Tangier, to be brought out as head of a provisional North African wartime government opposed to Vichy.Darlan became head of the civil administration and Giraud became commander of the French armed forces in North Africa on the basis of that patchwork agreement, which is now shaky. On December 19, de Gaulle's first emissary, General François Dastier de la Vigerie, arrived in Algiers in a private capacity to inform his leader.He was the brother of Henry, who had been a leading figure in the Algiers uprising of November 8, and who had by then participated in the Royalist plot to bring the Count of Paris to power.The Gaullist's visit was tentative.He held talks with Giraud and Eisenhower on the 20th and 21st of December. He formally proposed to them that the Free French Forces would like to cooperate with them militarily, but no decision was made.The visit of General Dastier de la Vigerie actually only served to further push the Gaullists against Darlan.While these talks were going on, the royalists in Algiers decided to force Darlan to abdicate and hand over power to an all royalist government.Until now, we don't know exactly how many people supported them at that time. On the afternoon of December 24th, Darlan drove from his villa to his office in the Summer Palace.He was attacked by a twenty-year-old youth named Bonnie de la Chapelle at the door of the office.The admiral died on the operating table of a nearby hospital within an hour.According to some legends, the young Assassin was related to Henri Dastier, and after much instigation he set out to save France from its wicked leader.There was no one in Algiers who publicly supported this move, except a small group of his close friends who supported Dastier.On the orders of General Giraud, he was court-martialed and, much to his surprise, shot by firing squad shortly after dawn on December 26. Immediately after hearing the news of Darlan's assassination, General Eisenhower rushed back to Algiers from the Tunisian front.Under the circumstances, there was nothing to do but to appoint General Giraud to fill the vacancy.We must not allow civil disarray in the rear, so the American authorities exerted indirect but categorical pressure to secure Giro's appointment as the supreme but temporary head of the North African regime. 不論達爾朗被暗殺這件事是多麼罪大惡極，它卻使盟國不必再因為與他合作而感到為難，同時，它又使盟國得以坐享在盟軍登陸的緊要關頭他所能給他們的所有方便。他的職權順利地轉交給在十一和十二兩月裡按照美方當局的意向所成立的那個組織。吉羅補了達爾朗的缺。這樣一來，障礙便告掃除，使當時集結在北非和西北非的法軍，和戴高樂所領導的自由法國運動得以攜手合作，從而使不在德國統治下的世界各地的所有法國人得告團結一致。戴高樂在接獲達爾朗被刺的消息後，便首先主動提出這樣的建議。當這消息傳到倫敦時，他正要啟程前往華盛頓，與總統進行拖延已久的首次會晤。他當時立即起草了一封電報，通過盟國轉致吉羅。我認為，推遲訪問華盛頓，以期能團結法國的抗戰力量，乃是明智之舉。因此我便打電報給總統，說明情況，並將戴高樂致吉羅的原電副本附上。 former navy personnel to president roosevelt 一九四二年十二月二十七日 我已請求駐倫敦的美軍總部將戴高樂所乘的飛機推遲四十八小時起飛，以便靜觀火炬作戰計劃地區形勢發展如何，這事我已告訴過哈里了。我認為我們首先應當力圖把他們團結在一起，組織某種堅強而團結的法國核心，以便能與之合作。我今天將和戴高樂會晤，餘情容再電告。 二‧我深信不能因為象徵計劃（我們的卡薩布蘭卡會議）之故而暫不解決北非問題。我們獲悉，該地的法國知名人士已一致推選要人為高級專員兼總司令。我已告知艾森豪威爾說，我方完全贊同這一解決方案。 三‧戰時內閣對任命麥克米倫和他到達（阿爾及爾）極為重視。我們深以在該地沒有我們的代表為苦，但是該地又與我們的命運息息相關，而且我們正盡力為你們的事業作出實際貢獻，墨菲的任命既已宣佈，我希望你也能同意我發表麥克米倫的任命。我深信他將會發揮作用。他充滿了對美國最友好的感情，而他母親是肯塔基州人。 電文後附有戴高樂通過倫敦美國大使館轉致吉羅的電報： 一九四二年十二月二十七日 在阿爾及爾所發生的暗殺是一種標誌和警告：它標誌著法蘭西的悲劇使法國人的思想和靈魂慷慨激昂到何種程度； 它警告由於在我國歷史上空前的一次國難中，缺少一個全國性的當局所必然產生的種種後果。建立這樣一個當局乃是當務之急。親愛的將軍，我謹建議你和我應當盡快在法國領土上相晤，或是在阿爾及利亞，或是在乍得，以便探討將國內外和法國所有領土上一切能為解放和拯救法蘭西而鬥爭的力量團結在一個臨時中央當局下的途徑。 像達爾朗海軍上將那樣，由於判斷錯誤和性格上的缺點而付出了那麼慘重代價的人誠屬不多。他是一個職業軍人，個性堅強。他一生致力於重建法國海軍的工作，從而使法國海軍的地位提高到法國歷代王朝以來從未有過的地位。不僅是海軍的軍官團，而且全體海軍官兵都矢忠於他。在一九四○年，他原應按照他所再三允諾過的那樣，命令法國艦隊駛到英國、美國或非洲的港口去，不論何處，只要是德國人鞭長莫及的地方即可。除了他自願作出的保證以外，沒有任何條約或義務迫使他這樣做。但是，等到他在一九四○年六月二十日這個不吉利的日子，從貝當元帥手裡接受了海軍部長的職位時，他的這種決心就改變了。從那時候起，大概是由於身為部長之故，他便失忠於貝當元帥的政府。由於從一個海軍軍人搖身一變成為政治家，他便由一門他對之有著淵博知識的業務轉而從事另一門工作，在這門工作裡，指導他行動的主要就是他的反英偏見，我已經說過了，這種偏見始自特拉法加之役，因為他的曾祖父便是在那次戰役中陣亡的。 在這種新情況下，他表現得既有魄力而又果斷，但並不完全了解他所做的大部分事情的道義上的意義。野心促使他犯了種種錯誤。在他當海軍上將時，他的眼界只局限在他的海軍上，而在他當海軍部長時，他的眼界也只局限在當前的局部或個人利益上。一年半以來，他一直是支離破碎的法國的強有力的人物。當我們在北非登陸的時候，他無疑是那位年事已高的元帥的繼承者。就在此時，他遇到了一連串的驚人的事件。由於他兒子生病的偶然機會使他來到了阿爾及爾，因而他就成為英美權力支配下的人物了。 我們在前面已經敘述過他所經受的種種痛苦。整個法屬北非和西非都寄望於他。希特勒侵佔維希法國一事，使他有權作出新的抉擇，也許這種權力是無可厚非的。他為英美盟軍帶來了一種正是他們所求之不得的東西，那就是，一個能使全體法國官兵在這個目前陷入戰火之中的遼闊的戰場上聽從召喚的法國聲音。他為我們盡了他最後的努力，因此，由於他投奔我方而獲益非淺的人不應在他死後辱罵他。一位嚴酷而公正的法官也許會說，他原應拒絕和他曾經中傷過的盟國談判，而藐視它們的嚴厲懲罰。我們也許都願意他另作選擇。這種抉擇使他喪了命，但是即使他不死，他的生命也沒有多大意義了。顯然，他在一九四○年六月沒有把法國艦隊駛到盟國或中立國的港口去是錯誤的；但是他的第二次的驚人的抉擇卻是正確的。恐怕他最引以為憾的便是他未能把土倫艦隊爭取到我們這邊來，因為他始終宣稱絕不讓它落到德國人手裡。在這件事情上他並沒有失敗，歷史可作他的見證人。願他安眠，願我們大家都感謝上蒼，我們從來沒有必要面臨使他身敗名裂的那種種考驗。