Chapter 165 Volume 5, Chapter 10: Tensions with General de Gaulle

The culmination of the de Gaulle movement. The creation of the French National Liberation Committee. The question of the recognition of the committee. President Roosevelt's view of the situation. I wrote a memorandum of July 13. I tried to persuade the president to give limited recognition. He proposed another cooperation program. We are in Quebec on the situation. De Gaulle and Giraud continued to vie for power Formation of the Free France Consul de Gaulle became sole president of the Council of Nationalities Violence broke out in Syria A year of disappointing relations with Free France.

During the summer of 1943, relations between the British government and de Gaulle soured.We have made great efforts to unite the French of all parties in Algiers, and I have often urged the Americans to accept General de Gaulle as a leading figure in the political situation which we both tried to bring about.After the accords of Clark-Dallan and the appearance of Giraud, there was an atmosphere of tension in French affairs, in which de Gaulle became more stubborn than before.His position, in recent weeks, has been consolidated.He has many supporters in Tunisia, now under Allied control.News from the French capital, and the formation of a secret Central Committee there, pointed to his widespread authority and the growing popularity of the de Gaulle movement.It was under these circumstances that Giroux agreed to meet his opponent in North Africa.

On May 30th, de Gaulle arrived in Algiers, and the two sides began negotiations with the purpose of setting up a unified interim committee to manage the affairs of the fighting France. During the negotiations, they were sharp and angry with each other.Their dispute revolved around three main issues: the supreme civil and military power of Giro; De Gaulle's determination to demand formal recognition of the sovereignty of the fighting France, a step that would have violated the terms of the agreement concluded between Darlan and General Mark Clark in November 1942; , especially those of Noguet, Peloudon, and Boisson.Boisson was a particular target among them.De Gaulle never forgave him for what happened at Dakar in 1940.

These heated discussions continued, making the situation in Algiers even more tense. On the afternoon of June 3, an agreement was finally reached and a French National Liberation Committee was established, which included Giraud and de Gaulle, Generals Cattrull and General Georges, and some members of the de Gaulle committee from London, which was established at the When de Gaulle left London for North Africa, it had already disbanded.Prefects appointed by the former Vichy government were not included in the new body, which now became the Central Provisional Government of fighting France and its empire until the end of the war.

The reader will also recall that General Marshall and I were meeting with General Eisenhower in North Africa while the talks on the future of France were going on.Just before I left North Africa, I invited the members of the new committee to lunch.When I returned to London, I received a worried telegram from President Roosevelt.In his telegram of June 5, he said: I will tell you my thoughts: North Africa is ultimately under British and American military rule; on this basis, Eisenhower can use it according to your wishes.The bride had apparently forgotten that a war was still going on there.We only hear the bridal advocacy.What are our British and American news organizations doing?I wish you the best of luck in getting rid of our mutual headaches.

In my reply to President Roosevelt I stated my impressions of Algiers: former navy personnel to president roosevelt June 6, 1943 We invited all the members of the French Committee to lunch on Friday (June 4th) and everyone seemed very friendly.General Georges I managed to get from France a month ago.He was a personal friend of mine and a great supporter of Giro.If de Gaulle had been brutal, he would have been in the minority of five to two, and possibly completely isolated.The Commission is therefore a body with collective powers and, in my opinion, we can safely work with it. 2. I believe that the establishment of this committee puts an end to the formal contact between me and Charles de Gaulle, leader of the fighting France, from my correspondence with him in 1940, and from certain other documents later started.I propose that these linkages, financial and otherwise, be passed on to the full committee as necessary.Though I think the Commission is a solid recipient of arms and supplies, I feel that we should observe how they conduct their affairs and present themselves before deciding to what extent they should be admitted to represent France.Macmillan and Murphy worked together in perfect harmony, and they would continually submit detailed reports to Eisenhower, who held supreme and final power.

3. If Boisson is dismissed, I will firmly oppose it. However, their heated arguments did not stop.De Gaulle could not accept Giraud as the supreme commander of the French army.Giraud was eager to keep the North African army intact and free them from Free French influence.De Gaulle's attitude towards the issue of military command deepened America's dislike and distrust of him. President Roosevelt telegraphed me again: President Roosevelt to Prime Minister June 10, 1943 I just received the following telegram from Murphy: Giraud told me this afternoon that de Gaulle, at the meeting of the French Council this morning, had finally announced that he was going to be Minister of Defence, a post that would have the usual powers of Minister of War in the cabinet.He also asked to command French units that were not actively engaged in combat, again contradicting what he and Eisenhower, Macmillan and I had said about his intentions.Giraud categorically refused to surrender command of the French troops.He insisted on appointing General George as Secretary of Defense.Cattrull offered a compromise that was extremely favorable to de Gaulle's proposal.Giraud told me that if the committee voted for him on this question, he would resolutely retire and inform the British and American governments and the French people of the injustice caused by de Gaulle's ambition.I have asked Giroux to hold off on any such action until he has had an opportunity to discuss the matter with several other members of the committee.

Macmillan reported to me in the same vein.I just desperately hope that a straightforward agreement can be reached. Prime Minister to Mr Harold Macmillan (in Algiers) June 11, 1943 We do not think at all about our recognition until we know the circumstances of the object of our recognition.Look at Matthew 7:16: By their fruit you will know them.Shall grapes be picked from thornbushes, or figs from thistles?Really, the whole chapter is very educational. You are quite right in biding your time and giving de Gaulle every opportunity to regain his sanity and recognize the forces around him.If he treats us and France squarely, we treat him squarely.

President Roosevelt had no such patience. President Roosevelt to Prime Minister June 17, 1943 The following telegram is the gist of a telegram I sent to General Eisenhauer today: It is our government's position that during our period of military occupation of North Africa we cannot tolerate the French Army being controlled by any body not under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander in Chief.We have to choose people we trust completely.We will absolutely not continue to arm such a force if we cannot fully trust its willingness to cooperate with our military operations.Moreover, we have no interest in the formation of any government or council, which should think itself to rule in France until the people of France choose a government for themselves.

When we enter France in the future, the Allies themselves have a plan of government for the administration of civil affairs which is fully compatible with the sovereignty of France.Finally, it must be stated unequivocally that we have a military occupation in North and West Africa, so that no independent civil decision can be taken without your full consent. These telegrams from President Roosevelt, and the growing hostility expressed against de Gaulle's actions in Algiers, have made me apprehensive for the whole future of the relationship between the Allies and Free France.The Americans had come to the point where they might refuse to recognize any provisional administration if they believed that de Gaulle would become a dominant force affecting the future of postwar France.I feel the need to reassure Americans on military matters while preserving the new interim committees.

former navy personnel to president roosevelt June 18, 1943 I am not in favor of dissolving the Committee of Seven or banning it from meeting at this time. I think it would be better for General Eisenhower to issue your order as his order, and for Murphy and Macmillan to enforce it by whatever means they deem most appropriate.His Majesty's Government will support such a policy. The Commission will thus be faced with a choice of two paths, either to accept our decision by a majority, or to expressly oppose the rescue of their two great powers.If they accept our decision by a majority, which seems possible, it will be up to de Gaulle to decide whether he and the other opponents obey or resign.If de Gaulle resigns, he will make himself condemned by public opinion; at the same time, we must take necessary measures to prevent him from creating disputes.If he obeys, we may have more trouble in the future, but it is much better than we cancel a committee, because the Allies, as well as France, have a lot of hope in it.We should lay down the necessary conditions for the security of our army, and place the responsibility on de Gaulle.In any case, it is always wise to try this approach first. The attitude of the United States to the political situation in France in North Africa was dictated in part by military necessity.The background to the controversy over de Gaulle was the preparations for the Allied landing in Sicily.It was at this critical moment that de Gaulle provoked the dispute over the French High Command.Whatever agreements there may have been in the past between the British government and de Gaulle, we cannot allow them to damage our relationship with the United States. On July 13, I drew up a document for my colleagues summarizing these developments in American policy toward law.I said: It has long been our aim to unite the French produced by the Americans in North-West Africa with the French National Council in London, especially General Giraud and General de Gaulle.I thought I could have made good arrangements at the Casablanca meeting, but as my colleagues know, this plan was marred by the absurd behavior of General de Gaulle.Since then President Roosevelt has armed General Giraud's North African forces on a large scale, and he is now concerned with the movement and command of this part of the army.During this period, the Gaullist organs in London and Brazzaville, together with their supporters in the Anglo-American press, continued to criticize American policy, and there was no doubt that not only Mr. Hull but also President Roosevelt had a strong reaction. disgusted. For all these reasons, we have always hoped that de Gaulle himself should first be absorbed into the National Council in London, and that now, now that this crucial step has been accomplished, he should be united with the Algiers elements in the National Liberation Council.After a number of crises and twists and turns, this committee is gradually acquiring a collective character, especially as civilian personnel are increasing and demonstrating their talents.There is no longer a clear line between Giraud and Gaullist.These healthy trends should be allowed to develop, and if in the coming months it turns out that de Gaulle and his faction are not the masters of the Liberation Committee, but that he himself acts in good faith in this ranks, it may be possible Get some sort of acknowledgment of the committee from President Roosevelt.However, such results are not easily or quickly attainable.We also have to consider what course we should take in the meantime. When the Liberation Committee was formed, I hastened to transfer to it some of the agreements I had made with General de Gaulle.This formality must continue, otherwise we have no one to negotiate on matters of finances, propaganda, Syria and other French possessions, and control of the French armed forces.The Foreign Secretary has explained to me that we have passed a decree empowering de Gaulle to maintain discipline in the Free French troops on British soil, and there can be no doubt that this power must now be vested in a new commission.There is little objection to treating the council as a collective as a de facto authority.Dealing with them in the necessary business can only do them good, and if they can bear their responsibilities, it will also increase their strength. This in some sense implies recognition of the Commission, but emphasizing this at this stage, or taking any action that constitutes legal recognition, will only cause us unnecessary trouble with the United States.We should refrain from using the word recognition, and from any action that creates such momentum or posturing, while at the same time continually dealing with it on its merits.It was not only its duty, but also its interest, that the Commission should regain or restore the wounded confidence of the two great powers that came to the rescue of France, and especially of the estranged American government.If we take any steps towards formal recognition of the Commission at this juncture, it will greatly offend Washington.Moreover, it would attract hostile criticism for the US government from all those who would try to remove Roosevelt in next year's election.The whole course of the war rests on our sincere relations with the American government and with President Roosevelt, and it is our duty to our troops in the field not to aggravate them by taking any steps which might seriously weaken the present very good co-operation between the two countries. task.Even if Soviet Russia recognizes de Gaulle for his recent flattery to the Communists, we would still be wise to measure our policy against that of the United States.In this instance, it is true, it is more important not to isolate them, but also not to give the appearance that we and Russia are against them. I have repeatedly stated that it is in England's vital interest to have a strong France after the war, and I do not hesitate to maintain this view.I worry that the anti-Gaullism of the Washington government may gradually crystallize into a clear anti-French sentiment.However, if de Gaulle was gradually absorbed into the committee and became silent, and if, on the other hand, the committee adopted a rational and faithful attitude, this dangerous tendency on the American side might be reversed and moderated. The French Committee felt that we wanted to make them better relations with the United States, which would do them no harm.If the healthy and salutary methods of which I have alluded proceed, and if we act patiently, and above all with measure, in dealing with these nuisances, then, at the Conference of the Allies, for France It is still possible to win a recognized status with the French Empire. The opinions of our cabinet members gradually tend to give some form of recognition to the committee.So I called President Roosevelt again. former navy personnel to president roosevelt July 21, 1943 I was under considerable pressure from the Foreign Office, my cabinet colleagues, and environmental forces to recognize the National Liberation Committee in Algiers.What does it mean to admit it?One can recognize someone as an emperor, or a grocer. Confession is meaningless without a clear formula.Before de Gaulle went to Northwest Africa and the new committee was formed, we had all our contacts with him and his committee.I reported to the meeting on June 8 that this committee of collective responsibility had been created to replace the situation created by my correspondence with General de Gaulle in 1940.Our dealings, financial and otherwise, will henceforth be directed to the Committee as a whole.I am happy to do this, because I would rather deal with a collective committee than with de Gaulle alone.In fact, for many months, I tried to coax or force de Gaulle to undertake the task.Thanks to the new arrangements, this appears to have been largely resolved.Macmillan repeatedly tells us that the Commission was acquiring a collective authority over which de Gaulle was by no means its master.He also told us that if the Commission collapsed, it would probably come to a day if it had no support. Then, in addition to the power exercised by Giro in Northwest Africa and Dakar, relying on the armed forces of the United States, de Gaulle would once again be Become the only one who can control everything.He strongly recommends a recognition scheme.Both Eisenhower and Murphy agreed on that, he said in the report. I am, therefore, approaching the point when, in the interests of Great Britain and the aforementioned French and British interests, I may well have to take this step.If I do, Russia will certainly admit (them), and I fear it will embarrass you. So I would very much like you to tell me (1) whether you agree with our approach or something like it, or (2) whether you would mind if His Majesty's Government took that step alone.According to my thinking, there is no doubt that the former method is much better.There are many good people in the committee, such as Catrou, Massigli, Monet, Georges and of course Giro, who arrived here yesterday.He's bound to ask all these questions and sharpen things. However, it is clear that the Americans are not prepared to recognize the Algiers Committee as it is constituted.Giro was in the United States at this time negotiating the supply of arms and equipment to the North African Army.His stay in the United States did little to appease the local Gaullists. On July 22, I received a long and important telegram from President Roosevelt stating the considered views of the United States Government on the French question. President Roosevelt to Prime Minister July 22, 1943 Various parties continued to demand recognition of the now-established French National Liberation Committee despite such modest pressure.Some demanded its recognition as an organization representing French interests in all French territories, including the mainland.Others demanded recognition that it represented only French interests within the former French Empire. Most, but not all, were willing to accept the authority of the committee provided it met the military needs of the Anglo-American armed forces. We have always maintained that, first, military needs are and will be the primary place in comparison with all civil affairs; It has complete and true unity.This unity must dispel those past strife in French politics or parties which tended to foster bloc antagonism or personal ambition, and show that its real purpose is to unite itself and all Frenchmen behind it, in order to support the Allies A joint effort in the war against the Axis powers.At the same time it should remember that its only cause is the liberation of France and the success of the Allies. The French Council is supposed to be based on the principle of the collective responsibility of individual Frenchmen for the conduct of the war, and our relations with it should be maintained on that basis.It goes without saying that on matters of a military nature our Governments will deal directly with the French Commander-in-Chief of the French Armed Forces. The political problems of France must be left to the French people when they are liberated from the present domination of their enemies. My Government is eager to proceed with you and other Allies along the line of limited acceptance of the Commission, if such acceptance is always subordinated to military necessity.But we must make it clear that the French should be united, and this minimum condition must be well fulfilled. I do not think that we should at any time use the word recognition, because it can be misinterpreted to mean that, as soon as we land on French soil, we recognize the Council as the French government.The acceptance by the local civil authorities of the committees in the colonies on a provisional basis is perhaps a word which comes closer to expressing my thoughts.However, as long as it is in the military interest of the Allied cause, we must maintain the right to deal directly with the local authorities of the French colonies, while continuing the present practice.The case of Martinique is an example. Giraud came here for a visit, with great success.We are keeping this visit on a purely military basis, and we are using each convoy to North Africa to send additional equipment directly to his troops. Roosevelt at the end of the telegram.A joint approach was proposed, based on cooperation with the French Council rather than on recognition. My reply to President Roosevelt's July 22nd telegram is as follows: former navy personnel to president roosevelt August 3, 1943 First of all I think the way you are suggesting is rather disappointing and will not quell the agitation for recognition in both our countries.On the other hand, the situation has moved in our favor.When the whole of Italy's problems became known to the world, the French Committee felt acutely neglected.I think that de Gaulle is now more deeply bound in the general structure of the Commission. Regarding the arrangement of command power, it also seems to be more satisfactory than the deadlock in the past. 2. I have therefore asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to propose some modification of your approach in order to harmonize our views.If we can't reach a consensus, we can discuss it again. The Quebec Conference, already described, is about to convene at this time.We are now at a stalemate. President Roosevelt to Prime Minister August 4, 1943 I sincerely hope that nothing will be done about the recognition of the French National Liberation Council until we have had an opportunity to talk together. It was only after exhausting discussions that I was able to persuade the Americans to issue a manifesto in general terms in support of the political situation that had developed in North Africa. Prime Minister (in Quebec) to Mr Macmillan (in Algiers) August 25, 1943 After painstaking and lengthy discussions on the problem of recognition we have arrived at a series of solutions which I believe can be regarded as satisfactory.We think it is best for both of us to express our views in our own terms, rather than insisting on a joint declaration by the United States and the United Kingdom. 2. In my opinion, President Roosevelt and Mr. Hull have done a great deal to satisfy our wishes.You should tell my friends on the committee that I am sure that the right course for them is to welcome the American declaration in the most earnest terms, and not to draw objectionable distinctions in any manner of recognition.On the contrary, the more happy they are with the American declaration, the better it will be for them.A friendly attitude towards America at the present time would be especially helpful to the interests of France.On the other hand, if the newspapers or the radio broadcast comments or condemnations, the effect is only to reignite the anger of the State Department. The next day's proclamation recognizing the French National Council marked the end of a period.Although French leaders were not invited to the armistice negotiations with Italy, or to the Mediterranean Commission that was later created to deal with Italian affairs, they now communicated formally with the Allies as French representatives. The weeks passed, but the struggle for power between de Gaulle and Giraud did not ease, and the two sides often clashed over any issue of civil and military personnel.Nor was the fault always on de Gaulle's side.Unnecessary incidents also occurred with regard to the liberation of Corsica, where the Free French took Ajaccio on the night of September 9th.Giraud sent an expedition to the site two days later, and relations were exacerbated by an unfortunate dispute between his military commander and the local Gaullist leader.From a military point of view, the liberation of the island was slow but successful. Prime Minister to Mr Harold Macmillan (in Algiers) October 3, 1943 If you think it appropriate, please forward my following message to General Giraud and General de Gaulle: Congratulations to your troops on the smooth progress in Corsica, and eagerly look forward to the liberation and return of this famous island to France soon. The next day, the French completed their occupation of the island. In October the plan for a temporary consultative conference to expand the bases of the French regime gained ground.Giro's position is constantly weakening.The only support he had came from certain people in the Army who valued friendly relations with the United States, and the support he received as one of the two chairmen of the National Council quickly disappeared.De Gaulle proved to be incomparably the stronger figure.On November 3, the consultative meeting was held for the first time in Algiers.The political life of France is gradually forming the rudimentary government of the future.On November 8, exactly one year after the North African landings, Giraud resigned from the National Council but remained Commander-in-Chief of the French Army.I am disturbed by the possible consequences of these events. It is very important to the future unity of France that a certain balance of power should be maintained between these dissenting elements. So I call President Roosevelt: prime minister to president roosevelt November 10, 1943 I am not satisfied with the changes in the French National Council, so that de Gaulle became the only president.The organization we recognize is of a quite different nature, and its chief feature is the joint presidency of Giraud and de Gaulle.I suggest that we should maintain a completely reserved attitude until we discuss the situation together. I hope that, while passing through Cairo on my way to the Tehran Conference, I will take advantage of the opportunity of reviewing the new French Army to bring together the two opposing generals. Prime Minister to Mr Macmillan (in Algiers) November 2, 1943 If I could spare a few days in Africa between now and Christmas, I would like to inspect the new French army.You can prudently ask both General de Gaulle and General Giraud whether they are willing to agree.We could parade in the afternoon, sleep somewhere overnight, and watch some drills the next morning.In this case, I wish to be a guest of the French National Council. I think they probably took it as a tribute to them, which is what we mean.For many obvious reasons, I cannot fix a date at this time. My intentions have been thwarted by the brutal and tragic actions of the Free French regime in Syria.The formal independence of Syria and Lebanon was proclaimed by the Free French at the end of 1941.We have recognized these republics and appointed Sir Edward Spears as British Minister in February 1942.For a whole year, however, there was no progress.Cabinets have been reshuffled in both countries, but elections have not been held.Anti-French hostility grew.In March 1943, provisional governments were appointed in both countries.Election results in July and August showed overwhelming nationalist majorities in both republics.The majority called for an overhaul of the trusteeship constitution.The weakness of the Liberal French regime prompted action by local politicians who had little faith in France's promise of independence after the war.On October 7, the Lebanese government proposed to revoke France's status in the republic.A month later, the Free French Committee in Algiers denied the right of the Lebanese to such one-sided actions.On his return from Algiers, General Quatrou's representative, Mr. Eler, ordered the arrest of the President of Lebanon and most of his cabinet members, which, especially in Beirut, provoked riots and bloodshed.The British Cabinet was disturbed by these events. The actions taken by the French completely negate the agreements we have concluded with the French and with the Syrians and the Lebanese.This is in conflict with the Atlantic Charter we have proclaimed and many other declarations.It seems that throughout the Middle East and the Arab world, this situation will be distorted, and everywhere people will inevitably say: what kind of France is this?On the one hand, it submits to its enemies, but on the other hand, it wants to make other countries submit to it. Therefore, I feel that the British and American governments should jointly respond strongly.The nature of the organization which we had recognized at the Quebec Conference had now been completely changed by the full powers of de Gaulle.But the riots that have broken out in the Levant countries are of another nature, and will give us good reason to settle the matter with de Gaulle, with the support of world opinion.I believe that the abducted Lebanese president and cabinet members should be released and reinstated to their full capacity, and that the Lebanese parliament should reconvene once law and order are ensured.If de Gaulle refuses to do so immediately, we should withdraw our recognition of the French National Council and stop arming the French troops in North Africa. I had to order General Wilson to be ready to send British troops to take over Lebanon and restore order if necessary, but luckily it was not necessary.General Catrouh arrived from Algiers on November 16 to mediate, the French authorities released the imprisoned politician on November 22, and the long-running campaign for the eventual independence of Syria and Lebanon Negotiations have also begun. These events have left their mark on our relations with the Free French Committee and with General de Gaulle.Much effort has been made during the past year to establish a united policy based on a true fighting friendship between the leaders of America, England, and Free France, but the results have been disappointing.