Chapter 168 Volume Five, Chapter Thirteen, Hitler's Secret Weapon

Memorandum of General Ismay April 15, 1943 Appointment of Mr. Sands Report on Peenemünde Decision of the National Defense Council on the attack on Peenemünde Hitler's optimism Hopes Warnings about rockets and drones Opinions were divided as to their relative importance. The successful attack on Peenemünde on August 17, which caused the Germans to long delay planning, had far-reaching consequences. On the 25th of September I telegraphed President Roosevelt's reply to Sir Stafford Cripps' report of our timely defensive measures. A few years before the war broke out, the Germans had begun developing rockets and unmanned aircraft, and established an experimental station for this purpose at Peenemünde on the Baltic Sea.This activity is of course strictly confidential, but they cannot completely cover up the ongoing activities.In the autumn of 1939, material on various types of long-range weapons began to appear in the reports of our intelligence agencies.In the first few years after the war began, we received rumors and sporadic, often contradictory, information on the subject from all sides.In the spring of 1943 the Chiefs of Staff of the three services studied the situation, and General Ismay wrote me the results of the study in a memorandum on April 15 which read as follows:

prime minister The Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Services believe that your attention should be drawn to the reports of the Germans experimenting with long-range rockets.Since the end of 1942 we have received five reports which, even if imprecise in detail, point to a fundamental fact. The opinion of the chiefs of staff of the armed forces is that we should lose no time in ascertaining the facts, and if the evidence is reliable, we should immediately consider countermeasures.They believed that the issue would be best and most quickly resolved under an investigation led by someone who could muster the appropriate scientific and intelligence advisers.Therefore, they propose that you appoint someone who will be immediately responsible for this task.They recommend that you consider Mr. Duncan Sands, and think that it would be a good fit if Mr. Sands could be offered the position.

The Chiefs of Staff also suggested that the Secretary of State for Home Security be asked to keep an eye out for the possibility of such an attack and to be informed of the above proposal.They believe that, at this stage, it is inappropriate to announce the matter to the public as the evidence is far from clear. The Chiefs of Staff of the armed forces request your approval of the above proposal. Early in the war Mr Sands served in an air defense unit in Norway.Later, while he was in command of the 1st Rocket Experimental Regiment, his feet were crippled in a car accident.In July 1941, he joined the government as Chief of Treasurer of the War Department, and then as Deputy Secretary of the Quartermaster Department.In both positions he had had great responsibility for the general direction of weapons development and was thus closely associated with the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Services Committee.As he is my son-in-law, I am of course pleased that the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces are willing to give him this important job, even though I have made no suggestion at all.

A month later Mr Sands made his first report, which was circulated in the War Cabinet.The following excerpt summarizes the main points of the report: I have reviewed various evidences for the development of long-range rockets in Germany.To supplement this information, I have requested aerial reconnaissance in the area around Peenemünde on the German Baltic coast.Judging by past reports, it appears likely that a rocket development program is underway at the site.This aerial reconnaissance has now been completed and the photographs provided further important information. It appears that the Germans have been trying for some time to develop a heavy rocket capable of bombing an area from a great distance.This work may have been carried out in parallel with the development of jet aircraft and air-delivered rocket torpedoes.We now have very little information on the progress of this development.But it may have come a long way, based on what the little evidence available provides.Given its size, London is a likely target for an attack.

We should make every effort to obtain more information in this regard from agents on the mainland, from prisoners of war, and through aerial reconnaissance. It seems highly probable that there were experimental facilities and factories connected with the development and production of this weapon in Germany and in the German-occupied zone, as well as in the coastal regions of north-western France.We should bomb these factories and facilities.A preliminary list of proposed targets for bombing is about to be sent to the Air Staff. On June 4, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Lieutenant General Ewell, issued instructions to enable Sands to directly contact the relevant intelligence agencies responsible for collecting further information on agents and prisoners of war, and asked him to make suggestions on aerial reconnaissance and send The conclusions drawn from the reconnaissance inform the Air Staff.All possible methods of tracing the trajectory of such projectiles and probing the place of launch were studied.Civilian air defense and security measures have also been initiated.

On June 11, Mr. Sands submitted a memorandum to the Air Staff requesting regular reconnaissance flights over the Peenemünde area and aerial photography of all areas in northern France within 130 miles of London.He also suggested that the experimental station at Peenemünde should be blown up.In his next report, he stressed the importance of an immediate attack. Recent aerial reconnaissance photographs provide evidence that the German experimental station at Peenemünde is intensifying the development of long-range rockets as quickly as possible and launching them frequently.In addition, there are signs that Peenemünde's poorly equipped air defenses are being further strengthened.

Under the circumstances, the plan to bomb this experimental station should be put into practice as soon as possible. On June 28, Sands reported that aerial photography of Peenemünde showed a large number of rockets along the launch site.These rockets probably have a range of about 90 to 130 miles. Despite all precautions we have taken, it is possible that the Germans, evading our detection, have managed to place several launchers in northern France and are preparing a rocket attack on London.In view of this situation, it is indeed necessary to find out the location of the launch rocket as soon as possible so that they can be destroyed by immediate bombing.

With the equipment available at present radar stations, it should be possible to observe rockets in flight and determine where they were launched to within ten miles.If some kind of auxiliary instrument is added, the performance of the radar can be greatly improved.The manufacture of such auxiliary instruments is already in progress.The first set of equipment is now being installed in Rye.The rest will be done in two or three months.Special instructions were sent to the five most suitable radar stations (Swingart, Rye, Pivensey, Polling and Ventnor) and the necessary training of operators had begun.

Since April, the National Defense Committee has been continuously receiving sufficient information.On June 29, it made a decision: The most thorough and rigorous investigation should be organized and maintained in the northern part of France within 130 miles around London, and all steps which can make this work as thorough and effective as possible should not be neglected. The attack on the Peenemünde experimental station should take the form of the most violent night attack possible, carried out by the bomber fleet as early as possible when conditions are favorable. As soon as the locations of the rocket sites in northern France are located, we should do everything in our power to plan for immediate air strikes against them.

Hitler was also keen on this plan.Around the beginning of June 1943, he visited Peenemünde accompanied by some leading party members who were ministers.At this time, we know more about rocket-launched missiles than we do about unmanned aircraft.Both approaches are actively being prepared on a large scale, and Peenemünde is the center of all research and experimentation.The Germans did not make any decisive progress in developing the atomic bomb.Heavy water produced little encouragement, but Hitler and his advisers believed that unmanned planes and rockets could be used to deliver a new and possibly decisive blow to Britain while disrupting British and American attempts to cross the Channel on a large scale to return to the Continental plans.Hitler was relieved by everything he learned in Peenemünde.He devoted the best of Germany's strength to this new and perhaps last hope.

Around June 10, he told the assembled military chiefs that the Germans just had to hang on.By the end of 1943 London would inevitably be leveled and Britain would be forced to surrender.October 20 was set as the date for the start of the rocket attacks.It is said that Hitler personally ordered the manufacture of 30,000 rockets for use that day.If the legend is to be believed, this shows that he was living in a wild fantasy.Dr. Speer, the German Minister of Munitions, said that the man-hours required to manufacture each V-2 [1] were approximately equal to the man-hours required to manufacture six fighter jets.Therefore, Hitler's request was equivalent to producing 180,000 fighter jets within four months.This is ridiculous.However, the production of these two weapons was given the highest priority, and 1,500 skilled workers from the factories that produced anti-aircraft guns and artillery were called in to this task. [1] V-two is the name we give to the rocket; the unmanned aircraft is called V-one. On July 9, Mr. Sands reported that, in addition to the German plans to use rockets to attack London, there were indications that the Germans were trying to use unmanned aircraft and artillery with extremely long ranges.Two dubious tunnels have been discovered, one at Vatans, near Saint-Omer, and the other at Breneva, near Fécamp.Instructions were therefore sent to selected radar stations in south-east England to watch out for rocket launches.The Home Office has also drawn up a plan, not to evacuate London's population on a large scale, but to evacuate 100,000 priority residents, such as school children and pregnant women, at an emergency rate of 10,000 per day.Thirty thousand of the Morrison table shelters have been brought into London, increasing the original stock of such devices in the city to about fifty thousand. [1] The table-shaped steel indoor anti-aircraft wall suggested by the British Home Secretary Morrison.translator On July 19th we reported that: In northwestern France, works of indeterminate nature are under way, including railway sidings, turntables, houses and buildings of reinforced concrete.Construction work is intensifying at breakneck speed in most of the above-mentioned areas, and activity is particularly intense in Wadang.For this type of engineering, some camouflage was also carried out, and at one point anti-aircraft guns were found transported to the site. When these facts and reports were referred to the National Defense Committee, many differences of opinion arose.Regarding the new method of attacking the British Isles, whether to use rocket bombs or drones, scientists and technicians have aroused very deep and sharp differences of opinion.At first the opinion of the rocket prevailed, but its proponents later wavered in their opinion when it became clear that estimates of the missile's size and destructive power were inflated.In the face of the foregoing, those in charge of internal security must face up to the possibility of evacuating not only children and pregnant women and certain other persons from London, but even the capital itself as a whole. The Home Security Secretary studied the report, was deeply disturbed, and often made the danger extremely serious.He must make sure that the danger is not underestimated, and this is, of course, his special duty.Lord Cherwell, on the other hand, expressed disbelief; he believed that the Germans, even if they could build huge rockets, were not worthwhile.He was adamant, as he had argued from the outset, that the Germans would have gained far more for far less had they used unmanned aircraft.Even if, as was predicted, they used rockets with warheads weighing ten or twenty tons, he did not think that England would have been devastated to the extent indicated by the figures already presented, and he did not believe it. It is possible.Hearing the regular discussions that had taken place between him and Mr. Herbert Morrison over the course of several months, it sometimes seemed that the two protagonists were at odds over whether the attacks of these automatic weapons were destructive or relatively unimportant.In fact, as is often the case, it is not a matter of whether but how much. Lord Cherwell's memorandum shows very clearly that he was generally correct in his views on the likely size of the attack, and that the sensational estimates were wrong. These discussions have not delayed or hesitated our action.The attack on Peenemünde was difficult but inevitable.On the night of August 17, Lieutenant General Harris, the commander of the Bomber Command, dispatched 571 heavy bombers for an assault.All buildings are spread out along a narrow strip along the coast and are protected by smoke screens.Pilot radio waves from England could neither reach them, nor were the instruments carried by our planes adequate to determine their position.Therefore, the bombing had to be carried out on a moonlit night, although the German night fighters were nearby, and it was too far to send our own night fighters.The pilots were ordered to bomb from 8,000 feet, much lower than their usual altitude.Moreover, Lieutenant General Harris told them that if the first night attack failed, it must be repeated the next night; The fact that after an attack it is obvious to do everything possible to strengthen the defenses.At the same time, every effort was made to guide our pilots and confuse the enemy.The pilot plane flew ahead, indicating the course and dispersal markers, and a master bomber circled the target, assessing the results and directing our planes by radiotelephony.The route taken this time was almost the same as the previous bombing of Berlin, and a small group of Mosquito planes were sent to Berlin to confuse the enemy. The weather that night was not as good as we expected, and the signs on the ground were not easy to find, but when we were about to fly to Rügen, the weather began to clear.Many pilots start flying on time and according to their own time and distance.The sky over the target was cloudy, and there was another layer of smoke, but, according to Harris, the attack was very carefully planned, thus ensuring that a large number of bombs were concentrated on all the targets.The enemy was initially deceived by our feint attack on Berlin, but this did not last long.Most of our bombers came back, but German fighters intercepted them on their way back, and in the bright moonlight we shot down forty bombers. The results of this bombing are of paramount importance.Although the material damage was much smaller than we expected, the attack had a profound impact on the situation.All construction drawings that had just been drawn up to be sent to the workshops were burned, and plans to start mass production were greatly delayed.The parent factory in Peenemünde was hit by a bomb.Fearing attacks on factories producing rockets elsewhere, the Germans concentrated manufacturing in underground factories in the Harz Mountains.All these changes greatly delayed the improvement and production of this weapon.The Germans also decided to relocate their experimental activities to a facility in Poland, out of range of our bombers.Our Polish agents are watching the place vigilantly.The new weapon was tested in January 1944.They soon discovered the range of the new weapon and its launch routes, but the places where the rockets fell were, of course, many miles apart from each other.German patrols often scrambled to where the rockets had fallen and collected debris.But one day, a rocket landed on the bank of the Bug without exploding.The Poles rushed to the scene first, pushed it into the river, and after the Germans gave up their search, they picked it up in the dark and disassembled it.After the completion of this dangerous task, a Polish engineer was picked up by a Dakota aircraft of the Royal Air Force on July 25, 1944. He carried many technical documents and a new one weighing more than one hundred pounds. Vital components of the weapon were flown to the UK.The heroic figure returned to Poland, was later arrested by the German secret police, and was shot dead in Warsaw on August 13, 1944. The attack on Peenemünde, in spite of all the sacrifices mentioned above, had an important and noticeable influence on the general course of the war.Had it not been for this air raid and the subsequent attack on launch sites in France, Hitler's rocket bombing of London would have probably begun in early 1944.It's actually been pushed back to September.By then, the prepared launch site in northern France had been occupied by General Montgomery's troops.As a result, the missiles had to be launched from temporary bases in the Netherlands, which were nearly double the distance from the London target and far less accurate.By autumn, German lines of communication were so overwhelmed by the demands of the war that the transportation of rockets to their launch sites could no longer be given top priority. General Eisenhower talked about his views in his book "European Crusades".He believes that the development and use of the V weapon was greatly delayed by the bombing of the experimental factory in Peenemünde and other places where the weapon was manufactured.He even said: This scenario seems quite probable: had the Germans been able to complete and use these new weapons six months earlier, our offensive in Europe must have proved extremely difficult, perhaps impossible.I am sure that if they had been successful in using these weapons for six months, and especially if they had made the Portsmouth Southampton area one of their main objectives, the Overlord plan might have been cancelled. This is an exaggeration.The average error of the two weapons was over ten miles.Even if the Germans could maintain a rate of one hundred and twenty bombs per day, and assuming none were shot down, the effect would be equivalent to dropping only two or three one-ton bombs per week on a square mile.Military commanders, however, feel that the threat of Weapon V must be eliminated, not only to protect civilian life and property, but equally to prevent its interference with our offensive operations. In early autumn it became clear that the Germans were planning to attack us not only with rockets but also with drones.On September 13, 1943, Mr. Sands reported: There have been signs that the enemy is considering using drones as a means of dropping bombs on London.Unless the planes used are very small, or capable of flying at special altitudes or speeds, our fighter jets and anti-aircraft defenses are sufficient against them.If these drones are capable of flying at altitudes and speeds that make them unstoppable by our air defenses, then they could actually be considered projectiles. Our response should be the same as with long-range rockets, that is, to blow up its manufacturing sites and launch sites or take-off airports. What we knew at the time was summarized in a report on September 25 by Dr. Jones, Chief of the Scientific Intelligence Division of the Air Force Department: We have gathered a lot of intelligence.In spite of the occasional omissions and inaccuracies that occur in individual accounts, they form a complete picture.However bewildering the enemy's propaganda, this picture could have only one explanation: the Germans had been conducting extensive research on long-range rockets at Peenemünde.Their experiments have of course encountered difficulties which may have made production still impossible.Despite Hitler's insistence that the rocket be operational at the earliest possible time, this earliest time was still perhaps a few months away. The Luftwaffe may also be developing an unmanned aircraft for long-range bombing to compete with rockets, and it is likely that such an aircraft will appear first. At the same time, we observe that in the north of France many strange-looking complexes are being built.All the buildings are of the same style, and most of them are oriented in the direction of London.Each complex consists of one or more buildings that look somewhat like a sled.We later discovered from aerial photographs that the buildings were similar to those near Peenemünde.One photo shows a tiny plane approaching a ramp.We infer from this situation that these so-called ski resorts in northern France are probably used to store, install and launch small unmanned aircraft or missiles. It was not until late autumn that I interrupted President Roosevelt to explain to him our long-standing serious concerns.We regularly keep the American Chiefs of Staff informed about the technical situation, but it was not until the end of October that I sent this telegram through our special personal relationship: former navy personnel to president roosevelt October 25, 1943 I should let you know that during the past six months evidence has been accumulating from many sources that the Germans are preparing to attack Britain, and especially London, with extremely long-range rockets.It is estimated that the rocket may weigh up to sixty tons and carry ten to twenty tons of explosives.For this reason, we raided Peenemunde, where their main experimental station is located.We also blew up Vatan near Saint-Omer, where a building work was going on, the purpose of which we were not sure.At the Pas de Calais and the peninsula of Cherbourg there are at least seven such sites, and there may be many others which we have not discovered. 2. Scientists are divided as to the practical possibility of making such a rocket, but personally I am not yet convinced that it cannot be made.We have been in close contact with your people, who are ahead of us in the study of rocket propulsion, which they are going to use to make something more advanced than airplanes, and are working on everything possible.The committee of experts looking at the rocket problem believes that a heavy attack, though premature and short-lived, is possible in mid-November, while a major attack may be attempted during the New Year.The Germans would certainly benefit from encouraging their armies, satellites, and neutrals by spreading talk about new weapons; but their attacks would probably not be as loud as they were clamoring for. 3. Hitherto we have been monitoring construction works of unknown purpose in the Pas-de-Calais area without bombing them (except Vatans) in order to obtain more information.However, we have now decided to destroy those known constructions.This should be easy, since our bombers can be protected by overwhelmingly superior fighters.Your Air Force is of course ready to support us in every way.But such an attack might not be able to stop the enemy's menace, for the country was full of forests and quarries, and inclined tunnels could easily be built on the sides of the mountains. The case of 4. Vartan is very interesting.We wrecked the place so badly that after two days the Germans, after a conference, decided to abandon it altogether.There are 6,000 French workers in forced labour.They were so terrified of air raids that a squad of uniformed young Frenchmen sent by the Germans to oversee the work shot their fellow countrymen with such brutality that a German officer shot and killed one of the young thugs on the spot.A week later, the Germans seemed to have completely reversed their previous decision and resumed work.More than 3,000 workers were sent back.The rest went to some other less clear place, thus confirming our perception.We have a very effective intelligence system in this part of northern France, and we know all of the above from these sources, as well as from aerial photography and interrogation of prisoners. 5. I think you would like to know the latest information on this subject, so I sent an air courier to bring it to you. After a few days, he replied as follows: President Roosevelt to Prime Minister November 9, 1943 We have also received a great deal of information concerning German rocket-building activities.The only information I have received lately that may be of value to you is about the locations of the rocket manufacturing factories, which are said to be Karni Alfred, Richshafen, Mützgennet, Berlin, Kugla Gefok, Schweinfurt, Wiener Neustadt, and an isolated factory south of Vienna on the left side of the road from Vienna to Baden.Production of the rocket is said to have been delayed due to the death of Lieutenant General Shamil Gombanski, who was in charge of the Peenemünde experimental station, in the bombing.This information was transferred by an intelligence officer through Turkey. The evidence, and the conflicting opinions, held by scientists and my colleagues on the National Defense Committee remains deadlocked and very confused.I therefore request Sir Stafford Cripps, Secretary of State for Aircraft Production, to use his special knowledge and impartiality to examine all information concerning German long-range weapons and to come to a conclusion.He presented his report on November 17. From a purely experimental point of view, the order of possibilities seems to be: (1) Large glide bombs; (2) unmanned aircraft; (3) small long-range rockets; (4) Large long-range rockets. The RAF attack on Peenemünde was of course of great value, and had set back the development of long-range offensive weapons, whatever their type. There is no doubt that the Germans are endeavoring to accomplish some sort of long-range weapon, and the new constructions in northern France, whose use is unknown, are extremely doubtful if we cannot indicate their other uses.In these circumstances I think that we should make all appropriate preparations for all the consequences should the enemy carry out such an attack, although there are no indications that it will happen before the New Year at the earliest. In the meantime, we should continue aerial photography and destroy the sites at every opportunity. This report, of course, has many ambiguities.On December 14, Lieutenant General Bottomley, the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, reported: Large launch sites in northern France, including three that have been hit, are suspected to be linked to the long-range rocket attack.The anti-aircraft guns used to protect one of these launch sites numbered fifty-six heavy ones and seventy-six light ones. Based on the evidence assembled, it appears that the ski resort was used to launch the drones.Aerial photographic reconnaissance confirmed that there are now sixty-nine ski resorts, and the final total is expected to reach around one hundred.If the present pace of construction continues, work on some twenty sites should be completed by early January 1944, with the remainder by February.Launch points in the Pas-de-Calais and Sommesine areas were targeting London, while several in the Cherbourg area were targeting Bristol. On December 18th Lord Cherwell, who has been in close communication with Dr. Jones, presented me with a report giving his opinion as to the date and intensity of the expected missile attack.He believed that the bombing would not begin before April, and that after the first day or two of the attack there would be no more than a hundred rounds per day; of which about twenty-five would reach within ten miles of the target.This figure equated to only fifty to one hundred casualties per day, and he therefore disapproved of the frightening measures of mass evacuation.He still disregards the possibility of using large rockets.Even if that rocket could be built, which seems impossible to any existing technology, it would take twenty or thirty times more man-hours to produce than the missile, and, in his opinion, would be no bigger. Effect. During the first months of 1944 we developed a plan for a missile attack.We decided that the fortifications should be divided into three areas on the outskirts of London, with a balloon blockage net, around which an anti-aircraft artillery emplacement, and outside the anti-aircraft artillery emplacement, a fighter area.We have also taken steps to urge the United States to supply electronic anti-aircraft sights and radio-controlled proximity fuzes, which enable anti-aircraft artillery to shoot down the vast majority of missiles once bombing begins. Meanwhile, British and American air forces continued to bomb about a hundred ski resorts in northern France.The bombing was so effective that by the end of the 1934 aerial reconnaissance showed that the enemy had abandoned projects in those areas.But our period of satisfaction did not last long, for we found, on the other hand, that the enemy was constructing disguised launch sites, which were less sophisticated but more carefully camouflaged and therefore more difficult to detect and strike. middle.Wherever such new places are found, we bomb them.Many sites have been destroyed, but there are about forty more that have not been damaged or discovered.And the enemy used these forty or so launch sites to finally launch a rocket attack in June. From the memorandum presented to me by the Chiefs of Staff in April 1943 to the actual attack in June 1944, nearly fifteen months passed.Not a single day of it was wasted, and never was it negligent.The preparations that would have taken many months to complete were carried out on a large scale in good time and at great expense.When disaster finally befalls us, we can fight it back as I describe in the next volume.In spite of our loss of life and property, there was no real hindrance to our ability to fight, or to military operations to be undertaken in France.The whole course of this incident may be seen as an example of the efficiency of our governing machinery, and at the same time as a testament to the foresight and vigilance of all concerned.