Chapter 166 Volume 5, Chapter 11, The Fragmented Axis

Autumn 1943 Civil war in Italy must be supported by the King of Italy and Badoglio's government I take the matter to President Roosevelt We have an agreement on policy Mussolini meets Hitler on September 14th! !Hitler's assessment of the Italian fascist leader The fate of the Salo Republic's Italian troops in the Balkans and the Aegean Sea I explain the situation to Stalin Marshal Badoglio signs a long-term surrender agreement on the island of Malta President Roosevelt, Stalin and I jointly declare that Italy enjoys Common Belligerents Count Sforza Enters the Political Stage Concerning the Use of Italian Manpower and Ships Italy declares war on Germany on October 13th! !A precarious situation.

Mussolini's attempt to revive the Fascist party plunged Italy into the horrors of civil war.Within weeks of the September armistice, Italian army officers and patriots in town and country who were stationed in German-occupied northern Italy began to organize guerrilla groups and take military action against the Germans and those natives who remained with Mussolini. action.They made contact with the Allies south of Rome and Badoglio's government.During these months, Italians have been in a brutal atmosphere of infighting, assassinations and massacres, and resistance movements formed to deal with the German occupation have spread all over the country.As in other occupied parts of Europe, the insurrectionary movement in central and northern Italy shook people of all classes.

Their aid and support to Allied prisoners of war who were still interned in northern Italy when the armistice was declared was an important achievement.The Allied POWs, numbering some 80,000, wore striking combat attire, and most of them did not understand Italian language or geography.In addition, there were at least 10,000 others ventured to safety by members of the Italian Resistance and simple folk from the countryside, most of whom wore civilian clothes donated by the local population. From the time of the armistice and the loyal and courageous participation of the Italian fleet in the Allies, I felt that I should cooperate with the King of Italy and Marshal Badoglio, at least as long as the Allies took Rome and we were able to establish a truly broad-based I should have done so before the Italian government joined us in the war.I am sure that King Victor Emmanuel and Badoglio could have done more for what is now our common cause than any Italian government composed of Italian exiles or members of the anti-fascist regime. much contribution.The surrender of the Italian fleet was a sure proof of their authority.On the other hand, the discourse against any relations with those who had worked with or assisted Mussolini persisted, and immediately gave rise to endless intrigues among the half-dozen leftist parties in Rome, who wanted to Get rid of the king and Badoglio, and let them take power by themselves.In view of the seriousness of the war and the paramount importance of having Italy convincingly join us in fighting, I resisted these developments as they appeared.On this point, Marshal Stalin supported me, because he obeyed the Russian maxim that you can walk with the devil until you step off the bridge.

After considering Macmillan's proposal from Algiers and Eisenhower's proposal, I called President Roosevelt for his opinion. prime minister to president roosevelt September 21, 1943 My colleagues and I in the War Cabinet have come to the following conclusions: It was of the utmost importance to establish the authority of the King of Italy and that of the Brindisi governing body as a government, while giving them a unified command over the whole of Italy.Even though Badoglio has spoken on the radio tonight, we still think that the King of Italy should say a few words before Bari steps up to the microphone, telling the Italian people that he is there and declaring that Badoglio is on his mandate. It is very necessary to continue to take charge of leading the legitimate government of Italy under the leadership of the Italian government.This is true not only of the Italian people, but of Italian representatives and garrisons abroad.

We should tell the King of Italy and Badoglio that they must form the broadest possible anti-fascist coalition.All decent people, as long as they can make some useful contributions, should be united at this critical juncture.The king should address the above points in his broadcast.It would certainly be of great advantage if Count Sforza and the professors who claimed to represent the six parties would join in a common effort.But it must be expressly stated that any provisional measures taken as a result of the needs of the war must not in the future prevent the Italian people from freely choosing that form of democratic government which they heartily desire.

The question of granting the Badoglio government the status of an ally is not yet included in our current plans.The status given to the co-belligerents was good enough.From this standpoint we should gradually transform Italy into an effective national force in the war against Germany, but, as we have already said, it must be self-reliant.Its useful contribution in fighting against the enemy will be recognized in the adjustment and implementation of the armistice conditions.On the other hand, we look forward to Badoglio continuing to work for the Allies on the basis of the Armistice Agreement.Our principle will be to pay for results.Badoglio is at liberty to declare war on Germany, and if he takes this action, he will immediately become our joint belligerent, though not an ally.

We can tell Badoglio that we don't plan to have allied juntas everywhere.If he cooperates with us, we are ready to hand over to his government immediately the territories liberated from enemy control.This proposal applies to Italy's historic mainland, Sicily and Sardinia.Within the territories authorized to be administered by the Italian Government, the intercourse of the United Nations with it will be conducted through a governing council. If the full document of surrender, even with some changes in it, could now be signed, we would find everything much easier to proceed than it is now.Admittedly, many of the provisions are not enforceable by the ruling institutions in Brindisi in their present state.However, these problems will become real problems when we advance to the north of the peninsula and surrender the territory to the Italian government.We do not want to put ourselves in a position where we have to weigh every demand with the Italian Government.The longer we delay the signing of the surrender document, the more difficult it will be, so I hope that Eisenhower, on the basis of the Foreign Secretary's telegram, will get Badoglio to sign it as soon as possible.

This plan should immediately be presented to the King of Italy and to Badoglio.First and foremost, the King of Italy should issue a public declaration as suggested.This of course does not necessarily have to wait for the final revision of the policy. This telegram was sent simultaneously with the following telegram from President Roosevelt: President Roosevelt to Prime Minister September 21, 1943 If you agree with the following cable, I will forward it immediately to General Eisenhower: In view of the current situation in Italy, it is of the utmost importance to take practical and feasible actions as soon as possible.

1. You should refrain from agreeing to a long-term truce pending further instructions. 2. On the basis of military necessity, you are empowered to make proposals at any time for mitigating the terms of the military armistice so that the Italians may fight against Germany within their means. 3. If the present Italian government declares war on Germany, we shall allow it to perform its functions as the Italian government in accordance with the provisions of the fourth paragraph below, and it shall therefore be treated as a joint fighter in the war against Germany ; such relations are based on the express understanding that in no way shall be prejudiced to the liberty of the Italian people to determine the form of government which they shall finally wish to adopt, and that, until the Germans have been expelled from Italian territory, no Determines the final form of Italian government.

4. The Allied military government and the appropriate functions scheduled for the Armistice Agreement Implementation Committee should be incorporated into the Allied Committee under the command of the Allied Commander-in-Chief as soon as the actual situation permits. The Leo government is ready to give guidance and issue orders in military, political and administrative affairs. 5. You should, by all practicable means, and under your direction, encourage the active use of the armed forces of Italy against Germany. It seems to me that the two directives do not seem to conflict on any important point, except the section concerning the temporary disallowance of the long term terms of capitulation.With regard to the long term terms of surrender, I defer to President Roosevelt, and we have agreed to send his telegram to General Eisenhower as our two instructions.

On September 14, Mussolini met Hitler for the first time after his liberation.Over the next few days, the two of them discussed how to prolong the life of Italian Fascism in the parts of Italy still occupied by German troops.On September 15th, the Italian Fascist leader announced that he had regained the leadership of the Fascist Party, and that a new republic, the Fascist Party, after purging the rebels, was in high spirits and prepared to re-establish a loyal government in the north .The ancien régime, now clothed in the garb of a pseudo-revolution, seemed, for a brief period, to be able to rekindle the flame of life.But the result disappointed the Germans.Comments made by Goebbels at the time revealed the message. The Fascist leaders did not draw the moral conclusions our Führer expected from the upheavals in Italy.He was, of course, overjoyed to see our Führer and to regain his full freedom.But the first thing our Führer expects from him is to take full vengeance on those who betrayed him.However, his lack of such expression is enough to show his real limitation.He is not a revolutionary like our Führer or Stalin.He was so bound up with his duties to his own people that he lacked the ambition of a world revolutionist and rebel. 【１】 [1] "Goebbels Diary" page 387. But this cannot be undone.Mussolini's half-push, half-finished hundred-day scandal has begun.At the end of September, he established his headquarters on the shores of Lake Garda.This poor shadow government is known all over the world as the Republic of Salo.This clumsy tragedy is played out here to the end.For over twenty years the Italian dictator and legislator, with his mistresses, lived under the control of his German masters, adhering to their will, while under the watchful eye of carefully chosen German guards and doctors, cut off contact with the outside world. The surrender of Italy took its forces in the Balkans completely by surprise, so many were caught in a very dangerous position between local partisans and the vengeful Germans.The reprisals were brutal.Almost all of the more than 7,000 Italian garrisons on Corfu were wiped out by their former allies.Italian forces on Kefalonia held off until September 22.Those who did not die in battle, many were shot, and the rest were deported.Some of the garrisons on the Aegean islands attempted to flee to Egypt in small groups.Some Italian detachments in Albania, the Dalmatian coast and Yugoslavia joined the local partisans.More frequently, they were sent to forced labor and officers shot.In Montenegro, most of the officers and soldiers of the two divisions of the Italian army were formed by Tito to form Garibaldi's division. They suffered heavy losses at the end of the war.In the Balkans and Aegean, the Italian army lost some 40,000 soldiers after the truce was declared on September 8, not counting those who died in exile camps. I explained the current situation and our policy to Stalin. Prime Minister to Premier Stalin September 21, 1943 Mussolini, installed by the Germans at the head of the so-called republican fascist government, urgently needs to be counteracted by strengthening the authority of the King of Italy and Badoglio in every possible way. They had signed an armistice with us, and since then faithfully carried out it with the best possible endeavors, and surrendered the greater part of their fleet.Furthermore, for military reasons we must mobilize and concentrate all Italian forces that desire to fight the Germans, or at least to obstruct them.These armies are already active. I therefore propose to exhort the King of Italy to make a radio appeal to the Italian people to rally around Badoglio's government, while at the same time declaring his readiness to form a broad-based anti-fascist coalition.It goes without saying that he must do nothing to prevent the Italian people from deciding what form of democratic government they will adopt after the war. And it should also be stated that the useful contribution of the Italian government, army and people to the war against the enemy will be recognized in the adjustment and implementation of the armistice; however, while the Italian government is free to declare war on Germany, such action will not Make Italy an ally, but only a co-belligerent. At the same time, I strongly advocate the signing of the comprehensive terms of the armistice (these conditions have not yet been resolved), although some of them cannot be implemented at present.Against this background, we will inform Badoglio that the Allied Government intends to hand over the historic Italian mainland, Sicily and Sardinia, after their liberation from enemy control, to the Allied Executive Council. Italian government. I am also making these suggestions to President Roosevelt.I hope you can agree with these suggestions.As you can easily understand, the matter is extremely urgent for military reasons.For example, the Italians have driven the Germans out of Sardinia; the Germans still hold many islands and vital points, which are within our reach. He replied as follows: Prime Minister Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill September 22, 1943 I have received your telegram of September 21st. I agree with your proposal concerning the section on the appeal of the King of Italy to the Italian people on the radio; however, I think it is very necessary that in the appeal of the King of Italy, it should be clearly stated that Italy has sent to Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union Surrender and will fight Germany with Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. 2. Regarding the necessity of signing a comprehensive armistice agreement, I also agree with your suggestion. As for your reservation that certain provisions are not currently enforceable, I understand this reservation to mean only that they are not currently enforceable in the areas still occupied by the Germans.Whatever the case may be, on this point I would like confirmation or necessary clarification from you. I asked President Roosevelt what he thought on this point and told him that I thought the long-term terms of surrender could well be dealt with by the Armistice Commission we are about to set up in Italy.Later, I sent him a telegram which read as follows: former navy personnel to president roosevelt September 24, 1943 Macmillan now tells me that he is convinced that within the next few days Badoglio will be able to get all the terms signed, and that the longer we delay, the more arguments will inevitably grow.It may take some time for new committees to be able to express their views.I myself would be happier if we settled the matter now.This may save us a lot of trouble in the future. As a result of Eisenhower's suggestion, we have made the preamble less harsh than before.We have also stipulated that the armistice of September 3rd shall remain in force. prime minister to president roosevelt September 25, 1943 I have not yet answered Uncle Joe's call in favor of supporting the King of Italy, and his opinion on general conditions, because I do not know what course you will take with him.You have of course received my telegram.Macmillan reported to me that there would be no difficulty in getting Badoglio to sign. President Roosevelt replied: President Roosevelt to Prime Minister September 25, 1943 If it can be signed quickly, I agree with you on the long-term terms, which I have communicated to Eisenhower. At this time, other political disputes arose. Prime Minister to Mr Macmillan (in Algiers) September 25, 1943 The broadcast on Radio Bari, in the name of the King of Italy and Albania and the Emperor of Ethiopia, caused consternation here. I need not say that the repetition of stupidity like this discredits our entire policy here.Would that king like to be sent back to his Ethiopian empire to be crowned? I think that the speech of the King of Italy is to be reviewed before it is published; and if time is too late, you should at any rate ask.It is extremely important that the Soviet Union is mentioned in the speech, because Stalin was valuable to us in using this policy of the Italian government. On September 28, Marshal Badoglio set out from Brindisi on a touch Italian cruiser for the signing of the long-term surrender agreement on the island of Malta.General Eisenhower, along with his Chief of Staff, General Bedell Smith, Lord Gort, and General Alexander, received him with formal ceremony aboard the battleship Nelson. Badoglio wanted to delete the clause on unconditional surrender, but the Allied commanders were adamant that this was a formal gathering to sign a document presented by the Allied governments and that no room for discussion could be allowed. After the two parties signed, Badoglio and General Eisenhower had a brief discussion on the issue of declaring war on Germany. The Italian Marshal wanted to declare war on Germany.The day's schedule ended with a visit to the Italian fleet anchored in the port of Malta. prime minister to president roosevelt September 28, 1943 We have agreed that the long-term surrender document should be kept secret at this time.I have every confidence that Uncle Joe would agree, but it would be better if you told him our opinion on behalf of both of us. We think it would be a mistake to discuss the transformation of Rome into an undefended city, which might hamper our advance, but would have no binding force on the enemy. Our troops in Italy were initially overwhelmed by the new situation.For more than three years the Italians had been their enemies.By joining the United Nations, the Italians acquired a new status, and some of them a new attitude, in a few short weeks.Requisitioning munitions was no longer possible.They refused accommodation to the British troops, and British officers, without Italian ration cards, were denied food.Locals viewed the British military ticket with suspicion.The senior British military officer who had served as the military and political chief of the North now dealt with the Italians only as a liaison officer.The conveniences they need can only be requested from the Italians and cannot be compelled to requisition. There were too many such requests, and the new regime in Italy was increasingly distressed.The highest authorities soon made a correction, but some Italian commoners took advantage of the change to their advantage.President Roosevelt and General Eisenhower felt the need to make a public proclamation to explain to the Italians, and indeed to the world, the status of the co-belligerents.I welcome this opinion. prime minister to president roosevelt September 30, 1943 I agree that we should make a joint announcement, but is this a good opportunity to bring Uncle Joe into the mix?Now it is clear that he did recognize the Italians as co-belligers.We lost a few days in communication with Moscow and back, but this delay seemed insignificant compared with the value of Russia's participation in the operation. If you agree, would you please inform Stalin of the content of the form we would like such a proclamation to take; would he like to publish it jointly with us, or would we rather publish it ourselves without having to include his name?Of course, we should take into account any revisions he may have made to the draft. I myself would like to make a few changes, which will be included in my forthcoming telegram.If you have no objection to them and agree to negotiate with Stalin, could you please submit the text to him in this form? The text of my draft manifesto is as follows: The governments of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union recognized the position of the Government of the Kingdom of Italy as stated by Marshal Badoglio and accepted the active cooperation of the Italian state and armed forces as a common belligerent in the war against Germany. The military events since September 8, and the brutality of the Germans towards the Italian populace, finally led to Italy's declaration of war on Germany, which had, in fact, made Italy a co-belligerent.On this basis, the governments of the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union will continue to work together with the Italian government.The three governments recognize the promise of the Italian government to submit to the will of the Italian people after the Germans have been expelled from Italy.It is self-evident that the absolute and full liberty of the Italian people, by constitutional means, to determine their ultimate desire for a democratic form of government, must not be compromised in any way. The co-belligerent relations between the Government of Italy and the Governments of the United States are not of their own accord to affect the terms recently concluded, which remain in full force, but only by the Allied Governments, in accordance with the aid which the Government of Italy may render to the cause of the United States, at the Adjustments are made after mutual agreement. This proclamation was agreed to by President Roosevelt and Stalin. Count Sforza is now on the political scene in Italy.Before the revolution of the fascist party, he was foreign minister and ambassador to Paris.During Mussolini's reign, he was an exile.He became a prominent figure among Italians living in America.He has claimed that he advocates bringing Italy to the Allies' side, and in a recent letter to a senior State Department official he expressed his willingness to cooperate with Badoglio.As tensions rose, he thought his chance had come for major power in Italy, and was convinced that he was entitled to it.He won the support of many Americans and could influence the votes of some Italian-Americans.President Roosevelt hoped, perhaps, to absorb him into the new government apparatus without overthrowing the King of Italy and Badoglio, since our military thinking about the Italian campaign was based on the King of Italy and Badoglio O as the basis. prime minister to president roosevelt September 30, 1943 With regard to your telegram concerning Sforza's co-operation with his government, it seems to me that his public speeches were, to say the least, unkind to the King of Italy.However, in the record of his speech of September 26th, I found the following excerpt, which shows his possible usefulness to our war effort: If the current leaders of Italy are serious and fighting hard, it is all our duty to fight with them and drive the Germans out of Italy. I say this from the point of view that my only main desire is to do the one thing that helps to win.We can unite around any government that enjoys the confidence of the Allies, if that government proves at present that it can fight and drive the Germans out of Italy. If I were to declare a republic tomorrow, I would say no.Above all, we should drive the Germans out of Italy.That is the hope of the Italians; but, when Italy is free, the Italians will decide.Former Naval Personnel to President Roosevelt October 1, 1943 I have your telegram concerning Sforza.He seems to have talked about various issues, but many places are quite different from what he wrote in his letter.It was indeed his duty to decide whether he would seek to aid Badoglio's royal government, or to undermine its prestige.Before we put him up, we should figure out where we stand.If you send him back to Italy, passing through the United Kingdom, wouldn't it be a good thing for us to give him further friendly advice here?I don't see much benefit in sending him back to Italy just to sabotage whatever small battle Eisenhower was able to wrangle among the Italians against fascism and the Germans. President Roosevelt to Prime Minister October 2, 1943 I have your telegram concerning Sforza.I heard that he and his son were due to fly to Prestwick on October 3rd to go to Marrakech. I hope you will give him a good lesson while he is in the United Kingdom. Today, I sent a telegram to Eisenhower, which reads as follows: Inform Badoglio that the U.S. government considers it unacceptable for Grandi to participate in Badoglio's administration at this time.Although Grandi may have been a major figure in the ousting of Mussolini, he was so closely associated with Fascism that it would be difficult to install him now in the Brindisi government. Caused many unfavorable comments and misunderstandings.The first figures to be incorporated into Badoglio's government should be those with clear principles of freedom and democracy. It is only by using such a person in a responsible position that the U.S. government sees justification for supporting the present Italian government. Germany had taken active belligerent steps against Italy, and the main strength of Badoglio's government lay in its declared determination to drive the German invaders out of Italy by force.If Italy is to gain the status of a joint belligerent, the Italian government must immediately declare war on Germany. I had a long conversation with Count Sforza as he was passing through London, and I believe we came to an agreement by which he would work faithfully with the King of Italy and with Badoglio, Until we are able to form a broad-based non-fascist government after we have conquered Rome as soon as possible.So I stick to our established policy.We intend to support the monarchy until Italy is liberated; to bring the Italian government to our side in the struggle against Germany; to strengthen that government by adding figures representative and resistant to Germany; we want the participation of the Russians Our present arrangements concerning Italian affairs. While we are exchanging these views, I urge that the best use can be made of Italian men and ships. Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary September 26, 1943 Shall we conclude an agreement with the Italian government on the use of Italian prisoners and manpower?We cannot allow such large numbers of Italians to remain in England or North Africa at will, without discipline and restraint.If they are to be sent back to the country, it will inevitably cause tension in our shipping.On the other hand, we also need their manpower.Our military operations in Africa must not be hampered by guarding large numbers of captives.Our 1st Armored Division was practically useless because it was only used to guard prisoners. Ships returning to the United Kingdom from Africa are often empty.We should demand that the transport of prisoners to the United Kingdom continue until a new agreement is concluded with the Italian Government.I am fully prepared to consider changing the status of the Italians if they continue to do the work they are doing and observe strict discipline. Prime Minister to Admiral of the Admiralty, Deputy Chief of Naval Staff and Admiral Cunningham October 2, 1943 The ships of the Italian Navy, berthed at Alexandria or elsewhere, cannot be left idle.I would now like to propose to the United States that the warship Litrio be sent to the United States to be equipped for the Pacific War and allocated to them for use there.I also propose to President Roosevelt that these Italian warships be transferred to us after the war.Because: first, we have undertaken the main tasks of the war against Italy; second, our capital ship losses have been severe; third, we have stopped building capital ships in order to facilitate the present short-term shipbuilding program.I am sure that these proposals will be taken up in an extremely friendly spirit.In all of the above, I would like to hear your opinion, and of course I would like you to inform me of the construction and value of these ships. Two. We must maximize the use of cruisers and other ships.We cannot allow some important ships to lie idle in the ports of the Mediterranean.The most important and modern ships should be put into service, and our overage warships should be scrapped. Older Italian battleships could also play their part in coastal bombardment squadrons, which were indeed needed in 1944, though not for long, in both the English Channel and the Indian Ocean. former navy personnel to president roosevelt October 4, 1943 Now that Uncle Joe has taken part in our proclamation concerning Italy, it seems to be of the first importance to compel the King of Italy to declare war as soon as possible.I know this is exactly your opinion too.I propose to instruct Eisenhower to exert maximum pressure on the King of Italy.There should be no more talk of waiting until after Rome has been conquered before declaring war.In our opinion, this is a good time for the Italians to make meritorious deeds. If you agree, please issue the necessary instructions without further consultation with us. The president took immediate action. President Roosevelt to Prime Minister October 8, 1943 On October 5, I sent Eisenhower the following notice: The President and Prime Minister agreed that the King of Italy should declare war on Germany as soon as possible. It seems unnecessary to wait until the occupation of Rome.So you have to put pressure on the Italian government to declare war sooner rather than wait for more achievements. Thus, the Government of the Kingdom of Italy declared war on Germany on October 13. Prime Minister to Mr Macmillan (in Algiers) October 23, 1943 My policy is to broaden the base of the Italian government and increase its forces to the left.We don't know much here about the existing characters.You should take note of all this and fully report to me. I am well aware that any reorganization of the Italian government is best waited until after we have occupied Rome.Occupy Rome to gain support from Italy and the Roman Catholic Church.Restoring Badoglio and the King of Italy there would have a better chance of uniting the existing Italian powers.That's where our deals are, and that's where their ambitions are. In the meantime, care should be taken not to take any action to weaken the existing position of the King of Italy and Badoglio.Instead, we must support them and lead them along with our troops.On the other hand, every effort should continue to be made to find persons who would strengthen the existing Government. prime minister to president roosevelt November 6, 1943 All the information I have obtained indicates that we shall suffer a great loss if we unravel this drama between the King of Italy and Badoglio.Victor Emmanuel is nothing to us.But his union with Badoglio has in fact led to the capitulation of the Italian fleet, which is now making a very useful contribution; The loyalty of the people was, of course, embraced by Italian diplomatic representatives stationed everywhere.Why should we burden the Anglo-American armies advancing on Rome by reducing any assistance to them?In my own opinion, we should encourage little change in the regimes of Badoglio and the King of Italy until we are in Rome and can form a truly broad-based Italian government. I know that Eisenhower was generally inclined to this opinion.We must insist on what we have achieved until we are sure that we can have a better harvest, and that better harvest can only be secured when we occupy Rome. This is the kind of precarious situation in Italy when I set off for Cairo and Tehran.