Chapter 170 Volume 5, Chapter 15, The Return of the Arctic Transport Fleet

In March 1943, the convoy was suspended for a while. Intense fighting on the Eastern Front. The Soviet Union's summer offensive at Kursk, Orel, and Kharkov. The German army's retreat. On November 6th, Kiev was recaptured. Molotov demanded a continuation. Send the transport fleet! !I urged the Admiralty to comply with Tirpitz's loss of combat effectiveness. Our personnel stationed in the north of Russia were treated harshly. A series of appropriate requests. Mr. Eden to go to Moscow. Stalin's reply to my letter. President Roosevelt I refuse to accept Stalin's telegram from the Soviet ambassador The War Cabinet agrees to my actions Mr. Eden reports his talks with Stalin and Molotov on October 21st The convoy resumes its voyage Scharnhorst The end of the day when the HMS Tirpitz was sunk by Admiral Fraser's Duke of York on December 25, 1943.

Towards the end of 1942, in Arctic waters, British destroyers were active in escorting convoys to northern Russia.As recorded in the previous volume, this action led to a crisis in the German High Command and the removal of Admiral Raeder in charge of naval affairs.During the months of January and March, when the night and day were still almost completely dark, two more convoys set sail on this perilous route, one forty-two and the other six, each separately. navigating.A total of forty ships reached their destination.During the same period, thirty-six ships sailed safely home from Russian ports, and five were lost.The restoration of daylight made it easier for the enemy to attack the transport fleet.The remnants of the German fleet, including Tirpitz, were now concentrated in Norwegian waters and were a constant and dire threat on most of the routes.Moreover, the situation in the Atlantic remained the same, it remained the decisive theater of naval warfare, and at the same time, in March 1943, the battle with submarines was approaching a very critical juncture.Our destroyers are under more stress than we can bear.In March the convoys had to be postponed, and in April the Admiralty proposed, and I agreed, that supplies to Russia by this route should be suspended until the autumn dark period began.

We deeply regret this decision, since major battles are going on in the Russian theater which will characterize the campaign of 1943.After the spring snow melted, both sides gathered their forces and prepared for a big battle.The Russians now had the upper hand in both land and air, and the Germans had little hope of a final victory.However, they struck first.The Russian prominence at Kursk, projecting into the German lines, posed such a serious threat that the Germans decided to attack from north and south in an attempt to chip away at it.The Russians had anticipated this move and had already been very vigilant and ready for battle.

Thus, when they attacked on July 5th, the Germans faced a situation where the enemy was holding on to well-fortified fortifications.The northern attack made some progress, but was repulsed two weeks later.To the south, the Germans initially had greater success, penetrating fifteen miles into the Russian lines.A major counter-offensive followed, and by July 23 the Russian front was fully restored.The German offensive thus far was a complete failure.They gained nothing to make up for a significant loss.They had pinned their hopes of success on the new Tiger tank, but this tank was destroyed by Russian artillery.

The German army was exhausted by the Russian campaigns and weakened by the addition of its second-rate Allies to its ranks.It concentrated most of its power at Kursk, disregarding the safety of other areas along its thousand-mile line of battle.Now, when the Russian army began to storm and attack, it was overwhelmed.While the Battle of Kursk was raging and the German reserves were heavily tied down, on July 12 the first strike was made against prominent German positions around Orel.After the intense bombardment pre-attack phase, the main attack of the Russian army rushed to the north of the prominent position, while an auxiliary attack was launched on the east of it.The Russians quickly made a deep breakthrough, and despite the tenacity of the defenders, one after another their strongholds were outflanked, besieged and overthrown.Their counterattack was repulsed, and under the weight of superior numbers and weapons they were utterly crushed.Orel was captured on August 5, and by the 18th all German salient positions fifty miles deep had been leveled.

The second great Russian offensive began on August 3, when the Orel offensive was in full swing.This time, prominent German positions around Kharkov came under attack.Kharkiv is an important transport hub and guards the main route to Ukraine and the Donets industrial basin.Therefore, the fortifications prepared by Kharkov are more complete than usual.This time the main offensive was again aimed at the north of the salient position, one force fell due south, attacking Kharkov itself, and the other broke into the southwestern position, thus threatening the entire German rear.Within forty-eight hours, these two attacks had penetrated the enemy positions, in some places as deep as thirty miles, and captured Belgorod.By August 11, Kharkov was threatened on three fronts, as a further attack was launched against it from the east, while Russian forces advanced swiftly fifty miles to the northwest.On that day, Hitler ordered that Kharkov must be held, no matter what sacrifices were made.The German garrison held its ground and fought until the 23rd before the whole city fell into Russian hands.

The three major battles of Kursk, Orel and Kharkov in two months marked the collapse of the German army on the Eastern Front.No matter where they are, they fail miserably.The Russian Army's plans, though enormous, never exceeded their resource constraints.The Russians proved their new superiority not only on land.In the air, some 2,500 German aircraft were opposed by at least twice as many Russian aircraft, whose effectiveness had been greatly improved.The strength of the Luftwaffe, at this period of the war, was at its zenith, with a total of about six thousand aircraft.But the fact that less than half of the aircraft were available to support this decisive campaign is ample proof of the value to Russia of our operations in the Mediterranean and the increasing combat effort of the British-based Allied bombers.Especially in terms of fighter jets, the German army felt stretched.Already inferior on the Eastern Front, they had to weaken there even more during September in order to defend themselves on the Western Front.By winter, three-quarters of all German fighter strength was deployed on the Western Front.The rapidity and succession of Russian attacks prevented the Germans from making full use of their air power.Air units were constantly moved from one theater of operations to another in order to meet new crises, and wherever they moved, there was always a gap in their rear, which led them to discover the overwhelming strength of the Russian aircraft.

During September, the Germans retreated along their entire southern front, from the area directly opposite Moscow, to the Black Sea.The Russian army pushed forward swiftly and pursued with all its might. At the pivot to the north, Russian forces advanced from Vyazma, and on September 25, Smolensk was recaptured.The Germans undoubtedly hoped to hold the line of the second great river, the Dnieper.But at the beginning of October the Russians crossed the Dnieper north of Kiev, and at the same time in the south at Pereyaslav and Kremenchug.Further south, on October 25, Dnipropetrovsk was captured.Only near the mouth of the Dnieper River, the Germans remained firmly on the west bank of the river; all the rest along the river was lost.The overland route to Crimea, Perekop, was seized, cutting off the retreat of the powerful German troops stationed in Crimea.Kiev, surrounded on both flanks, changed hands on 6 November, many Germans were captured, and the Russians pressed on, reaching Korostian and Zhytomyr.However, strong German armored forces counterattacked the Russian flanks and drove them back, so the Germans recaptured the above two towns.

Here, the battle line has temporarily stabilized.To the north, the Russians recaptured Gomel at the end of November and crossed the upper Dnieper on either side of Mogilev. By December, after three months of pursuit, the German forces in central and southern Russia had been pushed back more than two hundred miles.Unable to hold the Dnieper front, the Germans had an open front and were vulnerable to the winter campaign, which they knew from bitter experience that their opponents were good at.Such were the great achievements of the Russian army in 1943. It is natural for the Soviet government to take a censure attitude towards the temporary suspension of the convoy, because the Soviet army is eager for the arrival of the convoy.On the evening of September 21, Mr. Molotov summoned our ambassador in Moscow and asked the convoy to resume its voyage.He pointed out that the Italian fleet had been wiped out and that German U-boats had abandoned the North Atlantic to sail south.The Persian Railways could not transport sufficient quantities of supplies.For three months the Soviets had been on a wide-ranging and all-out offensive, yet they received in 1943 less than a third of the supplies they had received the previous year.The Soviet Government, therefore, insists that the convoy should resume its voyage as soon as possible, and expects His Majesty's Government to take all necessary measures within the next few days.

Although there is much to say in answer to all these opinions, on September 25th I raised the question with the Admiralty and others. Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary, Production Secretary, War Transport Secretary, General Ismay to the Chiefs of Staff, and Acting First Sea Lord September 25, 1943 It is our duty, if humanly possible, to reopen the Arctic shipping lanes, beginning in the second half of November, in accordance with the waxing and waning of the Moon.We shall make five trial voyages in November, December, January, February and March.The plan should be drawn up by the Admiralty and War Transportation.I think it's doable.

Since the Russians demand the restoration of these convoys, we have the right to make one very obvious demand of them, namely, better treatment of our staff stationed in the north of Russia. I was disappointed by the initial reply of the Admiralty concerning the convoys. Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary, Admiralty Secretary, General Ismay to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and others concerned September 27, 1943 Convoy to the North of Russia This answer is unsatisfactory.Why is the number of ships in the transport fleet insufficient in November?The same is true of the transport fleet that will set sail on December 8th.We must try to dispatch at least five full convoys before Operation Overlord begins.I disagree with the notion that the situation in the Atlantic or the Mediterranean is going to become as tense as it was when we sent these fleets.Of course, I am not prepared to conclude a solemn contract with Marshal Stalin, and we also have to guard ourselves against unforeseen contingencies, but I think that in November, December, January, February and March , the full fleet should be dispatched once a month. I will hold a staff meeting on this question at ten o'clock on Tuesday evening. When we met to discuss this question on the evening of the twenty-ninth, a pleasant new incident arose before us.The battleship Tirpitz was taken out of action by a bold and heroic attack by our small submarine.Of the six submarines that participated in the operation, two broke through the enemy's well-laid defenses.Their commanders, Captain Cameron (Royal Navy Reserve) and Captain Price (Royal Navy Active Duty), were rescued by the Germans and taken as prisoners of war. They were later awarded the Victoria Cross.Afterwards, aerial reconnaissance showed that the battleship was seriously injured and had to be docked for repairs before it could rejoin the battle.The German ship Luzov has sailed to the Baltic Sea.So we have a respite in the waters of the Arctic Ocean, perhaps for a few more months.A memorandum from me to the Foreign Secretary was then as follows: The problem of the resumption of the transport fleet has actually been successfully resolved.Before I call Stalin on this matter, please list the unfair treatment of our personnel in the north of Russia, so that I can bring these two issues together to him in the most advantageous way.I hope to draft this telegram tonight. The situation described by Mr. Eden is so serious that I sent the following telegram to Stalin: Prime Minister to Premier Stalin October 1, 1943 I have received your request to resend the convoy to northern Russia.All of my colleagues and I are very eager to do our best to help the heroic army you lead.I am therefore not prepared to answer the arguable points raised in Mr. Molotov's call.Since June 22, 1941, in spite of our own heavy burdens, we have tried our best to help you defend your own country against the brutal invasion of Hitler's gang, and we have always acknowledged and publicly stated that you The brilliant victories won and the fatal blows dealt to the Germans have brought us great benefit. For two or four days I worked with the Admiralty to draw up a plan for the redeployment of a convoy of convoys to the north of Russia.This plan involved great difficulties. First, the Battle of the Atlantic began again.The German U-boats had already used a new type of sound-detonated torpedo against us, which proved effective against our escort ships who were searching for the U-boat.Second, our situation in the Mediterranean is extremely tense, with an army of about 600,000 men to be assembled in Italy by the end of November, and trying to make the most of the collapse of Italian forces in the Aegean islands and the Balkans.Third, we must do our part in the war against Japan, which the United States is engaged in with such zeal, that the Americans would be outraged if we were indifferent. 3. Despite all the difficulties mentioned above, I am very happy to tell you that we are planning to send four convoys of transport convoys to northern Russia in November and December of this year and in January and February of next year, each convoy consisting of about three Fifteen British and American ships.In order to meet the requirements of navigation, each batch of transport fleets may be divided into two departures.The first convoy left the United Kingdom about November 12, and arrived in northern Russia ten days later; subsequent convoys sailed about every twenty-eight days.Before the end of October we intend to withdraw as many merchant ships as possible which are now remaining in northern Russia, and the rest will return with returning escorts. To prevent the possibility that the Soviets would again accuse us of breaking our promises if our efforts to help them were unsuccessful, I have added a paragraph in defense of our position. 4. But I must record that the above measure is not a covenant or a contract, but a declaration of our serious and serious resolve.On this basis I have ordered the necessary measures to be dispatched in four convoys of thirty-five ships. I then proceeded to enumerate the unsatisfactory treatment of our personnel in northern Russia. 5. The Foreign Office and the Admiralty have asked me, however, to bring to your attention, indeed, your own attention, the following difficult situation which we are encountering in the north of Russia. 6. If we are to redeploy the convoys, we must strengthen our apparatus in northern Russia, which has been reduced since March of this year.The number of naval personnel available, even on the basis of current needs, is less than is actually required, because there are no replacements for the personnel who are sent home.Your civil authorities deny visas to our personnel going to the north of Russia, even to replace those who should have been rotated long ago.Mr. Molotov has urged His Majesty's Government to agree that the number of British military personnel in northern Russia should not exceed the number of Soviet military personnel and trade missions in Great Britain.We cannot accept this proposal, since their jobs are quite different, and the numbers required for military operations cannot be regulated in such an unrealistic way.Secondly, as we have informed the Soviet government, we must decide for ourselves which personnel we need to carry out the military operations for which we are responsible.Mr. Eden has assured us that great care will be taken to keep numbers to a strict minimum. 7. Therefore, I have to ask you to agree to immediately issue authentication certificates to the people who need to be added now, and please promise that in the future, when we need to apply for sending aid to northern Russia, we will not refuse to issue visas.I would like to emphasize that of the approximately 170 naval personnel currently stationed in the north of the Soviet Union, more than 150 were due to be rotated several months ago, but the Soviets have been refusing to issue visas.These individuals are climatically and otherwise ill-adapted and in poor health, and we feel the need to rotate them back without further delay. 8. We also want to send a small medical team to Arkhangelsk, the responsible authorities of your country have agreed, but the necessary visas have not yet been issued.Please don't forget that we may have many wounded. 9. With regard to the present situation of our military personnel and sailors in the north of Russia, I must also ask your help to improve it.These personnel are, of course, engaged in combat operations against the enemy for our common good, and they are mainly transporting Allied supplies to your country.They are in a very different position from ordinary people going to Russia, as I am sure you will admit.However, they are subject to restrictions by your authorities which, in my opinion, are inappropriate for personnel sent by the Allies to carry out military operations in which the Soviet Union has a great interest.The restrictions are as follows: (1) No one on British warships and British merchant ships will be allowed to disembark unless transported by Soviet small boats, in the presence of Soviet officials, and papers must be checked each time. (2) No one on board a British warship may approach a British merchant ship without prior notification to the Soviet authorities.This even applies to the responsible British admiral. (3) British officers and soldiers must obtain a special pass before they can disembark from the ship, or travel between two British stations on the shore.Such passes are often delayed for long periods of time, thereby delaying work in progress. (4) The munitions, luggage or mail of this combat unit cannot be disembarked without the presence of Soviet officials, and all munitions and mail must be transported through various formalities. (5) Private letters must be checked; though we believe that checks of mail for combat troops should be left to the British military authorities. Ten. Stipulating these restrictions left our officers and soldiers with an impression that was not conducive to the relationship between Britain and the Soviet Union.Had the British Parliament been informed of this, Anglo-Soviet relations would have been seriously damaged.The accumulated effect of these procedures has created a great obstacle to the effective performance of duties by our personnel, and has seriously hindered urgent and important work on more than one occasion.We impose no such restrictions on Soviet personnel in the UK. 11. We have proposed to Mr. Molotov that cases concerning violations of Soviet law by our military personnel and seamen of our convoys should be referred to the British military authorities.No doubt there are a small number of such cases, at least partly due to the very harsh working conditions in northern Russia. 12. I do believe, Mr. Stalin, that you will find a way to resolve these difficulties in a spirit of friendship, so that we may do our best to help each other and advance our common cause. Given what we are doing now, these demands are not excessive.But there was no reply for almost two weeks. The meeting of the foreign ministers of the three main allies, after long preparations, is now about to open in Moscow.The next chapter will deal with the situation of the meeting.Mr. Eden flew to attend on October 9th.His journey will pass through Cairo and Tehran, where he will have a lot of business to attend to, and will not reach Moscow until the morning of October 18.I was in charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during his absence. Prime Minister to Sir Archibald Clark Kerr (Moscow) October 12, 1943 I sent a long telegram on October 1st concerning the resumption of the Arctic transport fleet, but has not received an answer.If the turnaround date for the convoy begins on November 12th, then our requests concerning personnel must be answered as soon as possible.The safety of the several dozen radio operators and communicators on whose work the convoy depended, together with some one hundred and fifty replacements to replace those who were due to return home, was due to depart from the United Kingdom by destroyer on 21 October.So please urge them to reply as soon as possible.Meanwhile, we are preparing to send convoys in the hope that the Soviets will still need them. The next day I received a call back from Stalin. Premier Stalin to Prime Minister October 13, 1943 I received your telegram on October 1, informing me that you plan to send four convoys of convoys to the Soviet Union via the northern route in November, December, January and February next year.However, this telegram has lost its value because of your statement; your stated intention to send the Northern Convoy to the Soviet Union is neither an obligation nor an agreement, but merely a declaration which can be understood as meaning that the British side may at any time Overthrow, regardless of the effect this may have on Soviet troops at the front.I must declare that I cannot agree with such an approach to the problem.The armaments and other military supplies provided by the British government to the Soviet Union can only be obligations and nothing else.This obligation was assumed by the British Government, by special agreement between our two countries, towards the Soviet Union, which for the third year bears the burden of fighting Hitler's Germany, the common enemy of the Allies. Nor should it be overlooked that the northern route was the shortest route by which the Allies could bring supplies to the Soviet-German battlefield in the shortest period of time; without full use of this route, it would have been impossible to supply the USSR in adequate quantities material plan.As I have written to you earlier, and as experience has shown, the shipments of munitions and supplies to the USSR through the Persian ports, however in quantity, cannot make up for those which have not been sent by the northern route . By the way, for some reason, this year's supply of munitions via the northern route has been greatly reduced compared with the one received last year; this has prevented the Soviet Union from fulfilling the planned plan of supplying military supplies to the army, and at the same time violated the Anglo-Soviet protocol on military supplies.Therefore, at present, when the Soviet Army is doing its best to meet the needs of the front in order to defeat the main body of our common enemy, it cannot be tolerated to depend on the arbitrary decisions of the British side for the supply of Soviet troops.This attitude towards the above-mentioned problems can only make people think that the British government is refusing to fulfill its obligations and is making some kind of threat to the Soviet Union. 2. Regarding the so-called debatable issues in Mr. Molotov's statement you mentioned, I must say that I cannot find any evidence for this comment.In my opinion, the principles of reciprocity and equality put forward by the Soviet side in order to solve the problem of visas for the personnel of the military delegation are correct and indeed just principles.As for the statement that the duties of the British and Soviet military missions are different, and that the number of staff in the British military mission can only be determined by the British government, I do not think this is convincing.The People's Committee of Foreign Affairs of the USSR has given detailed explanations on this issue in some previous memorandums. 3. Regarding the section on increasing the British military personnel stationed in the northern part of the Soviet Union, I think there is no such need; because, as the Soviet side has pointed out many times, most of the British military personnel already stationed there have not been fully utilized, and they have been working for several months. Since then, doing nothing.We can cite this example: we raised the question of withdrawing the British base in the port of Arkhangelsk on several occasions because it was unnecessary, and only recently the British side agreed to withdraw it.In addition, there are some regrettable facts: individual British military personnel have behaved that we cannot allow, and they have tried several times to bribe Soviet citizens to collect intelligence for them. Such instances of insulting Soviet citizens certainly created incidents that led to unpleasant disputes. 4. With regard to the formalities and certain restrictions you mentioned in the northern ports, if you have not forgotten the current war situation in the Soviet Union, you must consider that such formalities and restrictions are unavoidable on the front line and areas close to the front line .I might add that this applies to Britons and other foreigners as well as to citizens of the USSR.In this respect, however, the Soviet authorities have granted British military personnel and sailors a number of privileges, and the British embassy was notified of these privileges as early as March of this year.Therefore, your mention of many procedures and restrictions is based on inaccurate information. As regards the inspection and prosecution of British military personnel, I have no objection to the inspection of the private correspondence of British personnel in the northern ports, on the basis of reciprocity, at the responsibility of the British authorities themselves; and if British military personnel commit minor offenses, Issues not related to court prosecution are referred to the appropriate military authorities for consideration. Mr. Eden was on his way to Moscow and had now left Cairo for Tehran, so I sent him the following telegram: Prime Minister to Foreign Minister (Tehran) October 15, 1943 We have now received such an insolent reply to our convoy telegram.I am sending you my drafted answer.Since you're going to get there, I'll let you do the camera.With regard to the Navy rotation and communications personnel, I don't think we should budge.It would be a great relief if we could be relieved of the burden of these convoys and bring our men back from northern Russia.If this is their true intention and desire, we should enable them to do so. Here is a draft of my reply: Prime Minister to Premier Stalin October 15, 1943 It is impossible for His Majesty's Government to guarantee the dispatch of the four convoys which we have mentioned without regard to the military situation at sea.However, if the Soviet government pays attention to receiving the supplies from the convoy, we will make every effort to do so regardless of great losses and sacrifices.I cannot, however, promise to do more than I can, and His Majesty's Government must reserve its own judgment as to whether any particular combat operation by its troops is in fact feasible. 2. The round-trip voyage of these four convoys will be a great burden on the Royal Navy, and it will be necessary to withdraw the much-needed destroyer fleet from anti-submarine warfare, as well as the warships to escort the army and other important convoys.At the same time, it would expose the principal ships of the fleet to serious danger.If the Soviet government paid no attention to sending a convoy, His Majesty's government was more than happy to be relieved of this difficult task. 3. In particular, it should be pointed out that the British government once requested that the hundreds of British military personnel stationed in the northern part of the Soviet Union be rotated and slightly increased in number, especially the dispatch of communications to a certain extent related to the safety of the transport fleet personnel, but these requests were denied, thus creating an insurmountable obstacle.His Majesty's Government is very willing to withdraw its small number of military personnel from northern Russia, and to do so as soon as it becomes aware that the Soviet Government will not take over convoys under such appropriate and reasonable conditions as the British Government deems necessary. carry out. I addressed the issue to President Roosevelt: former navy personnel to president roosevelt October 16, 1943 Talk about sending a fleet to Russia.Now that I have received a telegram from Uncle Joe, I think you will feel that it was a surprise to receive such a telegram from the gentleman for whose sake we are doing our best at all costs and troubles.I drafted a reply and sent it to Anthony, asking him to act accordingly. 2. I think, at least I hope, that this telegram was sent by the leadership of the CPSU and not by Stalin, because it took twelve days to prepare this telegram.The leadership of the CPSU was convinced that it could get everything by intimidation, but I firmly believe that it was of some importance for it to realize that this may not always be the case. Mr. Eden had by this time arrived in Moscow. Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary October 18, 1943 Ideally, you've arrived on the scene to deal with the shipping fleet.At three o'clock this afternoon, I will receive the Soviet ambassador, and I intend to return Stalin's rude telegram to him, stating that I do not wish to accept this telegram, since the matter will be settled by you in Moscow.You do not have to submit the answer I have drafted, but take it as a guideline at best. Furthermore, the first convoy of convoys is gathering and is scheduled to set sail on November 12th. These ships are loading, and I do not think it proper to interfere with their work, especially since it would involve the United States, which they send at our suggestion.But I hope that you can point out in your personal contact with Stalin: first, the importance of these four transport convoys together with the materials loaded by the 140 ships, and the great efforts we had to make to ensure the necessary escort Second, we ask for a slight improvement in the treatment of our personnel stationed in northern Russia; third, we certainly hope to relieve the burden of these convoys and withdraw our personnel from northern Russia; fourth, you Or he may be corrected so that he does not think that my reluctance to enter into an absolute covenant or contract implies any threatening intent; all I have to do is reserve the right of final judgment, that is, to judge whether to send Whether the operation of the convoy was militarily practicable, or whether, taking into account the general situation in the Atlantic, it could be attempted without being accused, as usual, of bad faith.I must insist on retaining this right. I sympathize with you for this lifeless meeting, and I wish I could be with you.On all these questions you can have full confidence in the forceful position Britain is taking; and I very much hope that you will impress upon them our willingness to maintain their friendship and our firmness of purpose on fundamental points.I wish you all the best of luck. On the same day, I invited the Soviet ambassador to visit me.Since this was the first time I met Mr. Gusev (after Maisky as ambassador to Britain), he conveyed to me the greetings of Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov, and I also told him that during his stay in Canada, Enjoy a good reputation among us.After these pleasantries, we briefly talked about the Moscow Conference and the Second Front.I explained to him that military operations of this nature cannot be done at will, so I have been preparing to arrange a meeting of British and Russian military experts, who will study the facts and figures in depth. This is the basis for all actions. is futile.I spoke to him sincerely about our great desire to co-operate and maintain friendly relations with Russia, how we envisioned her having a great place in the world after the war, and we welcome this At the same time, we will try our best to make it have a good relationship with the United States.I also said that I was eager to have a meeting with Marshal Stalin, if it could be arranged, and how important it would be for the future of the world to have such a meeting of the heads of government of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union. Then I turned the conversation to Stalin's telegrams about the convoys.I will say very briefly: I do not think this telegram will help the situation, but it distresses me greatly; I am afraid that any reply I can give will only make matters worse; now that the Foreign Secretary is in Moscow, I leave him to settle the matter on the spot, and therefore I do not wish to accept this telegram.So I handed an envelope back to the Soviet ambassador.Gusev opened the envelope to see what was inside, recognized the telegram, and said he had been ordered to deliver it to me.I went on to say that I wasn't prepared to take it, and at the same time, stood up and signaled in a friendly way that our conversation was over.I went to the door and opened it.我們在門口又談了幾句，內容是關於想在最近邀請他來吃午餐，以及請他來同邱吉爾夫人商談有關她所徵募的俄國基金的一些問題。當時我告訴他基金的數目現已達四百萬鎊。我沒有給古塞夫先生任何機會，讓他重新提出運輸船隊問題，或者試圖把電報退回給我，就鞠躬把他送出門去。 戰時內閣贊同我拒絕接受斯大林的電報。這確是一個不尋常的外交事件，正如我後來所知道的，它使蘇聯政府留下了深刻的印象。事實上，莫洛托夫在談話中，有好幾次提到了這件事。甚至在這件事還沒有向莫斯科報告以前，蘇聯方面已經產生了一些疑慮。十月十九日，艾登先生在電報中說，莫洛托夫曾到英國大使館拜訪他，並且表示，他的政府非常重視運輸船隊，而且一向非常焦急地盼望它們的到來。北方路線是把供應物資送往前線的一條最短而又最快的路線。這時，俄軍在前線，正經歷著一個困難時期。德軍的冬季防線必須突破。莫洛托夫答應向斯大林說明所有的情況，並且安排一次會談。 艾登先生繼續說： 有兩名英國商船水手，因為在俄國北部毆打了一名當地的共產黨領導人員，最近被判了嚴厲的徒刑，他們的命運引起了我的注意。除非這兩名不幸的英國水手獲得釋放，並交給我方海軍當局，以便將他們解送回國，否則我極不願意答應恢復運輸船隊，我們的大使同意我的見解。我相信，如果我們聽任這兩名水手在蘇聯監獄中呻吟，而另一方面，對於參加未來的運輸船隊的英國海員們所承擔的風險，卻又予以接受，這必然會使你和我一樣，產生極大的反感。我想親自向斯大林或莫洛托夫提出懇切的要求，看一看能有什麼結果。 這次重要的會談在二十一日舉行。與此同時，為了加強艾登手中的牌，同時也由於他的建議，我讓英國驅逐艦暫不起航，因為恢復運輸船隊的第一個行動就是派出驅逐艦。 Foreign Secretary to Prime Minister 一九四三年十月二十二日 昨天晚上，我會見了斯大林和莫洛托夫。英皇陛下的大使和我一同前去，雙方的會談涉及廣泛的問題，前後持續了兩小時零一刻鐘。 二‧初步寒暄以後，我提出了運輸船隊的問題。我說，我必須說明，這些運輸船隊對於皇家海軍增加了多麼巨大的壓力。每批運輸船隊的一次航行，就是一個重大的海軍作戰行動，大概需要四艘巡洋艦和十二艘驅逐艦直接給予保護，此外，全部本土艦隊也必須出動進行掩護。為了獲得必要的護送艦隻，我們必須削減我們在大西洋的海軍力量。誠然，我們在反潛艇戰中所面臨的形勢比以前好轉，但是鬥爭仍然非常激烈，雙方的力量相差極其有限。談到這裡，我讓斯大林看一張圖表，上面列有過去三年參加作戰的德國潛艇的數字。 該圖表明潛艇的數目現在仍接近頂峰。我們所以不準備承諾我們一定派出四批運輸船隊，是因為我們不願意在戰爭突然發生一些變化，從而使我們事實上無法派出四批運輸船隊時受到指責。但是我們的真誠願望是要使這幾批運輸船隊都能如期起航。我還告訴斯大林，你本人為了進行必要的安排曾費盡心血，現在你已打電報來說，你估計我們能夠運來總計一百三四十艘船的供應物資，總數約為八十六萬噸。如果運輸船隊要復航的話，我們迫切希望立即開始。我們在這種基礎上，已經部署了我方海軍力量，並且，我們希望利用德艦提爾皮茨號不能活動的時期進行。我們關於海軍人員問題所提出的必須的人數，已經縮減到絕對不能再少的最低限度，我們一定要堅持這個數字，此外還有一些次要的要求，想在達成一般的協議後向莫洛托夫提出來。 三‧斯大林同意我所談的潛艇戰的情況。他說，他和你的意見分歧，不在於船隊復航的困難，而在於究竟我們是否有義務這樣作。你曾經暗示，我們每派出一批運輸船隊，就是送一次贈品。斯大林並不認為這種提法能夠真實地反映實際的情勢。根據他的了解，我們有義務要設法交付這些物資。但是，在他給你答覆以後，你非常生氣，並且拒絕接受他的答覆。我回答說，我們從未暗示，派出這些運輸船隊是一種恩惠或慈善行為。你始終如一地決心作出一切的努力，以便將這些物資交付給我們的盟國，但是由於我已說明的理由，你不能就一系列你也許不能完成的軍事行動作出保證。斯大林本人對他的同盟者的誠意的確應該有信心，因此你對於他的覆電感到不快，並不是出人意外的事。這位元帥說，他並不是有意要引起你的不快。 四‧經過進一步討論後，斯大林說，他不能同意增加我方人員的數目。我們已有許多水兵在俄國北部的一些港口無所事事，於是，便同俄國海員發生糾紛。俄國人自己可以承擔這些運輸船隊的任務。我答道，這是不可能的。他說，只要我方駐在俄國北部的人員當初以平等的態度對待他的人民，任何這種糾紛也不會發生；如果我方人員能夠以平等的態度對待他的人民，我們可以隨意增派人員。雙方又經過了一些爭論以後，便作出決定：莫洛托夫和我在明天會談，屆時我將向他提出我們的各項要求，並看看我們能否達成協議。 恢復運輸船隊的事就這樣商定了。第一批在十一月起航，第二批接著在十二月出發。這兩批由七十二艘船舶組成，都平安地到達了目的地；同時，運輸船隊返航的空船也都順利地回來了。 十二月出航的運輸船隊，引起了一次令人滿意的海戰。由於德艦提爾皮茨號失去了戰鬥力，沙恩霍斯特號成了敵人在挪威北部海面唯一的的重型戰艦。一九四三年聖誕節的晚上，它和五艘驅逐艦從阿爾滕峽灣猛衝出來，在熊島南面約五十哩的海面上襲擊運輸船隊。運輸船隊的護送艦隻的實力經過加強以後，有十四艘驅逐艦，此外尚有三艘巡洋艦予以掩護。本土艦隊總司令弗雷澤海軍上將乘坐的旗艦約克公爵號，連同巡洋艦牙買加號和四艘驅逐艦，這時正在西南的海面上。 沙恩霍斯特號曾經兩次企圖襲擊運輸船隊。每一次，它都受到護送的巡洋艦和驅逐艦的截擊和迎戰，在戰鬥中，沙恩霍斯特號和英國巡洋艦諾福克號都被炮彈擊中，但是這次戰鬥沒有決定勝負，德艦隨後突然停止戰鬥，向南方逸去，我方巡洋艦尾隨不離，並匯報它的行蹤。但德國幾艘驅逐艦始終未被發現，也未參加戰鬥。其間，本土艦隊總司令乘坐旗艦，以最高的速度穿過波濤洶湧的大海向前逼近。 下午四時十七分，當北極黃昏最後的餘暉早已消逝時，約克公爵號使用雷達在相距大約二十三哩的海面上，偵察到敵蹤。但是直到下午四時五十分，約克公爵在相距一萬二千碼的海面上借助照明彈向它開火以前，沙恩霍斯特始終不知道它即將遭到毀滅性的打擊。與此同時，弗雷澤海軍上將派遣他的四艘驅逐艦前去伺機給予襲擊。其中的斯托德號配備的是挪威皇家海軍的人員。沙恩霍斯特慌忙掉頭向東逃遁。在追擊途中，它被炮彈命中好幾次，但是由於它的速度較快，得以逐漸拉開了距離。然而，到了下午六時二十分，它的速度明顯地減低，我方驅逐艦能夠從兩翼向它逼近。大約在下午七時左右，它們全力展開攻勢。四枚魚雷擊中了敵艦。我方只有一艘驅逐艦被炮彈擊中。 沙恩霍斯特回轉身來，企圖擊退我方驅逐艦，因此約克公爵號能夠迅速駛近到相距大約一萬碼的海面上，對它重新開火，給予摧毀性的打擊。在半小時內，我方戰列艦和敵人負傷的戰鬥巡洋艦之間的一次實力懸殊的戰鬥就結束了。約克公爵號將其餘的任務留交巡洋艦和驅逐艦去完成。 沙恩霍斯特號不久就沉沒了，它的一千九百七十名官兵，包括貝海軍少將在內，都隨該艦一同沉沒，我們只能救起三十六人。 敵方已受重創的提爾皮茨號的命運，雖然拖延了將近一年，但是沙恩霍斯特號的沉沒，不僅消除了我們北極運輸船隊受到的最大威脅，也使我們本土艦隊獲得了新的行動自由。我們無需再隨時準備防止德國的重型軍艦在它們自己選定的時刻突然闖進大西洋。這是令人感到慰藉的一個重要成就。 一九四四年四月，有跡象表明提爾皮茨號已經修好，可以駛往波羅的海的一個港口，重新進行裝備。我方艦空母艦勝利號和狂暴號的飛機，用重型炸彈對它進行襲擊，結果又使它不能動彈了。皇家空軍這時從俄國北部的一個基地起飛，對它繼續襲擊，結果使它受到了更大損傷。由於這個原因，提爾皮茨號被轉移到羅姆索峽灣，這個地方距離英國，比以前的地點要近二百哩，而且在我們從本土基地起飛的重轟炸機的最遠航程以內。德國人現在已經放棄了將這艘戰艦駛回本國修理的希望，並且不再把它當作一艘遠洋作戰軍艦了。十一月十二日，皇家空軍二十九架特製的蘭開斯特式轟炸機，包括以炸毀莫內水壩的著名的空軍第六百十七中隊的轟炸機在內，以總重量達到一萬二千磅的炸彈，給提爾皮茨號以決定性的打擊。這些轟炸機必須從它們的蘇格蘭基地飛越二千哩，但是，當天天氣晴朗，三枚炸彈擊中了目標。提爾皮茨號在它的停泊處被炸翻了，它的一千九百名船員大半已被炸死。我們只犧牲了一架轟炸機，但它的飛行人員都獲救了。 英國的重型軍艦現在全部可以自由地調往遠東了。