Chapter 146 Volume 4, Chapter 36, Various Problems Brought by Victory

Staff plan to expand the results of Operation Torch My memorandum of November 9, 1942 My memorandum of November 8 of the same year I still hope to cross the English Channel in 1943 Combat A Confused Telegram From Washington My Telegram to President Roosevelt on November 24 Dispelling Misunderstandings The President's Telegram to Me on November 26 I Send to President Roosevelt on November 25 Memorandum to the Committee of Chiefs of Staff dated 1st advocating an attack on Sicily first. Another memorandum to the Committee of Chiefs of Staff dated December 3. Russia's incomparable war of resistance and its impact on the Western Front. The need for a full reconsideration I still hope In 1943, the encirclement and annihilation plan was carried out.

People in the U.S. military, not just the most senior ones, believed that a large-scale campaign across the English Channel into French-occupied areas in 1943 was absolutely impossible once the Operation Torch Plan had been decided upon.I can't agree with this view yet.I still hope that after just a few months of fighting we will be in possession of French Northwest Africa, including the tip of Tunisia.In that case, we could still attack France from the British in July or August 1943 and occupy the 837th arrondissement.I am therefore very tempted to proceed with the creation of an unprecedentedly strong American force in Great Britain, subject to the permission of our ships, during the Operation Torch Program.The possibility of hitting the enemy with our right hand and our left hand, and the fact that the enemy must be prepared to be beaten on both sides, seem to be most consistent with the economy of war.As for whether we will attack across the English Channel, or take advantage of the victory in the Mediterranean, or even both at the same time, it depends on the development of the situation.For the overall situation of the war, and especially for the aid of Russia, it seems extremely necessary that the Anglo-American allied forces invade Europe from the west or from the east in the coming year.

But at the time there was a danger that we might not do either of these two things.Even if our campaigns in Algeria and Tunisia were concluded quickly and victoriously, we might be content to take Sardinia or Sicily, or even both, and postpone the Channel crossing until 1944. .For the Western Allies, this would mean wasting a year, with results that would not endanger our existence, but could negate a decisive victory.We lose 500,000 to 600,000 tons of ships every month, and this situation cannot be allowed to continue.What the Germans most desire is the stalemate between the two sides. These questions were being considered by the British Chiefs of Staff at a time when we did not yet know the outcome of the Battle of Alamein or the Operation Torch Plan, or of the great war in the Caucasus.The combat planning committee under their leadership is also busy.I thought their reports were overly negative, and I expressed my opinion on them to the Chiefs of Staff on November 9, while the North African landings were still in progress.

It would be a pity if, in 1943, after Operation Torch and Alamein were over, we took advantage of the victories and occupied Sicily and Sardinia.We have agreed with the United States to carry out the encirclement and annihilation campaign plan in 1943, which is the largest combat operation.The present insertion of the Operation Torch Plan must not be used as an excuse to be content in 1943 with an attack on Sicily and Sardinia or some sporadic operations like Dieppe (which is really not enough to follow).The combat effort in 1943 should obviously be a constant preparation to attack the Continent in order to contain the enemy in northern France and the Low Countries with a strong force, and to attack Italy decisively, and even better to attack the south of France, and to carry out some operations without loss. Military operations with too many ships and other forms of pressure in order to bring Turkey to fight alongside us so that we can join the Russians in their overland invasion of the Balkans.

If we use North Africa as an excuse to hold down our strong forces and take a defensive position, and call this an obligation, it would be better not to attack this area in the first place.When Hitler was preparing for a third offensive against the Russians in 1943, did we think the Russians would be content with us standing still for that year?We must try to set foot on the Continent of Europe in 1943 and fight the enemy, however dire the prospect may be. On the 18th, I expressed my opinion as follows: According to our agreement with General Marshall concerning the Encirclement and Bolero plans, by April 1, 1943, we would have twenty-seven American divisions and twenty-one British divisions, plus all The necessary landing craft, etc., are ready for combat to attack the European continent.This work is already officially underway, and a large part of it is already complete.Later, we started preparations for the Torch Operation Plan, which is now underway.

However, the Torch Operation plan used only 13 divisions in total, while we originally planned to use 48 divisions to attack the enemy in 1943.We therefore reduced the forces originally intended to attack the enemy to thirty-five divisions.Admittedly, the distance from here to the theater of Operation Torch is longer than the distance across the English Channel, and this should be taken into account.But we have already told Stalin that we will attack the Continent in 1943, and we are now working on the basis of thirty-five divisions, which is a larger number than planned for April-July 1943. The number of months for this period is less, in other words, a little more than a quarter less.

It is wrong to ignore this situation, or to think that this contradiction will not be discovered.Personally, I think that our and General Marshall's estimates of our capabilities at that time, such as the transportation capacity of ships and the preparation speed of the US special landing craft, etc., were undoubtedly too high.But between what the Chiefs of Staff thought in the summer of 1942 it could do in the 1943 campaign and what they now say we can do in this campaign, The difference is striking.I am not making any accusations as I am personally responsible for this.But I think we must study this question particularly thoroughly.I'm afraid I'll have to make a trip to America recently.

We obviously played a little too much for the plan for 1943 this summer, but we are obviously playing a little too little now.I must emphasize again that the Torch Operation Plan can never replace the Encirclement and Annihilation Operation Plan. We must not forget that we originally planned to carry out the Encirclement and Annihilation Operation Plan while fighting in the Middle East. Now that Rommel has been wiped out, we You can sit back and relax in the Middle East.In fact, we've lowered our tune almost to the point where it couldn't be lowered.I don't know what the Russians will say or do when they find out.My personal attitude is that I still advocate the plan of encirclement and annihilation operations, but postpone it until August.I will never give up this proposition until someone can cite a large number of facts and figures to prove that this is actually impossible.However, if these figures prove that this is indeed impossible, all the ambitions and judgments that we and Americans have made this summer will be in vain.

I never wanted the Anglo-American forces to stand still in North Africa.North Africa is a springboard, not a sofa. Maybe we'll be able to wrap up the fighting in the Mediterranean by the end of June so we can plan the encirclement and extermination operations in August.We ourselves must come to a consensus before a decision is made on this question at the highest level. Thus a double stalemate developed between the two countries on both sides of the Atlantic.The British staff favored an offensive in the Mediterranean, attacking Sicily and Sardinia, targeting Italy.American specialists gave up all hope of crossing the English Channel in 1943, but tried to avoid letting the Mediterranean entangle them in carrying out their grandiose plans in 1944.I wrote at the time: It seemed that all the concerns on the British side were compounded by those on the American side, which had been voiced faithfully by their respective militaries.

The U.S. staff, with its undue love for logical, definite decisions, no matter how desirable they may be, about which I have ventured to mention in previous chapters the fact that, once the decision was made to proceed with the Operation Torch Plan, was Preparations for the Polejo program in the UK have been decisively slowed down.In late November, we received a written notice from the US government that took everyone by surprise.At that time there were many rumors in the United States, saying that I was trying my best to oppose the plan to cross the English Channel on a large scale in 1913. Open up a second front.My following telegram to the President should, incidentally, and I hope forever, have all this nonsense swept away.

former navy personnel to president roosevelt November 24, 1942 We have received a letter from General Hartle stating that, according to the instructions of the U.S. Department of War, any formation of more than 427,000 people must be carried out by your own manpower and material resources. Lend-Lease supplies are not provided.This made us extremely uneasy, not because of Lend-Lease, but because of overall strategy.Our side has been preparing for 1.1 million soldiers under Project Polile, and this is the first notice we have received that this goal is about to be abandoned.Prior to this, we did not know that your side had decided to abandon the plan of encirclement and annihilation operations at all, and all our preparations were in full progress in accordance with the Bolile plan. 2. I think it would be a pity if it were decided to abandon the plan of encirclement and annihilation.The torch operation plan can never replace the encirclement and annihilation operation plan, and only thirteen divisions were used, while the encirclement and annihilation operation plan originally planned to use forty-eight divisions.What I said to Stalin in Al's presence was, of course, based on a deferred program of encirclement and annihilation operations, but I never suggested that we should not be in 1943, or even in In 1944, a second front was opened in Europe. 3. Mr. President, this question must be given very careful consideration.General Marshall's argument that the main force of France and the Low Countries can only be committed to France and the Low Countries by a plan of encirclement and extermination, and only in this area can the main force of the British Home Air Force and the United States Overseas Air Force enter the battle; impression.One of the arguments we use against the Bash program is that it will exhaust in 1942 the capital required for a much larger program of encirclement and annihilation than it had in 1943.It is true that we both overestimated the power of our shipping, but this error can be remedied by time.Only by building up an encircling and annihilating army here as quickly and continuously as possible while satisfying other urgent needs for ships will we be able to grasp the strength to fight to the death with the main force of the enemy and liberate the countries of Europe.But despite our best efforts, it is very likely that by 1943 our strength will not reach the required level.In that case, however, it would be all the more necessary to ensure that this level was reached in 1944. 4. There may be a good opportunity even in 1943.If Stalin got his wish and attacked Rostov on the Bank of the Don River, the German troops on the southern front would suffer a great disaster.We are fighting in the Mediterranean following Operation Torch and may force Italy out of the war as well.Morale in the German army may also be generally low, so we must be ready to take advantage of any opportunity that arises. 5. Mr. President, please be sure to tell me what the reason is.This news and the way it has come to our side confuse us greatly at the moment.I think it absolutely necessary that General Marshall and Admiral King come here with Harry, or that I come to you with my staff. The president immediately corrected the misunderstanding caused by the subordinates. President to Prime Minister November 26, 1942 Of course, we have no intention of abandoning the plan of encirclement and annihilation operations.No one can predict whether we will have the opportunity to attack across the English Channel in 1943. Obviously, if we have the opportunity, we will not miss it.But to decide how many troops the Bolele plan will require in 1943 is a strategic issue that needs to be considered by both of us.It is my present opinion that we should, as soon as the military operations currently under way allow, establish an increasingly powerful attacking force in the United Kingdom, ready to use should Germany collapse, or, if Germany is then intact If you take no damage and take a defensive position, then build a large army. The conclusions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting held in London last summer indicated that the build-up of the required forces in the United Kingdom had to be suspended in order for Operation Torch to be launched.Our studies have shown that, as a result of our need to initiate and continue the Operation Torch Program, no more troops and materiel can be sent to the United Kingdom at the present time than General Hartle has proposed.North Africa, of course, has priority until the outcome of the battle in Tunisia is in doubt, until our strength and materiel to North Africa are insufficient to meet a possible response from Spanish Morocco.The forces and supplies we have invested in the Southwest Pacific have far exceeded my expectations a few months ago.Nevertheless, we will proceed with the Polejo project as quickly as our shipping and other forces allow. At this time, I tried to take a comprehensive look at the situation in the Mediterranean. memorandum from secretary of defense November 25, 1942 In making a decision in such a wide-ranging war situation, it is sometimes better to try to carry out a major military operation for which one is responsible firmly to the end, and to make the rest subordinate. List them together as well.After meeting the requirements of this major military operation as much as possible, the status of other aspects of the battle situation will naturally be properly placed.In addition, only by continuously strengthening major military operations can the enemy obey our will and regain the initiative. 2. Our main task at present is firstly to occupy the African coast of the Mediterranean Sea, and to establish there the necessary naval and air force facilities for opening an effective military channel; secondly, to use the bases along the African coast to effectively hit the underbelly of the Axis powers【1】. [1] That is Italy.translator 3. Therefore, it can be divided into two stages: the consolidation stage and the development stage.Let's talk about the consolidation stage first.We can expect General Alexander to occupy all of Cyrenaica within the month and to advance against the enemy, perhaps even Siirt, defending the position at Aghera.We may also assume that, if the British and American forces advanced with the present inexorable momentum, at the same time, or soon thereafter, the British and American forces would become the masters of all French North Africa, including Tunisia. 4. Air stations must be established at appropriate intervals along the coast of Africa under our control, especially at the top of Tunisia.The largest airfield for American bombers should be established here, so that the long-range bombers sent by the United States to North Africa can cooperate with the American bombers already established in the Middle East to bomb targets in Italy.American daylight bombing would be most effective in the better climate of the Mediterranean. 5. As long as the weather is more favorable for bombing Italy than Germany, Italy should be given the taste of British night bombing. 6. The attack on the airfields at Catania and Cagliari, in order to prevent the enemy from attacking Tunisia while our side is consolidated, is undoubtedly necessary. 7. As soon as we are firmly established and consolidated in French North Africa, especially in Tunisia, there should be two consecutive military operations.The first is to advance towards Tripoli.General Alexander may be able to take this important place from the east, and I have consulted him on the matter, and how long he thinks it will take; but we must also account for the possibility of a rapid advance from the west.Would the two British divisions commanded by General Anderson be enough if the U.S. Army and the French Allied forces could hold Tunisia?Please provide your best estimate of the time required. 8. The second immediate target is obviously Sardinia or Sicily.Occupying either of these two islands and those airfields in the south will form an aerial triangle in which we should seize and maintain air supremacy.Moreover, the constant close-range raids on Naples, Rome, and the Italian fleet bases, from any one of these islands, would make the war on Italy extremely violent.Please prepare a report on this immediately so that a decision can be made.No matter what choice is made, we should try our best to take advantage of the lack of aircraft in the Axis powers and start the air battle to seize the air supremacy in the Central Mediterranean as early as possible.Note that the preparations for an attack on Sardinia may be as long as those of an attack on Sicily, but Sicily is undoubtedly far more important than Sardinia. The rest of the memorandum deals with the need to get Turkey into the war.These arguments are of course referred to later in this book. I then returned to the most important project of crossing the English Channel in 1943. memorandum from secretary of defense December 3, 1942 Last April, General Marshall told us of the plan of operations that came to be known as encirclement and extermination, of which Poleer was the logistical part.A strong argument is that only the encirclement and annihilation scheme would have brought large numbers of American and British forces into direct contact with the enemy, and brought the British Home Air Force and the American Overseas Air Force to their highest potential.The American military circles were unanimous in their approval of this operation, and preparations have been going on according to the Polile plan ever since, interrupted only temporarily by the Operation Torch.As a supplement to the plan for the encirclement and annihilation campaign, a plan for a crushing attack was proposed in July.The Anglo-American Joint Staff agreed that there should be a Torch plan instead of a Bash plan.At the same time, continue to carry out the Bolile plan and prepare for the postponed or opportunistic encirclement and annihilation plan. 2. However, the U.S. staff believed that abandoning the Bash Operation Plan and adopting the Torch Operation Plan actually made it impossible to realize the Encirclement and Annihilation Operation Plan even if it was postponed.One of the reasons for this was that by 1943 Russia would be so weakened that Hitler would be able to bring back large numbers of troops from the Eastern Front, leaving insufficient forces for the planned encirclement and extermination operations in that year.Another argument they make is that, since the allocation of ships to Operation Torch will greatly delay the time required to muster forces for the Encirclement and Annihilation Operation, so that by the offensive season of 1943, even if the enemy Our forces are weak, and we are unable to land on the European continent.Consequently, the American military staff expected that their troops would have nothing to do in the United Kingdom, a situation that the President and General Marshall were keen to avoid. 3. In addition to the above-mentioned situations, the phenomenon of ship tension has obviously become serious.Work on building landing craft and training crews, while largely still, has slowed.Operation Torch is in full swing, and it will require a large number of ships, and we can also imagine that there will be a variety of operations on Brimstone (Sardinia) in the future. But the scale is not small. 4. Conversely, we promised the Russians that we would open a second front in 1943.In front of Mr. Harriman, the representative of the United States, I explained to the Russians the plan of the campaign of encirclement and annihilation.These conversations in Moscow were duly reported to the President.If our land offensive against Germany and Italy in 1943 had been reduced to about thirteen divisions from the nearly fifty divisions originally told to Stalin, I think Premier Stalin had very good reason to complain.Moreover, apart from all obligations to Russia, I consider the scale of our offensive operations for 1943 to be too small compared with the manpower and material resources of Britain and the United States. V. Recent events of great importance have changed and are changing the arguments which have hitherto guided the thinking of men on both sides of the Atlantic.The Russians were not completely defeated or devastated in the war of 1942.On the contrary, it was Hitler who suffered a crushing defeat, and the German army suffered heavy casualties.According to General von Thoma[1], of the 180 German divisions on the Russian front, many of them consisted of less than a brigade.The morale of the Hungarian, Romanian and Italian armies on the Eastern Front has clearly been demoralized.The Finnish army, with the exception of a few mountain units, has ceased fighting. [1] Captured at Alamein 6. There are several battles currently going on in Stalingrad and the central part of the front lines of other countries, and the outcome has not yet been decided.The Russian offensive is likely to have a profound impact on Germany's strength.If the German Sixth Army, now besieged in front of Stalingrad, is annihilated, the Russian offensive to the south may reach its destination, Rostov on the Don.Under such circumstances, the position of the three German armies remaining in the North Caucasus, which had already been attacked by the Russian army, would not only be in jeopardy, but might even be wiped out. In this way, the consequences would be immeasurable.The Russian offensive in the central part, and their counter-offensives at many points throughout the front, could have reduced the German front to winter positions.Winter will make the already exhausted German army preparations difficult, although they currently have a better railway system.Before the end of 1942, we may at least be able to safely draw the conclusion that in 1943 it was impossible for Germany to transfer a large number of troops from the East to the West.This will be a new fact of paramount importance. 9. Events in France have compelled the Germans to withdraw eleven of the forty French and Low Countries divisions which had been stationed across the coast from England in order to defend the southern coast of France.Their task of policing the interior of France has become more onerous.They might have to find another four or even six divisions of manpower to counter the threat of Operation Torch, to defend and suppress Italy; and to defend Sicily, and perhaps Sardinia.The resistance movement in Yugoslavia is still going on, the Axis powers will not get respite everywhere in the Balkans, on the contrary, they will have to reinforce because of the overall situation and because Turkey may enter the war we will work on it Greece, Romania and Bulgaria.None of these things came up when the London Conference in July considered plans for encirclement and thrashing. I therefore think it necessary to re-examine the whole situation in order to find out the means by which the American and British forces could make a direct attack on the Continent.For this purpose, the assumptions mentioned in the preceding paragraphs should be based.In addition, it should be assumed that there is a sufficient air force on the coast of North Africa, and that by the end of March the military movement in the Mediterranean will be unimpeded, so that the tension on the ships will be greatly relieved; all military operations like landing on Sardinia should be completed by the beginning of June; all landing craft, etc., necessary for the plan of encirclement and annihilation operations should be returned to England by the end of June; preparations and maneuvers should be carried out during July; August or, if the weather is not favorable, September should be the starting point. period of attack. I kept giving General Marshall details through Deal, and I was greatly relieved to learn that General Marshall agreed with my arguments. Field Marshal Deal to Prime Minister December 14, 1942 I had a private conversation with Marshall, and he was overjoyed to know that you were thinking as he did.But he made it clear to me that he was not sure about our future strategy when the war in North Africa was unclear and Eisenhower had not been consulted. 2. However, he increasingly believes that we can do so if we send American troops to Britain as soon as the Axis forces in North Africa are cleared, instead of sending them to Africa to expand the gains of Operation Torch Carry out a revised plan of encirclement and annihilation operations before the summer (1943).He believed that such a military operation would be far more effective than Operation Brimstone or the Husky Operation, would be more economical in shipping, would be more satisfying to Russia, and would contain more of the Luftwaffe. It is also the most effective way to prevent German attack through Spain. III. Marshall would naturally be happy to discuss these issues with you and the Chiefs of Staff, but since the views of the US and the UK are so close, he sees little need for such an interview. So far, I have told readers my views on the war situation at the end of 1942.Of course, events proved that I was overly optimistic about the prospects for the war in Northwest Africa and that the American staff believed that the decisions we made in July concerning the Operation Torch Plan would make it impossible for us to The idea of ​​planning an encirclement and annihilation campaign is correct.And it is true.At that time, no one could have predicted that Hitler would spend a lot of effort to transport hundreds of thousands of elite troops by sea and air to the top of Tunisia for reinforcements, regardless of the heavy sacrifice.What he did was a serious strategic error.This indeed delayed our victory in Africa for several months.But if he had not used these troops captured or wiped out in May, he might have used them to reinforce his retreating lines in Russia, or to muster enough forces in Normandy that, even with our determination, we could Plans for encirclement and annihilation operations could not be carried out in 1943.Hardly anyone now doubts that the decision to wait until 1944 for the encirclement and extermination program was wise.I did not deceive Stalin, I have a clear conscience.I have done my best.On the other hand, as long as we are able to attack the Continent from the Mediterranean in our next campaign, while the Anglo-American forces engage the enemy in full force, I will have no dissatisfaction with the choice which fate and facts force us to make.