Chapter 178 Volume 5, Chapter 23, Revisiting Cairo‧Supreme Commander

The talks between the United Kingdom and the United States in Cairo on the Andaman Islands operations plan resulted in no agreement at our first plenary meeting on December 4. President Roosevelt decided to abandon the above plan. On December 6, he sent a joint call to Prime Minister Stalin Mountbatten on the required troops. Question of Numbers Staff Discussions on Strategy Against Japan Our Talks with the Turks in Cairo Outline of a Plan to Assist Turkey The Turks Will Not Make Any Promises President Roosevelt Appoints General Eisenhower to Command the Battle of Overlord President Roosevelt and I Visit the Sphinx

On December 2, I returned to Cairo from Tehran and was placed in a villa near the pyramids.President Roosevelt also arrived that evening, and we continued our cordial discussions about the overall situation of the war and the outcome of the talks with Stalin.At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff visited Jerusalem on their way back to Cairo to refresh their energy, and they had to continue discussing their important tasks the next day.Admiral Mountbatten has returned to India, from which he has handed over the revised plan assigned to him for the amphibious campaign (pirate combat plan) against the Andaman Islands.This plan would completely take up the much-needed landing craft we have transferred from the Mediterranean.I hope to make a final effort to get the Americans to agree to another plan of operations for Rhode Island.

The next night, I had dinner with the President again.Aiden was also present.We stayed together until after midnight, discussing our differences of opinion.I agree with the British Chiefs of Staff that they were very concerned by the President's promise to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek before the Tehran Conference to launch an early attack from the Bay of Bengal.On account of this promise, my hopes and plans of taking Rhodes, and I think Turkey's entry into the war, will depend largely on the taking of Rhodes, but Mr. Roosevelt has made up his mind to fight the Bay of Bengal.When our Chiefs of Staff raised this issue at military conferences, the American staff flatly refused to discuss it.They say the president has made a decision and they have no choice but to obey.

On the afternoon of December 4th we held our first plenary meeting since our return from Tehran, but made little progress.The President announced at the outset that he must leave here on December 6, and that all reports must be prepared by December 5, that is, Sunday night, so that the two sides can reach a final agreement.Apart from the question of Turkey's participation in the war, the only thing that seemed to be unresolved seemed to be a relatively minor question, namely, the use of a dozen or twenty landing craft and their equipment.It was inconceivable to be stumped by such an insignificant question, and so the President felt he should say that every detail should be worked out.

I said I would like to make it clear to the meeting that the British delegation was very concerned about our early dispersion of power and that there were still many issues of first priority to be resolved.Two decisive events have taken place in recent days.First, Marshal Stalin automatically declared that once Germany was defeated, the Soviet Union would immediately declare war on Japan.This will give us better bases than we can find in China, so it makes more sense for us to focus on making the Overlord campaign a success.The staff had to study what effect this new fact would have on the campaigns in the Pacific and Southeast Asia; a second event of paramount importance was the decision to cross the Channel in May.I myself think it best to choose a date in July, but I am determined to do my best to make the date fixed for May a complete success.This is an overwhelming task.In the end, one million American troops will be invested, plus five or six hundred thousand British troops.

We anticipate a violent war on an unprecedented scale.In order for the Overlord campaign to have the best chance of success, we felt that the landing campaign on the Riviera (Operation Anvil plan) must be as strong as possible.I think that the landing force will be in greatest danger around the thirtieth day, and that it will be necessary to take all measures to initiate operations elsewhere in order to prevent the concentration of superior German forces against our beachheads.Once the troops participating in the Battle of Overlord and the Battle of Anvil enter the same area, they are under the command of a commander.

President Roosevelt, summing up the discussion, indicated that there was agreement on the following points and asked us whether he was correct in this view.These points are: (1) The progress of the Overlord's battle plan must not be hindered. (2) The progress of the anvil battle plan shall not be hindered. (3) If Turkey enters the war, we will do everything possible to muster enough landing craft to fight in the eastern Mediterranean. (4) To instruct Admiral Mountbatten to carry out the plan with the best possible effort, using all the supplies (in the Bay of Bengal) that have been allocated to him.

On the last point, I propose that it may be necessary to cut some of the strength allocated to Mountbatten to strengthen the Overlord and Anvil operations plans.President Roosevelt said he could not agree to that.We have a moral duty to help China, and he is not prepared to give up this two-sacrifice campaign without extremely good and obvious reasons.I replied that our great adventure in France might constitute such a very good reason.The Overlord campaign we are currently preparing to carry out is still based on landing three divisions at a time, but when we attacked Sicily, we landed nine divisions on the first day.This major operational plan currently has too little room for expansion and contraction.

I returned to the attack on the Riviera, saying that the plan for this attack should be based on at least two raiding divisions.This would allow enough landing craft to carry out a flanking campaign in Italy and, if Turkey entered the war, also allow the capture of Rhodes.I then pointed out that the campaign in Southeast Asia must be judged in relation to the Overlord plan of overriding importance.I said I was surprised by what Admiral Mountbatten had asked of me regarding the taking of the Andaman Islands.Under the circumstances of Marshal Stalin's promise that Russia would enter the war, the value of the campaigns commanded by the South East Asia Command has been greatly reduced. On the other hand, the price of these campaigns has reached a point where no one dares to engage in rashly up.

Discussions continue to revolve around the question of whether to hold on to the Andaman campaign.President Roosevelt objected to Britain's desire to abandon the plan.We did not reach a conclusion, but decided to discuss it in detail between the staff officers of the two countries. On December 5th we held another meeting, and President Roosevelt read the report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on all aspects of the campaign in Europe, and everyone agreed.All problems solved, now only the Far East campaign remains.Rhode Island was out of the question, so I concentrated on getting the landing craft needed for the Anvil and Mediterranean campaigns.At this point a new factor emerged.The figures put forward by the South East Asia Command regarding the forces needed to storm the Andaman Islands are appalling.The President had said fourteen thousand would be enough.The suggestion was to use 50,000 people. Judging from the situation of this meeting, this suggestion will obviously make the plan of expedition to the Andaman Islands impossible to realize.It was then agreed to ask Mountbatten what kind of amphibious campaign he could conduct on a smaller scale, assuming that most of the landing craft and raiding ships were withdrawn from Southeast Asia within the next few weeks.So we broke up the meeting, which made Mr. Roosevelt very unhappy.

The impasse in Cairo was resolved before we could take further action.In the afternoon, after consulting with his advisers, President Roosevelt decided to abandon the Andaman Islands campaign plan.He sent me a brief personal letter: The Pirate Campaign has been cancelled.General Ismay reminded me of what I had said to Ismay when I secretly telephoned him that the President had changed his mind and had informed Chiang Kai-shek of this welcome decision: He who rules his own mind , is better than a person who can conquer a city.At half past seven the next evening all of us met again at Kirk's villa to study the final report of the meeting.The campaign to attack southern France was officially sanctioned, and President Roosevelt read his telegram to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek informing him of our decision to abandon the Andaman Project. So President Roosevelt and I prepared a joint summary of our resolutions to send to Stalin. Prime Minister and President Roosevelt to Premier Stalin December 6, 1943 In the just-concluded Cairo Conference, we reached the following agreement on the question of waging a war against Germany in 1944, in addition to the agreement reached by the three of us in Teheran. The bombing offensive against Germany would be given the highest strategic priority, with the aim of destroying the combat capabilities of the Luftwaffe, the German military, industrial and economic systems, and paving the way for a campaign across the Channel. We have reduced the size of the March campaign in the Bay of Bengal in order to increase the number of amphibious ships needed for the war in southern France. We have ordered that all efforts should be made to increase the production of landing craft in the United Kingdom and the United States in order to complement the Overlord campaign, and have ordered the repatriation of certain landing craft from the Pacific for the same purpose. When I informed South East Asia Command of our decision, I was astonished that Mountbatten had not concealed my shock at the estimates put forward by his advisers and signed by him. Prime Minister to Admiral Mountbatten (in Derry) December 9, 1943 You must have seen President Roosevelt's telegram to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek about abandoning the pirate campaign, and you know I totally agree with that.We have taken this step because in Tehran it has been decided to concentrate all forces on the Overlord campaign while attacking southern France. Your request to use British and Imperial forces totaling 50,000 men, including 33,700 combatants, to fight 5,000 Japanese troops has created a bad influence among those here.I too was taken aback by this request, and wondered whether you had taken the advice of your reliable military staff.The ratio of forces used by the Americans to seize the Japanese islands was two and a half to one, but your generals demanded six and a half to one, which created a very bad impression.Not even the detailed list of calculations you provided me could dispel this impression. I wish to begin now the preparations for attacking Sumatra after the monsoons.However, if you still stick to the standard you have accepted for taking the Andaman Islands, there is not much hope for any kind of amphibious campaign that is contemplated. Mountbatten replied that the United States had used superior forces in recent landings, with ratios ranging from about three to one to more than six to one.Where cover by aircraft from the coast cannot be obtained, troops should be employed in the latter larger proportion.In order to capture the Andaman Islands, he would use aircraft carriers rather than coast-based aircraft as cover, and the combat effectiveness of these aircraft will be exhausted after about four days. Therefore, the Andaman airfield must be captured within these four days .The supplies already allocated to him would enable him to supply the fifty men he had previously suggested for the campaign.But only 9,000 of them made it to land in the first two batches.He therefore did not think that he was asking for an exorbitant superiority of forces in order to assure quick success.He cites the example of the American landing at Munda, where they had a higher force ratio but progressed very slowly. I'm still dubious.But the comments made by the Ministry of Defense after the war should be published here in order to do justice to the points of contention: A piracy campaign to raid the Andaman Islands required moving our troops a thousand miles from the nearest base, including soldiers of all kinds involved in providing military facilities, building airfields and runways, and working on the docks.An estimated 16,000 people were non-combat troops, and included in the combat troops were headquarters personnel, engineers and air defense personnel.The enemy is considered to have air superiority in this area.Our main force was estimated to exceed the Japanese garrison by a ratio of about four to one, but this ratio was not too great compared with the generally accepted ideal advantage of a surprise landing at the time.It cannot be overlooked that during the past twelve months we have fought without success against Japan.There is no doubt that Lord Mountbatten hoped to be able to start victoriously, and so should the morale of the battlefield alone. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also discussed Britain's role in the strategy for fighting Japan, and they made their recommendations to President Roosevelt and me in their final Cairo report.In a nutshell, they suggested that the main force of the Southeast Asia Command's operations should be placed in Burma.After Germany has been defeated, advance troops of the army and air force, together with the manpower and material resources of the air force based in Australia, should be dispatched to cooperate with General MacArthur.Britain's sea power should be mainly concentrated in the Pacific Ocean and not in the Bay of Bengal.The British Chiefs of Staff were as uninterested as I was in a laborious and ineffective campaign in northern Burma for the purpose of building a road of dubious value to China.On the other hand, they also conceded that Admiral Mountbatten could conduct any large-scale amphibious operations only six months after the collapse of Germany.The plan to enrich the Pacific battlefield can be started much earlier. Therefore, they agree with the US side.In their final report, the two staffs said they had agreed in principle to a comprehensive plan to defeat Japan as the basis for further investigation and preparations.This plan contemplates the dispatch of a British squadron and provisionally provides for this squadron to operate in the Pacific in June 1944.President Roosevelt and I both initialed this document, but with more pressing matters to attend to and President Roosevelt having to return to the United States, we had no opportunity to discuss long-term plans with our advisers or between the two of us , but we are convinced that there will be time in the future to study the whole situation. One of the main purposes of our meeting in Cairo was to resume talks with the Turkish leadership.On December 1, I called President Inonu from Tehran, suggesting that he come to Cairo to meet with President Roosevelt and me.We arranged for Vyshinsky to attend as well.These talks were facilitated by Mr. Eden's exchange of views with the Turkish Foreign Minister in Cairo on his way home from Moscow in early November.So the Turks arrived in Cairo again on December 4th, and I hosted a banquet in honor of the Turkish President the next day.My guest's attitude was extremely cautious, and some subsequent interviews showed how impressed his advisers were with German military power.I strongly urge Turkey to join the war.After Italy withdrew from the war, Turkey's interest in participating in the war has increased significantly, while its risky element has decreased. On December 6th I drew up a memorandum to the British Chiefs of Staff detailing the policies and actions we would have to take if Turkey were to join us in the fight. PM sends General Ismay to Chiefs of Staff Committee December 6, 1943 After the Cairo Conference on Operation Saturn, the Turkish Government will state that their policy remains unchanged and that every precaution will be taken to reduce the suspicion of the enemy. 2. However, the preparation and protection of the Turkish airfields should be carried out without delay, and all necessary military personnel and supplies in plain clothes should be transported there.It takes about six or seven weeks at most to get the job done.British air squadrons are ready to fly to the airfield there at any time after 1 February, the exact date to be determined according to enemy movements and in consultation with the Turkish Government.There is room for flexibility in this deadline of two weeks, during which time more supplies and personnel can be transported as quickly as possible. 3. Rome is expected to be captured in January. During the military intermission thereafter, it is hoped that three battalions of medium bombers will be placed under the Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East Air Force, and that it will be stationed in Cyrenaica so as to counter the enemy's attack. Airfields and shipping bombed to cripple its strength and cover the transfer of British fighter groups.Bomber battles can start at any time, regardless of any decisions about calling in.But if the enemy does not move, it is best not to send out bombers for a while, so as to cover the transfer and the events that follow.The details as to how this part of the air force is to be employed, and how to coordinate the timing of its mobilization, are to be drawn up by the Commander in Chief. 4. The redeployment operation should be completed by February 15, and from then on Turkey should be given a certain degree of security against air attack. 5. Once the British Air Force squadron was settled at the airfield and after consultation with the Turkish government, it began to operate in the Aegean Sea, while being supported by the medium bomber group from Cyrenaica.Under the cover of an air force, the British navy in the eastern Mediterranean, after the necessary reinforcements, could attack enemy ships and convoys which were transporting supplies to the islands. 6. At the same time, various preparations should be made for the capture of Rhode Island.To this end, one of the best British divisions should be used for the attack, and another division of lesser rank should be prepared to defend the island, so that the above-mentioned British division can be withdrawn to continue the fight in Italy.Whether Rhode Island can be captured depends, of course, on the landing craft we may obtain.This campaign was to be fought by the end of February, after which date all landing craft were to be ready for the Battle of Anvil. 7. What actions do you expect the enemy to take?It is obviously in the interests of the Allies that the enemy's action should be delayed as long as possible.Therefore, the Turkish government should try to maintain relations with Germany and Bulgaria until the last moment, and respond diplomatically to any protests they may raise while preparations continue.When Bulgaria threatened Turkey, the Russians would inform Bulgaria that if it attacked on the orders of the Germans, the Soviet Union would immediately declare war on Bulgaria.Consider whether Bulgaria should be informed: If Germany or Bulgaria drop one ton of bombs on Constantinople or Smyrna, we will drop two or three tons on Sofia.If the Russian army continues its victorious advance in southern Russia, and if the Anglo-American armies make good progress in the Roman campaign, it seems probable that Bulgaria will not intend to invade Turkey, but it may withdraw its nine divisions from Greece and Yugoslavia to assemble In Thrace, the line with Turkey confronted. 8. At the same time, under the changing situation and increasing pressure, Bulgaria may also try to sign a separate peace treaty with the three major allies.It is recommended that Turkey refrain from declaring war at any stage; it should continue with protective rearmament and wait for the enemy to act. 9. At the same time, after the British opened the sea route from Egypt to Turkey and gained control of the Aegean Sea, they immediately tried everything possible to transport supplies and support troops to Smyrna.If possible, through the Dardanelles, so that the further equipping of the Turkish army and the food supply of Constantinople can proceed as quickly as possible. 10. As soon as the transfer of the British air squadron is completed, the Turkish Government should assist in the clandestine entry of six or eight British submarines and their necessary munitions into the Black Sea.Since the mothership cannot be supplied, if possible, base equipment should be arranged in Ismet.These submarines were sufficient to inflict heavy casualties on the Romanians and Germans evacuating Crimea, and to assist the Russians in their assault on the Romanian coast, an operation perhaps made possible by Romanian politics. But such an action should be diverted from the wishes of the Russians. The Turks returned home to report to their Congress, which agreed to concentrate British experts during this period to complete the first phase of the Saturn plan.That's it. During our many talks in Cairo, President Roosevelt never mentioned the important and urgent issue of the commander in chief of the Overlord campaign. Therefore, in my impression, we have always believed that our original arrangements and agreements are still valid.But the day before he left Cairo, he told me his final decision.We were driving from Cairo to the pyramids in his car.He said then, almost casually, that he could not let General Marshall go because his enormous influence under President Roosevelt as chief of military and operational command was valuable and essential to the success of the war. He said that he is also an indispensable figure, so he suggested that Eisenhower be appointed to command the Overlord campaign and asked for my opinion.I say it is for him to decide, but we also warmly welcome General Eisenhower and wholeheartedly place our fate at his command. Until then, I had thought that Eisenhower would return to Washington as Chief of Staff of the Army and Marshall would command the Overlord campaign.Eisenhower had heard the news too, and was glum about leaving the Mediterranean for Washington. Now everything was decided: Eisenhower commanded Overlord, Marshall remained in Washington, and a British commander was transferred to the Mediterranean. The person who wrote the biographer for Hopkins mentioned the whole story of President Roosevelt's final decision after long delay and hesitation, saying that Roosevelt made the decision on December 5th (Sunday), regardless of Hopkin Stimson's and Stimson's advice was almost impassioned, regardless of the well-known preferences of Stalin and Churchill, regardless of his own declared intentions.Mr. Sherwood later quoted the following excerpt from a note written by General Marshall which he obtained after the war: Marshall said: Recalling that President Roosevelt concluded our conversation by saying, You can't sleep peacefully. [1] There is no doubt that President Roosevelt did not think that the mere command of the Overlord campaign was sufficient reason for General Marshall to leave Washington. [1] Sherwood: "Roosevelt and Hopkins", 802 | 803 pages. We are finally done.I gave a dinner at the villa for the Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Eden, Mr. Casey, and one or two others.I remember being very impressed by the optimism prevailing among the senior officers.The idea was being thrown around that Hitler would not be strong enough for our spring offensive and would probably collapse before we launched the Overlord campaign in the summer.I was moved by the prevailing opinion at the time, so I asked each person around the table to give his opinion in turn. All those in charge of the military were inclined to believe that the collapse of Germany was imminent.The three politicians present put forward opposite opinions.Of course, there is always a lot of speculation on such a major issue involving the lives of many, many people.There are too many unpredictable and unpredictable things.Who knows how vulnerable the enemy is hidden behind the front line of war and the brazen mask?When will his willpower break down?When will he be defeated by us? The president has never had time to visit the local sights, but I can't let him leave without taking a look at the Sphinx.One afternoon, after tea, I said: You must come now.We headed immediately by car to see this wonder of the world from every angle.For several minutes as twilight fell, the President and I stood and gazed at it in silence.It didn't say anything to us, it still had that incredible smile on its face.It's useless to stay any longer. On December 7th, when my great friend took off from the airport near the pyramids, I went to see him off.