Chapter 171 Volume 5 Chapter 16 Moscow Foreign Ministers Meeting

Recall that the Quebec Conference required a tripartite government summit. Correspondence between me and Stalin. Preliminary tripartite foreign ministers' meeting. October 11. Memorandum I wrote for Mr. Eden's participation in this meeting. October 19th. Opening of the Moscow Conference. The Soviet Union's proposal. Concentrate on the Cross Channel Offensive October 20th My Private Memo to Mr. Eden Concerning Turkey and Sweden's Entry into the War Eisenhower and Alexander's Important Report on the War in Italy Further Discussions in the Kremlin The Russians Emphasize the Overlord Operation Plan Friendliness The atmosphere of Mr. Eden's account of his proposal to give Russia a share of the Italian ships was my telegram on the subject of October 29. The tripartite declaration I had drawn up concerning German war criminals was accepted as an important achievement of this conference.

It is now necessary to look back to connect the course of diplomatic events with the narrative of the story.Since the Quebec Conference, we have been proposing to Stalin that a tripartite summit be held.As early as in Quebec, I received a reply from him, which read as follows: Prime Minister Stalin to Prime Minister (in Quebec) August 10, 1943 I have just returned from the front and have read the British Government's call of August 7th. 1. I agree that it is absolutely necessary to hold a trilateral government summit meeting.Such a meeting should be held as soon as possible after the location and time of the meeting have been agreed upon with the President of the United States.

At the same time, I should tell you that I am so sorry that in the current situation on the Soviet-German front, I cannot even leave my job and the front for a week.Although we have won several victories on the front line recently, the Soviet Army and the Soviet High Command must strengthen their strength and pay special attention to vigilance against possible new actions taken by the enemy.For this reason, I must go to various fronts to inspect the situation of our army more than usual.Under the present circumstances, I cannot visit Scapa Flow [1] or any other remote location to meet with you and the President of the United States.

[1] In the Orkney Islands of Scotland. However, in order not to postpone the discussion of issues of common concern to our three countries, it would be advisable to organize a meeting of responsible representatives of our three countries, and we can come to an understanding on the place and time of this meeting in the near future. In addition, we must agree in advance on the issues to be discussed, as well as the drafts of the proposals to be adopted.If this cannot be done in advance, it will be difficult for the meeting to achieve concrete results. 2. I take this opportunity to congratulate the British Government and the Anglo-American Army on the great victory at the Battle of Sicily which has brought down Mussolini and his bandits.

This is the first time that the Russian side has endorsed any level of meeting between the three allies.When I sent the following telegram to Eden, asking him to forward it to Moscow, I said: I am very happy to receive a telegram directly from Mr. Xiong again.Please forward to him my reply, written according to your wishes. After discussing with President Roosevelt, we jointly drafted a telegram and sent it to Stalin. Prime Minister and President Roosevelt (in Quebec) to Premier Stalin August 19, 1943 The two of us are here with our staff, and there will probably be a meeting of about ten days.We fully understand that you have good reason to be on the front lines, and that your presence on the battlefield has made the war so many victorious.However, we would still like to emphasize once again the importance of a meeting that the three of us participated in together.We do not think Arkhangelsk or Astrakhan would be appropriate, but we are prepared to go to Fairbanks (in Alaska) with the appropriate officers in order to have an overall review of the situation with you consider.The present appears to be a unique opportunity for a meeting, and a turning point in the war.We fervently hope that you will reconsider this matter.How long the British Prime Minister stays on this side of the Atlantic is a matter of necessity.

2. If it is really impossible to hold the very necessary summit meeting of the three countries, we agree with you that a meeting at the foreign ministerial level should be held in the near future.This meeting will be exploratory, as the final decision must, of course, be left to our respective Governments. Stalin replied: August 25, 1943 I have received your joint call on August 19th. I fully agree with you and Mr. Roosevelt about the importance of the meeting between the three of us.At the same time, I earnestly ask you to understand my current situation. At present, our army is engaged in an extremely intense battle with Hitler's main force. And continue to add new divisions.At such a time, and in the opinion of all my colleagues, I cannot leave the field to go to a place as far away as Fairbanks, where our operations would suffer.Although, as I have said before, if the situation on our front lines were not what it is today, Fairbanks would undoubtedly be a convenient location for our meeting.

As for the meeting of the representatives of our three countries, especially the diplomatic representatives, I agree with you: it is best to hold it in the near future.This conference, however, should not be of a purely exploratory nature, but should be of a practical preparatory nature, so that after the conference our Government can take definite decisions on urgent matters. Prime Minister to Premier Stalin September 5, 1943 Regarding the meeting of foreign ministers.I was very pleased to receive your call on August 25th.In your telegram you agreed to an early meeting of the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain in charge of foreign affairs.If Mr. Molotov is able to attend, we will send Mr. Eden to attend.

2. Of course, even if the meeting is composed of the above-mentioned personnel, it cannot replace the functions and powers of the relevant government.We would very much like to know your wishes for the future, and we will also inform you of the opinions we have formed.At that point, our government will have to make a decision, and I hope we will meet in person at some point.I am willing to go to Moscow if necessary. 3. Political representatives may need the assistance of military advisers.I am going to send a general officer, Sir Hastings Ismay, to be my personal representative on the Chiefs of Staff for the Office of the Defense Secretary.He can provide arguments, facts and figures on military issues discussed at the conference.I believe the United States will also send a comparable number of military officers to participate.I think in terms of the foreign ministers' meeting, at this stage, these are enough.

4. However, if you would like to examine the technical details of why we have not yet crossed the Channel to attack France, and why we could not have attacked France earlier and with a larger force than is currently recommended, I would welcome you to send another Technical delegations of army and navy generals come to London or Washington, or both.At that time, we will explain our human and material resources and intentions to them as fully as possible, and discuss with them.I would really like you to hear these instructions, and you have every right to them. 6. I hope we can hold the foreign ministers' meeting in early October.

Premier Stalin to Prime Minister September 8, 1943 You suggested setting the date for the meeting of representatives of the three governments at the beginning of October, which I think is feasible.The venue of the meeting, I suggest Moscow.I think it's important that we agree in advance on the agenda and agree on proposals to make decisions on the issues on the agenda that are of common interest to our three governments.I believe, as before, that this is necessary for this meeting to be successful; this meeting should pave the way for later unanimous decisions among the three countries.On other issues related to the organization of the meeting, I see no difficulty in reaching consensus.

As for the meeting of the heads of governments of the three countries in person, I have written to the President on this issue, stating that I am also working hard to make this meeting come true as soon as possible, and his suggestion on the meeting time (November-December), I think it is It is feasible, but it is best to determine the location of the meeting in a country where all three countries have representatives, such as Persia.I have only one reservation: the exact date of the meeting should be determined separately with reference to the situation on the Soviet-German battlefield.On the Soviet-German battlefield, there were more than 500 divisions fighting on both sides. [1] In this situation, the supervision of the Soviet Supreme Command was required almost every day. [1] A division in the Soviet Union is about one-third the size of a division in Britain or the United States. On September 10, I replied to Premier Stalin's proposal: Prime Minister to Premier Stalin Regarding the meeting of representatives of the Foreign Ministry, we respect your opinion that it should be held in Moscow.So our Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, will go to Moscow in early October.He will be accompanied by the appropriate staff. ‧Agreement ‧Agenda.His Majesty's Government declared that it was willing to discuss any question with the allies, the Soviet Union and the United States.We will give you our comments during the day, but we would especially like to know the main topics that come to your mind. In my opinion, this meeting of diplomatic representatives is the most important and necessary preparatory meeting for the summit meeting of the three governments.I feel very comfortable that the summit will be held between November 15th and December 15th. For months, I have been telling you that I would go anywhere, at any time, and risk anything to attend a meeting like this.So I'm going to Tehran, unless you think there's a better place in Persia.I think Cyprus or Khartoum are better, but I still respect your opinion.Marshal Stalin, I would like to tell you that all the united countries are very eager for a meeting of the three of us to decide not only the best and quickest way to end the war, but also good measures for the future of the world: to make Britain, the United States and the United States The Russian nation can make a permanent contribution to mankind. Later, on my return to London from Quebec, I drew up a memorandum for my colleagues on the general points to be considered at the forthcoming meeting of foreign ministers now arranged. Prime Minister's Memorandum for Foreign Secretary to attend upcoming meeting October 11, 1943 Great Britain did not seek for herself any territory or special interest as a result of taking part in this war; she went to it to fulfill her duty and to preserve the public law. 2. We urge the preservation of the League of Nations system, which will include a Council of Europe, an International Court of Justice and an armed force capable of enforcing its ‧ judgments.During the armistice (which may be prolonged), we advocate that the three major powers, the Commonwealth and the British Empire, the United States and the Soviet Union, plus China, should remain united and fully armed so that the terms of the armistice can be enforced and be able to The world establishes permanent institutions of peace. 3. We believe that countries and nations that were violently conquered by the Nazis or Fascists during the Great War should enjoy full sovereignty and be eligible to attend the peace conference, and all issues related to the final territorial transfer must be resolved at the peace conference. At the same time, Due regard shall be given to the interests of the peoples concerned. 4. We reaffirm the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and at the same time note the fact that Russia's accession to the Atlantic Charter is based on the borders of June 22, 1941.We also note the historical borders of Russia before Germany launched two wars of aggression in 1941 and 1939. 5. We should welcome any agreement between Poland and Russia that guarantees, on the one hand, a strong and independent Poland, while at the same time providing the necessary security guarantees on Russia's western frontiers. 6. We insist that Nazism and Fascism should be completely eradicated from their source, that is, in the aggressor country.We also insist that democratic governments should be established in these aggressive countries, based on the fact that the people can freely express their will in a reasonable and stable environment.These propositions should not preclude military and diplomatic measures, or a relationship with a possible interim government, so that we can achieve our main objectives while minimizing carnage, especially with regard to Allied forces. 7. We do not recognize any territorial expansion achieved by Germany or Italy during the Nazi or Fascist regimes, and we believe that the future constitution of Germany, as well as the status of Prussia as an integral part of the German state, should be subject to a policy unanimously decided by the three Western powers . 8. We are determined to take all necessary means to prevent criminal states from threatening the peace of Europe by force of arms.This means not only disarming them, but also controlling all forms of war institutions or organizations in their countries for a long time. 9. We have no intention of subjecting any member of the European family of states to a position of subordination or binding, unless the general needs and security of the world so require. 10. We declare that we are unswervingly determined to use the authority vested in the three powers in order to serve the general interests of the world and the cause of human progress. The meeting of the three foreign ministers in Moscow is now playing a very valuable role in our complex affairs.President Roosevelt had hoped that the aging Mr Hull would be spared the long-distance flight to Moscow and had asked for the meeting to be held in London, but Stalin refused to change the venue.Mr. Hull, however, is undeterred.It was a heroic act for the seasoned diplomat to take his first air travel in debilitating conditions. Before the meeting was held in Moscow, the foreign ministers of the three countries exchanged many messages on the agenda.The United States put forward four proposals, including a four-power declaration on the treatment of Germany and other European enemies during the armistice.For our part, no less than a dozen proposals have been made, including a common policy towards Turkey, a common policy in Persia, relations between the Soviet Union and Poland, and general policy concerning Poland.The Russians made one, and only one, proposal to discuss how to shorten the time of war against Germany and its European allies.Although this is clearly a military question and not a political one, it has been shown from the outset that they are not prepared to discuss any other issues until this issue is fully resolved, so I think General Ismay should be involved our delegation. The first formal meeting was held on the afternoon of October 19th.Mr. Molotov, himself and his delegation, were obviously satisfied that Mr. Molotov had been elected chairman, after the pretentious refusal of the Speaker of the House of Commons, as he did when he was swarmed onto the rostrum.Then, the agenda was adopted.After these preparatory procedures were concluded, Molotov circulated the following Soviet proposals: 1. The Governments of Great Britain and the United States should take urgent measures in 1943 to ensure that the British and American forces attack the northern part of France; this action, combined with the powerful Soviet attack on the main body of the German army on the Soviet-German front, will drastically affect the Destroy Germany's military-strategic position and decisively shorten the duration of the war. On this question, the Soviet Government believes that it is necessary to clarify whether the statement made by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt in early June 1943 that the British and American troops will attack northern France in the spring of 1944 is still valid. 2. The three major powers should suggest to the Turkish government that Turkey should join the war immediately. 3. The three major powers should propose to Sweden: provide air bases to the allies for use in the war against Germany. Molotov asked whether Mr. Hull and Mr. Eden planned to discuss the proposals in strictly limited meetings when they had had time to study them.On this they quickly agreed. Mr. Eden reported the proceedings to me, and I immediately made my comments to him. Prime Minister to Mr. Eden (in Moscow) October 20, 1943 Our present plans for 1944 appear to be prone to very serious shortcomings.We will send fifteen American and twelve British divisions into France during May, and six American and sixteen British divisions on the Italian front.Unless the German army collapsed, Hitler, because he controlled the most convenient transportation hub in the world, could muster at least forty or fifty divisions to fight against any of the above-mentioned armies, and at the same time he still had the strength to contain the other army.He could withdraw to the Saff and Danube at once with little loss in the Balkans, and thus gain all the necessary troops without weakening his Russian front.This is one of the most fundamental propositions of war.How many troops we deploy on the two battlefields of Italy and the English Channel have not always been determined by strategic needs, but by the development of the situation, the possibility of shipping, and an appropriate compromise between Britain and the United States.Neither the troops assembled in Italy nor the troops preparing to cross the English Channel in May were sufficient, and only seven or eight divisions could actually be mobilized between the two battlefields.I am determined to re-examine the situation. 2. If the matter were up to me, I would not withdraw any troops from the Mediterranean, nor would I enter the Po valley from the narrow boot of Italy, but would fight fiercely with the enemy on a narrower front, while at the same time Foment unrest in the Balkans and southern France.In the absence of a German collapse, I think we should have crossed the Channel with at least forty divisions in sixty days, unless heavy fighting took place on the Italian front.I don't accept the argument from the US that our home air force is capable of bombing everything in or on the way to a theater.We don't have that experience yet. All these are for your personal consideration only, and it is inappropriate to disclose them to the outside world at this stage.These circumstances, however, show you how dangerous it is to commit to the Overlord's plan in May as we do to a lawyer's contract.For then we might lose the Italian front and all possible gains in the Balkans, but on the other hand we will not have enough troops to defend ourselves after we have crossed the Channel for thirty or forty days. 3. You should try to find out what the Russians really think about the Balkans.We attempted to launch an offensive from the Aegean Sea, to involve Turkey in the war, to open the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus so that British naval and merchant ships could assist the Russians in their advance, and finally to attack them along the Danube. Strong aid, does all this action appeal to them?How interested would they be in our opening of the Black Sea to open the way for the warships and supplies of the Allies, and for the armies of the Allies, including the Turks?Did they have any interest in our detour from the right hand direction?Or, they still just want us to attack France?They believed that the continuous build-up of forces in Britain would, in any case, keep large numbers of German troops on the Western Front. Perhaps for political reasons, the Russians do not want us to embark on a large-scale Balkan strategy.On the other hand, they want Turkey to participate in the war to show that they are interested in the southeast battlefield. 4. I still believe that it is important to gain a foothold in the Aegean Sea, and that this should be achieved by taking Rhodes, recapturing Kos, holding Leros, and establishing a strong naval and air superiority in these waters.Do the Russians take a sympathetic view of our efforts to hold Leros and our desire to take Rhodes?Do they understand what this would mean for Turkey, and how it would lead to the possibility of the Navy entering the Black Sea?The above points are only for your personal consideration. On October 21 a conference was held in Moscow to discuss the Soviet proposal, represented by Mr. Eden, the British Ambassador Sir Archibald Clarke Kerr, Mr. Strong and General Ismay; Mr. Hall, Ambassador Harriman and Major General Dean represented the United States; Mr. Molotov, Marshal Voroshilov, Mr. Vyshinsky and Mr. Litvinov represented the Russian side.At the beginning of the meeting, Ismay made a speech on behalf of the British and American delegations in accordance with the decision of the Quebec meeting. He emphasized the restrictions imposed on the launch of the offensive across the English Channel. In the discussions that ensued, our representatives made it very clear that on our part there was virtually no change in the plan, and that we were prepared to proceed if the conditions we had established were met.The Russians seemed content with that at the time.Molotov said that the Soviet government should carefully study General Ismay's speech and hoped to have further discussions in future meetings. Mr. Eden went on to talk about Turkey, pointing out that we cannot give the necessary effective support now.As for the issue of jointly making representations to Turkey, it should be left for the future.In addition, Russian proposals concerning Sweden were also mentioned.Sweden would obviously ask Russia for guarantees to Finland, an issue the Russians were reluctant to discuss. That evening, Eden visited Stalin and, over two hours, discussed a wide range of issues.As the reader already knows, the most important thing is the question of the Arctic shipping fleet.The conversation then turned to a proposed tripartite summit of allied governments.Stalin insisted that the conference should be held in Tehran. On the whole, the conversation seemed to be going well. Mr. Eden, who had by this time received my telegram of October 20, gave me his opinion.The Russians, he said, single-mindedly and blindly insisted that we attack northern France.They were most interested in the meeting reaching a decision on it.They repeatedly asked whether there had been a change in the agreement President Roosevelt and I had made with Stalin after the Washington meeting in May to attack France in the early spring of 1944, and when this military operation would begin. On the first point, he assured them that nothing had changed, but emphasized that three conditions must be met before the expedition could have any hope of success. [1] With regard to the second point, we think it best not to fix an exact date, but Mr. Eden assured them that all preparations are being made to start the attack when the weather improves in the spring. 【1】See page 69 of this volume. I replied in my reply as follows: Prime Minister to Foreign Minister (in Moscow) October 23, 1943 If we forced Turkey into the war, it would insist on air support, etc., which would have cost us our main campaign in Italy.However, we would not be under the same obligation, and would gain enormously, if Turkey, perhaps after a non-belligerent period, entered the war automatically.Obviously, it was important not to miss the moment, and the timing depended on the aggressive strength of the enemy forces in Bulgaria and Thrace.We will have the advantage that our supplies to Russia, our warships and other troops will go into the Black Sea.This is what I mean by vigorous assistance to Russia.It is not impossible for Turkey to take such an action, especially if the German army immediately withdraws to the Danube and Saf Rivers in the Balkans while the losses are not large. 2. Finland and Sweden will have great advantages if they can bring Sweden into the war. We do not believe that the German army has the power to invade Sweden on a large scale.We should win a new nation and a small but elite army.What we gain in Norway will have a profound impact.Various important facilities will be given to the Russian Air Force.For ourselves, the effect of bombing Germany from East Anglia, with its massive facilities, was much greater than from Sweden, where everything had to be flown in, and in a very crude way.The distance we fly from the UK to all parts of Germany is exactly the same as the distance from Sweden to all parts of Germany.As a matter of fact, with the present conveniences in England and those we hope to have north of Rome, we can send heavy bombers to any part of Germany. 3. Personally, I would like to see Turkey automatically enter the war, and the same is true for Sweden.I don't think either country will be invaded, and each new enemy will hasten Shearer's collapse.I suggest, however, that the first step is to ascertain exactly what we and the Russians need, and what will be most helpful to both of us, and then, as a second step, immediately consider the ways and means which are required in the future.Please try it and let me know how it goes. Two days later, I went to another telegram. Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary October 25, 1943 On further consideration, I firmly believe that we should not obstruct Russia's desire for Turkey and Sweden to become co-belligerents or de facto allies voluntarily.Let us not give the Russians the opportunity to argue this point, nor put ourselves in the position of merely creating difficulties.We should agree in principle and let the difficulties manifest themselves, as they inevitably arise when discussing ways and means.But the difficulty is likely to be overcome, or put in its proper place and weight.In any case, we should not be critical of everything from the outset. A previous chapter described an important telegram from General Eisenhower informing me of General Alexander's judgment on the Italian campaign.At this time, I received this telegram. [1] I forwarded it to Eden and asked him to show it to Stalin.I would like to add the following points to the telegram: 【1】See page 216 and the following pages of this volume. October 26, 1943 We are now in this precarious position because we are drawing some of our best divisions and a large number of important landing craft from the Mediterranean in order to gather forces for the Battle of Overlord, which is seven months away.This is the inevitable result of wars being governed by lawyers' contractual agreements, which, although carefully concluded months ago, are now being carried out in spite of the ever-changing situation of the war. Let him know, if you think fit, that during my time in charge I will not allow the Italian campaign to be left aside for the attack across the English Channel in May, which would result in a terrible disaster, because the Italian campaign is of great importance And it was effective, and already attracted a large number of German reserves to fight.For this campaign, we must give support and persevere until victory is achieved.We will do our best with the Overlord plan, but it will be of no avail if we are prepared to suffer defeat on the battlefield for the sake of temporary political gratification. 2. You must therefore state that your commitment to the Overlord campaign in May, being limited to certain conditions, must be varied in accordance with the exigencies of the Italian campaign.I am discussing this issue with President Roosevelt, but as far as the British army is concerned, at this juncture, my determination not to give up the Italian campaign will not change under any circumstances.Eisenhower and Alexander deserved what they needed to win this war, regardless of how future military operations would be affected.In fact, doing so may indeed affect the date of execution of the Overlord operation plan. Three days later, I offer my final opinion on this question: Prime Minister to Mr. Eden (in Moscow) October 29, 1943 We certainly will not abandon Operation Overlord, which remains our major military operation in 1944.The need to keep the landing craft in the Mediterranean in order not to suffer a defeat for the Roman campaign might have delayed the date of the attack a little, perhaps to July, since the smaller landing craft could not cross the Bay of Biscay during the winter months , must wait until spring to sail.However, this delay would mean that, once the offensive was launched, the strikes would be harder and that the full-scale bombardment of Germany would not abate rapidly.We are also ready to facilitate and take advantage of the collapse of the German army at any time.These arguments may be useful to you in your discussion. That night, our ambassador and Ismay accompanied Mr. Eden to the Kremlin. Molotov was with Stalin.At the beginning of the meeting, Eden handed Stalin the Russian translation of Eisenhower's telegram concerning the situation in Italy.Stalin read it aloud to Molotov.After reading it, he showed no disappointment.He said that, according to Russian information, there were twelve British and American divisions against six German divisions south of Rome, and a further six German divisions along the Po; however, he admitted that General Alexander might have had a more correct intelligence.Eden said, I am eager for Stalin to know the latest report on the situation in Italy, and I want him to know that I am not only anxious about this matter, but also insist on supporting the Italian campaign until it is victorious, no matter what effect it has on the Overlord operation plan .He also stated that the allies are currently facing very important decisions, which makes it all the more necessary for the three-nation government summit to be held as soon as possible. Stalin smiled and said that if there were not enough divisions, the tri-government summit meeting would not be able to create divisions.Then he asked bluntly whether the telegram he had just read meant that the Overlord plan would be postponed.Eden replied that he could not be sure until the Anglo-American Joint Chiefs of Staff had conducted a full review and made a decision to improve the situation, but had to face the possibility.He also quoted a passage from my telegram saying that we are determined to do our best with the Overlord plan, but it is useless to prepare for defeat on the battlefield for the sake of temporary political gratification.There were two difficulties with this plan: first, the landing craft, and second, the delivery of seven battle-tested divisions to the United Kingdom in early November to serve as the advance force of the Overlord assault.Perhaps, the plan to transport some or all of the above-mentioned divisions must now be postponed, but whether this will affect the date of implementation of the Overlord's Total War plan, and if so, to what extent, cannot be estimated now. Stalin then turned the discussion to general strategic issues.According to him, we could take two courses: take the defensive north of Rome and use all our other elite troops for the Overlord plan, or, on the other hand, push through Italy and into Germany. Mr. Eden said the first approach was exactly what we wanted.As far as he knew, we had no intention of crossing the Pisa Rimini line.This front is sufficient to allow us to gain depth north of Rome, as well as to bomb the air bases in southern Europe.Stalin apparently thought we were right and said that it would be difficult to cross the Alps and that it would suit the Germans, who were trying to fight us there.After the capture of Rome, England's prestige will of course be so much enhanced that we can take the defensive in Italy. Later, the discussion turned to other locations of attack.Simultaneously with launching the Overlord campaign, Mr. Eden said, we might carry out a diversionary attack on the south of France.If we can capture a bridgehead with two divisions, we may use several French divisions trained and equipped in North Africa.Stalin thought it was a brilliant idea, because the more we spread Hitler out, the better.This was exactly the tactic he was using on the Russian front, but were there enough landing craft? Then, he raised the question again, should the Overlord's plan be postponed for one month or two months?Mr. Eden said he couldn't answer that question.What he can clearly say is that we should make every effort to launch the attack at the earliest moment when there is a reasonable hope of victory in the Battle of Overlord, and especially hope that the heads of governments of the three countries will meet as soon as possible.Stalin fully agreed, but said Roosevelt was a little hesitant about going to Tehran.When Aiden proposed Habania, both he and Molotov firmly refused.Stalin himself said he could not travel far as long as he could continue to weaken Hitler's forces.The Germans had recently sent several tank divisions from France and Belgium to the Soviet front, but they lacked equipment and supplies.It is important not to give Hitler a chance to breathe; he volunteered that the Germans were afraid to mobilize their forty divisions on the Western Front only because they feared an attack from us, and that if they could mobilize these forces, the Soviet Army would Wins already earned will not be gained.The Soviet Union is fully aware of this contribution we are making to the common cause. Mr Eden said Marshal Stalin was well aware that the British Prime Minister shared his desire to strike Hitler.Stalin fully admits this, but suddenly laughs and says that I tend to keep the shortcuts to myself and leave the hard work to the Russians.Eden disagreed with this statement, and explained the various difficulties our Navy was working on, and our recent severe losses in destroyers.Stalin returned to seriousness and said that his men had said little about our naval operations, but he understood their difficulties. The whole interview, Mr. Eden telegraphed me, went off surprisingly smoothly.斯大林似乎非常高興；這天晚上不論談到什麼問題，對於過去的一切，都沒有任何指責，而且對於我們所面臨的真實困難，也沒有任何忽視的意思。這也許只是最初的反應，他以後的想法可能就不是這樣理想了；但重要的是，他竟主動地承認我們由於在西線牢牢地拖住了四十個德國師，因而作出了貢獻，而且他在談到我方海軍作戰行動的各種困難以及需要登陸艇等問題時所表示的同情態度，似乎都說明他不再認為渡海作戰行動是一個簡單的問題了。然而，明顯的是，他希望我們作出一切的努力盡早地執行霸王作戰計劃；而且，他對我們的話所表示的信任，在我看來，是非常突出的。 在會議期間，許多跡象表明，蘇聯政府真誠地希望同英美兩國保持永久的友誼。在我們預計會發生困難的許多大小問題上，他們和我們取得了協議。斯大林對於我們的問題表示理解，直到現在為止，我們回想以後，還沒有感到任何令人不滿之處。莫洛托夫，艾登先生說：在許多場合，尤其是今天，當我們舉行有關軍事問題的最後一次會議由他擔任主席時，就表現了這種精神。雖然他對於昨晚我同他與斯大林談話的結果顯然感到失望，以及對於我們絲毫未能以一種使他滿意的態度，來贊助蘇聯關於土耳其和瑞典問題的提案，也感到失望，但他在處理我們的事務時，明顯地希望避免使我們任何一方感到為難。今晚，我接到他的通知，說我們兩個被監禁的水兵已經獲得寬宥，這是一個友好的表示。 俄國代表們還作出了其他種種關於願意打開英俄關係新篇章的表示。你關於運輸船隊的態度已使他們留下了深刻的印象。莫洛托夫和他的一些同僚們今晚到我國大使館參加宴會，這是多年來的第一次。米高揚的任務是向這些人不斷提供情報，他今晚特別滔滔不絕地讚揚你個人在恢復這些運輸船隊方面所起的作用。 在這種氣氛中，我迫切希望能夠在會議結束時，以某種方式明確地表示我們的友好情誼。我確信，如果我能對他們想要分得意大利艦隊少數艦隻的願望，透露一些有希望的信息，那麼，在心理上所造成的影響，就會大大地超過這些艦隻的價值，不管它們的價值有多大。我國大使和哈里曼都完全贊同這個意見。倘若在我離開蘇聯以前，不可能給予明確的答覆，那麼，如果我至少能告訴莫洛托夫先生，我們原則上同意蘇聯政府應分得一部分繳獲的意大利艦隻，而且他們要求分得一部分是合理的，這就會給我以極大的幫助。具體的辦法，包括移交的日期，可以隨後規定。如果你能這樣幫助我，我確信，其收穫將不僅限於證明你的態度是正確的。我懇切地要求你給我支援。 我立即告訴他戰時內閣關於意大利艦隊的意見。 Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary 一九四三年十月二十九日 在原則上，我們願意承認俄國有權分得意大利艦隊的一部分艦隻，然而，我們認為這支艦隊將在對日戰爭中發揮作用，而且我們正計劃將利特里奧式以及其他艦隻裝上熱帶設備，以便在戰爭的這個後期階段使用。如果俄國想要在太平洋部署一支分艦隊，那是一個值得重視的事件，我們希望在我們會見時，討論這個計劃。 五‧現在唯一可能向俄國移交意大利艦隻的地點，是阿爾漢格爾斯克和摩爾曼斯克。意大利軍艦很不適宜在北冰洋活動，而且它們首先需要在船塢中修理幾個月。我們也應注意，不要使直接向俄方移交艦隻而對意大利的合作產生不良的影響。意大利在海上舉起反德的旗幟，這是很重要的。意大利人正在塔蘭托的船塢中為我們進行重要的工作，我們不希望由於向俄國移交艦隻，致使意大利人拒絕合作。如果他們想到，他們從德軍魔掌中逃出的一些艦隻要移交給外國海軍人員時，我們不能絕對擔保他們就不會鑿沉幾艘。目前，他們正為我們從事許多工作。意大利潛艇正在運送軍需物資前往勒羅斯。意大利的七艘完好的驅逐艦正在護送地方的運輸船隊。他們的巡洋艦正在運輸軍隊和軍需物資。因此，我們在任何情況下，必須對這事嚴格保密，直到我們能採取措施，防止不良的影響。一旦意大利艦隊開始被分配，法國人、南斯拉夫人和希臘人就會提出要求，而且他們的要求是有充足理由的。 六‧由於上述這些理由，最好暫時不提這個問題，等到尤里卡（德黑蘭）會議時再談。 七‧誠然，我們已獲得意大利的一部分商船，但比起我們必須供應被佔領地區和意大利地區的最低需要量來說，實際數量還嫌不足，所以經過衡量以後，我們的船舶噸數實際上是很低的，尤其因為大部分的意大利艦隻適合於擔任地方性的運輸。 八‧赫爾先生是否已向他的政府匯報了這個請求？重要的是，我們應取得一致的意見。我希望，如果尤里卡會議確實能夠舉行的話，所有這些問題最好在會議上討論。 當天我又致電外交大臣。 假如美方同意，你可以告訴莫洛托夫，我們原則上同意蘇聯政府可以分得一部分被俘獲的意大利艦隻，而且他們所要求的數量也是合理的。我料想，他們所要求的戰列艦不是一艘利特里奧式的。在決定具體的移交辦法和日期時，必須考慮到軍事行動，同時不要輕率地透露消息，以免失去意大利人的支援。此點極為重要，當然，我們期望把這支艦隊中的最新式的艦隻用於對日作戰。俄國人必然會理解，我們不應當使對日作戰受到影響。同時，我們認為，我們（英國人）在戰後應當獲得兩艘利特里奧式軍艦，第一，因為在對意大利的全部戰爭中，我們承擔了最大的任務；第二，因為在主力艦方面，我們海軍遭受了嚴重的損失；第三，為了集中全力滿足目前的戰爭需要，我們已停止了經過議會核准的長期建造戰鬥艦的計劃。 二‧特別需要嚴格保密，僅供你自己思考，或許可以試探一下：假如俄國決定在希特勒崩潰後負起對日作戰的責任，一個重要的計劃可能會實現，而作為計劃的一部分內容，則可能出現下列的情況：在我們所控制的某個太平洋基地，有一支懸掛蘇聯旗幟、配備俄國水兵的強大海軍部隊裝備起來，這部分海面艦隻將在戰爭的最後階段參加戰鬥。然而，我希望，我在這封電報的頭幾行中對你所表示的同意，將會解決你的困難。 我起草了一份關於德國戰爭罪犯的宣言的初稿，作為即將舉行的三國政府首腦會議討論的基礎。 首相致羅斯福總統和斯大林總理 October 12, 1943 請考慮下列文件，是否可以由我們三人簽署發表： 英國、美國和蘇聯（如果認為有其他更方便的排列方法，我們很願意列在最後），已從許多方面，獲得關於希特勒軍隊在他們曾經蹂躪過而如今正被步步逐出的許多國家中所犯的暴行、屠殺以及殘酷無情地執行集體死刑的種種證據。納粹統治的暴行，並不是什麼新的事情，凡是在他們魔掌下的所有人民或地區，都已受到借恐怖手段而實行極端惡劣的統治所造成的痛苦。新的情況是：許多地區目前正由解放的國家的向前挺進的軍隊拯救出來，敗退的希特勒匪徒和德國鬼子在絕望中正加緊他們殘酷無情的暴行。 據上所述，三個盟國茲代表三十二個聯合國家的利益，嚴正宣告，並以下列的宣言提出強烈警告： 在允許德國可能建立的任何政府實行停戰的時候，凡曾經負責或自願參加上述暴行、屠殺或執行集體死刑的德國官兵和納粹黨員，都應當解回到他們犯下滔天罪行的所在地的國家，以便依照這些被解放的國家以及將在這些國家中建立的自由政府的法律，審判懲處。應當根據所有這些國家收到的盡可能詳細的材料，來編製這種人的名單，特別是蘇聯的被佔領區、波蘭、捷克斯洛伐克、南斯拉夫、希臘（包括克里特島和其他島嶼）、挪威、丹麥、荷蘭、比利時、盧森堡、法國和意大利。因此，凡曾參與大批槍殺意大利軍官，或把法國、荷蘭、比利時或挪威的人質或克里特島的農民處死；或曾參加殺戮波蘭人民，或曾殺戮現在敵人正被掃蕩乾淨的蘇聯領土內的人民的德國人，應當明白：無論費用多大，他們都將被解回到犯罪地點，並在當地由受過他們迫害的人民進行審判。讓那些直到現在手上還沒有沾染無辜人民的鮮血的人們明白：慎勿廁身罪人之列，因為三個盟國必定要追蹤他們到海角天涯，必定要將他們交給控訴他們的人，俾使正義得以伸張。 上述宣言不影響首惡元兇的案件，他們所犯的罪行不限於某一個特定的地方。 Roosevelt 斯大林 邱吉爾 如果這一宣言或類似文件（我不特別講究措辭）由我們三人簽署，我相信會使某些壞蛋膽戰心驚，惟恐參加屠殺者行列；現在他們已經知道，打擊即將臨到自己頭上了。我們知道這樣的事例：過去我們揚言要對德國人在波蘭的暴行進行報復，這種威脅曾經減輕了波蘭人民所遭受的殘酷待遇。敵人運用恐怖武器，無疑地會加重我軍的負擔。許多德國人，如果知道他們將被押解到他們犯有罪行的那個國家受到審判，或許就在犯罪的地點受審，可能會增添精神上的顧慮。我向你們竭力推薦就地審判的原則，因為它可能對於敵人的恐怖行為起到制止作用。英國內閣贊同這個原則和政策。 這個宣言稿被接受和簽署了，文字上稍有修改。 三國外長每天按時開會，討論的範圍非常廣泛。他們的協議載入了在十一月三日起草的一份秘密議定書中。這些協議的重要性在於增加一個合作機構，這個機構現在就要設立。根據協議，決定在倫敦設立一個歐洲咨詢委員會，以便在希特勒政權將近崩潰時，開始對德國和歐洲大陸出現的問題進行處理。正是這個機構制定了關於將德國劃分為若干佔領區的初步計劃，這種安排後來引起了嚴重的問題。關於這方面的情形，以後在適當時候將進一步說明。關於意大利事務，將設立另一個咨詢委員會，其中包括一名俄國代表。關於軸心國家的衛星國所發出的任何和平試探，將互相交換情報。美國渴望在這次莫斯科會議上，簽署一項包括中國在內的四大國宣言，宣佈四大國保證對它們正分別與之作戰的那些軸心國家採取聯合作戰行動。十月三十日，這項宣言簽字了。 最後，艾登先生就俄國和英國商定對土耳其採取聯合行動一事，草擬了一份議定書，並在十一月二日簽署。 我們對這些成果感到完全滿意。這次會議解決了許多發生摩擦的問題，採取了實行進一步合作的具體步驟，為三個主要的盟國政府首腦盡早地舉行會議鋪平了道路，同時部分地消除了我們同蘇聯共事中過去不斷加劇的僵持局面。 參加這次會議的代表們，不論在會上或會下，都感到友好的氣氛比以前大大地增加了。俄國一位最著名的畫家，受他的政府的委託，將這次會議中的會談實況繪成一幅圖畫。他對英美代表團的各個成員已作了初步的素描。我們不知道這幅畫是否已經繪成，但它至今未見問世。