Chapter 194 Volume 6, Chapter 4 Attacking the South of France?

Conference of Tehran Concerning Strategic Resolution Plans for Landings in the South of France Delays in the Capture of Rome General Marshall's Visits to Britain and the Mediterranean A telegram arrived of the opposing views of the British and American chiefs of staff and a communication from President Roosevelt General Wilson ordered to attack the French Riviera My plan for landing on the Atlantic coast August 7th Visit to Eisenhower and a visit at Portsmouth A telegram from Mr. Roosevelt expressing his disapproval. In the European campaign of 1944, the liberation of Normandy was the main event, but it was only one of several concentrated blows against Nazi Germany.The Russians were pouring into Poland and the Balkan countries to the east, while, to the south, in Italy, Alexander's forces were pressing on the Po.Some decisions must now be made as to our next move in the Mediterranean.Because of these issues, we have had the first major disagreement with our American friends on the highest strategic issues. It should be said that this is a pity.

During the lengthy discussions at the Teheran Conference in November 1943, a major point was drawn up for the project of eventual victory on the European side.Our plans are still governed by these decisions of the time, and it is fitting that they be recalled.First of all, we have agreed to implement the Overlord Operations Plan.This is an overriding task, and this is our first duty, no one can dispute that; but we have some strong forces in the Mediterranean, so what are they to do? This issue remains unresolved.We were determined to have them take Rome, near which some airfields were necessary for bombing southern Germany.Once this task has been accomplished, we also plan to advance north along this peninsula as far as the Pisa-Rimini line, where as many enemy divisions as possible can be contained in northern Italy.However, things are not that simple.A third operation was also agreed upon at the time, namely, an amphibious landing in the south of France, and it was this project which was to cause some controversy.The plan was originally intended as a feint or threat against the enemy to hold the Germans on the Riviera and prevent them from participating in the Normandy campaign; Divisions were engaged in a real attack, and at the Tehran meeting Stalin supported them.

Although I intended to use other methods to take advantage of the achievements in Italy, I accepted this change mainly to avoid inappropriate changes to the Burmese side. The code name for this operation is Anvil. One thing is evident: it is of no use for us to land in the south of France unless the time is right.The mere threat of a surprise attack would be enough to keep the German army in this area; a real advance into this area might cause the enemy to strengthen the garrison; Much less, since it is unlikely that Hitler would divert troops from the main fighting front in the north in order to hold on to Provence.If we were going to take the Riviera at all, we had to do it at the same time as D-Day, or just before the D-Day landings, and that's what we were planning in Tehran when we made the plan.

For the anvil to work, it is also subject to a second condition.This operation, that is to say, is a general attack, not a diversion or threat. Much of the force required must be drawn from our troops in Italy, but these troops must first complete the capture of Rome and the various airfields. Difficult and momentous task.It was unlikely that troops would be freed or drawn from Alexander's forces before this task was accomplished.Rome must be captured before Operation Anvil can begin. Everything is based on the capture of Rome.It would be good for all parties if we could take Rome quickly, and then troops could be drawn from the Italian front, and Operation Anvil could be launched in time, otherwise diversionary landings alone would be too difficult. Enough is enough.If we do land, and the time is after the start of Operation Overlord, then our team will not be able to join Eisenhower's army without a long journey, but by then, the Battle of the Beach may be a thing of the past, and these Team support would be too late.That is what actually happened, and at the beginning of 1944 it really seemed possible.

At the Tehran Conference we had hoped with confidence to reach Rome in early spring, but this has proved impossible.Our important attack on Anzio, in order to hasten the capture of Rome, lured eight or ten German divisions out of that vital field, that is to say, in greater numbers than an anvil operation could hope to lure to Rivet. Ella's is more.This actually replaced the Anvil Plan because it achieved the purpose of the Anvil Operation Plan.Still, the Riviera project went ahead as if nothing had happened. Aside from the hanging anvil and the uncertain future, some of our best army divisions in Italy were correctly assigned to the main combat missions of Project Overlord by the end of 1943. Set sail for England.Alexander's power was thus weakened, while Kesselring's was strengthened.The Germans had sent reinforcements to Italy, out of the way of our raid on Anzio, and kept us from entering Rome until just before the day of the attack.The intensity of the fighting certainly helped Operation Overlord in its early critical phases by committing the enemy to important reserves that might have been used on the French side, but our advances in the Mediterranean were hampered. Seriously messed up.The landing craft problem is another obstacle.Many of them have been transferred to the Overlord.Project Anvil cannot be launched until these landing craft are brought back, which in turn depends on the situation in Normandy.

These facts had been anticipated, and General Maitland Wilson, the Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean, had reported as early as March 21 that Project Anvil could not begin before the end of July.Later, he estimated the date of this operation to be mid-August, and also declared that the best way to help the Overlord would be to abandon any attack on the Riviera and concentrate on Italy. On June 4, when Rome fell, the question had to be reexamined.Should we continue with the anvil plan, or make a new plan? General Eisenhower naturally wanted to use all available means to strengthen his attack in northwestern Europe.Some strategic possibilities in northern Italy did not attract his attention, but he agreed to send back the landing craft as soon as possible, provided that this would lead to the rapid realization of the Anvil plan.The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with Eisenhower, firmly insisting on concentrating the largest number of troops at decisive locations, and in their view, decisive locations only refer to northwestern Europe.They had the support of the President of the United States, who took note of the agreement reached with Stalin in Tehran a few months earlier, however, everything was changed by the delay in progress in Italy.

Shortly after the day of the offensive, General Marshall arrived in England.He expressed concern about another issue.At that time, a large number of troops were gathering in the United States, and they should be sent into battle as soon as possible.They could sail directly to France, or via the United Kingdom; arrangements were made, but such numbers were originally agreed to be brought in that Marshall doubted whether our ports would be sufficient.During this period our side possessed very few ports on the French coast of the Channel.Although Eisenhower intends to capture Brest, and if the situation goes well, other landing sites in the Bay of Biscay may also fall into our hands, but we are not sure whether we can capture these places, let alone have enough time to clear the ports; however, the success of Operation Overlord hinges on a sufficient and rapid build-up of forces.The solution suggested by Marshall was to take several entirely new bases in western or southern France, preferably in western France because it was quicker to get there from the United States.

I am fully aware of all this, and have considered for a time an attack on the coast of Biscay from North Africa, if not before the end of July or the beginning of August; Victory screwed up.I think.Alternative avenues remain open, and we should make every preparation to proceed in the direction we deem most expedient. On June 14, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to prepare for an amphibious operation in the Mediterranean, possibly in the south of France, in the Bay of Biscay, or at the head of the Adriatic.No decision has been made on the destination of this operation at this time.Three days later, General Marshall visited the Mediterranean and held talks with several commanders.General Wilson, deeply moved when he first heard that Project Overlord needed more ports, did not change his opposition to Project Anvil, and, on June 19, told the Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he still believed that The greatest contribution he could make to the common purpose was to press with all his strength on the valley of the Po.Thereafter, with the aid of amphibious operations on the Istrian peninsula at the head of the Adriatic Sea (which Trieste dominates and extends southwards from), there is a good chance of passing through Ljubljana. The gorge pushed forward into the territory of Austria and Hungary, so as to attack the hinterland of Germany from the other direction.Alexander agrees.

Smuts was in Italy at the time and sent me a telegram. Field Marshal Smuts to Prime Minister June 23, 1944 I have consulted with both Wilson and Alexander concerning the future use of the latter's corps, and hereby submit a summary of the results.Neither of them favored any suggestion of the present anvil program, since it is at least doubtful that its results would directly help Eisenhower, and would, in any event, entail a serious loss of time, whereas for us, Time is very important. What Alexander had achieved, and the present high morale of his troops, strongly suggested that it would not be expedient to divide his troops and interfere with their triumphant advance.Eisenhower, with his soon-to-be-arrived reinforcements, would not only be able to hold his own position and extend his right flank to the Loire, but would also be able to advance eastward toward or across Paris.The matter of extending his left wing is a matter for the staff to consider and report on, but this should not delay the decision on the very urgent and serious question of deployment at present.

As for Alexander's plan to move forward, he and Wilson agreed that it would not be possible for his troops to break through to the Po River and then move eastward, rushing towards Istria, Ljubljana, etc., and heading straight for Austria. What's the problem.Alexander is in favor of a two-pronged attack by sea and land, while Wilson advocates an attack by sea, and believes that three sea divisions, plus one or two air divisions are enough, and by early September, it is possible to capture Lya ster.Afterwards, re-advance to the east, and gradually gain the support of a large number of guerrillas, it may be possible to force the enemy to withdraw from the Balkan countries.Our advance on Austria and Germany, in cooperation with the Russians, would pose as much a threat to the enemy as Eisenhower's advance from the west, and, surrounded on three fronts, would most likely Make the enemy collapse as soon as possible.

Alexander has just held a conference with his commanders and is presenting his opinion separately to the Chief of the Reich General Staff.I would add that the considered opinion of two generals as able and experienced as Wilson and Alexander, which I valued highly, should not be lightly brushed aside by the Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; In any case, it should not, in considering its plans, exclude from the alternative proposals which both generals insisted on.Both of them, for many reasons, brought to my attention the urgent need to reach a decision by the end of next week, if possible. On June 23, General Eisenhower proposed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to concentrate our forces in direct support of the decisive campaign in northern France.He conceded that the advance through the Ljubljana Strait might hold back the German troops, but it would not lure any of their divisions away from France.As for the raid on the Bay of Biscay, he also believes that Bordeaux is closer to the United States than Marseilles, but he insists that he can use the troops already in the Mediterranean region to capture Marseilles faster, so as to provide a way for the north to participate in the battle to capture the Ruhr. direct route.He therefore urges the anvil to be carried out, of course, at the expense of our troops in Italy, since, in my opinion, the resource power of Britain and the United States does not allow us to maintain two major fronts in a European war, And each battlefield has its own decisive mission. We all agreed that Operation Overlord was the priority, and the question was how best to support the defeat of Germany with Italian forces in the second theater.The Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States strongly supported Eisenhower's opinion.They denounced what they called any commitment to bring the power of the Mediterranean to large-scale operations in northern Italy and the Balkans.We, the Chiefs of Staff, take the opposite view.On June 26, they declared that Allied forces in the Mediterranean could best assist Operation Overlord by destroying German forces opposing them.In order to launch the anvil on August 15th, the withdrawal of troops from the Italian front would have to begin immediately, and they would rather send troops by sea directly to Eisenhower than land on the Riviera.They said presciently: We believe that, if Operation Anvil is to be launched on such a scale as to be successful, the remainder of General Alexander's forces will have to be mopped up, and any further activity will be limited to very insignificant proportions. They insisted that Alexander should launch an offensive in Italy to engage and destroy all German forces that resisted them; One or more American divisions, and all the French divisions he can accommodate as our shipping capacity will allow. [1] Emphasis made by the author. This tit-for-tat conflict of opinions was motivated by sincerity on both sides, and heated debates were held.Only the President and I could resolve it, if at all, and so the telegram round-trip began. On June 28, I said: The impasse between our chiefs of staff raises some of the most serious questions.Our first desire is to support General Eisenhower in the most expeditious and effective manner, but we do not believe that doing so will necessarily bring down all our major affairs in the Mediterranean, so we find it difficult to understand that Why do we have to do this? I sincerely ask you to examine this matter yourself and please remember what you told me in Tehran about Istria and how I put it It referred to the formal meeting.This has entered my mind quite deeply, although it is by no means a pressing issue on which we have to decide. I afterwards summarized my conclusions to Mr. Roosevelt as follows: (1) Let us reinforce the Overlord directly and make maximum landings from the west. (2) Next, let us make the most of the excellent opportunities presented to the commanders in the Mediterranean, while our side at this stage only slightly diverts attacks and threats to hold the enemy near the Gulf of Lion. (3) Let us leave all the landing craft to General Eisenhower for as long as he wants to expand their landing capabilities. (4) Let us find out whether the throughput of the ports in the Overlord operation area has been raised to the maximum. (5) Let's make a decision not to ruin one great battle for another.Both battles are winnable. The president replied immediately, not taking it seriously.He was determined to carry out what he called Teheran's great strategy, namely, to complete the Overlord's plan, to advance victoriously in Italy, and to attack southern France as early as possible.Political ends may be important, but military action to achieve them must be subordinated to a campaign against the heart of Germany in Europe. Stalin himself had favored the anvil and had subordinated all other operations in the Mediterranean, so Mr. Roosevelt said he could not abandon the plan without first consulting with Stalin.The President added: My interests and hopes were centered on defeating the Germans before Eisenhower and driving them into Germany, not on confining our actions to a single major campaign in Italy.I believe that, after withdrawing the forces required by the Anvil, we will still have sufficient strength in Italy to pursue Kesselring north of the Pissarimini line, and to keep heavy pressure on his army, at least to contain the the necessary limits of his present power.I do not think the enemy will pay the price of ten additional divisions to keep us out of northern Italy, as General Wilson reckons. We were able, and Wilson confirmed this, to immediately draw up five divisions (three American and two French) from Italy to assist Project Anvil.The remaining twenty-one divisions, together with a large number of independent brigades, would certainly provide Alexander with sufficient ground superiority Mr. Roosevelt also said: Landing in the Bay of Biscay will cause a waste of shipping power.If Eisenhower needed more troops, they were all on standby in the United States, as long as he asked, but what the President objected to was the attack on the Istrian peninsula, and the attack on Vienna through the Ljubljana Strait.This not only shows the rigidity of the US military plan, but also shows that he himself has doubts about his so-called campaigns in the Balkan countries.Alexander and Smuts, he said, were inclined, for several natural and very human reasons, to disregard two considerations of vital importance.First, this operation interferes with the great strategy; second, it will take a long time, and we may not be able to mobilize more than six divisions.He wrote: I cannot agree to the use of American troops to attack Istria and into the Balkan countries, and I don't think the French will agree to the use of French troops in this way. There are some purely political reasons here. If people know that there are If a large number of troops are transferred to the Balkans, I can't bear the slightest setback in Operation Overlord.None of those involved in this discussion ever thought of sending troops into the Balkans, but Istria and Trieste are strategically and politically important, and this could provoke deep and widespread reactions , especially after the Russians pushed forward.He saw this section very clearly. The President suggested that we should present our respective views to Stalin.I said, if this dispute is really referred to him for resolution, I don't know what his opinion will be.On military grounds, he may have had a great interest in the eastward advance of Alexander's army, which would profoundly affect, if not enter, all the forces in the Balkan states, and which, moreover, was not unlike Stalin's campaign against Romania, or Combined with any possible Romanian attack on Transylvania, it could have far-reaching consequences.From a long-term political point of view, he may be willing to let the British and Americans bear the responsibility for the coming bitter battle in France, while Eastern, Central and Southern Europe will naturally fall into his grasp.However, I feel that it is more appropriate for the two of us to resolve this matter within ourselves.If we could meet face to face, as I always recommend, we would surely come to a pleasant agreement. On July 2, the President declared that he and his Joint Chiefs of Staff remained convinced that Project Anvil should begin as soon as possible, and asked us to instruct General Wilson as appropriate. While in Tehran, he said, he had only intended to launch a series of vigorous raids in Istria once the general German retreat from the Dodecanese and Greece had begun, but that had not yet happened. Finally he said: I am compelled to agree with my Chiefs of Staff on the ground that we should not disperse the main force to a new front. I truly believe that God will bless us as He did in Operation Overlord, and in Italy and North Africa.I always remember my elementary knowledge of geometry that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points. I had to back off for the time being, and on the same day ordered General Wilson to attack the south of France on August 15th.Preparations begin immediately, however, readers should be aware that the Anvil has now been renamed Dragoon.The reason for changing the name is to prevent the original code name from being learned by the enemy. By early August, however, marked changes had taken place on the battlefields of Normandy, and some major developments were on the horizon.On the 4th, I again raised the question of transferring the dragoons to the west with the President. prime minister to president roosevelt August 4, 1944 The course of events in Normandy and Brittany, and especially the brilliant operations of the American troops, show good prospects that the whole peninsula of Brittany will be in our hands in due time.I beg you to consider the possibility of diverting the Dragoons to the main and vital theater of operations, where they will be at hand at hand in the great and victorious campaign in which we are now engaged. Second, I cannot rashly say that all the details have been worked out in detail, but everyone here believes that these details can be resolved.Instead of forcing a landing on the enemy's strong fortifications, we can easily join the welcoming American troops at certain points along the Brittany peninsula northwestward from Saint-Nazaire. I feel that we have every right to use the extraordinary flexibility of sea and air forces to act with changing situations.The ten divisions allotted to the dragoons, with their landing craft, may soon be available.If this happened, it would have been decisive in Eisenhower's victorious march directly across France by the shortest route. 3. It is with all sincerity that I request that you instruct your Joint Chiefs of Staff to look into this proposal, and our people here are already working on it. I also hope that Hopkins can assist in this matter. Prime Minister to Mr Harry Hopkins August 6, 1944 It pains me to say that not even brilliant victories and increasing opportunities could bring us to strategic agreement.The brilliant operations of the American Army have not only cut off the Brest peninsula but, in my opinion, have greatly demoralized the scattered German forces remaining there.Saint-Nazaire and Nantes (one of your main ports of landing during the last war) could fall into our hands at any moment.Quiberon Bay, Lorient, and Brest will soon be captured for our side.I believe that the German forces south of the Cherbourg peninsula on the Atlantic coast are in a weak, disorganized state, and that Bordeaux may be taken easily and quickly.The presence of these Atlantic ports, in addition to our existing ones, will open the way for the total importation of the large number of American troops waiting to depart.Moreover, as soon as Saint-Nazaire was occupied by the Allies (in the present case, by the Americans), the ten divisions, now equipped for Dragoon operations, could immediately be transferred there.In this way, Eisenhower can quickly provide a new big port, and at the same time add a new army to his right flank in the march to the Seine. 2. Let me repeat: Regardless of whether the troops are transferred from the United States or the United Kingdom, all of the above are not within the scope of the original transportation plan.Now, instead of this, we must force us to attack the enemy heavily from the sea against the extremely fortified Riviera coast, and march westward to capture the two fortresses of Toulon and Marseilles. A new theater of operations in which the enemy was far stronger than ours at the outset, and where we were to advance against a maze of terrain, full of formidable rock formations, hills, and valleys. 3. Even after taking the fortresses of Toulon and Marseilles, we had to make a long march up the Rhone valley before we could reach Lyon.It is feared that none of these actions would have had an effect on Eisenhower's campaign within ninety days of the landing. [1] We do not act on the ground near Saint-Nazaire, but we begin our operations five hundred miles from the main battle-field.It is impossible to communicate with our troops on the peninsulas of Brest and Cherbourg and those which are under way to Toulon and Marseilles.After the capture of Marseilles, the round trip from America was about fourteen days longer than the direct voyage across the Atlantic. [1] The first major combat operations in which the forces of the Dragoon Project took part in mid-November after joining forces with Eisenhower's forces. 4. Of course, we will win anyway, but these are unshakable facts.When Plan Anvil was proposed in Tehran, it was intended to be a diversionary or containment operation a week before or a week after the date of the Overlord Offensive, in an attempt to bring eight or so German divisions to Lure away from the main campaign.The decision to proceed with the attack on Anzio, and the delay at Cassino, obliged us to continue to postpone the anvil, and when it was changed to dragoons, it had nothing to do with the plan originally considered.However, the bad turned into a good thing, and the sustained operations in Italy had drawn out no fewer than a dozen divisions from the German reserves in northern Italy and elsewhere, most of which had been destroyed.The coincidence of the defeat of Kesselring and the fall of Rome at the very moment of Operation Overlord far surpassed anything the Anvil Plan had anticipated, and to those who did not know what was going on, it seemed a What a great plan looks like.So I think that what Project Anvil was intended to achieve has now been achieved. 5. We did everything in our power to heed the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States after our formal objections had been invalidated and our views were dismissed, including providing nearly half of the naval forces that were about to enter combat .If it is true that this situation cannot be salvaged, then I can only sincerely hope that the American point of view is correct.But with victories won in France, and still greater victories appearing to be possible, a completely new situation has now arisen.It is under such circumstances that, on the recommendation of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, I think this question should be reopened.There were still three or four days before the decision to send to Saint-Nazaire the detachments already committed and more than half embarked for the execution of the dragoon plan could be reconsidered.I admit that there is some reason for those who say that it is too late to change the plan, but this opinion should be weighed against the seemingly overwhelming situation in our favor in strengthening the main campaign, so that we can have a better future. It is possible to kill Hitler within this year. 6. You know the great admiration I have for Marshall; and if you think it is right for you to ask about these matters, I shall gladly ask you to give him my opinion, especially in the following passages, Those words were my answer to him, as he might accuse me of supporting Anvil in Tehran and then later expressing my opposition to the plan. 7. Please also tell me whether my previous speech was satisfactory from the US military standpoint, and what parts of it you think I should have stated differently.I value the good relationship between our militaries above all else. With your kindest regards. His reply was far from comforting. Mr Harry Hopkins to the Prime Minister August 7, 1944 Call to learn.Although the President has not yet responded to your communication on the same incident, I am confident that his answer will be in the negative.I have not seen an analysis of the logistical problem, but I can say with absolute certainty that you will find the supply problem insurmountable.There are already several divisions available to meet Eisenhower's immediate mustering needs, and they will limit the burden on the ports.Moreover, no one knows the situation of several ports in Brittany.It seems to me that the tactical situation we have today in Operation Overlord is exactly as we planned it to be, and is exactly what we expected it to be when Project Anvil began.A change of strategy now would be a great mistake, and I believe it would retard rather than help our assured campaign in France.I also believe that moving north from the anvil will be faster than you might expect.The enemy cannot stop us.The French will also rise up and do to the mass of German invaders, including, I believe, M. Laval, what the Abyssinians did to the Italian invaders.A big victory is within reach. On that day I was near Portsmouth, visited Eisenhower at his headquarters, and confided to him my last hope of stopping the Dragoons.After a pleasant lunch we had a long and serious talk.Accompanying Eisenhower were: Bedell Smith and Admiral Ramsey. I was present at the meeting with the First Sea Lord because the movement of shipping was a key issue.In short, what I propose is to continue to load the dragoon expedition on board, but after the soldiers are on board, they should be sent through the Strait of Gibraltar and into France at Bordeaux.The matter had been considered for a long time by the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, and the operation was considered feasible.I took my unanswered telegram to the President, showed Eisenhower, and tried to convince him.The First Sea Lord strongly supported me.Admiral Ramsey talks about the arguments against changing the plan.Biddle Smith, on the contrary, declared that he was personally in favor of the plan, which deflected the attack abruptly, with all the surprises that naval power can exert.Eisenhower never showed any displeasure with the opinions expressed by his chief of staff.At the highest level, he always encouraged free expression.Of course, once a decision is made, it must be faithfully and unswervingly implemented. Even so, I could not shake him; the next day, I received a telegram from the President as follows: President Roosevelt to Prime Minister August 8, 1944 I have e-mailed our Joint Chiefs of Staff to disagree with your suggestion that the forces assigned to the dragoons could be moved to France through several ports on the coast of Brittany. On the contrary, I have considered and concluded that Operation Dragoon should proceed as planned at the earliest practicable date, and that I have every confidence that it will be successful, which is essential to Eisenhower in driving the Germans out of France. , would also be of great help. There is no other solution to this problem.It is worth noting that: American armies poured into Europe, and their ranks grew in the Far East; and for the first time in July they outnumbered us in combat operations in the war.We are now well past that day.The influence that affects the operations of Allied forces usually grows with a large number of reinforcements.It should also be remembered that if the British position on this strategic issue were to be accepted, there would likely be some delay in the tactical preparations, which would again react to the great debate. prime minister to president roosevelt August 8, 1944 I pray to God that you are right.We shall do our best to help you succeed!