Chapter 172 Volume 5, Chapter 17: The Creation of the Three Kingdoms Conference‧The Supreme Commander

There is an urgent need for a Supreme Commander to be selected for the Overlord operation plan. We are in favor of Marshall. I correspond with Roosevelt. The President has not made a decision. He wants a Supreme Commander to command both battlefields on the Western Front. I disagree with this idea. Preparations for the Tripartite Conference are required September 20 On the 5th my telegram to Stalin and his reply made it difficult to agree on a suitable place for the meeting. Roosevelt's suggestion was that Stalin would only go to Tehran. Roosevelt was disappointed. He used the pretext of not violating the constitution. On the thirteenth I sent a telegram to the President. He suggested inviting Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. He suggested that Russia also take part in the preparatory meeting. I objected to this suggestion and agreed on a meeting. Russia refused to hold a meeting with the Chinese government at this stage.

We urgently need a Supreme Commander for Operation Overlord, the invasion of Europe across the English Channel in 1944.This question naturally most directly affects military operations in war and raises many important and delicate personnel issues.At the Quebec conference, I had agreed with President Roosevelt that Operation Overlord was under the command of an American general.I also informed General Brook of this decision, as I had earlier appointed him to this position.Later, I learned from President Roosevelt that he was going to choose General Marshall, and we were very satisfied with that.However, during the period between the Quebec and Cairo meetings, I felt that President Roosevelt had not made the final decision on Marshall.Before this main issue is decided, of course all other deployments cannot be carried out.Meanwhile, rumors abounded in the American press, and a parliamentary reaction was also expected in London.Admiral Lehi, in his book, refers to some of the conflicting views of the United States. [1] He wrote: Public opinion believes that Roosevelt will appoint Marshall as Supreme Commander.Some in the press strongly objected to this arrangement.These opponents charged that Marshall was going to be promoted secretly; that Roosevelt wanted to transfer him from a high position to a low position; that this was a conspiracy against Marshall.At the other extreme, there were reports that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the Supreme Command post was a promotion for Marshall, whom they were jealous of.

[1] Li Hai: "I Was There" (Gollands Publishing Company), page 227. We both discussed this issue in considerable detail.I am eager to emphasize General Marshall's position in every way, but without prejudice to the authority of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Anglo-American Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee.At the end of September, I telegraphed to Hopkins stating what I meant. Prime Minister to Mr Harry Hopkins September 26, 1943 The press was buzzing about Marshall's appointment as Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces on the Western Front.From our conversations, what I understand is that he will be in charge of the Overlord campaign.However, in the future he will not just be a commander in a theater.Apart from his specific sphere of command, he had as much knowledge of the whole situation in the war with Germany as we did, just as Dill had the full picture of the war in Washington on the Allied Chiefs of Staff.We very much welcome his frequent meetings with our chiefs of staff and would like to provide him with the full picture of operations.But, as I have made clear, it is much more necessary for our Chiefs of Staff to sit together and consider our situation from a British standpoint, just as your Chiefs of Staff have done in Washington.He doesn't have to think about decisions outside the scope of the Overlord campaign.All our joint operations and global strategy must be in the hands of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are subject to the orders of the heads of government.

If there is any inappropriateness in this view, please let us know. A few days later, I wrote directly to President Roosevelt. October 1, 1943 It disturbs me to reveal to the public what we see as an important change in High Command in the present manner.So far nothing has been revealed, but in the United States something is said about Marshall almost every day.On Tuesday, the twelfth, when Parliament was in session, I was inevitably asked questions.Moreover, I would be embarrassed if the appointment of Marshall as Commander-in-Chief in England and Alexander's succession as Commander in the Mediterranean Theater were not announced at the same time.Rumors were already abounding, fueled by the level-headed, cautious talk of Stimson in today's papers.This kind of conversation gives people a mysterious feeling, as if to hide something.This is an excellent opportunity for those with ulterior motives to spread rumors and make trouble.However, as long as the clear decision we have made is published, all rumors will disappear.In any case, I hope that you will try to get both of us to issue these two movement orders at the same time, and to declare that they will be carried out as soon as the military situation permits.

2. In addition, please also consider the difficulties caused to me by other appointments caused by this.For example, I heard that Marshall wanted Montgomery to be his second-in-command, or, in other words, to command the British Expeditionary Force at the Battle of Overlord under his leadership. This required me to remove General Paget from his current position as Indigenous Commander.Now there is an opportunity, because General Bonnard, the former commander-in-chief of the Iraq and Persia theater, is about to go to India with Mountbatten to serve as the chief of staff. I can place Paget in the Iraq and Persia theater.It is difficult and harmful to keep these commanding positions vacant for a long time.

3. It seems that some American newspapers have been sharply attacking Mountbatten. Some American telegrams received here describe him as a British nobleman and playboy, and say that he has squeezed out the legitimate position of the veteran MacArthur, and so on The words of Mountbatten were greatly affected.These arguments made the command of the Indian theater of command very important, which would naturally lead to a strengthening of Japanese forces there, and we have received information in this regard.We heard that many journalists were going to Delhi from the United States, or were trying to get there, and speculation was circulating among them that war would soon begin.In fact, due to the floods and the rainy season, it was of course impossible to take decisive action before the New Year.However, if we speak out, Japan will feel a sense of relief.It was unpleasant to think of journalists swarming Derry in droves, blah blah blah.Therefore, if we can eliminate as much controversy and interest in this area as possible, our battle will have a better chance of winning.

4. In this case, I think it is very advantageous to state directly the decisions we have made for each field, including the commanders, their chiefs of staff, and one or two principal officers, all published together.If you agree, I can draft a statement to you. President Roosevelt replied: President Roosevelt to Prime Minister October 5, 1943 The press here, led by the Hearst-McCormick system, made a big deal about Marshall's position.Other newspapers have also been buzzing for a few days, but now it is almost silent.It seems to me that if we are forced to make public statements about our military command, we are letting the press dictate wars.So I hope we keep quiet until things are fully developed.Perhaps future events (but certainly not criticism in the press by our political opponents) will prompt us to issue a joint statement sooner than I had originally estimated, but for the time being I strongly prefer that we remain silent.I agree with you that in due course we must make a comprehensive statement on the commander issue.

I fully understand your position at home, however, I do not feel that Marshall's major appointment should be announced because of the difficulty of appointing secondary commanders in other theaters of the world. I'll do my best about Mountbatten, I know some of our papers are very disrespectful to him.Overall, though, he wasn't hurt. American public opinion is of course fully in favor of his appointment.I agree with you that we should not allow people, either at home or abroad, to be overly optimistic about the (Burmese) campaign, however, there is a very proper perception of Mountbatten that whatever duties he is assigned, he will go all out.

I very much hope you will agree that there is no need for a statement on Marshall's appointment at this time. The delay by the United States has embarrassed me.So I telegraphed President Roosevelt on October 17 and said: It seems to me that the situation increasingly requires us to make decisions about Supreme Command.Unless Germany collapses now, the campaign of 1944 will be the most dangerous we have ever fought.Personally, I am more worried about the success of this campaign than I was in 1941, 1942, or 1943. It was almost two weeks before I heard back, and the outcome was still pending.

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister October 30, 1943 Preparations for the Battle of Overlord seemed to have reached a stage where they could only proceed if a commander had been appointed.You must know that I can't let Marshall off right now.However, I am still eager for preparations to proceed as agreed at the quadrant meeting, which remains on May 1st.I suggest that you consider first appointing the deputy commander in chief of the British side of the Overlord campaign. Since he has the support that will be given to Marshall in the future, he will be able to work well for her.If I could, I would suggest Dill, or Porter, or Brooke.

We did not know until early November that President Roosevelt himself and his advisers wanted the Supreme Commander in the Battle of Overlord to also have command of the Mediterranean.President Roosevelt's idea was to let Marshall command two battlefields, sit in one battlefield and take care of the other.According to my estimation, the command is conducted from Gibraltar.I think it is necessary to express Britain's attitude immediately.But at this stage, it is not appropriate for me to exchange views directly with President Roosevelt. I think it is better to tell Field Marshal Sir John Deere to discuss with Admiral Lehai, Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. Prime Minister to Field Marshal Deal (Washington) November 8, 1943 You have to tell Admiral Lehi clearly and let him know that we absolutely cannot agree to the proposal that an American commander-in-chief command both the Overlord campaign and the Mediterranean theater.This arrangement is inconsistent with the principle that the great allies must remain on equal footing.I disagree with merging the two commands under one general command.This put him above the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and at the same time, the constitutional right of the president, as commander in chief of the United States, and the prime minister, who represented the war cabinet, to control troop movements would be affected.I certainly cannot take responsibility for such an arrangement.In Tunisia, Sicily, and Italy, we have fought and suffered casualties in a roughly two-and-a-half-to-one ratio, though we fought faithfully under the command of American generals.With regard to this fact, we have previously been successful in preventing any dissent at home.If I make a suggestion like the above again now, it will inevitably cause an uproar.However, as long as I don't leave my current job, such a thing will never happen.You can take the camera to tell Mr. Hopkins about these situations. The next day, Dill met Li Hai and conveyed very clearly my attitude towards the unification of the Overlord Campaign and the command of the Mediterranean Sea.Although Li Hai was personally disappointed, there was nothing he could do about it. He said: If this is really the Prime Minister's opinion, then there is nothing to say.Dill also met with Hopkins.Hopkins was also disappointed, he reported.Dill said: Anyway, Hopkins and Lehi have learned that it is futile to try to change your opinion again, and I hope they will stop doing it. As I have already recounted, during the Quebec Conference I visited the Castle, the White House and Hyde Park.As soon as I returned to China after the visit, I immediately thought about the trilateral summit meeting that must be held after the UK-US talks.In principle, everyone agrees that this meeting is urgently needed, but no one who has not experienced it himself can appreciate how much it took to determine the time, place and conditions of the first meeting of the so-called Big Three. What a complicated situation I encountered.I write the whole thing down, because the story is at least a diplomatic anecdote. I first wrote to Stalin.As far as I know, he is in favor of Tehran as the venue. Prime Minister to Premier Stalin September 25, 1943 I've been thinking about our summit of government leaders in Tehran. In this area where security work is relatively lax, we must make proper arrangements for security.I therefore make a suggestion for your consideration: I am in Cairo making preparations for accommodation and security, and these activities, despite careful secrecy, will still be detected.Then, about two or three days before the meeting, we deployed a British brigade and a Russian brigade around a suitable area (including the airport) in Tehran to maintain a cordon of absolute security until the end of our talks .That way we have an effective blindfold against journalists from all over the world, as well as nasty characters who might not actually like us. 2. In addition, I suggest that we use the word Cairo III instead of the word Tehran (this location will never be disclosed); at the same time, I suggest that we use Eureka as the code name for our meeting. The word Eureka probably comes from ancient Greek.If you have other comments, please let me know so we can bring them to President Roosevelt.So far I have not spoken to him about it. Stalin's answer was straightforward. Prime Minister Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill October 3, 1943 I have no quarrel with your idea of ​​false preparations in Cairo to confuse the enemy.As for your proposal to deploy a British brigade and a Russian brigade in the three districts of Cairo a few days before our meeting, I think this method is inappropriate, because it will cause unnecessary sensation and expose our preparations.I suggest we each take a certain number of guards with us.I think that's enough to keep us safe. In fact, a complete security circle was set up during the meeting later, and thousands of troops and police units were mobilized, especially from the Russian side. Since I don't know whether President Roosevelt's security advisers will allow him to go to Tehran, I propose several other places.Among them was a desert camp near Habaniya's Air Force Instructor School, which was defended brilliantly in 1941.Here we have absolutely no disturbance and are so safe that President Roosevelt can fly in from Cairo in a matter of hours.I therefore telegraphed him with this proposal. former navy personnel to president roosevelt October 14, 1943 I have a new idea for Eureka.I have asked Eden (who is on his way to Moscow) to sound out Uncle Joe, and if Uncle Joe agrees, I will let you know immediately.There is a place in the desert, which I now call Cyprus, whose real name is Habania.It is much more convenient for you to get there from Cairo than to Cairo, and for Uncle Joe, the distance is only a little longer.We could pitch three tents and be comfortably in absolute privacy and security.I am going to study the details of the meeting in light of the prospect of a possible Trinity [1] agreement.Look at the Gospel of Matthew in the Bible, chapter seventeen, verse four. 【２】 [1] Borrowing from the so-called Trinity of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in the New Testament.translator [2] "New Testament" Matthew, chapter 17, verse 4: Six days later, Jesus took Peter, James, and James' brother John, secretly up a high mountain, and was changed in front of them. image, with a face as bright as the sun, and clothes as white as the light.Suddenly Moses and Elijah appeared to them and spoke with Jesus.Peter said to Jesus, Lord, it is good for us to be here. If you want, I will build three tents here, one for you, one for Moses, and one for Elijah.translator President Roosevelt to Prime Minister October 15, 1943 I finally sent the following telegram to Uncle Joe.I think your idea is very good.St. Peter was sometimes truly inspired by the gods.I love the idea of ​​three tents.In the future, you can add another tent to your old friend Jiang. The question of my going to Tehran has become so acute that I feel I should tell you frankly that I cannot take the risk for constitutional reasons.The U.S. Congress is about to meet.After the new bills and resolutions are sent, I must sign and send the texts of the bills and resolutions back to Congress within ten days.None of these transactions could be conducted by radio or telegraph.Tehran is too far away to guarantee me the fulfillment of my constitutional responsibilities.Flying east over mountains and heading west when returning could cause insurmountable delays.According to our experience, regardless of the round trip, the plane is often delayed for three or four days. Cairo is attractive in many ways.I know that there is a hotel and several villas near the pyramids, which are completely isolated from the outside world. It is said that Asmara, the capital of the former Italian territory of Eritrea, has very good buildings and an airport that can be used all day. In addition, it is also possible to meet in some port in the eastern Mediterranean, and each of us occupies a boat.Another suggestion is that it is near Baghdad. In any case, I believe that journalists should be completely excluded from the venue, and a cordon should be placed around the entire area so that we will not be disturbed. It is very important to me that you and Churchill will hold an intimate personal meeting with me, on which the hope of the future world depends so much. We are all heartened by our growing initiative across the front. prime minister to president roosevelt October 16, 1943 I totally agree with your cable about Eureka that you sent Uncle Joe.Please tell me how he replied. However, Stalin insisted on Tehran as the venue. President Roosevelt to Prime Minister October 21, 1943 Last night, I received a reply from Uncle Yue, which read as follows: Unfortunately, none of the places you suggested as an alternative to Tehran worked for me.Judging from the combat situation of the Soviet army in the summer and autumn of this year, it is obvious that the summer combat will continue into the winter, and it can be seen that our army can maintain the offensive against the German army.My colleagues agreed that these operations required my personal connection to the command and daily instructions from High Command.Conditions are better in Tehran, where there is direct radio or telephone connection to Moscow, but not in other locations.For this reason, my colleagues insisted on Tehran as the venue for the meeting. I agree with your suggestion to tentatively set November 20 or 25 as the meeting date. I also agree that representatives of the press should be excluded from the meeting.I hope that, thanks to the personal presence of Mr. Hull (who has safely arrived in Moscow), the Moscow meeting will be a great success. President Roosevelt responded immediately. I was very disappointed to receive your cable today regarding our meeting. I fully understand the reasons you make: the need for high command to issue instructions on a daily basis, and the need for you to maintain personal contact with command has produced excellent results. I want you to see that within our constitutional government of the United States there are also matters of great importance which have become fixed duties which I cannot alter.Our Constitution says the president has to deal with the bill within ten days of its passage.In other words, within the ten-day period, the president must submit the bills he received, together with written approval or veto, to Congress.As I have told you before, I cannot deal with bills by telegraph or radio.The reason why Tehran is inconvenient is simply that the flight routes leading to the city through the mountains and mountains are often blocked for several days.This is a double risk. First, it is dangerous for the plane that transmits official documents from Washington;I regret to say that, as head of state, I cannot travel where it would prevent me from fulfilling my constitutional duties. If I use the method of aircraft relay to transmit the official documents to the plains east of the Persian Gulf, I can still take on the responsibility of this kind of flight adventure; but let the aircraft carry the official documents over the mountains and enter and leave Tehran in the basin, which will cause delays. I dare not take this responsibility.Therefore, I regret to inform you that I cannot go to Tehran, and the members of my government and the leaders of the legislature fully agree with me. President Roosevelt suggested Basra as the venue for the meeting. I don't even think about the fact that I have to travel six thousand miles from American soil to attend the talks, and you only have to travel six hundred miles from Russian soil.Had I not had to lead a constitutional government a hundred and fifty years old, I would gladly have traveled ten times as far to meet you.I beg you to consider that I also have a great responsibility to the United States Government and to sustaining the entire American war effort. As I have told you before, I think the meeting of the three of us is extremely important, not only for our present people, but also for our children and grandchildren whether they can live in a peaceful world.If Churchill and you cannot meet because of the distance of hundreds of miles, our future generations will think it is a tragedy. Mr. Eden was still in Moscow, and he was doing everything he could to get Stalin to agree to a meeting place and time that pleased President Roosevelt.But it was clear that Stalin would insist on Tehran as the meeting place.At this time, although I was not sure that I could persuade President Roosevelt to meet in Tehran, I began to consider plans to hold a meeting there. My thoughts are centered on several serious issues for the upcoming talks.I think there should be a substantial agreement between the British Chiefs of Staff and the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, and between their superiors, President Roosevelt, and myself, on the tactics of Operation Overlord and its implications for Mediterranean operations.The entire overseas armed forces of our two countries are to be involved, and when Operation Overlord begins, British forces will be twice as large as the American forces in Italy and three times as large as the American forces in the rest of the Mediterranean.Before inviting Soviet political or military representatives to participate, we should of course achieve some practical mutual understanding. I therefore proposed such a plan to President Roosevelt. President Roosevelt to Prime Minister October 22, 1943 We should have sufficient time to analyze the results of the current Moscow meeting and, I think, the next meeting that we are considering.Had we called the Moscow Conference while it was still in progress, or at least before we had studied its results carefully, I feared that it would have adverse repercussions in Russia. 2. The joint planning staff is now drawing up a comprehensive plan to defeat Japan.It was very important that this plan be completed before the tripartite conference, so that the chiefs of staff of both sides had the opportunity to study it. 3. Eisenhower and the commanders of the Pacific Theater, the outline plan for the campaign approved by the Quebec Conference will be presented on November 1, and we should give it some consideration before participating in the joint conference. From this point of view, President Roosevelt agreed with my opinion, but he did not agree with my arrangement of the procedure.At this time, within the American government, there was a strong tide of public opinion; some people seemed to be willing to sacrifice the cooperation of Anglo-American warfare in order to win the confidence of Russia.So I make my point again.I feel that it is most important that we have a clear and unified understanding of both the outstanding issues of the Overlord campaign and the issue of the Supreme Commander before we can talk to the Russians. former navy personnel to president roosevelt October 23, 1943 If the United States and Britain could coordinate closely the large-scale combat operations they were preparing to conduct in 1944 on a battlefield without Russian troops, we would not have to trouble the Russians.And if we can't come to an agreement on US-British cooperation in combat, I don't think we need to have talks with Stalin, even if they can be arranged. 2. I will be satisfied if your staff attends the meeting as early as November 15th.I think the staff could work together a few days before you and I arrive (about the eighteenth or nineteenth) and then we go to Eureka together.I don't know yet whether the meeting date is November 20th or 25th.In my estimation, Eureka will not last more than three or four days, and there will not be many technicians in attendance. 3. Ninety days have passed since the opening of the Quebec Conference to November 15th. During those ninety days something of the first importance happened.Mussolini has fallen; Italy has capitulated; its fleet has surrendered; we have successfully penetrated Italy and are now marching on Rome with victory in sight.The Germans are massing twenty-five or more divisions in Italy and the Po Valley.These are all new happenings. 4. In the past, the U.S. and the U.K. each made concessions and obtained a compromise plan, and finally decided on the execution date of the Battle of Overlord.It can be argued that the troops we are gathering in Italy, the ones we are preparing for the Battle of Overlord in May, are not strong enough for their tasks. 5. The British Chiefs of Staff, my colleagues, and I feel that it is necessary to re-examine these situations; our commanders in both fields should be fixed to participate in the study.In accordance with the decision of the Quebec Conference, we have prepared to transfer our two elite divisions, the 50th and 51st Divisions, which are now in Sicily, back to England.But this would prevent them from taking part in the immediate Italian campaign, and for seven months, only after certain presumed conditions had been fulfilled.In early November we had to decide to bring our landing craft back from the Mediterranean for the Battle of Overlord.This will seriously affect operations in the Mediterranean.But within a few months, these landing craft will not be able to play a role in the battle situation in other regions.We have complied with the agreement of the Quebec Conference, but we believe that in the ever-changing war environment, this agreement should not be interpreted rigidly, but should be reconsidered. 6. I personally think that if we had made serious mistakes in the campaign of 1944, it might have given Hitler a chance to strike back suddenly.General von Thoma, a German prisoner of war, is said to have been overheard saying: Our only hope is that they attack where we can use our army against them.All this shows that we must be very cautious and far-sighted in our military deployment, coordinate the combat operations on the two battlefields with the most precision, and must gather the most powerful troops for the two combat plans, especially the Overlord Plan.I have no doubt that under the present conditions we will be able to land and deploy our forces.My deepest apprehensions, however, were the question of the massing of the army, and the possible development of the situation from the thirteenth to the sixteenth day.I feel strongly that the commanders conducting the Overlord campaign should have made a detailed study of the influx of American personnel into the United Kingdom, and of how to organize combat units. I hope that the candidates for the commander-in-chief and deputy commander-in-chief can be resolved to the satisfaction of our two countries, and then the very important second-level commander can be decided.I reiterate my great confidence in General Marshall, and should he take charge of the Overlord plan, we in England will support him with all our resources, man and material. Dear friends, what we are about to do now is a matter of unprecedented magnitude, and yet I cannot believe that we have taken the steps necessary to ensure the success of this campaign.I currently feel that I have countless thoughts in my heart, and whether I think about problems or take actions, I lack the necessary courage to move forward.So I hope to convene the meeting as soon as possible. 7. The plan of Eisenhower and Commander Zhun Fen of the Pacific Theater is scheduled to be submitted on November 1st. Judging from all your comments on this plan, if the meeting is held no later than November 15th , that is appropriate.I don't know how much time you think it will take for the joint planners to develop a comprehensive plan for a long-term war against Japan and for our chiefs of staff to study that plan.I feel that the more pressing issues I have mentioned above should not be postponed by studying the long-term war plan against Japan.Of course, the war against Japan should also be pushed forward with all strength. 8. I hope you also feel that there are sufficient reasons to hold a (British-American) meeting, but we cannot make a final decision until we receive a reply from Uncle John. If the Tehran meeting fails, it will be all the more necessary for us to hold talks based on what we have learned from the Moscow (foreign ministers) meeting.I expect Aiden to leave before the end of this month, and I am planning to leave anytime after the first week of November. Nine Leros is still in our hands. I believe you will feel as relieved as I do.The dog also ate the crumbs that fell from his master's table. 【１】 【1】Code out of the "New Testament", which means that if you have faith, you will succeed.translator Before replying to my above proposal, President Roosevelt sent the following telegram, from which it appears that he has not decided to agree to go to Tehran. President Roosevelt to Prime Minister October 25, 1943 Suffering from influenza is really troublesome.McIntyre said I needed to make a sea trip. Haven't received any information from Uncle Yue yet. If he is stubborn, you and I will each bring a few entourages to North Africa, or even hold a meeting next to the pyramid. When the meeting is almost over, let the generalissimo (Chiang Kai-shek) come and talk with us for two or three days. What do you think?At the same time, we can also ask Uncle Yo to send Molotov to our meeting.We propose November 20 as the meeting date. Two days later he commented on my proposal for a caucus of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. President Roosevelt to Prime Minister October 27, 1943 The current Moscow talks, it seems, are indeed the beginning of the cooperation between Britain, Russia and the United States, which will lead to Hitler's early defeat. He suggested sending the following telegram to Stalin: Up to now we have informed you of the outcome of the Anglo-American joint military staff meeting.You might think that it would be best to send a Russian military representative to these meetings to listen to the discussions about joint Anglo-American operations and to record the decisions.He can make comments or make suggestions according to what you mean.This will keep you and your staff in close touch with these meetings and get timely reports. I am appalled at the suggestion of Russians participating in such a meeting. former navy personnel to president roosevelt October 27, 1943 Like you, I'm delighted that the Moscow meeting is going well, and I'm hopeful that we can get Eureka right. 2. I am not in favor of inviting Russian military representatives to our Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting.Unless the Russian representative is fluent in English, the delay is intolerable. As far as I know, not a single really senior Russian officer can speak English.Such a representative has no right to speak, except to speak according to the instructions of his superiors.He only knows to strive to open up the second front as soon as possible, and hinders all other discussions. Since they never tell us about their troop movements, I don't think we should open the door to them either, because then they are likely to send observers to all future meetings, and all discussions between us will be paralyzed.We will soon be mobilizing 600,000 to 700,000 British and American troops and airmen to Italy, and we are preparing a huge Overlord operation plan. In these battle plans, not a single Russian soldier participated.On the other hand, our whole destiny depends on these battle plans. I think it is our fundamental and important right to sit together and discuss our own military movements in our two countries.So far we have been working together very successfully, but now I feel that 1944 is dangerous.Great differences can arise between us, and we can go astray.On the other hand, we may again take a compromise approach, only to lose both ends.The only hope is to rely on the close friendship that has developed among us and among our senior staff.If this is violated, I despair of the immediate future.Needless to say, the British Chiefs of Staff were of exactly the same opinion as I was.I must add that I was more anxious about the campaign of 1944 than any other campaign that concerned me. President Roosevelt was still uncertain about going to Tehran for the meeting. Some people in the American political circles exerted great pressure on him, and put forward his status stipulated in the U.S. Constitution as a basis.I fully understand his difficulty. prime minister to president roosevelt October 30, 1943 At your suggestion, I shall meet you in Cairo on the twentieth, and, if you agree, I shall take care of all matters pertaining to your safety and comfort! !This is our due friendship as masters.有人借給凱西一所漂亮的別墅，我曾親自到過那裡，擔保各方面對你都很合適。它距金字塔一兩哩，四面都是樹林，完全與外界隔離。從飛機場至該地，二十分鐘就可到達，中間不經過任何城鎮。英國軍隊可組成警戒圈來保衛這整個地區。我們還可以一起作幾次有趣的沙漠短途旅行。我毫不懷疑，凱西一定非常高興把這座別墅供你使用。我自己則可能住在開羅英國大使館裡，相距大約二十分鐘的路程。不過，也可以把我們兩人都安排在金字塔區內。我想你們的柯克先生也有一所很精緻的房子。開羅具備各種便於全部參謀人員食宿及辦公的條件，而且他們隨時可以很方便地到你的別墅去。由於我掌握全面情況，我認為這是再好也沒有的一項計劃。如果你喜歡這項計劃，我就立刻著手進行各種準備，你可以派一名官員前來，這樣可以使一切安排更合你的心意。 這時，我們的計劃開始有了眉目。 President Roosevelt to Prime Minister 一九四三年十月三十一日 赫爾自莫斯科起程，需要兩天才能返抵此間。我在離開之前必須見到他，我想你會欣然同意這一點的。我原想在到達開羅前，在北非耽擱三天。不過，我可以在回國的時候，再辦理一些有關北非和意大利的事務。因此，我在抵達港口後，立即乘飛機飛往開羅，仍希望能於二十日抵達。但是如果風大，天氣不好，我也許要到二十二日才能到達開羅。我估計我將一直乘船至奧蘭。 非常感謝你建議為我們在開羅安排一切，我們欣然接受。 如果在那裡發生什麼阻礙，我們當然還可以在亞歷山大港會晤，參謀人員住在岸上，我們則在各自的軍艦上。 我現正準備發電報給（蔣介石）大元帥，讓他準備在十一月二十五日在開羅附近和我們會面。 prime minister to president roosevelt 一九四三年十月三十一日 二十日以後，六分儀行動【１】的一切準備工作就可完成了，沃登上校將在約會地點等候Q將軍上將，以及天國之人。【２】參謀人員的食宿並無困難。 【１】為英、美、中三國會議的密碼代號。 【２】分別指你的忠實僕人、你自己和大元帥。作者（按即邱吉爾、羅斯福和蔣介石。譯者 艾登告訴我說，要想使斯大林改變他以德黑蘭為會址的建議，是沒有希望的，因此，我竭盡一切努力為召開會議鋪平道路。 首相致伊斯梅將軍（莫斯科） 一九四三年十一月一日 據說三國不能在開羅三（德黑蘭）開會的理由是，自開羅越過山峰前往開羅三的飛行，可能發生中斷，使公文不能按憲法規定的期限送達Q海軍上將（羅斯福總統）手中。請調查當地天氣的情況，並弄清從德黑蘭到敘利亞是否有公路相通，汽車在兩地間傳送公文需用多少時間（公文到達山地南部後馬上即可用飛機傳送）。如果我能使Q海軍上將相信公文旅行不會發生中斷，我們原來的計劃也許還是可行的。 這時，我嘗試最後一個變通辦法，即羅斯福總統和我各乘自己的軍艦，在奧蘭會面，雙方的參謀人員則在馬耳他島進行四天預備性商談，但此事未能成功。羅斯福總統已經決定乘他的軍艦起程。這時他提議在和俄國人及中國人發生任何接觸之前（他曾十分熱心地敦促他們參加開羅會議），聯合參謀長委員會需要先行開會。但是該委員會開會的最早可能的日期是十一月二十二日。美國方面提議中國代表團在這一天到達，而他們一到達，不可避免地就會參加我們的討論。另外，我間接聽說，羅斯福總統同時還邀請莫洛托夫到開羅去。因此我給羅斯福總統發出下列電文： prime minister to president roosevelt 一九四三年十一月十一日 我們之間看來已產生了一個非常不幸的誤會。從你發來的電報來看，我以為在俄國人或中國人參加會議之前，英美參謀人員要進行多次會談。但是，現在我聽克拉克‧克爾大使說，十一月九日，美國駐莫斯科大使把你的一封信交給斯大林，邀請莫洛托夫先生攜帶一名軍事代表於十一月二十二日抵達開羅。但是，十一月二十二日是參謀人員能夠開會的第一天。所以，我要求推遲莫洛托夫和他的軍事代表抵達開羅的日期，最早在十一月二十五日到達。 二‧另外還聽克拉克‧克爾大使說，你正打算於十一月二十六日赴德黑蘭，我很高興。我覺得你若直接告訴我那就更好了。 我希望事情分三個階段進行：第一，英美在開羅基本達成協議；第二，在德黑蘭召開三個大國政府首腦會議；第三，回到開羅後，就確實緊迫的印度戰場和印度洋戰爭這個純屬英美範圍的事務，進行討論。我們的時間很短促，在我們需要對關係到整個戰局的問題作出至少是暫時性決定的時候，我不希望把時間消磨在畢竟是比較次要的問題上。另外，在蘇聯還沒有向日本宣戰之前，似乎不宜正式邀請他們和中國政府一道開會。 十一日我寫信給斯大林說：依靠三方面相互間通信的方法來解決問題是很困難的，特別是當人們正在海上或空中行動的時候。所幸的是，有些困難互相抵銷了。 President Roosevelt to Prime Minister 一九四三年十一月十二日 我剛剛聽說約大叔將到德黑蘭去。我立刻打電報給他，說我已把此間有關憲法的事務安排好，所以，我可以前往德黑蘭，去和他開一個短期的會議，並告訴他說，我感到很高興。但是，即使在我這樣說的時候，我還在懷疑他能否恪守他以前的諾言，一定到德黑蘭去。他剛才的來電肯定了此事，所以我想，現在可以肯定你我在二十七日到三十日之間能和他面。難題就這樣獲得了解決，我想我們可以皆大歡喜了。 至於說開羅會議，我自始至終認為我知道你也一直有這樣的看法！ !讓約大叔覺得我們在軍事行動上結成一夥來對付他，是一個嚴重的錯誤。如你所知，英美參謀長在開羅預備會議期間，將討論籌劃工作。事實不過如此而已。莫洛托夫和一名俄國軍事代表參加開羅會議，對於你我不會有什麼害處。這樣，他們就不會感到我們迴避他們。他們既無參謀人員，又無計劃人員參加會議。我們還是讓他們正式參加吧。 僅僅在五個小時以前，我才收到約大叔聲明要到德黑蘭去的電報。莫洛托夫和軍事代表無疑將於二十七日和三十日之間隨我們回到德黑蘭，等我們和約大叔的會談結束後，他們再和我們一道回到開羅，其中除了第一次陪同莫洛托夫赴開羅的那名代表外，可能再增加其他的軍事人員一同去。 我認為按照這個程序進行是必要的。我可以向你保證不會有什麼困難。 我馬上就要起程了。預祝我們兩人旅途順利。 prime minister to president roosevelt 一九四三年十一月十二日 獲悉你已將憲法問題處理停當，我們的會議現在一定可以召開了，我非常高興。這樣，事情就前進了一大步。 二‧然而，三軍參謀長對於你為軍事會談所作的安排，感到很惶惑，我也同樣感到疑慮不安。從上次的電文來看，我原以為英美參謀人員在俄國人和中國人參加會議之前，要進行多次會談的。鑒於我們所要解決的嚴重問題，我仍認為進行多次會談是絕對必要的。我不反對你我在同約大叔舉行會談之前和莫洛托夫會晤，但是，在會談一開始，就讓蘇聯的軍事觀察員出席，將造成嚴重的尷尬局面。英皇陛下政府不能放棄英國同你和你的將領們，就我們的混合軍隊的重大問題，進行詳盡而坦率的討論的權利。我們雙方的三軍參謀長必須進行一些密切的會談，我們當然不能容許蘇聯觀察員參加這些會談，而不讓他參加，又很容易得罪他，但是，我們並不拒絕他參加我所建議的在一定時候召開的正式的三國參謀會議。 最後，這種危險由於總統邀請了蔣介石而得以消除。斯大林無論如何不肯為了同日本的三個敵國一起舉行四國會議而危及他與日本的關係，因此，所有有關蘇聯派代表參加開羅會議的問題，都被否定了。這使我們如釋重負，然而，這卻引起了嚴重的不便，並且後來為此付出了代價。 斯大林致邱吉爾首相 一九四三年十一月十二日 雖然我曾去信給羅斯福總統，告訴他莫洛托夫先生將於十一月二十二日抵達開羅，但現在我必須說，我很抱歉，莫洛托夫先生由於某些重要原因，不能前往開羅。他可能在十一月底赴德黑蘭，並且將和我一同到達那裡。同我一起去的，還有幾位軍事人員。 僅限於三國政府首腦參加的會議，理應根據以前已經取得的協議在德黑蘭舉行。應當絕對不准任何其他國家的代表參加這次會議。 我預祝你同中國就遠東事務舉行的會議獲得成功。 這樣，我們的安排就最後確定下來了，於是便開始了我們的旅行。