Chapter 147 Volume 4, Chapter 37, We Need to Meet

Our Army Frustrated in Tunisia General Eisenhower's Decision on Christmas Eve Rapid Eighth Army Advance Necessary for a Summit Conference My Telegram to President Roosevelt November 26 His Reply December 3 On December 3rd, I objected to holding talks of a purely military nature, especially in Moscow. Stalin could not leave Russia. I called the President again to hold an Anglo-American meeting without delay. Letter from the President on December 14th. Meeting in Casablanca All set to go Q Admiral Anglo-American disagreement on strategy We are not going to Casablanca empty-handed Alexander's report on Montgomery's push ahead Hoping to capture Tripoli.

The offensive in North Africa was apparently frustrated at this time.Although we have the initiative and win by surprise, the reinforcement of our troops is very slow, which is also helpless.There were few ships in the first place, and the air strikes by enemy planes on Algiers and Bounai affected the unloading work.There is also a lack of land transport.The five-hundred-mile single-track coast railway was in bad shape, and any one of its hundreds of bridges and culverts could be destroyed.With the arrival of large numbers of German troops in Tunisia by air, an excellent, tenacious and violent resistance began.At that time there were more than 100,000 French troops on our side.Most of them are well-qualified local troops, but they are still poorly equipped and poorly organized.General Eisenhower placed all of his American forces under Anderson's command.We put all our strength into it.A brigade of British infantry and part of the 1st American Armored Division attacked and took Mejaz, and by November 28 they had nearly reached Jedida, only twelve miles from Tunis.At this point, the winter campaign has reached its peak.

Then came the rainy season.It rained cats and dogs.The temporary airport built by our army turned into a muddy pond.The Luftwaffe, though outnumbered by us, could fly from good airfields, rain or shine.Their counter-offensive on 1 December spoiled our planned attack, and the British brigade was forced back to Medjez a few days later.Frontier troops can only get a small amount of supplies from the sea.This ration was actually just enough to satisfy their hunger, let alone store it up.It was not until the night of December 22 that our army could resume its attack.At the beginning, they won a small victory, but from the dawn of the next day, it rained heavily for three consecutive days.Our airfield is no longer usable, and our vehicles can only be driven on bad roads.

At a conference held on Christmas Eve, General Eisenhower decided to abandon his plan for the immediate capture of Tunisia and instead stick to the advancing airfields on the occupied front.Although the Germans suffered heavy losses at sea, their strength in Tunisia continued to increase.By the end of December they numbered almost 50,000. While these battles were going on, the Eighth Army was also making great progress. Rommel finally withdrew the remnants of his troops from Alamein to Aqella.A patrol of the long-range Desert Air Force Brigade, already concealed in Al Qaira, has been watching, calculating and reporting all movements along the way.His rearguard was vigorously pursued by us, but attempts to hold them south of Benghazi failed.Rommel stopped at Agera as Montgomery was overcoming the transport and supply difficulties of his predecessor after his long march.

On December 13, the 2nd New Zealand Division drove him out of Aguila in a major detour and almost cut off his retreat.He suffered heavy losses, with the Desert Air Force taking heavy damage to his vehicles on the coast road.Montgomery could only pursue with light troops at first.Since the Battle of El Alamein, the Eighth Army has advanced twelve hundred miles. After capturing Siirt and its airfield on Christmas Day, our army attacked Rommel's second major position near Birat at the end of the year. In the telegram sent to me by the President on November 26, part of which I have quoted in the previous chapter, he also proposed a meeting of representatives of the three national staffs.

I think that as soon as we get the Germans out of Tunisia, a British, Russian and American military strategy conference should be held.I hope our military situation in Africa develops to allow us to have such a meeting within a month or six weeks.I am sure that the Chiefs of Staff of our two countries' Joint Staff will make recommendations in the next few days as to what steps to take next, but I feel strongly that we must sit down with the Russians for a meeting.My idea is to hold a conference in Cairo or Moscow, with a small number of representatives from each of you and me, in secret.The conclusions reached at the meeting were, of course, subject to the approval of the three of us.I might send Marshall as head of our delegation, but I think all three services should be represented.I think it would be best to have no more than three representatives from each of our countries.

I hope you can let me know your opinion on this proposal as soon as possible. I called back to the President that same day, saying that I did not think a meeting of experts would solve our problems. Former Navy Personnel to President Ross November 26, 1942 I fully agree in principle that a conference should be held with the Russians.But I very much doubt that a conference of officers on general strategic matters can do much more than settle certain particular problems.If the Russians sent a delegation to Cairo (which I think is unlikely), their mandate would be so limited that they would have to consult Stalin in Moscow on all important questions.If the conference had been held in Moscow there would have been no delay, but I hope that the British and American delegations will have at least a mutually agreed common view on which to base the talks before going to Moscow.

If you send General Marshall, I hope he will not pass through our country. I thought I could tell you in advance what the Soviets would say.They will ask our two countries, how many German divisions will you fight in the summer of 1943?How many German divisions did you fight in 1942?They will certainly demand that we open up a strong second front in 1943, a massive attack on the Continent from the West or the East, or both.I heard this argument a lot when I was in Moscow, and these questions need to be answered by the people in charge or the people in charge of the navy and shipping transportation, so they must also be present.At present, it is very difficult to get all our chiefs of staff to take such a long time.

Stalin told me in Moscow that he would like to meet with you and me in a certain place this winter, and he proposed Iceland.I pointed out at the time that England was no farther than Iceland, and more convenient.He neither accepted nor rejected this opinion at the time.Meanwhile, holding a new tri-Atlantic conference in Iceland has many other problems besides the weather.Our ships may be moored together in Halffjord, and we will have to find a suitable warship for Stalin to use, which will still have to fly the Soviet flag for the time being.He had spoken enthusiastically at the time of his willingness to fly and his comfort with Russian aircraft.Only in meetings of the most senior people can real results be achieved.What do you think if it is suggested to be held in January?By then the enemy in Africa would have been cleared, and the great battle in southern Russia would have been decided.

I also want to say that if I can really persuade you to go to Iceland, you must come to our country before returning home, otherwise I will be very dissatisfied. On December 3rd, the President called me again. President Roosevelt's Message to Former Navy Personnel December 3, 1942 I have thought long and hard about our proposal for a joint conference with the Russians, and I agree with you that only a personal meeting between you and Stalin can satisfactorily draw the major strategic conclusions to suit the military situation.What I mean is that each of us can take a very small number of entourages, including our chief chiefs of land, air and naval staff.I am going to take Hopkins and Harriman, but not any State Department representatives, although I think we should agree on a preliminary procedure to be adopted should Germany collapse.I think the meeting would be best held around January 15th or shortly thereafter.Before the meeting, Tunisia should have been wiped out, and Rommel's army should have been wiped out.As for location, it is impossible for me to go to Iceland or Alaska during the current season, and I believe Stalin did as well.I would argue for a slightly safer place south of Algiers or in or near Khartoum.I don't like mosquitoes.I think the meeting should be kept in the utmost secrecy and closed to the press.I think it would be better for Marshall or anyone else not to go to England until after the meeting, because I don't want to give Stalin the impression that we both had settled everything in private before meeting him.

I think you and I know each other so well that there is no need to hold a meeting beforehand, and we can discuss it at any time when we have a meeting.Our military personnel should also continue to work closely together from now on. I think that the outcome of this meeting is likely to bring the defeat of Germany sooner than we originally expected.As you know Stalin has agreed to a purely military conference in Moscow and I have telegraphed him today to urge him to meet you and me.I believe he will not refuse. I think the oasis of Anle is better than the raft of Tilsit [1]. [1] Tilsit, a seaport thirty miles northeast of Kaliningrad, on the Neman River, is rich in timber.translator I immediately reply as follows: former navy personnel to president roosevelt December 3, 1942 I am very pleased with your suggestion, because only in this way can a good plan be made for 1943.At present we have no plans for 1943 that can be called grandiose or worthy of developments.It's great to have you here, and I'd love to meet you anywhere.I have called Stalin to support your invitation. 2. At the same time, I am against sending our military representatives to Moscow.This just leads to deadlock and messes things up.We still think that Marshall, King, and Arnold should be here beforehand so that when we meet somewhere in Africa in January, we will at least have some definite plans on which to base our talks.Otherwise, Stalin would ask us when he saw us: You promised me to open a second front in 1943, but why haven't you made a plan yet? 3. Khartoum is at your disposal. The climate, security and communication conditions of the place are extremely satisfactory.I will tell you about the living conditions in this place tomorrow.We will take pride in being able to do our best as a host.I've never heard of any oases south of Algiers, though I'd love to know.I personally vouch for the living conditions in Marrakech and, with very few exceptions, the climate is generally good. 4. A military council of the highest order like this should have the necessary personnel. For my part, I intend to take Eden from the War Cabinet and the Chief of Staff or Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, plus a capable Secretariat, cipher clerks, map room staff, etc., about twenty-five people. 5. As for the time, the sooner the better.Every day is precious.We can safely expect the fighting to end in Tunisia by the end of December and in Tripolitania by the end of January.We should not wait for these battles to actually end. All hope of attacking Europe in 1943 depended on an early decision. 6. However, everything depends on whether Bagis is willing [1] or not. [1] A line from the novel "David Copperfield" by Charles Dickens.Here it refers to whether Stalin is willing.translator As the following correspondence shows, he turned out to be unwilling. Prime Minister to Premier Stalin December 3, 1942 The President told me he suggested that the three of us meet somewhere in North Africa in January. This is far better than the Icelandic proposal we were talking about in Moscow.You can get anywhere in North Africa in three days, mine in two, and the President about as long as you need.I sincerely hope you will agree.We must decide as early as possible on the most ideal scenario of attacking Germany from Europe with all our strength in 1943.This issue can only be resolved by a meeting of the governments and heads of state of the three countries, with their senior experts at their side.Only by holding such a conference will it be possible to share the whole burden of the war according to our respective capabilities and possibilities. Prime Minister Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill December 6, 1942 I am in favor of holding a summit meeting of the heads of governments of the three countries in order to determine a common military strategy. However, I am very sorry that I will not be able to leave the Soviet Union at that time. Since it is impossible to arrange our meeting, can't we discuss these issues by means of correspondence between us?I admit there is no disagreement between us.During January, some battles will not calm down, and may become more intense. I am awaiting your reply on the question of opening a second front in Western Europe in the spring of 1943 in a passage in my last letter to you. The battle in the Stalingrad area and on the central front is progressing smoothly.We surrounded a large number of German troops in the Stalingrad area, hoping to wipe them all out. In reply to the same telegram that I had sent, the President expressed deep disappointment with Stalin.He said so to me. I think it would be wrong for our staffs to be in Moscow to discuss any major military action planned for next summer.As a matter of fact, first, the major military operations they propose cannot bind your government, or our own, and second, these final plans must first be carefully studied by our domestic staffs in both countries before we can approve them. So if it is proposed to hold a meeting of the three military staffs of the United Kingdom, Russia and the United States in Africa, whether it is in Algiers, Khartoum or other suitable places, what do you think?The results of this meeting and the recommendations made will of course be studied by the three heads of state before final approval. My opinion remains the same.While I am pleased that the President sees the disadvantages of holding a meeting of experts in Moscow, I am also not in favor of holding such a meeting in Khartoum or Algiers.I am convinced that it would be a waste of time, and after many long After the password telegram, it is likely to cause a deadlock on the spot, and it will even become more and more deadlocked.Only when the heads of state or government of the three countries sit face to face can the major problems that need to be resolved be resolved.Why did Stalin's refusal to attend the Tripartite Conference prevent Britain and the United States from holding an early meeting?Yet the President seemed determined to hold a tri-nation military conference, and I had to agree with him in principle.On December 17 he forwarded to me Stalin's latest reply on the main question of holding a tripartite summit.Stalin said: (I also) have to express my deep regret to you that I was not able to leave the USSR recently or even at the beginning of March.Business at the front required me to be constantly with my country's soldiers, so I couldn't get away.So far, I don't know what specific issues you, Mr. President, and Mr. Churchill want to discuss at our joint meeting? I don't know whether we can use communication to discuss these issues.As long as we don't have the opportunity to meet, I don't think there will be any disputes between us. Allow me to express to you my conviction that the opportunity has not been lost, and that you, Mr. President, and Mr. Churchill, will do what you both did about the The promise of a second front in the spring will make it a reality that the British and American forces will open a second front in Europe in the spring of next year. In view of the various rumors circulating about the attitude of the U.S.S.R. to the use of Darlan and his like, my colleagues and I believe that Eisenhower's approach to Darlan, Boisson, Giraud, etc. was entirely correct Yes, let me tell you this is probably not unnecessary.I think it is a great achievement for you to put Darlan et al on the course (? mainstream) of fighting Hitler with the Allies.I said the same to Mr. Churchill a few days ago. At this time the President sent me a very kind letter by courier, asking whether I agreed or disagreed. washington, white house personal letter December 14, 1942 Dear Winston: I have not yet had an answer to my second invitation from Uncle Joe, but even if he were to decline again, I think you and I should have a meeting, as there are many issues where it is clear that only you and I have meetings with our staffs to decide.I am convinced that neither of us wants a repeat of the delays that occurred last July when deciding on the Operation Torch plan. 1. Due to the nasty weather and the ice on the wings of the plane, the two of us cannot go to Iceland anyway. 2. Due to political reasons, I must not come to the UK. 3. If the people of my country find out that I have flown over any ocean in a plane, there will be a national outcry.So to me, Bermuda is like Africa, we can't go there.But as long as I can leave in extreme secrecy and keep the trip a secret until I return home, I've largely settled for Africa. The reason is that public opinion will be taken aback when it hears about it after the fact. , but would be satisfied. 4. Public opinion would soften its accusations a little if it knew that I met our military leaders in NW Africa, and it is for this reason that I think it would be better for us to meet somewhere in NW Africa than in Khartoum.In addition, I was able to meet our soldiers with my own eyes. 5. By the way, it was also of great benefit to myself, because I was able to escape the political atmosphere of Washington for two weeks. 6. So my idea is that we could meet north of Algiers or north of Casablanca around January 15th, if that time suits you.That means I'll start around January 11th, hopefully with good weather then. My route is either from here to Trinidad, from there to Dakar, and then up from Dakar; or from here to Natal (Brazil), and then over the Atlantic to Liberia or Freetown, then head north from there. 7. Since Stalin will not be present, I don't think you and I need to bring foreign service personnel, because our meeting will be mainly of a military nature.Perhaps your three chiefs of staff and my three chiefs of staff could meet in advance at the same place four or five days before our arrival, so that by the time we arrive there we will have a fairly complete draft plan.I have charged General (Biddle) Smith to set out from here four or five days ago, to secretly investigate certain oases to be visited, as far as possible from any city or crowded place.One dictionary says that an oasis is never completely dry.Wonderful this dictionary. 8. If Uncle Jo says he will meet with us around March 1, the plan can be changed as follows: I suggest that your and my staffs meet with the Russian staff somewhere in Africa, even as far away as Baghdad, and work out some proposal that will at least enable preparations for a new military operation to begin.By the time the three of us meet, the remaining issues will be settled and some post-war issues discussed. Sincerely, warmest regards Franklin D. Roosevelt In order to save time, Mr. Roosevelt also telegraphed the main content of his letter to me first. Although Stalin could not meet with us, I still think that the two of us and our staff officers should try to meet immediately.I would like to meet you in Africa around January 15th.As far as I know, there is a satisfactory and safe location a little north of Casablanca.It would be best for our military personnel from both sides to be several days ahead of us in order to initially resolve some issues.I reckon that if the two of us can hold meetings together for four or five days, all the problems can be resolved.Hope to share your opinion. I am naturally satisfied with this solution and am convinced that it is much better than a purely technical meeting of experts.I immediately reply as follows: former navy personnel to president roosevelt December 21, 1942 readily agree.The sooner the better.I am most relieved.Only in this way can the problem be solved.Preparations will be made entirely on the basis that this meeting is only a staff meeting.The code name for the proposed meeting is symbolic. The next few weeks were spent drafting staff estimates of the situation for the upcoming meeting.Not only military strategic issues need to be resolved, but also the major political issues arising in North Africa as a result of Operation Torch and Darlan's assassination.I obtained the consent of the President to appoint Harold Macmillan to assist Mr. Robert Murphy, the political representative of the United States in North Africa, and Macmillan went there to study the situation on the ground. During this period, preparations for the symbolic plan are proceeding smoothly. former navy personnel to president roosevelt December 30, 1942 I sent Brigadier General Jacobs to North Africa at Christmas to consult with Generals Eisenhower and Biddle Smith on the preparations for the symbolic project. Jacob is now telegraphing that they have found excellent lodgings, and that General Bedell-Smith is in full agreement with him, and has cabled you the results of their investigation. Two. I think we should of course accept their proposals, and, because of time constraints, I will work on the assumption that you agree with your proposals. 3. My plan is that the lower-level staff officers, translators and subordinates of my delegation will set off from the United Kingdom around January 4th on the British ship Bolele, which is a ship equipped with special The command ship of the equipment can be parked in the port as a communication ship. 4. You suggested that our military personnel should be several days ahead of us in order to preliminarily solve some problems. I fully agree with this opinion. I will try to make the chief of staff of the British armed forces arrive at the agreed assembly point by air on the same day as the chief of staff of the American armed forces. , any date is acceptable, as long as it is suitable for the Chief of Staff of the United States Armed Forces. Hope to let you know the date. 5. If you can inform me of your planned schedule as soon as possible, it will be of great help to me in drawing up my schedule. 6. Thank you very much for the appointment of Macmillan.I totally agree with you that Eisenhower has the final say. The President and I had several pleasant correspondence on security issues at this time.He himself proposed to call him Admiral Q. former navy personnel to president roosevelt January 3, 1943 How did you come up with such an impenetrable disguise?In order to make the enemy more difficult to debunk and the person more elusive, I suggest that you be called Admiral Q and I be called Mr. P. Note that we must be mindful of our P's and Q's. 【１】 【1】Pay attention to someone's P's and Q's, this is a common saying, which means that words and deeds must be cautious, and Churchill used a pun here.translator About Charles de Gaulle.I think it would be best to postpone his visit until after the operational Torch issues are symbolized. The Chiefs of Staff submitted two reports to the War Cabinet in which they summarized their findings on future strategy.In their conclusion, they emphasized that they and their American colleagues had serious differences of opinion.Such differences are differences in focus and priority, rather than differences in principle.In fact, the purpose of the upcoming meeting is to reach a consensus agreement.The British Chiefs of Staff believed that the best policy was to carry out the Torch Operation Plan to the end, and at the same time, prepare Polile on a large scale as possible so that the implementation of the Encirclement and Annihilation Plan could begin, while the American Chiefs of Staff However, it is in favor of putting our main force in Europe into the plan of encirclement and annihilation operations, while in North Africa we will not move.In their first report, the British Chiefs of Staff expressed the following opinion on the American proposal: We believe that our approach should be: 1. Make every effort to expand the results of Operation Torch to: (1) defeat Italy; (2) to push Turkey into the war; and (3) to allow no respite for the Axis powers. 2. Intensify the bombing of Germany. 3. Continue to deliver supplies to Russia. 4. Under the conditions of carrying out the above-mentioned military operations, to strengthen the Bolile plan as much as possible, so that we can return to the European continent with a force of 21 divisions in August or September 1943, If there is a chance of winning under the circumstances at that time. Since we were unable to commit more than twenty-five divisions to Europe by the end of the summer of 1943, we considered this course to be better than our full-fledged Project Polile without all other military action, because it would It can directly and indirectly relieve the pressure on Russia earlier and more. I informed Stalin of our plans for a meeting.He replied: Prime Minister Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill January 5, 1943 Thank you very much for informing you of your upcoming meeting with President Roosevelt.Xi hoped to inform the outcome of the talks. Final arrangements have been made. We did not go to this extremely important meeting empty-handed.Alexander and Montgomery had by this time formulated their plan to advance to Tripoli. General Alexander to Prime Minister January 5, 1943 Because of its logistical situation, the Eighth Army's main force could not The advance was made by the night of the 15th, but Montgomery still intended to advance with a large force on that day.Fierce fighting will continue until Tripoli is reached. 2. The strong wind caused heavy damage to ships and ship unloading facilities in Benghazi on January 4.This will delay the march or reduce the number of troops.I have asked Montgomery if he has changed his mind. General Alexander to Prime Minister January 6, 1943 Supplementary pre-electricity.Montgomery's original date remains unchanged. General Alexander to Prime Minister and Chief of the Reich General Staff January 9, 1943 The battle plan is as follows: The march will begin on the night of January 14-15 with the XXX Corps.The British 7th Armored Division and the 2nd New Zealand Division will advance to Sedada.Possible resistance in the Gedahia area.After eliminating the resistance there, the advance to Beni Ulid-Taguna will be led by the British 7th Armored Division; the British 51st Division will advance along the main coast road; the British 2nd The Twelfth Armored Brigade is co-located with Army Headquarters; the British Tenth Corps will not be engaged in combat.From January 8th, our side will violently bomb Tripoli and the bottleneck area of ​​the coastal road. The 30th Army will carry about 500 miles of gasoline for the entire army and rations and drinking water for ten days.The ammunition team will have sufficient ammunition ready, and in general the logistical situation will be adequate for ten days.Tenth Army would assist in transporting supplies from Tobruk to Benghazi.After we reach Tripoli, our rations will be severely depleted until the port is cleared.The supplies that can be supplied to the 30th Army by the road are about 800 tons per day. If our army does not need to fight during the period after the capture of Tripoli and before the port is opened, this amount should be enough to meet our army's needs. Taking Tripoli would be a most welcome victory.This would bring the Eighth Army two hundred miles closer to Tunisia, thereby bringing a new and obviously significant factor of advantage to the North African campaign.