Chapter 169 Volume 5, Chapter 14, The Stalemate in the Third Battlefield

Hitler decided to fight the German winter front south of Rome. Alexander's army was weakened. On October 24, I sent a telegram to Alexander and its reply. General Eisenhower held a meeting of theater commanders. He agreed with Alexander's analysis of the situation in Italy. Our army has lost mobility and the speed of the massed army has declined. Observing the changing situation, I have called General Marshall and President Roosevelt. General Marshall's reply has requested that more landing craft be retained in the Mediterranean. Eisenhower authorized an additional sixty-eight landing craft to be retained through December. On the 15th, November 9th, I called our ambassador in Moscow and I informed General Brooke that we need Polish troops! !The excessive demands of the Joint Strategic Air Force that the Eighth Army crossed the Sangro River and the U.S. Fifth Army approached the main German position at Cassino. The German air force in Italy was weakened.

In early October, Hitler adopted Kesselring's suggestion and changed his original decision on the Italian strategy.Until then he had advocated withdrawing his army to the rear of Rome, and holding only northern Italy.Now, he ordered the army to fight as far south as possible.The line he had chosen, the so-called Winter Front, ran from behind the Sangro River on the Adriatic coast, across the rugged ridgelands of Italy, to the mouth of the Garigliano River on the west coast.The natural features of Italy, steep mountains and fast-flowing rivers, make this position, which is several miles deep, very strong.After a year of almost non-stop retreat from Africa, Sicily, and Italy, the Germans happily turned around and returned to their carbine.

Although the onset of winter would seriously hamper our operations, the major strategic decisions made at the Quebec conference benefited from the Germans' deep entrapment in the Italian field.We gave priority to the attack across the Channel, which made Italy a secondary theater from then on.Hitler felt compelled to use so many troops against our advance, which served our main objective, but was not a valid reason for the failure of our campaign in Italy. The Fifth Army resumed its offensive on October 12. After ten days of fighting, its British Tenth Army and American Sixth Army crossed the Volturno River, established a solid position, and prepared to attack the enemy. The next position to impede our advance was formed by a series of plateaus south of the Galligiano River.It will take another week of fighting to drive the enemy from these positions.But during the first two weeks of November, the Fifth Army fought against the enemy at the outposts of the Winter Front.The six divisions of the Fifth Army encountered an equal number of German forces on this front, which continued to fight as tenaciously as they had always done.The first tentative attack on the German front was made without much progress.Our troops have been fighting hard for two months. The weather is very bad at this time, and the troops need to rest and reorganize.But the plans of the Quebec Conference to deal with a different situation were now strictly enforced, and most of the landing craft in the Mediterranean theater were removed.

Thus the situation in Italy turned against us.The Germans received strong reinforcements and were ordered to resist, not retreat.Instead, the Allies withdrew eight elite divisions from the Italian and Mediterranean theaters and sent them back to Britain for the 1944 cross-channel attack.This loss cannot be compensated for by the strength of the other four divisions which I am gathering or have transferred.What ensued was a stalemate, and after eight months of bitter fighting, there is still no abatement.This situation will be discussed shortly below. While considering these and other circumstances, I called General Alexander on October 24:

While your fighting is going on, the removal of our two elite divisions, the 50th and 51st Divisions, in order to carry out the resolutions of the Conference of Quebec, certainly worries me.I would like to hear your opinion on the strength of your army for the task before it.Has the Eighth Army been concentrated? You mentioned that the deadline was twenty-four days. 2. I am calling for a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be held somewhere in Africa around the fifteenth of November.In any case, I will come to you then.I have many things to tell you.wish all the best. Alexander replied that the number of German divisions in Italy certainly caused him some concern.The consequences of these divisions depended on how far south of Rome the enemy could maintain a strong force.Every effort is being made to paralyze the German lines of communication by air operations.He is anxious to strengthen our air force in Italy.All of this takes time, labor and supplies.The Eighth Army has been concentrated and launched an offensive which, in its first stages, has progressed satisfactorily."I think we have to watch the situation with extreme caution," he said.I am delighted to hear that you will be visiting us shortly and will be more than happy to welcome you.

On the same day, General Eisenhower held a meeting of theater commanders.He asked Alexander to give an overview of the current situation.His report was so important that Eisenhower forwarded the full text of it to President Roosevelt and me.Eisenhower agreed with all of Alexander's views and believed that his report gave a clear and truthful account of the current situation. first part (1), (1) On September 9, the day of the Avalanche campaign and the declaration of the Italian Armistice, the general situation of the enemy was estimated as follows: Two divisions resisted the advance of Eighth Army in Calabria ; one division is stationed in the heel-shaped area of ​​Italy; three divisions are stationed in positions south of Rome according to the original map, ready to be used for combat when the Allied forces land in the Gulf of Salerno; there are about two or more divisions in the vicinity of Rome The strength of the army, nine divisions in northern Italy.The total number of forces at the disposal of the Germans on the Italian mainland was therefore about eighteen divisions.Some of these divisions we consider to be dealing with the internal situation in northern Italy, which, we expect, will cause them considerable difficulties.

(2) Of course we realized that we were facing a German confrontation and that it would be very dangerous to launch an assault near Salerno.But the situation in Italy, and the opportunity of landing a small force on the heel, combined with the overwhelming superiority of our air force, made the whole situation very favorable to us, and we therefore quite rightly took the risk.In addition, the very large number of landing craft at our disposal affords us complete freedom of agency and flexibility in mustering and replenishing our forces by sea.These landing craft in turn made it possible for us to conduct further amphibious operations to support the advance on land.This flexibility proved invaluable.The Eighth Army took full advantage of this flexibility when it fought along the coast of Calabria, and the Seventh Army, when it sent a division from Sicily to reinforce the Salerno area at the first critical juncture of the war.

(3) Although we knew at that time that the landing craft would be withdrawn in winter, the number and date of withdrawal had not yet been determined.Our original plan was to gather an estimated thirteen hundred vehicles a day from the ports of the Mediterranean.Such a figure meant that twenty divisions of Allied and tactical air forces could, in fact, be shipped to Italy by the end of the year, provided they could be equipped and provided.At the same time, the number of landing craft to be used in the future has also been estimated, so that we can have sufficient mobility to help replenish the army and, if necessary, to provide material conditions for amphibious operations on land in conjunction with the advance to Rome.

the second part 2. (1) Today's situation has undergone tremendous changes.In the south eleven Allied divisions stood against nine German divisions, while the enemy had about fifteen more further north, bringing the known total to twenty-four divisions, or as many as twenty-eight.Assuming that there are no unforeseen causes which further slow down the massing of troops, the highest numbers of troops which we can employ in Italy proper are: thirteen divisions at the end of November; fourteen to fifteen divisions at the end of December; ten divisions at the end of January. Six to seventeen divisions.Our rate of massing troops has been reduced from the previous estimate of 1,300 vehicles per day to about 2,000 vehicles per fortnight, with the result that the formation of the Air Force and Army has been delayed.The reduction in the massing of ground troops was also influenced by the decision to move the Strategic Air Force to the Foggia area as soon as possible without waiting for the occupation of the bases in the Roman area.The Air Force's requirements should be met by the end of the year.

(2) The reduction of landing craft, already attributable to attrition, is so severe that, except by a small number of forces, we cannot take advantage of the inherent weakness of the enemy's flanks to sea-surrounding attacks.Due to the destruction of road and railway facilities, most of the existing landing craft need to be used to assemble troops and provide supplies for coastal areas.At the same time, due to the shortage of barges and tugboats, and the damage to the berthing facilities by the enemy is difficult to repair for a while, landing craft are also needed to maintain the traffic in the port.

3. (1) A study of the enemy's present situation shows that the enemy's lines of communication are sufficient to allow them to muster a total of about sixty divisions in Italy, chiefly in the northern regions, if they have so many.And, despite our air superiority, the enemy was able to keep them there during the winter months.The Germans apparently wanted to shorten their front around the European fortresses in order to form a reserve army.This reserve army could be used to further reinforce their army in Italy. (2) In contrast, the position of the Allies is not so favorable.With the existing manpower and material resources, it is impossible to increase the speed of army assembly.It is impermissible to establish a stable front to the south of Rome, for the importance of the capital far outweighs its strategic position, and we must gain sufficient depth before the airfield of Foggia and the port of Naples can be destroyed. considered safe.That being the case, it became urgent to capture a strong defensive base north of Rome.Moreover, we cannot take a purely defensive measure, since that would give the initiative to the Germans. the third part 4. The apparent attempt of the Germans now is to maintain a front south of Rome where the terrain is favorable for defense and where our superiority in armor or artillery is of no use.The impending inclement weather will limit our Air Force's activities, as, in fact, it already does.The enemy's troops may be exhausted, but they can be replaced by troops brought in from the north.There are already signs that they are switching defenses now.We have neither armies to rotate nor transport ships to enable us to take such a step.The present tendency, therefore, seems to be that our push to Rome will have to be protracted and costly. It's a hard baseball game, and our troops in the field now have a slight advantage, but the enemy has a chance to rotate, so that cancels out the two; and since we don't have a sufficient number of landing craft, we can't Amphibious flanking operations of a magnitude sufficient to expedite our advance.There is now a danger that this fierce baseball game, even if won in the end, may leave us north of Rome in a state of exhaustion and weakness.If the Germans bring in new divisions from the north for a counter-offensive, we cannot maintain the positions we have gained.The actions of our air forces during the winter months will not be able to counteract blows of this nature which the enemy can inflict on us; and apart from the above, I have no apprehensions.The Germans appeared to be sending more reinforcements to the Italian field than its internal situation or purely defensive needs would have allowed.If an opportunity for easy victory presented itself, the Germans would no doubt seize it to offset the effects of a year of setbacks on all fronts and to improve the German army before the campaign of 1944 began. morale.The effects it will have in the Balkans and in France may be particularly unfavorable to us. 5. (1) Finally, assuming the initial attack on Salerno is successful, the outlook for September looks promising.Some German divisions in the north will be embroiled in difficult internal security issues.The pace at which the army must be assembled in the south we consider to be such that by the end of December we should have twenty divisions against the possible eighteen divisions of the enemy, provided that the Germans have no reserves to reinforce them, and at the In mainland Italy we have the necessary and sufficient air force.We consider a sufficient number of landing craft, as may be necessary, to outflank the enemy's coastal flanks and maintain our forces on the beach. (2) To sum up: Today's situation is such that eleven divisions of the Allied forces are engaged in a frontal battle against the German army, which has nine divisions and can receive reinforcements at any time, in areas conducive to the defensive.By the end of January our massed forces will be reduced to no more than sixteen or seventeen divisions against the enemy's imminent possession of some twenty-four divisions, and we have no manpower and material resources available to deploy more than a partial aggressive amphibious operations.We could be held out south of Rome for so long that the Germans could clarify the situation in northern Italy and then reinforce their southern front.If this is the case, the initiative will likely pass into their hands. This is really a brilliant document that touches on all the most serious issues of our strategy. I have raised some of these issues with General Marshall. Prime Minister to General Marshall (Washington) October 24, 1943 I once sent a very long cable to President Roosevelt about our great need for a conference in Africa.I hope he can show you the telegram.For the sake of the distant Overlord operation plan, I was of course deeply touched by the withdrawal of our two elite divisions, the 50th and 51st Divisions, from the imminent Battle of Rome.We are fulfilling our covenant, but I pray to God that this action will not cost us dearly. Now I'm calling President Roosevelt: former navy personnel to president roosevelt October 26, 1943 Now that you have read the Eisenhower report, it describes the situation we are getting into in Italy.We must not allow this great Italian campaign to degenerate into a stalemate.We must win Rome and the airfield north of it at all costs.The fact that the enemy has transferred such a force as theirs to this field justifies our strategy.Nor can anyone doubt that our defeat of Italy has greatly aided the Russian advance, and this is the only way we can give them support at present.In my opinion, in order to win the Italian campaign, Eisenhower and Alexander had to get everything they needed, regardless of the impact on later military operations. I feel deeply uneasy when I trouble you with these things while you are still recovering from your cold. General Marshall replied on October 27 that he believed Eisenhower had enough troops to fight in Italy without taking undue risk.His current problem is landing craft, which will be studied.In his estimation of the situation in Italy, the great advantage of the overwhelming superiority of our air forces has been almost neglected.Bad weather cannot necessarily counteract, or cannot counteract for a long time, the inevitable result of intensive raids on the enemy's lines of communication. I now appeal to President Roosevelt on the question of landing craft in the Mediterranean. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt: November 4, 1943 I am very sorry that I must draw your attention to the growing apprehension of His Majesty's Government regarding the withdrawal of landing craft from the Mediterranean at this critical juncture.We now have before us the prediction made by General Eisenhower that, if the present plan for the removal of the landing craft were to be strictly followed, he would not have before the end of January, or even the end of February, the occupation necessary to protect the Roman airfields. that battle line.He further stated that in order to achieve such disappointing results, a costly and protracted frontal attack was necessary.Given the disproportionate proportion of British troops engaged in the Italian war against the enemy, and the greater number of casualties, and the express opinion of the American Commander-in-Chief under whom we serve, we have a right to ask our American allies to heed our sincere advice. 2. Therefore, I was formally requested by the War Cabinet to make a request that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff must consider the request of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee.We regret very much that the urgency of the matter does not allow us to delay for another three weeks until the next General Staff Conference can be held, since that would cause the landing craft to be withdrawn or out of service during cause serious damage. 3. I would like to mention in passing that, thanks to the enormous effort on all fronts, we are fully confident that the United Kingdom will be able to produce an additional seventy-five tank landing craft by the dates stipulated in Operation Overlord. I was relieved to receive his answer. President Roosevelt to Prime Minister November 6, 1943 The Allied Chiefs of Staff has today authorized Eisenhower to retain until December 15th the sixty-eight tank landing craft that were due to be withdrawn to the United Kingdom at the earliest opportunity. In my opinion, this action should have met his basic requirements. I notified Alexander immediately.He replied as follows: General Alexander to Prime Minister November 9, 1943 The tank landing craft will not be withdrawn for the time being, which is of great help to my plan, and I am very grateful to them.However, the deadline of December 15 will not allow me to realize all my plans, as I have stated in my telegram to the Chief of the Reich General Staff. Prime Minister to General Alexander November 9, 1943 You should make another battle plan on the basis that the tank landing craft will remain available until January 15th.I am sure that this will be agreed upon in our meeting. I then called our ambassador in Moscow and read as follows: Prime Minister to Sir Archibald Clark Kerr November 9, 1943 The weather in Russia was particularly sunny, while in Italy it was pouring with rain.The frontal attack which we had to launch, with troops which were not much stronger than the enemy's, had been actively fighting, but the tempo of this frontal attack had to be slowed down. My desire has always been to continue and push the Italian campaign forward, and to draw as many German divisions as possible to that field and keep them there.I am pleased to say that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reached an agreement that no landing craft will be withdrawn until December 15th.In this way it will be possible to devote greater forces to our whole operation in Italy.I hope that through a new and great effort at home many more landing craft will be produced to make up for the shortage caused by the delayed return of other landing craft. Half of the German forces are in northern Italy and Istria, some three hundred miles from our front.They have withdrawn some troops from this half force back to the south of Russia.The withdrawal of these forces was not due to any incompetence on our front, but to the acquiescence of the Italians in northern Italy, thereby alleviating the danger to internal security.We have no doubts about the correctness of General Ismay's estimate of German strength.He mentioned that there were six German panzer divisions there, half of which were fighting on our field.The Germans deployed to fight south of Rome now prove to have ten divisions, against which we have a slightly larger force of twelve or thirteen divisions.These forces are not much of an advantage for a sustained frontal attack in mountainous terrain. I wrote to General Brooke as follows: Prime Minister to Chief of the Reich General Staff November 16, 1943 It is now an urgent matter that the Poles should go to the front to fight.Over the years, although they have made a lot of preparations and used a lot of materials, they have done nothing.The Italian battlefield is also in urgent need of reinforcements, and the Poles are scheduled to be transferred immediately after the New Zealanders are transferred.Now is not the time to change their establishment.It would be best to transfer the two understaffed divisions to try it out.Their name is still the Polish Army, and we must try to recruit from other sources. In my opinion, instead of dismantling these establishments that have been painstakingly established in Persia, it is better to use the Polish armored division in Britain first, because this division will have no combat missions for a period of time in the future.But I believe that if Polish troops went to the front and fought the Germans in full view, it would have been possible to get more Polish troops from Stalin.I plan to bring this up when we meet.The Soviet government has a tendency to distrust the Polish army, and suspects that it will use it against the Russians in the future to protect Poland's rights and interests.However, this perception would be dispelled if this Polish army went to the front against the Germans and started fighting.On the other hand, I do not agree with any changes to the current establishment. At this time the Allied heavy bomber fleet was being established at Foggia Airfield to strike industrial targets in eastern Germany beyond the range of our home-based air squadrons.I was growing increasingly uneasy as the demands of this heavy bomber fleet put enormous pressure on our limited shipping forces. In my opinion, these demands were disproportionate and irrelevant to the general situation at the time. Prime Minister to General Ismay, to the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Services November 17, 1943 It would, of course, be entirely wrong to sacrifice the interests of the campaign for the capture of Rome in order to establish a strategic air force in Italy.The strategic bombing of Germany, however important, cannot be treated as a matter of priority over this campaign, which must occupy the forefront of our minds.Major tactical needs must always take precedence over strategic policy.I did not understand until recently that the build-up of the Army was hampered by the forward movement of large strategic air forces unrelated to the campaign.In fact, it was against all orthodox military principles and seemed wrong to common sense. A week later, I said again: The enormous obstacles created by the Air Force's eagerness to get ahead had indeed hampered the Army's operations. The Eighth Army had now advanced and, after a series of battles, approached the Sangro River.There are four divisions of the German army stationed here.In order to maintain the initiative, it was General Alexander's intention that the Eighth Army should cross the river, break through the winter front on this front; Traffic on the West Coast is in danger.Our army has established a bridgehead across the Sangro River, but the enemy's main fortifications are on the opposite high ground.Bad weather, rain, muddy roads, and swollen rivers postponed the attack until the 28th of November.On this day, the 78th Division, the 8th Indian Division and the recently arrived New Zealand Division launched an offensive and made great progress.After a week of heavy fighting they secured their position ten miles across the Sangro.By December 20, Canadian forces had reached the outskirts of Ortona, but it was not until three days after Christmas, after very heavy fighting, that Ortona was cleared of the enemy.This is the first large-scale street fighting, and a lot of experience and lessons have been gained from this street fighting.But the enemy continued to resist, and more reinforcements were brought in from northern Italy.The Eighth Army made some progress in December, but failed to capture any significant targets, and then winter weather brought active military operations to a halt. The U.S. Fifth Army, under the command of General Clark, labored along the road to Cassino and attacked the outpost fortifications of the main German positions. The enemy has set up strong positions on the hills overlooking the road on both sides.On December 2, the British Tenth Army and the U.S. Second Army attacked the majestic Cassino Mountains to the west of the road. After a tenacious battle, after a week, they finally wiped out the enemy. To the east of the road, equally heavy fighting was fought by the U.S. II Corps and VI Corps, the latter now including the Moroccan II Division.It was not until the beginning of the new year that the enemy was repulsed, and the Fifth Army was fully deployed along the Garigliano River and its tributary, the Rapido River, with the Cassino plateau and the famous monastery in front of it. In all these land battles the Army was fully supported by our tactical air force, while our strategic air force, in the rear of the enemy's lines, carried out several effective raids, especially in the one attack on Turin, where a Important ball bearing factories were blown up by American air fortresses.On the other hand, the combat power exerted by the Luftwaffe was relatively small.During the day, their fighters and fighter-bombers were rarely deployed.Six or seven raids by their long-range heavy bombers on Naples had little consequence.But on December 2nd there was a very destructive surprise attack on our crowded port of Bari, as a result of which one munitions ship happened to be hit, sixteen others were sunk, and three were lost. tons of cargo. The Germans had no intention of competing for air supremacy over Italy during the winter, and they significantly reduced their air power as shown in the table below: Strength of the Luftwaffe (in the Central Mediterranean) July 1, 1943 nine hundred and seventy-five October 1, 1943 Four hundred and thirty January 1, 1944, three hundred and seventy Our air offensive from Great Britain caused the enemy to withdraw all aircraft that could be brought back from the Mediterranean and Russia.The long-range bombers in Italy had all been removed for retaliation against Britain and for a small blitzkrieg the following spring. For reasons already stated, I have called the Italian campaign the third front. Twenty elite German divisions were drawn to this battlefield.If you add the garrisons that remained in the Balkans for fear of attack, the Germans retained nearly forty divisions to resist the Allies in the Mediterranean.Our Second Front in Northwest Europe is not yet at war, but its existence is real.The enemy prepared at least thirty divisions to deal with this field, and as the date of attack drew nearer, the enemy's prepared strength increased to sixty divisions.Our strategic bombing from Britain forced the enemy to bring back a large number of troops and supplies to defend their homeland.These contributions to the Russians' First Front (as they had every right to call it) cannot be ignored. Before I close this chapter, I should make a conclusion. During this period, all major strategic cooperation of the Western countries in the war was limited and incorrectly carried out because of the lack of tank landing craft to transport various vehicles instead of tanks.For those who dealt with military affairs during this period: the words tank landing craft were deeply imprinted on their hearts.We have entered Italy with great force.Our army there could have been completely abandoned if not supported, thus handing Hitler his greatest victory since the fall of France.On the other hand, there is no doubt that the 1944 Overlord plan is imperative.My biggest request is nothing more than a two-month reprieve, that is, from May to July, 1944, if necessary.This would solve the landing craft problem.These landing craft did not need to be transferred back to England before the winter gale in late autumn of 1943, but could have returned in early spring of 1944.But if the May date of the attack was pedantically adhered to, and interpreted as May 1st, the danger to the Allies in Italy seemed irreparable.Had some of the landing craft designated for the Overlord operation been permitted to remain in the Mediterranean for the winter, the Italian campaign would have had no difficulty in winning.There were vast numbers of troops in the Mediterranean theater not yet in action: three or four French divisions, two or three American divisions, and at least four British divisions or British-commanded divisions (including the Polish ones).The factor that prevented these divisions from going to Italy for actual combat was the landing craft; and the main factor that hindered our acquisition of landing craft was the insistence on their early transfer back to England. Let the reader who has read the various telegrams quoted in this chapter not be tempted to think, because of an inadvertent misunderstanding of some of the words: (1) I want to give up the Overlord battle plan; (2) I will take away the main force of the Overlord's battle plan: or (3) It is intended to use the troops fighting in the Balkans for a campaign.These are nonsense.I never had such a desire in my heart.Giving me a six-week or two-month turnaround from May 1st, the date set out in the Overlord operation plan, I can use the landing craft in the Mediterranean for several months in order to put real effective forces into action on the Italian front, This would not only capture Rome, but would cause the Germans to withdraw many divisions from the Russian or Normandy fields, or both.All of these issues have been discussed in Washington, but little attention has been paid to the limited nature of those to which my assertion touches. As we shall see shortly, everything I asked for was finally granted.The landing craft could not only be kept in order to maintain the transport in the Mediterranean; they could even be postponed for the Battle of Anzio in January.This did not have any impediment to the successful launch of the Overlord Operation Plan with sufficient forces on June 6.What actually happened, however, was that our long struggle to secure these short periods of turnaround and to prevent the setting aside of one vast field of battle for the sake of strict observance of dates for the opening of another field was finally The Italian campaign was protracted and unsatisfactory.