Chapter 167 Volume 5, Chapter 12: The Island That Lost Its Opportunity for Victory

Rhodes, the key to the Eastern Mediterranean We have the power to control the Aegean General Wilson's plans are thwarted Major Lord Jellicoe's adventure The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree to capture Rhodes, Røros and Kos The Germans hold Rhodes Hitler Concern over the Aegean Sea: German reoccupation of Kos. Urgent need to attack Rhodes. On October 7, I sent a telegram to President Roosevelt. His reply was disappointing. Questions remain in the air. News of Hitler's decision to fight south of Rome ruins plans. October 10. Wilson's report. I sadly back down. October 10th, my telegram to President Roosevelt. The fate of our forces defending Leros. The German offensive of November 12 dealt a heavy blow to the pedantic and stubborn opposition of the secondary personnel.

The capitulation of Italy afforded us the opportunity to secure important spoils in the Aegean with little cost and effort.The Italian garrison obeyed the orders of the King of Italy and Marshal Badoglio.If we could get to them before they were intimidated by the Germans on the islands and disarmed, they would surrender.The Germans were much smaller in number, but not so long ago the loyalty of their allies may have been suspected and countermeasures prepared.The three islands of Rhodes, Røros and Kos are fortresses and have long been our very important strategic objectives in the secondary combat area.Rhodes is the key to this group of islands because it has a good airfield.Our own air force could fly from there to defend any other islands we might occupy, and could give our navy total control over the sea.Moreover, if the British Air Forces in Egypt and Cyrenaica had moved some of their forces to Rhodes, they could have defended Egypt as well, if not better.In my opinion, if you don't pick up these treasures, you are really missing a godsend opportunity.Our ability to gain command of the air and sea over the Aegean Sea could have a decisive influence on Turkey, which was at this time very shaken by the collapse of Italy.If we can take advantage of the Aegean Sea and the Dardanelles, it will open up a shortcut for the Navy to go to Russia.

There was then no need to organize risky and costly Arctic convoys or to maintain the long, tiresome supply lines through the Persian Gulf. I felt from the outset that we must be ready to take advantage of any situation in which Italy collapsed or Germany was encircled. Prime Minister to General Ismay, Transfer to the Chiefs of Staff Committee August 2, 1943 Now there is an important task that must be actively promoted by all means.If Italian troops in Crete and Rhodes revolt against the Germans and a stalemate ensues, we must support the Italians as early as possible so that the local population can also be induced to support them.

2. The Middle East should be informed today that all supplies to Turkey may be stopped in order to prevent an emergency; they should prepare expeditionary forces, not necessarily in divisions, in order to take advantage of possible opportunities. 3. There is no time now for conventional formations, but instead to utilize whatever combat forces are available.Could it be possible to get at least some attack ships without interfering with the main operations against Italy?This is not to say that troops can only be transported and landed by armored landing craft.It would have been different if they had been aided by friends on shore.Can we use canoes and boats between the ship and the coast?

It is my hope that the Chiefs of Staff will encourage such an action, as it can yield great spoils for little cost, albeit at great risk. Middle East Command had been planning and preparing for the capture of Rhodes for months.During August the 8th Indian Division had trained and practiced for the operation and was preparing to embark on 1 September.But on August 26, in fulfillment of a secondary decision made at the Washington meeting in May of the previous year, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered Middle East Command to divert ships that would have been used to transport the 8th Indian Division to Rhode Island. sent to India for operations off the coast of Burma, while the division itself was on standby to join Allied forces in the Central Mediterranean.

When the great event of the capitulation of Italy occurred, my thoughts turned again to the islands of the Aegean, for they had long been an object of our strategic desire.On September 9, I called General Wilson, Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East from Washington, saying: The time has come to show your talents.Be resourceful and decisive.General Wilson was eager to act quickly, but his troops had been drawn down.He had then only the 234th Brigade, which was part of the formerly hard-tested garrison of the island of Malta, and as for transport he had no ships other than those which he had managed to cobble together locally.Those attack ships that had been trained were recently transferred from him. Although these ships are still under the control of his superiors, the pressure from the Americans is very great. They want to transfer our ships out of the Mediterranean Sea separately. Either to the west for the still-distant Overlord campaign, or to the Indian battlefields.Agreements made before Italy's collapse and applied to entirely different circumstances are still being strictly enforced, at least among middle-level officials.Thus Wilson's well-thought-out plans for swift action in the Dodecanese were rudely disrupted.Thereafter, we had to do our utmost to occupy and maintain those islands of great strategic and political importance with insufficient forces.

The Special Air Defense Regiment, formed by Lieutenant Colonel David Stirling (Special Merit III), has carried out a series of daring and successful raids on enemy airfields at a distance of two to three hundred miles behind the enemy , and has recently expanded its activities beyond the desert.On the night of September 9, one of the leaders of the expedition, Major Lord Jellicoe, son of Admiral Jellicoe, led a detachment which landed on Rhode Island by parachute in an attempt to force the island to surrender.If we were able to capture a port and an airfield, and be able to send British troops there quickly, this might motivate the Italian army to keep a much smaller German army in check.But the Germans were tenacious, and the Italians bowed to their authority.

Jellicoe had to retreat quickly.After that, to capture Rhode Island, which was held by 6,000 German troops, the required troops would inevitably exceed the troops that the Middle East Command might draw. The preparations for the occupation of the three islands of Rhodes, Røros and Kos were among the final conclusions made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee on September 10 in accordance with the decisions of the Quebec Conference. approved. [1] Wilson had very quickly and decisively dispatched small forces by sea and air to some of the other islands, and reported on September 14th as follows:

【1】See Chapter VI of this volume, page 102. General Maitland Wilson to Chief of the Imperial General Staff September 14, 1943 The situation in Rhode Island deteriorated so rapidly that we did not have time to act.After a light bombardment, the Italian army surrendered both the town and the port (to the Germans).Since then only a surprise landing is still feasible, but unfortunately, the 8th Indian Division, which has conducted training and exercises for this campaign, has now been transferred to the Central Mediterranean Theater, and their ships have also been ordered by the Admiralty Orders are scattered all over the place.The morale of the Italian army on Rhodes was very low, indicating that they had no intention of resisting.Although they have made a big propaganda to resist the German army.We have taken the island of Kastellorizo ​​and sent troops to the islands of Kos, Leros and Samos.A small squad of Spitfires will form today on Kos, and parachute infantry to garrison this evening.A detachment of infantry will also go to Leros.I propose to carry out surreptitious raids on the enemy's communication lines in the Aegean Sea in the future, and to occupy the Greek islands with Greek forces when the opportunity arises.The partially equipped 10th Indian Division is the only unit currently available, as the New Zealand Division will also be heading to the Central Mediterranean theater.

All troops and supplies in the Middle East Theater are at the discretion of General Eisenhower, so we cannot make a surprise landing on Rhodes Island, but I hope to capture the island by the method adopted by the Turks in 1522, although It takes less time. If we fail to take Rhodes, our gains across the Aegean are in jeopardy.Only the vigorous use of airpower will enable us to achieve what we need to achieve.If we had reached a consensus, it would not have cost them much time.General Eisenhower and his staff do not seem to have noticed our low-hanging fruit, even though we had voluntarily placed all of our vital resources entirely in their hands.

We now know that the Germans were alarmed when they expected us to be a deadly threat on their southeastern flank.On September 24, representatives of the army and navy at a meeting at the Fuehrer's headquarters urged a evacuation from Crete and the other islands of the Aegean while there was still time.They point out that these forward bases were previously occupied in order to launch an offensive in the Eastern Mediterranean, but the situation has completely changed now.They emphasized the need to avoid the loss of troops and supplies, which would play a decisive role in the defense of the Continent.Hitler refuted their opinions.He was adamant that he could not order a retreat, especially from Crete and the Dodecanese, because doing so would inevitably have adverse political repercussions.He said: The attitude of our Southeast European countries and the attitude of Turkey depend entirely on their confidence in our strength.To abandon these islands would create a very unfavorable impression.Facts have proved that he made the right decision to fight for the Aegean island.He made a huge gain in a minor theater with little loss to a major strategic position.In the Balkans he was wrong, but in the Aegean theater he was right. We have no intention of taking Crete, and rightly so.The large German garrison on the island had quickly disarmed Italian troops and taken over the defense. But on some small islands outside of it, our combat operations have been going smoothly for the time being.On September 15, troops began to be mobilized from both sea and air routes.The Royal Navy sent destroyers and submarines to assist.As for the rest of the means of transportation, such as small coasters, sailboats and motorboats, they are all requisitioned.By the end of the month, three battalions had taken the islands of Kos, Røros, and Samos, while small detachments landed on several other islands.The Italian garrison they encountered was extremely friendly, but the coastal fortifications and air defense facilities that the latter boasted were extremely simple.Due to the lack of ships, our own heavy weapons and vehicles cannot be transported. Strategically speaking, Kos is another particularly important island besides Rhodes.There is only one airfield on the island from which our fighters can operate.The airfield was quickly repaired and opened, and twenty-four Bofors anti-aircraft guns were brought in to defend the airfield.The island was of course the target of the enemy's initial counter-offensive and, from 18 September, of increasingly frequent air strikes.Our reconnaissance planes reported that an enemy convoy was approaching, and at dawn on 3 October German parachute troops landed on the central airfield and overcame our lone company defending the airfield.The rest of our battalion, which had been cut off, was stationed in the northern part of the island from which the enemy had landed.It was evident that a battalion of troops, the most we could send, could do nothing to repel such a double attack on an island thirty miles long.The island of Kos fell.The Royal Navy tried unsuccessfully to hold off an enemy convoy en route to Kos.This was due to an unfortunate incident when all but three destroyers were transferred away.At that time, as part of the non-urgent arrangement of the assembly of the principal ships of the Navy on the island of Malta, our two ships of the line were ordered to proceed to Malta, and were required to be escorted by all the rest of the ships. On September 22, Wilson reported that he had some minimal, not excessive demands in order to launch an offensive against Rhode Island around October 20.Apart from the use of the 10th Indian Division and part of the Armored Brigade, he asked only for his navy's frigates, bombardment ships, three tank landing craft, several military transports, a hospital ship, and enough transport planes to airlift a battalion of paratroopers.I am very troubled by our inability to support military operations in the Aegean.On September 25, I called General Eisenhower: You will see a telegram from the Commander in the Middle East about Rhodes Island.Rhodes is the key to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea.It would be a great disaster if the Germans could build up their defenses there.Middle East Command's requirements are minimal.I would be very grateful if you could tell me the specific situation.I haven't asked Washington that question yet. 【１】 【1】See Chapter 8 of this volume, page 134, for my telegram to him on the same day. It seems a small request to ask our American friends for the little aid we need in order to hold the island of Leros and recover Kos in order to secure the spoil of Rhodes.The incredible success we've had has paid off for the concessions they've made under my constant pressure over the past three months.I have every right to ask for a very small amount of aid to strengthen the British army.British troops are now being prepared for combat operations in the Aegean, or have been sent to dangerous positions with the consent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee.as long as you can With landing craft transporting a division, and a few days of assistance from major Allied air forces, Rhode Island is definitely ours.But the Germans have now regained control of the situation and have diverted many of their planes into the Aegean to sabotage what I've always wanted to achieve. I gave President Roosevelt full details of the matter. former navy personnel to president roosevelt October 7, 1943 I am very concerned about the development of the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean.Immediately after the collapse of Italy we sent small detachments from Egypt into several Greek islands, especially Kos and Leros.The former had an airfield, the latter was an Italian naval base with fortifications and powerful permanent batteries.We risked our attack this time because we hoped that the Italian garrison, which had welcomed us, would take part in the defense, but this hope seemed to have failed.The island of Kos is now lost, and only some troops are still fighting in the mountains.The island of Leros is likely to suffer the same fate, and our plan to attack Rhodes has failed. 2. I believe we will see that the military and political unity of the Italian peninsula and the Balkan peninsula is indeed a unified battlefield against which we must contend.We certainly cannot have a successful campaign in Italy if we ignore what is happening in the Aegean.The Germans obviously attached great importance to this eastern battlefield, and did not hesitate to allocate a large part of their already tense air force to preserve their position there.They had to worry about Hungary and Romania betraying them, and a violent secession in Bulgaria. Turkey may also use all its strength to resist at any time.We can fully see how unfavorable the situation in Greece and Yugoslavia is for the enemy.When we remember how brilliantly the political reaction to our military efforts has been achieved in Italy, the same, if not greater, can happen if we ignore all or some of the countries I have mentioned Aren't we too short-sighted?If we can elicit such a reaction and profit from it, our common task in Italy will be greatly eased. 3. I never wished to send troops to the Balkans, but only to encourage the fierce guerrilla warfare that was already raging everywhere there, with secret agents, munitions, and commandos.Such an approach would ultimately have immeasurable impact with minimal damage to our major military operations.What I want is the capture of Rhodes and the other islands of the Dodecanese; and that it would be very good to get our Middle Eastern air force northwards so that they could establish bases on these islands, and possibly on the coast of Turkey. would likely force the enemy to disperse far more than our forces need to disperse, and it would also provide an opportunity to engage the enemy's depleted air forces in a new theater of operations, thereby further weakening them .The enemy has only so much air power anyway, and the more we keep fighting it the better. 4. Rhode Island is the key to all of the above.I don't think the current offensive plan is perfect.It requires and deserves at least one of the best divisions, which, once we have taken the island, can of course be followed by a general garrison.The island of Røros is an important naval fort, and we are holding the island, but the situation is very dangerous.Air force and light naval vessels must have an extremely fruitful effect if we are able to hold our ground once in this area. This strategy should be carried out quickly and vigorously, which requires the deployment of elite troops and adequate means of transport, otherwise, of course, it would not have to be carried out.Such a military operation away from the main battlefield is only temporary, and its results are likely to have profound and permanent significance. 5. I implore you to consider this question, and not to let it go so that we lose all these possibilities in the crisis-ridden months ahead.Even if the landing craft and assault ships transporting a division could be diverted from the Overlord's operational plan for a few weeks without changing the scheduled operation date, it would be worthwhile.I feel that we could easily lose a wonderful but fleeting opportunity.If you think it is okay, please show this telegram to General Marshall before the Joint Chiefs of Staff take any decision. It was with great distress that I received a telegram from President Roosevelt.This telegram (which he had sent to Eisenhower) amounted to a refusal of all assistance, so that I now faced an imminent blow after having made a promise with the agreement of him and the United States Chiefs of Staff.The negative forces that were suppressed with great difficulty in the past are indeed regaining control of the situation. President Roosevelt to Prime Minister October 8, 1943 I do not want to force Eisenhower to change the plan, because to do so would limit our desired result, namely, the early and smooth development of operations in Italy in order to establish a solid front north of Rome. I object to any change in the original plan that Eisenhower believes will jeopardize his present consolidation of position in Italy.Eisenhower's opponent enjoyed a marked advantage in ground forces and armored divisions; in contrast to these famous characteristics of the opponent, our efforts to establish a consolidated position have been very slow. I do not think that any movement of troops or equipment should prejudice the intended plan of the Overlord's operations. The Chief of Staff of the United States Armed Forces agrees with the above opinion. I have sent a copy of this telegram to Eisenhower. I pay special attention to this sentence: I think that any deployment of troops or equipment should not damage the predetermined Overlord battle plan.There is nothing short of prioritization to use as an excuse that a six-week delay in the return of nine of the more than 500 landing craft associated with Operation Overlord would affect 194 Major combat operations in May of four years.In any case, there are still six months between now and the implementation of the Overlord Operation Plan!I therefore resolve to make one more earnest appeal to President Roosevelt.Reflecting on the far-reaching success which followed my trip to Algiers with General Marshall this past June, and from which trip all our good fortune began, I think I may claim the same.I made all preparations to fly to Tunisia immediately. prime minister to president roosevelt October 8, 1943 Remembering how fruitful our concerted action has been in the past and how important it will be in the future, I earnestly beg you to consider my opinion at this critical juncture. 2. I am convinced that if Rhodes is not captured at this stage, and at the same time the overall situation in the Eastern Mediterranean is ignored, it will inevitably lead to a major strategic error.I am also convinced that if we all sit around the conference table and talk, this campaign can be incorporated into our plans without jeopardizing our advance in Italy or the preparations for Operation Overlord.Concerning the advance in Italy, as you know, I have always supported it; and I am ready to give my loyal support to the Overlord plan. 3. May I ask you to recall how anxious I was in Quebec when we received reports that no more than twelve divisions of our assembled troops in Italy would be able to disembark by December 1 .Now, on October 9, more than fifteen divisions had landed, of which about a dozen were already in action. We know that the enemy is retreating northward, and at the same time is engaged in a rear-guard campaign to carry away the spoils; We cannot yet say whether Rome will be captured in October or November; but it is certain that we will not be able to make contact with the main German forces in northern Italy until December, or even later.Of course, the speed of progress is controlled by us. 4. We therefore have ample time to spare a division for the capture of Rhodes, and to return this division to the Italian front before our army reaches the German fortified line. 5. We have to find some way to solve these difficulties and figure out what the right action to take is.I would like to go at once to Eisenhower's headquarters with the British Chiefs of Staff, if you would send General Marshall or your personal representative to meet with me there; then we could send you and your Chiefs of Staff the results of a thorough discussion them.We were able to get there on Sunday (October 10) afternoon. Later that day, I called President Roosevelt again: October 8, 1943 I should add a few more words.I have talked about, and in my estimation, the impact on the Overlord program is limited to the delay of about six weeks for the return of the nine landing craft that are due to depart from the Mediterranean within this month, which is about six weeks before Operation Overlord There are nearly six months to go to plan the actual need for them.I think there should be some flexibility and reasonable leeway in dealing with our common cause. 2. The decision of the Quebec Conference to send four landing ships and their aircrafts from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Bay of Bengal for training has proved to be inappropriate.This decision should be re-examined in the light of the new situation opened by the surrender of Italy.Unfortunately, this was not achieved, and as a result, the Middle East was stripped of everything (referring to the landing craft) when it could have obtained huge spoils for a very small price. It is important to note that the above two telegrams are dated October 8.On that day we received sufficient information to justify my opinion that the enemy, under the cover of a rearguard, was retreating towards Rome or to the north of it. It was not until a day or two later that we began to understand that the enemy intended to hold his ground south of Rome and fight us.Although that situation had created a new situation, it did not in itself pose any immediate danger to our troops in Italy. President Roosevelt to Prime Minister October 9, 1943 I have received your telegram (October 8th) and have personally studied your several points carefully.I take these comments seriously, as do the Chiefs of Staff.My concern is that our military may suffer setbacks due to actions taken by the enemy.Because the enemy has superior forces except the air force, and their commander is both wise and brave.This is especially true of the absolutely safe front which we hope to secure in Italy. After fully understanding your difficulties in the Eastern Mediterranean, my (last telegram to you) thought is that no troops should be transferred from Italy, which would damage the security of the Allied forces in Italy; Actions taken by the target should not affect the success of the Overlord battle plan. We now have nearly all the facts to judge what missions the Battle of Rhodes might entail.In my opinion, the campaign was not merely a matter of taking Rhodes, but must have meant our attempt to advance, and the Germans must have seen that clearly.If the advance is not continued, Rhodes will be attacked by Kos and Crete again. I am in favor of us gaining whatever foothold we may gain in the Dodecanese without great obligation.But the issue involved in the current situation is not only a well-organized and resolute military operation, but also the issue that this operation must be carried out.Continuation of this military operation would require the means of attack to be drawn from certain other sources, principally ships and aircraft, rather than ground forces, and these other sources would inevitably be Italy, Operation Overlord, or perhaps the Mongolian These aspects of Patton's amphibious forces.At that time, the question before us would be: should we launch a campaign from the southern tip of the Balkans, or would it be safer to advance quickly to our agreed positions north of Rome in order to gain more?In my opinion, the latter step made the Allies more of a threat to the Balkans than a necessarily dangerous amphibious operation against Rhodes.Because the enemy knows that our attack on Rhodes Island lacks the necessary means to carry it through.Strategically, if we take the islands in the Aegean, I ask myself, where do we go from there?It can also be asked in reverse, if the German army continues to occupy those islands for a while, where can they go? As for your proposal to hold a meeting in Africa on Sunday (the 10th), this will actually be another meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, which will inevitably only be partially represented, and I will not be able to attend.To be honest, in the current situation, I don't agree with this approach.In my opinion, the issues that will be discussed can be adjusted by us through our Chiefs of Staff, and that would be a better solution than what you are proposing.We already have most of the facts and the outcome of the meeting scheduled for tomorrow in Tunisia will be available in the near future. Mr. Roosevelt's answer shattered my last hope.All I can do now is to ask that, despite President Roosevelt's initial negative telegram, it will not prevent a free discussion of the matter at the meeting of the Commander in Chief.There was a good reason for this request, and it was granted. prime minister to general wilson October 9, 1943 At the council you should try to get further support for the knighthood (Rhodes) campaign plan.I do not believe that there are enough troops currently assigned to this program.It would be bad if you were allowed to suffer setbacks.It became clear that the crux of the strategic situation in the Mediterranean during the next month could be summed up in these two words: the storming of Rhodes.So don't be hasty.Whatever you need, you can ask for it, and discuss it with Alexander.I'm doing my best. prime minister to president roosevelt October 9, 1943 The comments I have taken the liberty to make to you have taken your time to consider, and I am very grateful.In compliance with your wishes, and because you were unable to send General Marshall to the meeting, I have canceled my trip.I have informed Wilson by telephone that I will never make this trip without your blessing. Two. I agree with your last few words in today's cable that we should wait for the consequences of the meeting scheduled for today in Tunisia, and then we can consider and resolve them through the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. 3. I fear, however, that, as a copy of your telegram of October 8 to me has reached Eisenhower, it will be regarded as your order and that the matter has been concluded.If so, I find it hard to accept.I therefore want you to make it clear that this meeting has full freedom to examine the whole issue from all sides and should report their conclusions to you and me through the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee.I ask the meeting to give full, free, patient and unbiased consideration to the whole issue after hearing the views of the representatives of the Middle East. 4. General Wilson is now preparing to attack Rhode Island on the 23rd with an army under his own command, which General Eisenhower had assigned to him.He thinks these are enough, but I wonder if he's being too budget-minded. The question, therefore, seemed to me to be whether he deserved this meager reinforcement, or whether the operation should be cancelled. 5. Cancellation of this campaign will inevitably lead to the fall of Leros Island even if they can hold for some time and we completely abandon all footholds in the Aegean Sea.The Aegean has since been a no-go zone, and what we get in that part of the world is not a huge benefit, but a very unfortunate political and psychological reaction. 6. I fully agree with what you say about the vital importance of the concentration of forces in Italy, and I have demonstrated my zeal in this matter in various ways, such as by reducing the supplies of the British Middle East Command so that Facilitate General Eisenhower's war plan, for here we too have a great stake. President Roosevelt replied to my telegram as follows: President Roosevelt to Prime Minister October 9, 1943 The following cable was sent to Eisenhower: In his telegram to the President, the Prime Minister stated that he was concerned that after the President sent you a copy of the telegram to the Prime Minister on October 8, it would be regarded as an order from the President and that the matter had been finalized.The Prime Minister wishes to make it clear to you that the meeting scheduled for today in Tunis has full freedom to examine the whole issue from all sides and should report their (you and General Wilson) conclusions to the President and Prime Minister through the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee.The Prime Minister asked the meeting to give full, free, patient and unbiased consideration to the whole question after hearing the views of the representatives of the Middle East. The President directs that you accept as your guidelines the above wishes expressed by the Prime Minister. At the critical moment when the meeting was going on, we received information that Hitler decided to reinforce his army in Italy and prepare for a major battle south of Rome. This news overturned plans for the small reinforcements needed to attack Rhodes.Wilson reports: general wilson to prime minister October 10, 1943 Yesterday, before the meeting in Tunisia, I received a call from you.I also had discussions with Cunningham and Alexander.I agree that our plans for Rhode Island, on their present scale, are in danger of failing.This plan would have been possible at the time of the armistice, but unfortunately our ships were diverted a few days ago, and we were powerless to act when the fleeting favorable moment came. 2. Since then the situation has changed to such an extent that a single traveler is sent for a surprise attack, followed by another traveler four days later, which, if the weather is bad, These two groups of troops will be in danger of being defeated separately.The landing craft of Operation Overlord, as well as the ships, landing craft, and aircraft that Alexander used for the attack, were to be obtained if the forces we agreed at yesterday's meeting were now necessary.According to the latest information received yesterday, the situation in Italy has undergone significant changes, and I have no choice but to agree to let Alexander use all the available manpower and material resources to fight. 3. This morning, John Cunningham, Linnell, and I reviewed the situation in the Aegean Sea on the assumption that the Rhode Island plan was postponed to a later date.We have concluded that holding Leros and Samos is not impossible, although defense will become increasingly difficult and will depend on continued Turkish cooperation.Aiden will be here on Tuesday and I will discuss this with him.無論如何，撤退守軍的問題將成為一個極其困難的問題，我們希望它永遠不會發生。我們在愛琴海堅守不退，而敵人想把我們趕走，這就使他們的很大一部分兵力受到了牽制。 I immediately reply as follows: 首相致威爾遜將軍 一九四三年十月十日 如果可能的話，你要堅持下去。這將成為一個輝煌的戰績。同艾登徹底磋商，看看你能從土耳其人那裡得到什麼援助。 【１】 【１】艾登正在前往莫斯科參加外長會議的途中。 如果你在盡到一切努力以後，仍然被迫撤退，我一定給你支援，但是最好還是爭取獲得勝利。 雖然我能了解，在局勢已經改變的情況下，參加我們意大利戰役的將領們的意見受到了怎樣的影響，但是，我內心裡仍不相信至今也還不信關於攻佔羅得島的計劃，竟然不能與其他計劃配合。然而，我卻讓步了，儘管這使我在戰爭期間再一次遭受極其強烈的痛苦。一個人在不得不作出讓步時，如果他不爽爽快快地表示順從，那也是徒勞的。當那麼多的嚴重問題懸而未決的時候，我不能冒險使我和羅斯福總統的個人關係產生任何不和。因此，我利用意大利傳來的消息，乘機接受了我認為是現在仍然認為是缺乏遠見的抉擇，並且給羅斯福總統發去一封電報，其中第一段雖然在其他地方也曾提到過，現在我將全文發表如下： former navy personnel to president roosevelt 一九四三年十月十日 現在，我已閱讀了艾森豪威爾將軍關於會議的報告。德國人企圖立即對意大利南部進行增援並在羅馬前面進行戰爭，這就是艾森豪威爾將軍恰當地稱之為過去四十八小時內發生的劇烈變化。我同意，我們現在必須預見到，在到達羅馬以前將要遇到的極其猛烈的戰鬥，而不僅僅是擊退敵人後衛部隊。因此我贊成會議的結論：我們不能指望有任何比較平靜的間歇期用來攻佔羅得島；我們必須把現有一切重要兵力集中用於這次戰鬥，而把羅得島等問題，正如艾森豪威爾將軍所建議的，留待在羅馬北面成功地建立了冬季戰線以後再予考慮。 二‧我現在必須正視愛琴海的局勢。即便我們曾經決定在二十三日攻打羅得島，勒羅斯島也很可能在那個日期以前已經失陷。我已要求艾登會同威爾遜將軍和坎寧安海軍上將一道審查：在土耳其讓我們使用附近的登陸地點的基礎上，能否使用仍屬於中東司令部的資源，盡力奪回科斯島。如果這樣做不能得到任何結果，那麼除非今晚或明晚，我們能夠幸運地消滅載運敵人攻擊部隊的護航隊之一，否則的話，勒羅斯島的命運已經決定了。 三‧因此，我建議你通知威爾遜將軍，如果他判斷形勢已經絕望，他可以自由地命令駐防軍在夜晚撤退，帶上所有的意大利軍官，以及盡可能多的其他意大利人，並且要破壞大炮和防禦工事。我們不能指望意大利人作戰，而且我們只有一千二百名士兵，甚至配備一小部分必要的炮台還嫌不夠，更談不到防守外圍陣地了。土耳其的收容所是不嚴密的，而且在那裡也不可能久留；他們或者可以沿土耳其海岸撤出來。 四‧我不想贅言，我作出這一決定時是多麼痛心。 我告訴亞歷山大說： Prime Minister to General Alexander 一九四三年十月十日 現在你應當盡量設法收拾殘局。如果事情已毫無希望，而你又無能為力，你應同威爾遜將軍共同研究，究竟是應當把勒羅斯的守軍撤往土耳其，還是讓他們在炸毀炮台後沿海岸設法脫險。此外還應盡力將其他島嶼上的遠程沙漠部隊撤出來。這樣做，比聽任他們淪為戰俘和讓意大利軍官遭到槍殺，要好得多。 我又致電威爾遜將軍： 首相致威爾遜將軍 一九四三年十月十四日 留給你這樣少的殘餘兵力，而你卻善於利用，我真高興。 切勿氣餒。 所有這些謹小慎微的措施，到頭來是一無所得。事實證明，佔領羅馬還是八個月以後的事情。比起原定用來協助在兩周內攻克羅得島所需的船舶要多二十倍的船舶，在整個秋冬兩季，用於將英美重轟炸機的基地從非洲遷往意大利。羅得島仍然是我們的肉中之刺。土耳其眼看盟軍在它的海岸附近遲遲不採取行動，它也更不聽從使喚了，而且拒絕我們使用它的飛機場。 美國參謀人員固執己見；英國人現在不得不為此付出代價。儘管我們極力保持我們在勒羅斯島的地位，我們在那裡的一支小型部隊的命運，實際上已經決定了。我們曾主動地把我們一切最好的地面和空中的作戰部隊（遠遠超過了五月在華盛頓和八月在魁北克商定的數量），交給艾森豪威爾自由支配，而且我們也曾在超過最高統帥部的計劃和期望的程度上，極力加強在意大利的軍隊，但現在我們卻不得不研究一下我們能用手頭剩餘的兵力做些什麼。勒羅斯島和薩摩斯島遭到了猛烈的轟炸，這顯然是德軍展開攻勢的序曲。勒羅斯島的守軍，已經增加到一旅人的實力三個精銳的英國步兵營。這三營士兵曾在馬耳他島受到圍攻和食糧斷絕的整個時期內經受過考驗【１】，這時仍在恢復他們的體力和戰鬥力。 【１】步兵第三團第四營，愛爾蘭皇家明火槍第二營和禁衛軍第一營。 在科斯島陷落的那一天，海軍部曾命令包括五艘巡洋艦的強大海軍增援部隊，從馬耳他島開往愛琴海。艾森豪威爾將軍也派遣兩大隊遠程戰鬥機前往中東，作為一種臨時措施。 它們到達當地後不久就顯示出威力。十月七日，敵方一個載運援兵前往科斯島的護航隊，在海空軍的夾攻下被摧毀了。幾天後，海軍又擊沉了敵人的兩艘運輸艦。可是，遠程戰鬥機卻在十一日撤退了。此後，海軍再一次面臨兩年前克里特島戰役時存在過的那樣的局勢。敵人掌握了制空權，而我們的艦隻只有在夜間活動，才不致遭到嚴重的損失。 戰鬥機的撤退決定了勒羅斯島的命運。敵人在不受嚴重干擾的情況下，利用分散的小規模船隊，能夠繼續集結兵力。 現在我們了解，敵人在船舶運輸方面，面臨著危險的局勢。敵人延遲攻打勒羅斯島的原因，主要是由於他們擔心盟軍在亞得里亞海展開攻勢。十月二十七日，我們聽說四千名德國阿爾卑斯山部隊和許多登陸艇，已經到達比雷埃夫斯，其目標顯然是勒羅斯島；十一月初關於敵人登陸艇調動的報告，預示了敵人的進攻。德國的軍隊和飛機，夜晚隱蔽在群島中間，躲避我方的驅逐艦，白天在它們強大的戰鬥機的保護下，以小隊形式移動，逐漸集結起來。我們自己的海軍和空軍對於它們悄悄地向前逼進，竟無法干預。 駐防的軍隊是保持警惕的，但是人數畢竟太少了。勒羅斯島被兩個狹窄的地峽分為三個崎嶇不平的山區。我們在每個山區各分配一營人防守。十一月十二日清晨，德軍在該島的東北頂端登岸，同時也在勒羅斯城東南的海灣登陸。敵人對該城的進攻最初被擊退了，但在當天下午，六百名傘兵在阿林達灣和格納灣之間的地峽降落，從而把我方防線切成兩段。以前的報告曾說，該島不適於傘兵降落，因此，敵人這次空降著陸完全出乎意外。為了奪回這個地峽，曾經作了極大的努力。在最後階段，駐守薩摩斯島的皇家西肯特第二團，曾經被派往勒羅斯島，但是，一切都完了。他們自己也成了犧牲品了。島上的三營守軍，自己沒有多少空中支援，卻遭受了敵機的猛烈轟炸，它們苦戰到十一月十六日的夜晚，終於疲憊不堪，不能再戰了。於是，這一旅精銳的部隊，便被敵人的威力壓倒了。 威爾遜將軍報告如下： 威爾遜將軍致首相 一九四三年十一月十七日 勒羅斯島對於敵人佔有絕對優勢的空襲，進行了極其英勇的鬥爭以後，終於陷落了。這是一場以毫釐之差而決定成敗的戰鬥。本來可以不費很大氣力，就能使形勢變得對我們有利，並且圓滿地以勝利而告終。相反地，我們卻遭到了挫敗，其後果是顯而易見的。我們在九月間是明明看到危險而甘冒危險的，如果我們能夠攻下羅得島，一切都好了。我相信總有一天，我們也會得到機會，在進行一次戰役時，從一開始就使形勢對我們有利。 我在前往開羅的航途中，讀到這些逐日送來的電文時，心情十分沉重。 【１】 【１】我正在前往參加開羅｜德黑蘭會議的途中。關於會議的情況，在本卷後面的章節中將要敘述。 現在我答覆如下： 首相致威爾遜將軍 一九四三年十一月十八日 感謝你關於勒羅斯島的來電。我讚賞你在指揮該島戰鬥時的表現。同你一樣，我感到這是一個嚴重的損失和挫敗，而且，也同你一樣，我感到我是在雙手被捆在背後的情況下進行戰鬥的。我希望，在我們下次舉行會議以後，能有較好的安排。 勒羅斯島既已陷落，我們在愛琴海的一切希望暫時也就破滅了。我們立即設法撤退薩摩斯和其他島嶼上的少數駐軍，並且從勒羅斯島救出殘餘的部隊。撤出的英國和希臘的部隊在一千名以上，此外，還有許多持友好態度的意大利人以及德軍俘虜，但是，我們的海軍這次又遭到很嚴重的損失。六艘驅逐艦和兩艘潛艇被敵機和水雷擊沉，另有四艘巡洋艦和四艘驅逐艦受到了損傷。希臘海軍分擔了這些損失，他們自始至終英勇地參加戰鬥。 這時，安東尼‧艾登已從莫斯科回到國內，我給他一封電報如下： 首相（在海上）致外交大臣 一九四三年十一月二十一日 勒羅斯島的陷落，對我是一個沉重的打擊。如果議會提出這個問題，我建議按照下列方針說明： 有人可能質問：既然沒有空中優勢的保證，是否應當採取這樣的軍事行動？我們有沒有吸取克里特島以及其他戰役的教訓？我們有沒有再度使用斯圖卡小型俯衝轟炸機，讓它們像過去那樣在極短的時間內建立克敵制勝的奇功？答覆是：這些質詢都問得很有道理，但是要詳細答覆卻不相宜。現在所能說明的是，所有那些論點，沒有一項不是在企圖佔領這些島嶼以前，早就預料到的。如果對這些論點有所忽視的話，那是因為有其他的理由和其他的期望使它們退居次要的地位。如果我們除了十拿九穩的事以外，絕不輕易地採取任何行動，我們勢必要面對一場持久戰的前景。 我們本來有機會可以輕易地以極小的代價佔領多德卡尼斯群島，但我們現在經過重大的消耗後，卻把它丟掉了，對於這種挫敗所造成的痛苦，不必試圖縮小。你也應該強調德國人所作的巨大努力，他們在意大利境內本來已經處於劣勢地位，卻從那裡撤出了幾近半數的空軍，從而使我們在意大利的軍隊獲得了一種間接的援助。 不要忘記說明，兩千名德軍的絕大部分在航運途中已經溺斃，連同他們在戰鬥中死亡的，其數目無論如何總相當於我們的三千名俘虜。德國人在這場戰鬥中所付出的代價（包括俘虜在內），按一命換一命來計算，很可能比我們的損失大得多。儘管如此，公平地說，這是一九四二年托卜魯克戰役以來，我們第一次遭到的真正重大的挫敗，但是，我希望不必把這件事看成是一個重大的災難。 我已詳細敘述了羅得島和勒羅斯島的慘痛故事。它們造成了我和艾森豪威爾將軍從來未曾有過的極其嚴重的分歧，幸而這些分歧僅限於很小的範圍。好多個月以來，我曾經面對重重阻力，為他在意大利的戰役獲得勝利掃清了道路。我們在意大利本土已經集結了大批軍隊，而不只是佔領撒丁島。 科西嘉島是我們獲得的額外收穫。我們從其他戰場上吸引來很大一部分德國後備軍。意大利人民和政府已投到我們這邊來了。意大利已經對德國宣戰了。他們的艦隊加入了我們自己的艦隊。墨索里尼已成為一個逃亡者。羅馬的解放似乎已為期不遠了。德國十九個師，被他們的意大利夥伴遺棄後，零亂地散佈在整個巴爾幹半島，而我們在那裡所使用的兵力還不到一千名官兵。霸王作戰計劃的日期也沒有受到決定性的影響。 除了西北非最高統帥部認為可能調遣的師團外根據懷特利將軍的報告我還從駐在埃及的英軍和英帝國軍隊中調出了四個最精銳的師團。我們不僅幫助艾森豪威爾將軍領導的英美參謀人員完成他們的勝利事業，而且向他們提供了意外的重要資源，如果沒有這些資源，很可能會發生災難性的事件。我感到痛心的是，我為了達到與我們已經達到的同樣重要的戰略目的而提出的小小要求，竟遭到了那樣頑固的反對和拒絕。當然，當人們在戰爭中正在獲勝時，幾乎所有發生的事，都可以被認為是正確和明智的。但是，如果不是那些居於次要地位人員的迂腐頑固的反對，我們本可以在意大利戰役的所有戰果外，還會得到控制愛琴海而且很可能使土耳其參戰的結果。