Chapter 148 Volume 4, Chapter 38, The Casablanca Conference

Flying to the Anfa suburb of Casablanca President Roosevelt arrives in Casablanca Generals Eisenhower and General Alexander attend a meeting hoping to capture Tripoli I report to the War Cabinet for the first time on the meeting on January 18 Disagreement between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Planning Committee I and General Ecke talks about flying fortresses He persuades me to turn to their opinion Invites de Gaulle He arrives in Casablanca Serious talk Praises to General de Gaulle I report to the war cabinet on January 20th on the resumption of the meeting Unconditional surrender All quotes to be sure Ah, the final report of the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee on Operational Policy, 1943. The press conference held on January 24. The President and I drove to Marrakech at the Villa Taylor. The President departed for home at dawn on the 25th.

I set off for North Africa on January 12th.A little disturbing incident happened during my air travel.In order to keep the C|46 warm as spring, a gasoline engine was installed on board. This engine can generate hot air, which makes the radiators on the aircraft reach extremely high temperatures.At two o'clock this morning, when we were flying over the Atlantic, five hundred miles from anywhere, a radiator burned my toe and woke me up. It will burn to a blazing heat in no time, toasting the blanket.So I climbed out of the bunk and woke up Peter Portal who was dozing in a chair in the cabin below and showed him this very hot radiator.We inspected the cabin and found two more radiators that seemed to be burning to the same level.Then we went to the rear bomb bay (the plane had been converted into a bomber) and we found two men trying to keep the gasoline heater going.No matter from which point of view, I think this is very dangerous.A gasoline radiator can start a fire, and the surrounding gasoline will explode in no time.Porter felt the same way.I resolved that I would rather freeze than burn, so I ordered all the heating to be turned off, and went back to eight thousand feet in order to fly above the clouds, which I had to fly so high in winter. Falling asleep shivering in the cold.I have to admit, this made me extremely unhappy.

When we arrived in Casablanca, we found that the preparations were excellent.On the outskirts of Anfa there is a big hotel with a lot of rooms, enough for all the British and American staff to live in, and a spacious conference room.Around this hotel are several villas reserved for President Roosevelt, me, General Giraud, and General de Gaulle, should he come.The entire area is surrounded by barbed wire and heavily guarded by US troops.My staff and I arrived two days ahead of the president.I took several pleasant walks with Pound and the other two chiefs of staff on the rocky cliffs and on the beach.The turbulent waves hit the shore, rolling up large pieces of white cloud-like foam, which made it hard to believe that anyone could get onto the beach from the sea.No day is uneventful.Huge waves as high as fifteen feet crashed against the huge rocky cliffs with the force of a mountain roar and a tsunami.No wonder so many landing craft and boats were capsized with their crews.

My son Randolph came to Casablanca from the Tunisian front.There was also a lot to think about, so two days passed in a flash.During this period, the staff held long meetings every day. The President arrived on the afternoon of the fourteenth.Our meeting was most cordial and friendly, and this land, conquered or liberated, which this great comrade-in-arms and I have obtained despite the advice of his military experts, I can meet him on this land, I am very happy.General Eisenhower also arrived in Casablanca the next day after a dangerous flight.He was anxious to know what course the Joint Chiefs of Staff was going to take and wanted to keep in touch with them.Their authority is above him, and much higher.A day or two later, Alexander also arrived in Casablanca to report to the President and me on the progress of the Eighth Army.The President was very impressed with him and was very interested in him and the news he brought about the imminent capture of Tripoli by the Eighth Army.He explained the situation, how Montgomery, who had two powerful corps, put all the vehicles of one corps at the use of the other, so that this corps could keep advancing and was strong enough to drive Rommel from Tripoli to Maret border defense.The Maret line is a very serious obstacle.The news cheered everyone up, as did Alexander's affable manner.His kind of self-confidence, although he did not express it, infected others.

I report to the country as follows: Prime Minister to Deputy Prime Minister and War Cabinet January 18, 1943 The chiefs of staff of the three armed forces hold two or three meetings a day alone or with their US counterparts to study the entire battle situation on a battlefield-by-battle basis.Admiral King naturally believes that the Pacific should be the first all-out target, and the US Army and Navy authorities are eager to take stronger action in Burma in order to help China and gradually develop into a large-scale Anajim by the end of this year (Burma) campaign.General Marshall was quite enthusiastic about this, but otherwise he seemed to emphasize the sacrifice of the Mediterranean theater to the preparation of the encirclement and annihilation (or) bashing operations.

On the other hand, I am satisfied that the President is very much in favor of giving priority to the Mediterranean theater.He also seems to be increasingly leaning towards the Husky project (Sicily).He suggested to me last night that this plan should be called Belly, and I suggested calling it Bellona Convinced that there is no doubt that we both agree on fundamental issues. At the same time, it can also be seen at the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Americans are increasingly inclined to Sicily instead of Sardinia.Admiral King even said that he could find the necessary escort ships if it were decided to attack Sicily.

The situation in the Mediterranean war has obviously changed due to the successive victories of the Desert Army.Alexander, who has arrived here, clearly, accurately, and confidently described his progress and intentions at the meeting held by the President on the 15th, which made a very good impression on all those present.He hoped to capture Tripoli on the twenty-sixth, and to attack the Maret line with the Sixth Division by mid-March.A smaller number of divisions can be mobilized earlier. Therefore, adding Anderson's four divisions, we can expect that there will be ten British divisions of the First and Eighth Armies available for the final decisive battle for the tip of Tunisia.

Since the US troops in Tunisia will not exceed two divisions at most, and the French army is poorly equipped, the British army will have an absolute advantage in this battlefield.Under such circumstances, if the battle for Tripoli, which is currently underway, goes extremely smoothly, and it is not troublesome to clean up the Tripoli harbor, it will be of decisive significance for the Desert Army to march aggressively to the Tunisian battlefield .The large number of British reinforcements will obviously give us a greater say in the High Command.Last night, on the advice of the Imperial Chief of Staff, I suggested that at the appropriate time Alexander should fill the vacancy of Eisenhower's second-in-command, since Clarke had been appointed commander of the U.S. Fifth Army; the proposal was well received by the President.Appointing a British general to command all Tunisian forces would prevent discord with the French.

It is a great honor for us to meet here, and for General Alexander to be present at this meeting.General Eisenhower was about to launch a very bold and decisive attack on Sfax because he wanted to hold the ground and depended in part on Malta for his supplies.This campaign obviously had to be consistent with Alexander's offensive, otherwise the U.S. troops in Sfax would be onslaught by the Germans just as the Desert Army stood still in Tripoli, resupplying gasoline, supplies, and needing to rely on the port. So I put Alexander and Eisenhower together, both of them got along very well both individually and with the Reich Chief of Staff and Marshall.The result was that they got to know each other very well and agreed to visit each other when necessary.Eisenhower was relieved because he realized that Alexander's forces were quickly available and in great strength, and that he was no longer fighting alone to maintain the situation, but was able to draw upon a combined force that was indeed quite strong Come to fight.All four agreed that in Tunisia, as long as we didn't make mistakes, we could win.

Personally, I am extremely satisfied with how the situation has developed. Neither the President nor I were present at the staff meetings, but they reported to us every day throughout the meetings, and we talked with our own officers every day. The disagreement at the meeting was not between Britain and the United States, but between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Planning Committee.I personally strongly believe that Sicily should be the next target, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel the same way.But the Joint Planning Committee, and Lord Mountbatten, believed that Sardinia should be fought instead of Sicily, because they thought it would be three months earlier; Mountbatten lobbied Hopkins and others vigorously for this opinion.I have always insisted on my own opinion, and with the strong backing of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, I insisted on attacking Sicily first.The Joint Planning Committee politely but obstinately stated that this would not be possible before August 30th.I then went over the figures myself with them, and the President and I ordered that the date of the attack be fixed on a moonlit day in July or, if possible, in June. inside.As a result, the airborne troops were dispatched on the night of July 9, and the landings began on the morning of July 10.

During the first month of the meeting, General Eck, Commander of the U.S. Air Force in England, asked to see me.We discussed the American plans for daylight bombing of Germany with armored flying fortresses.Personally, I'm skeptical about this approach.I regretted that so much effort was spent on day bombing, and I still think that if the Americans concentrate all their efforts on night bombing, they will drop far more bombs than day bombing, and because of the scientific method, they will gradually do it very well. Exactly, as we have since done.I shared these points with Eck, who knew and was deeply disturbed.He defended daylight bombing with flying fortresses with the utmost sincerity, noting what great preparations had been made in England for it, bringing in squadrons of flying fortresses from the United States, gathering manpower, supplies, spare parts, etc., and, The airport is now finally ready, too. In my reply I pointed out that it was already the beginning of 1943.The Americans had been at war for over a year.They have been building up an air force in England, but so far have never dropped a single bomb on Germany by their day bombing method, except perhaps once, under the cover of British fighter planes, for a very long time. Short daylight bombing.Last year, in Washington, we were fooled into thinking that within four or five months, American planes would definitely drop a large number of bombs on Germany. As a result, a lot of manpower and material resources were spent, and not a single bomb was dropped. Eck, however, defended himself deftly and tenaciously.It is true, he said, that they had not yet dealt a blow to the Germans, but if they were given another month or two, they would certainly be fighting, and on an unabated scale. In view of the fact that the United States has spent a lot of manpower and material resources on this matter, and at the same time they are so unwilling to give up, I decided to support Ike and his proposition, so I turned 180 degrees and withdrew my objection All opinions on daylight bombing with flying fortresses.This pleased him greatly, for he feared that his government was no longer as confident in daylight bombing methods as it had been.In the second half of 1942, during a full six months, this huge deployment and work did not see any results, not even a single bomb was dropped on Germany, which is indeed too unreasonable.At that time, no less than 20,000 people and 500 aircraft were deployed in East Anglia, but it seemed that there had been no movement.However, when I changed my position and no longer pursued the fatal issue that I had been pursuing to the end, everyone felt relieved. The US plan has not been criticized by the British side since then.They proceeded with their project and received the results before long.Even so, I still think that if they had spent the money on night bombing, the climax of the bombing of Germany would have come sooner. General Eck has said many times after the military that I saved the flying fortress in time when the flying fortress was about to show its talents. They keep it from being abandoned by the U.S. government.If this is true, then I save them only because I no longer passively oppose them. This is where de Gaulle's problem arose.I really wanted him to come to Casablanca at the time, and the president basically agreed with me.I also asked the President to send a telegram inviting Charles de Gaulle to come.The general was so arrogant that he turned down the president's invitation several times.So I asked Eden to put the maximum pressure on him, and even told him that if he didn't come, we would push for someone else to replace him as Chairman of the French Liberation Committee in London.The president's son, Elliott Roosevelt, described this incident in his book very strangely.In it he hastily jotted down what he had heard at the dinner table.He had been brought to dinner by his father.He seemed to be implying that the President suspected that I was trying to prevent de Gaulle from coming and was against calling him; in fact, I was exerting maximum pressure on him to come.This kind of nonsense has been circulating for a long time.The following telegram should forever refute this nonsense. Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary January 18, 1943 If you deem it expedient, please forward my following telegram to de Gaulle. (beginning) I am authorized to inform you that you are invited here by the President of the United States and myself. General Giraud has arrived here with only two staff officers, and he is now waiting for your arrival, and I have not yet informed him of your refusal to come.I think the consequences will be bad for you and the movement you lead if you keep saying no.First of all, we are about to make arrangements on the North African question, on which we would very much like to consult with you, but if compelled to do so, arrangements must be made in your absence.Britain and the United States would support such an arrangement. I believe that your refusal to attend the proposed meeting will be unanimously condemned by public opinion and will be the best ground for accusation against you.If you decline the President's invitation now, your hopes of being invited to visit the United States in the near future will naturally come to naught.My efforts to bridge the divide between the movement you lead and America will also clearly fail.While you are still at the head of the above-mentioned movement, I am obviously unable to make further efforts in this direction. If you are still the leader of the above-mentioned movement, the Royal Government will also reconsider its attitude towards this movement.If you should miss the opportunity, we will try our best to get on good terms with it without you.The door is still open now. (End) You are free to modify this letter as you see fit, so long as it does not detract from its seriousness.The trouble is that, for the sake of secrecy, we cannot appeal directly to the French National Council past him.These days I've been fighting for de Gaulle and doing everything I can to try to reconcile the various factions of the French.If he declines the present opportunity, I think that the Crown's Government can continue to support the Free French Movement only if he ceases to lead it.I hope you will explain this properly to him in your own opinion.You should be very strict with him, and it is for his sake. On January 22, de Gaulle finally arrived.He was taken to his villa, which was next to the Villa Giro.He refused to visit Giraud, and it took us several hours before he was persuaded to agree to a meeting with Giraud. I had a very serious conversation with de Gaulle, and pointed out in no uncertain terms that if he continued to obstruct, we would break with him decisively and completely.He was polite, walked out of the villa with his head held high, and ran into the garden.Finally he was finally forced to agree to a meeting with Jiro.The meeting, which lasted two or three hours, must have been extremely pleasant to both parties.I was relieved that afternoon he went to see the President, and the two of them got along surprisingly well.The president was attracted by his bright eyes, but he just couldn't bring the two to see each other. In this part of the book I have set down the seriousness of my relationship with General de Gaulle in light of the events of the time.I did have constant arguments with him and had many violent arguments with him.But in the relationship between the two of us, there is an extremely important factor.I cannot think of him as representative of a humiliated France, nor indeed of a France free to determine its own future.I know he doesn't like England.However, in him, I have always seen the spirit and belief often expressed by the word France throughout the annals of history.His haughty attitude, although it offended me, was something I could understand and admire.He was a fugitive, a man condemned to death in his own country and exiled abroad.His success today is entirely due to the goodwill of the British government and now the American government.The Germans conquered his homeland.He had practically nowhere to stand.Even so, he didn't care and was arrogant about everything.Even in his most haughty moments he seemed to embody in him the character of a great French nation of high pride, power, and ambition.Some people laughed at him and said that he called himself the contemporary Joan of Arc, because it is said that one of his ancestors was a loyal follower of Joan of Arc.In my opinion, this is not very funny.He is said to have compared himself to Clemenceau, a wiser and more experienced statesman than himself, but both gave the impression that the French were unconquerable. I further report to the War Cabinet as follows: Prime Minister to Deputy Prime Minister and War Cabinet January 20, 1943 Admiral Q (President) and I had an all-hands meeting this afternoon where the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported on the progress of their work. The meeting was extremely satisfying.I believe that after five days of discussions and apparently many differences of opinion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reached consensus on the basic course of operations for 1943.Their final report has not yet been written, but the main points of the report made by the Chief of the Reich General Staff at the meeting on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee can be reported as follows.It was agreed that our joint forces should be directed first to the safety of sea traffic and reaffirmed the principle that all efforts must be focused on defeating Germany first.Preparations for the capture of Sicily began immediately with all-out effort, in order to realize this battle plan as early as possible.We also hope that by the end of this year we will have a war plan in place on Burma.The United States has promised that they will undertake most of the troop transport (needed by the latter) and the landing craft. These ships will be driven by American personnel, and they will also undertake part of the naval cover.In our country, our country will carry out the Bolile plan as soon as possible, so that once Germany shows obvious signs of collapse within this year, it can launch a military operation similar to the bashing operation plan, or fight back to the European continent with all its strength.In the Pacific, military operations to capture Rabaul and sweep New Guinea would continue in order to maintain the initiative and contain Japan.As for whether to advance this military operation to Truk in the future, it will be decided at the end of this year. Admiral Q fully agrees with me on the above points. 2. During the discussion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, the representative of the United States once expressed concern that once Germany was defeated, our side would withdraw from the war; after learning of this situation, I think it is necessary to use clear words to express that this matter is not only related to our country’s interests , and related to the honor of our country, the determination of the British Parliament and the British people to do their best to defeat Japan after defeating Germany is beyond doubt.I think it's appropriate to say that.I also expressed my firm belief that the War Cabinet was fully willing to enter into a formal agreement or treaty with the United States on this matter. Admiral Q dismissed the suggestion, saying he was convinced that the United States and Britain were completely on the same page on this issue.But he added that, if possible, it should be expressly agreed with Russia, if necessary, secretly, that they would take part in the war against Japan should Germany be defeated. 3. After reaching an agreement in general principles, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee will study ways and means within the next ten days.There's a lot of detail work to be done, so I think they should be together for the next few days.In any case, within six months another meeting of the same nature must be held.General Marshall emphasized the need for this. 4. I proposed at the plenary meeting that at the appropriate time, Alexander should serve as Eisenhower's deputy commander in chief, because I thought this was a good opportunity to raise the issue.General Marshall and Admiral King welcomed this opinion very much.This difficult problem of the Air Force Commander is being actively considered, and I am confident that it will be satisfactorily resolved. V. General Marshall expresses his deep admiration for Admiral Cunningham's distinguished service in the Allied operations in North Africa, and requests that this opinion be placed on the official record and that the matter should be known to the War Cabinet.Cunningham's ability to lead the Navy was outstanding, and his wisdom and opinions were a great help to General Eisenhower. Admiral Q also warmly praised Field Marshal Sir John Deere.The American people now regard him as an indispensable bridge between the US chief of staff and the British chief of staff in terms of military policy. 6. We are preparing to draft a statement on the situation of this meeting, which will be released to reporters at an appropriate time.We intend to declare in this statement that the United States and the British Empire are determined to carry on the war mercilessly to the end until the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan.Italy is not mentioned in the article, which is intended to promote the early dissolution of the three countries.The President approves of this approach because it will inspire our friends around the world. 7. At the end of the conference, a statement to Prime Minister Stalin had to be drafted. We believe that the common intention of the United Kingdom and the United States should be stated in this statement, but it should not carry any promises. 8. The foregoing has been written by General Ismay on my instructions, although it describes the present state of the meeting and, as members of the Cabinet know, is entirely in accordance with our common will; It must be admitted that the combined scale of our military operations is insignificant compared with the enormous power possessed by Britain and the United States, and still less compared with the enormous efforts of Russia.I think the president feels the same way because Hopkins talked to me about it yesterday and he said: OK, but not enough. Even taking into account our enormous efforts both at sea and in the air, I still feel strongly that during the coming sessions we must aim to make our blows even harder. The reader should pay attention to the sixth paragraph in the above cable, because the president's use of the words unconditional surrender in the press conference has caused controversy, which will appear again in this book, and people will inevitably will be debated for a long time.Whether in Britain or the United States, there is such a view that this sentence prolongs the war and plays into the hands of the dictators who want to force the people and armies of Germany and Japan to fight to the death.I personally disagree with this view, for reasons that will be discussed in this book.As I have personally found that my memory has failed me in certain matters, it is best to speak truthfully from my records.Elliott Roosevelt claimed in his book that the president used the phrase at a dinner.According to him, I thought about it, I frowned, I thought about it a little more, I finally got a smile on my face and finally said that was great and that my last glass of wine that night was an unconditional surrender .I don't remember any of these private, informal conversations, because they were casual and informal.But there is no doubt that this issue will be brought up in my official talks with the President.Otherwise, why would there be a sixth paragraph? War Cabinet records show that the question was raised at a War Cabinet meeting on the afternoon of 20 January.It seems that what was discussed at the meeting was not the principle of unconditional surrender, but the question of whether Italy should be excluded.The following telegram was therefore sent by the War Cabinet on January 21, which I received immediately, of course. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary to Prime Minister The cabinet agreed that it would be disadvantageous to exclude Italy, which would inevitably raise doubts in Turkey, the Balkans and elsewhere.We also thought it wouldn't do Italy any good either.Letting them know of the imminent calamity would have done more to affect the morale of Italy in our favour. So there can be no doubt that I did convey to the War Cabinet the words of unconditional surrender in the Joint Statement which was then being drawn up, and they never expressed any objection to it.On the contrary, they only hope that Italy should not be excluded from this sphere.I do not recall, nor do I have any records on hand, that the President and I exchanged views on the subject after I had received the cabinet telegram, probably because of the busy schedule of business, particularly the question of Giraud's relationship with de Gaulle and the reconciliation Because of the meeting between these two people, the two of us did not bring up this issue again. During this time, our advisors and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were busy drafting a formal joint statement.This is a carefully worded and carefully worded document that was reviewed and approved by both the President and myself.Probably because I was not in favor of the application of unconditional surrender to Italy at the time, I did not raise the subject again with the President, but we both did agree on the communiqué that we and our advisers had drawn up.In this statement, there is no mention of unconditional surrender.This statement was submitted to the War Cabinet for approval, and it was approved as such by the War Cabinet. I was a little surprised when the President said in his January 24th press conference that we were going to force all enemy nations to surrender unconditionally.I naturally thought that the communiqué, by mutual agreement, had superseded any previous conversation.General Ismay was also surprised because he knew my thinking well and had been present at the Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings when the statement was drafted.When I spoke after the President, of course I supported him and I agreed with what he said.On such occasions and at such times, a slight disagreement, even by inadvertence, between the two of us could undermine and even endanger the war effort of both nations.There is no doubt that I share responsibility with the British War Cabinet for this matter. But the following statement by the President to Hopkins is indisputable. We went to such lengths to get the two French generals together that I felt it was almost as difficult as reconciling Grant and Lee[1]. Then suddenly there was a press conference, and Winston and I didn't even have time to prepare, and it occurred to me that people called Grant an old man who surrendered unconditionally, so I knew I had said that. 【2】. [1] Grant, commander-in-chief of the Union Army during the American Civil War; Lee, commander-in-chief of the Confederate Army.translator [2] Sherwood: "Roosevelt and Hopkins", six hundred and ninety-six pages. I don't think this candid conversation is in any way less powerful because that sentence was in the speech he read out. Memories of the war may still be vivid, but they are absolutely unreliable until they are checked, especially the sequence of events.Regarding the matter of unconditional surrender, I obviously made many inaccurate statements, because I said what I thought at the time, and I thought what I said was true, and I did not check the records.I am not the only one who misremembered. On July 21, 1949, Mr. Bevin reported to the House of Commons that due to the policy of unconditional surrender, he encountered extremely serious problems in rebuilding Germany after the war. Difficulties.He has said that he or the war cabinet was never consulted about the policy at the time.I replied right then and there, as incorrectly and confidently as he did, that the first time I heard this term was from the President at a press conference in Casablanca.It wasn't until I went home and checked the files that I realized that the facts were as described in this book. This reminds me of that professor, when he was dying, his faithful disciple wanted to listen to his last teaching, he said: the quotation must be accurate. The use of the term unconditional surrender, though popular at the time, has since been described by various authorities as a serious failure of British and American wartime policy.Some clarification is needed on this issue.It is said to have prolonged the war and made post-war recovery more difficult.I don't think so.On June 30, 1943, I took the opportunity of speaking at London Guildhall to say: We, the Allies, demand the unconditional surrender of the Nazis, Fascists, and Japanese autocratic regimes.The so-called unconditional surrender means that their will to resist must be completely crushed, and they must be completely at our disposal.It also means that we must take all necessary far-sighted measures to ensure that the world is not once again thrown into turmoil, devastated and burned by war again because of their calculated plots and brutal aggressions.This does not mean, and never can mean, that we will have our invincible weapons stained by acts of inhumanity or simply by vengeance, or that we do not intend to arrange such a world , a world in which all peoples can enjoy what the American Declaration of Independence beautifully calls the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. President Roosevelt also said on December 24, 1943: The Allies had no intention of enslaving the German people.We want them to be given normal opportunities to develop in peace as useful and respected members of the European family.But we insist on the word respected, because we want to cleanse them of Nazism, Prussian militarism, and the presumptuous idea that they are a superior race that could cause catastrophe. The main reason I have always opposed the assertion that other terms of peace have been advocated is that, if the three great allies insisted, and public opinion would compel them, to insist on certain specific terms of surrender, they would It is far more unacceptable to the peace movement in Germany than the general term of unconditional surrender.I also recall that there were several attempts to draw up terms of peace that would satisfy the conquerors of Germany.When written, they were so horrific, and, in fact, absolutely impossible, that their publication would only stimulate the Germans to resist still more.They can only become waste paper when they are written. On January 14, 1944, just after the Russians made their position clear to us in Tehran, I wrote the following memorandum on this issue and sent it to my colleagues in the Cabinet. The so-called unconditional surrender means that the Germans have absolutely no ‧right‧right to enjoy any special treatment.For example, the Atlantic Charter cannot be applied to the Germans as a matter of rights.Conversely, it is up to the victors themselves to decide whether they abide by their humanitarian and civilized obligations. The question is whether we should be more specific at this point, and I think we should see what fate actually befell Germany before deciding whether the publication of more specific terms of surrender would induce them to capitulate. First, they will be completely disarmed and completely deprived of the ability to rearm. Second, they will be prohibited from using various types of aviation tools, whether civilian or military, and will also be prohibited from learning flying techniques. Third, large numbers of people convicted of atrocities will be brought to trial in the country where they committed the crime.Prime Minister Stalin once said in Tehran that he was convinced that at least four million Germans would need to work for him for many years to rebuild the homeland destroyed by the Germans.我深信俄國人將堅持要求大量的德國機械設備，以便綽綽有餘地補償被德國人所破壞的全部機械設備。很可能別的戰勝國也會提出同樣的要求。鑒於大量的法、意、俄籍戰俘和被拘留者所受到的嚴酷的待遇，這種要求似乎並不是不公正的。 第四，據我所知，英、美、蘇三國政府已一致同意，德國將被斷然分割成幾個獨立的國家。東普魯士和奧德河以東的德國領土將被永遠割讓，當地的居民將被遷走。普魯士本身將被分割與縮小。必須將魯爾和其他重要產煤產鋼中心置於普魯士控制之外。 第五，作為德國軍隊核心的總參謀部必須徹底解散，恐怕俄國人會要求將德軍總參謀部的大量人員判處死刑和長期徒刑。我本人原希望公佈一張名單，上列五十名到一百多名罪大惡極的壞蛋的名字，以便將大多數人民與將被盟國判處極刑的人區分開，並避免發生任何像大屠殺之類的事情。這勢必會使普通的德國人感到放心。但是這些建議在德黑蘭被認為是過於寬大而被輕蔑地加以拒絕了，可是我並不知道斯大林元帥的這一部分談話究竟是否認真說的。 無論如何，上面所述足可表明，一項關於德國未來遭遇的坦率的聲明，並不一定會使德國人民安心，說不定像無條件投降這種駭人的但更含糊其詞的詞句還能使他們更安心一點，何況它們在總統所發表的那些聲明裡已變得得緩和了呢？ 最後，我在一九四四年二月二十二日對下院說道： 無條件投降一詞，並不意味著德國人民將受到奴役或滅亡。但是它卻意味著盟國在受降時不受任何條約或義務的約束。例如，並不存在大西洋憲章理所當然適用於德國的問題，也不存在敵國領土不得轉讓或調整的問題。我們絕不承認像德國人在第一次世界大戰以後所說的那一套論證，說什麼他們投降是因為威爾遜總統的十四點。無條件投降意味著勝利者可自由行動，它並不意味著他們有權可以橫行霸道，也並不意味著他們想把德國從歐洲的國家中抹掉。如果說我們是受著什麼義務約束的話，我們只憑著自己的良心對文明負有義務。這就是無條件投降的意義。 在戰爭的末期，在德國對此沒有任何誤解，這一點是無可置辯的。 在對各項主要問題進行了十天的研究以後，聯合參謀長委員會終於取得了一致的意見。總統和我每天都了解他們的工作情況，並對他們的工作一致表示同意。聯合參謀長委員會決定，我們應當使用沙漠集團軍和英方所有的兵力，還有艾森豪威爾軍隊的一部分兵力，集中全力打下突尼斯；同時決定亞歷山大將任艾森豪威爾的副司令官，並實際負責指揮一切戰鬥。此外，由坎寧安海軍上將和特德空軍上將分任海軍與空軍的作戰指揮官。顯然，如果第八集團軍能夠將它的六七師兵力運抵該戰場的話，這些兵力，再加上安德森將軍所率領的英國第一集團軍的四五個師，英方就將擁有十二個師左右，而美方因為其餘的兵力都用於駐防摩洛哥和阿爾及利亞，他們只能出三個或四個師的兵力參加突尼斯決戰。兩年後，馬歇爾將軍曾在馬耳他對我說，他當時對這件事感到十分驚訝，就是雖然英方在突尼斯作戰的兵力要比美方多得多，可是竟沒有提出將艾森豪威爾的兵權轉交給一位英國指揮官。這件事我連想都沒有想到過。這和總統與我兩人合作的整個基礎是背道而馳的。關於艾森豪威爾和亞歷山大之間的關係，在以後還要提及。這兩個人都是大公無私的人，彼此以誠相待。艾森豪威爾把作戰指揮權全部委交給了亞歷山大。 這時我們已快要結束我們的會議了，我們和參謀長們在一月二十三日舉行了最後一次正式全體會議。在會議上，他們向我們兩人遞交了關於一九四三年作戰方針的最後報告。這份報告可概述如下： 同盟國的物資仍必須首先用於擊敗德國潛艇。必須盡量向俄國運輸供應品，以便支援蘇聯軍隊。 在歐洲戰場的軍事行動將按照下列目標進行，即在一九四三年內，使用同盟國可能用於對德作戰的一切兵力，擊敗德國。 採取攻勢的主要作戰方針如下： 地中海方面： 一‧攻佔西西里島，目的是 （1）使地中海的交通線更為安全。 （2）減輕德軍對俄國前線的壓力。 （3）加強對意大利的壓力。 二‧設法製造一種局勢，以使土耳其能加入我方，成為一個積極的盟友。 聯合王國方面： 三‧對德國進行最猛烈的空中攻勢，以打擊德國的作戰努力。 四‧根據現有兩棲部隊之兵力，發動局部攻勢。 五‧盡量集中空前強大的兵力，隨時待機而動，以便一旦德方的抵抗減弱到適當程度時，即可重登歐洲大陸。 在太平洋及遠東方面的軍事行動將繼續進行，其目的為維持對日本的壓力，並能在一旦德國戰敗時，立即對日本發動全面攻勢。聯合參謀長委員會認為，這些軍事行動須以不致影響同盟國在一九四三年內待機徹底擊敗德國的能力為限。在不影響此計劃的前提下，可擬出在一九四三年內開始收復緬甸的計劃（安納吉姆計劃），並為此作好準備，在不影響安納吉姆計劃的前提下，如尚有多餘的時間和人力、物力，可擬出進攻馬紹爾群島及加羅林群島的計劃，並為此進行準備。 這個作戰方針是我們兩人同我們的專家顧問們逐步擬定的，在批准這項方針時，總統和我還分別給自己本國的參謀長委員會寫了如下這樣一封信： 在欣然批准聯合參謀長委員會在對各種問題進行徹底的研究之後所擬定的報告之際，總統及首相願強調指出在一切準備工作中，均應隨時注意下列諸點： （1）必須尋求各種辦法，使開往俄國的W‧J‧【１】運輸船隊即使在進行哈斯基作戰計劃期間也不致中斷。 【１】溫斯敦｜約（Winston｜Joe）的縮寫。 （2）急需以飛機增援在中國的陳納德將軍的部隊，並物色人員，使此項飛機能充分發揮其戰鬥力。 （3）在六月分月色良好的日子到來以前，作好進攻西西里島的準備工作的重要意義；以及如在夏季按兵不動，對我方利益的嚴重危害性。 （4）為了能及時利用八月間的大好天氣，發動某種形式的痛擊作戰計劃，必須在聯合王國加快建立一支美軍攻擊力量。為此目的，不僅應重新徹底審查所發的作戰裝備與每月供應，還應根據在發動進攻日可能出現的作戰形勢，調整由美國運至英國的作戰物資與人力的優先權。 最後，在二十四號早晨，我們兩人出席了記者招待會。我們強使戴高樂和吉羅兩人與總統和我交錯地同坐在一排椅子上，並且強使他們兩人當著記者與攝影師的面前握手。他們照辦了，甚至在當時那種悲慘的日子裡，看到這些照片，都令人不禁感到好笑。總統和我兩人在卡薩布蘭卡一事，一直嚴守秘密。因此當記者們看到我們時，他們簡直不能相信他們的眼睛，而當他們聽到我們在此間幾乎已達兩星期之久的時候，他們幾乎不能相信他們的耳朵。 在舉行了這場費了九牛二虎之力才告促成的強迫婚姻或持槍逼婚（美國人這麼說）之後，總統便對記者發表了演說，我支持了他的意見。 總統準備動身。但是我對他說：你不遠千里而來，要是不逛逛馬拉喀什就回去的話，那就算是虛此一行。讓我們到那兒去玩兩天吧。我一定要同你共賞白雪皚皚的阿特拉斯山的落日。我也用同樣的話慫恿哈里‧霍普金斯。恰巧在馬拉喀什有一所非常可愛的別墅，是美國副領事肯尼思‧彭達先生從一位泰勒太太一個美國人那裡租來的。我以前根本就不知有這麼一所別墅。這所別墅可供總統和我居住，外面還有足夠的地方可以容納我們的隨行人員。於是我們便決定一起到馬拉喀什去。羅斯福和我同車在沙漠中在我看來，沙漠已經開始變綠了行駛了一百五十哩後，到達了這塊聞名的綠洲。我把馬拉喀什稱之為撒哈拉的巴黎，因為好幾百年以來，中非各地的商隊寧願在一路上向山中部族繳納重稅，並且甘願以後在馬拉喀什市集上受人欺騙，也想享受一下該城的放蕩生活，包括算命的、玩蛇的、大量的吃喝，還有就整個非洲大陸來說是最大的、組織得最完善的妓院。這些都是古今聞名的。 我們兩人商定，由我準備午餐，因此湯米便主持其事。一路之上，我一直與總統同車，一共是五小時的路程，總統一路大談公事，但是也談了一些題外話。沿路駐紮了好幾千名美軍，以保護我們，不致遇到任何意外，飛機則在我們頭頂不斷迴旋。我們在傍晚抵達那所別墅，受到了彭達先生的慇勤款待。我領著總統登上了別墅的塔頂。他坐在一張椅子上由人把他抬上去，他坐在那裡飽賞了白雪蓋頂的阿特拉斯山的日落美景。在吃晚飯時大家一共是十五六個人興高采烈，都唱了歌。我唱了一首歌，總統也加入了合唱，並且一度想要獨唱一曲。可惜有人攔住了他，因此我就從來沒有聽到總統的歌聲。 我的這位孜孜不倦的戰友定於二十五日清晨動身，開始他的長途飛行，他飛經拉各斯和達喀爾，然後越過大西洋到巴西，再飛到華盛頓。我們在頭一天晚上就已經告過別了，但是他在第二天早上去機場時到我這裡再次跟我話別。我當時還沒有起床，但是我不肯讓他一人去機場。因此我便跳下了床，穿上我那件拉鏈衣，除了一雙拖鞋以外，別的什麼也沒穿，我就這樣一身不能登大雅之堂的打扮，同他同車前往機場，然後我就登上了飛機，照料他舒舒服服地坐好，一面對他這樣行動不便的人竟有這樣的勇氣感到欽佩不已，一面為他所冒的危險而擔心。在戰爭期間，乘飛機旅行乃是理所當然的事。 但我仍視之為畏途。幸虧總統一路平安無事。後來我就回到了泰勒夫人的別墅。我又在那裡待了兩天，給戰時內閣寫信，告訴他們我今後的動向，還在塔頂上畫了一幅畫，這是我在整個戰爭時期唯一的一幅畫作。