Chapter 195 Volume 6, Chapter 5, Turmoil in the Balkans‧Russian Victory

The Necessity of Reaching a Political Agreement with Russia in Central and Eastern Europe May 18th Mr. Eden's Proposal on Greece and Romania May 31st Telegram to the President of the United States The Nervousness of the U.S. State Department Mr. Roosevelt's June 11th Telegram And my reply June 23 My telegram to the President of the United States Controversy among friends July 11 My telegram to Stalin on the Turkish question Stalin's noncommittal reply The Russian summer offensive August 25 Finland People asked for a truce to march on the Neman River. The twenty-five divisions of the German army crushed the Red Army across the Vistula River. The Romanian revolution.

In the summer of 1944, Soviet troops advanced into Central and Eastern Europe, and there was an urgent need to reach a political agreement with the Russians in those areas.The shape of postwar Europe seemed to be taking shape.Difficulties had begun to arise in Italy because of the intrigue of the Russians.We are negotiating directly with Tito, trying to reach a balanced result on the Yugoslavia issue.However, we have not made progress with Moscow on how to deal with Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, etc.The whole question was considered in its entirety at the Imperial Conference in London in May.

I wrote a memo to the foreign secretary at the time: May 4, 1944 A document should be drafted for the Cabinet (and possibly also for the Reichsconference) outlining (because it is necessary) the serious problems that exist between us and the Soviet government.These problems are growing in Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and other countries, but especially in Greece.Documentation shall be limited to one page. 2. I cannot yet say that there are many problems in Italy, but in general the question is: are we going to acquiesce in the communistization of the Balkans and perhaps Italy?Mr. Curtin has addressed this issue this morning.All in all, I think we should come to a definite conclusion on this; if our conclusion is to resist communist infiltration and aggression, we must put the question to them quite directly at the best time the military situation permits.Of course, we have to consult with the United States first.

On the same day, I also said: Clearly we are approaching a showdown with the Russians regarding their communist plots in Italy, Yugoslavia and Greece.I think their attitude is increasingly difficult to deal with. On May 18, the Soviet ambassador to London went to the Foreign Office to discuss a general proposal put forward by Mr. Eden, that in wartime, the affairs of Romania should be handled by the Soviet Union temporarily, while the affairs of Greece would be left to the We handle it.Russia is ready to take this proposal, but would like to know whether we have consulted with the United States.If it is negotiated, they agree to adopt it.I made an instruction on the minutes of this meeting: I would like to telegraph the President on this matter.He will probably agree, especially since we will certainly be in close contact with him.

I therefore sent a private telegram to Mr. Roosevelt on May 31: prime minister to president roosevelt May 31, 1944 There have been recent disturbing signs that our approach to the Balkans, especially Greece, may diverge.For this reason, we once suggested to the Soviet ambassador here that, as a practical matter, we should reach an agreement with each other: that is, the Soviet government should take the lead in dealing with the Romanian issue, and we should take the lead in dealing with the Greek issue. Support each other.Such an arrangement would be the inevitable result of the development of the current military situation, since Romania was under the jurisdiction of the Russian army, while Greece was under the jurisdiction of the Allied forces in the Mediterranean under General Wilson.

2. On May 18, the Soviet ambassador here told Eden: The Soviet government agrees with this proposal, but before making a final guarantee on the matter, we want to know whether we have consulted with the U.S. government and what the latter thinks agree to the agreement. 3. I hope this suggestion can get your approval.Of course, we do not intend to divide the countries of the Balkans into spheres of influence.While agreeing to the above arrangements, we must declare that such arrangements are only applicable in wartime situations; they will not affect any of the three major powers in exercising their rights and assuming responsibilities during and after the peaceful settlement of the entire European issue.At present, the United States and the United Kingdom jointly formulate and implement the policies of the allies towards the above-mentioned countries. Of course, this cooperative relationship will not change because of the above-mentioned arrangements.In any case, I consider the present arrangement to be a favorable measure to avoid any disagreement between our side and the Soviet side on the policy approach to the problems of the Balkan countries.

4. In the meantime, we have directed Halifax to raise the matter with the State Department along the lines outlined above. The State Department's initial response was lukewarm.Mr Hull is hypersensitive to any suggestion that might make one feel that there is an intention to divide spheres of influence, or accept it. On June 8th I telegraphed to Lord Halifax in Washington as follows: Prime Minister to Lord Halifax (Washington) June 8, 1944 There is no question of dividing spheres of influence.We should all act together, but someone has to play the cards.It's up to the Russians to deal with the Romanians and Bulgarians as the Soviets are storming them.The Greeks were ours to deal with, since they were in our designated theater of operations; they were our old allies; for them we lost forty thousand people in 1941; it seemed reasonable.I have reason to believe that the President fully agrees with my approach to Greece.The same is true for Yugoslavia.I have often kept him informed; but on the whole, our Majesty's Government is playing cards, and must play it carefully and in harmony with the Russians.There is nothing more unfortunate for any nation than at such a moment to be governed by the decisions of three or four parties exchanged by telegram.At this time, one problem was finally solved, but the other three problems went wrong.What's more, the situation in these countries is changing rapidly.

2. On the other hand, in South America, as long as the issue of beef and mutton is not related to our immediate interests, we always try our best to imitate the United States.Since we got very little beef and mutton, we will naturally have a lot of opinions. On June 11, Mr. Roosevelt replied: In short, we recognize that a government assuming military responsibility in any given area will inevitably have to make decisions as military progress requires; but we believe that the natural tendency of such decisions is to extend to non-military areas, and an agreement of the type suggested would reinforce this tendency.It seems to us that this will necessarily lead to you and the Soviet Union dissenting from each other and drawing up spheres of influence in the Balkans, although you claim that this arrangement is limited to military matters.

We believe it would be preferable to commit to the establishment of consultative institutions that would dispel misunderstandings and discourage the tendency to develop exclusive spheres of influence. prime minister to president roosevelt June 11, 1944 Received the call, very disturbed.Action would be paralyzed if each party had to consult with the other parties before every action was taken.Developments in these parts of the Balkans often outpace changes in the situation.Someone must have the authority to deploy and act.The Consultative Committee was nothing less than a stumbling block; in emergencies it was always necessary to set aside this body and have a direct exchange of views with Stalin, either between you or me.

2. Now review the events that took place during Easter.We are in a position to deal with the mutiny in Greece exactly as you suggest.This is because I have been able to issue constant orders to the military generals, who at first favored conciliation, especially without the use of force, or even the threat of force, with very few deaths, and the situation in Greece is much better; Change, the situation can be saved from chaos and disaster.The Russians intend to agree to deal with the Greek issue on our side, which means that the National Liberation Front and its various plots can be controlled by the Greek National Army.Otherwise, civil war and destruction are inevitable in the land you care so much about.I have regularly kept you informed about developments in the past and will continue to keep you informed in the future.You'll keep getting calls from me.I think you can trust me on this.

3. If faced with the above-mentioned difficulties, we have to negotiate with some other big powers in everything, and thus start a set of telegram exchanges among the three or four parties. The only result can only be confusion or powerlessness. 4. Given the imminent march of Russian armies into Romania, if the Romanians play a role (and they are quite likely to do so), the Russians will also help them retake part of Transylvania from Hungary.With all of this in mind, it seems to me that acknowledging the leadership of the USSR in the country seems advisable; because considering that you and I don't have any soldiers there, they can do whatever they want.Moreover, I think that the conditions put forward by the Russians are reasonable, even lenient, except for compensation.The Romanian army fought fiercely in the war against Russia, causing heavy losses to the Soviet army.I don't see any difficulty in having a dialogue with the Russians at any time and on any subject; but since they are already doing it, let them do it on the agreed lines. 5. Our situation in Greece is similar.We are old allies of Greece. We paid 40,000 casualties trying to defend Greece against Hitler, not counting the loss of Crete.The king and government of Greece are under our protection.They are currently living in Egypt and will probably move to Lebanon because the atmosphere there is better than Cairo.Not only did we lose 40,000 men in helping Greece, as mentioned above, but we also lost a large number of ships; moreover, in helping Greece, we weakened the defenses of Cyrenaica, so that Wavell had already occupied Cyrenaica. The area is all lost.All this was a heavy blow to us at the time.During a recent crisis, your call worked wonders for me.We were in perfect sync and the results were very satisfying.Why should this fruitful channel of command between us be interrupted and replaced by a committee of mediocre officials?Do we still have too few such institutions around the world?Since we share so many insights, why shouldn't we share this situation together? 6. To sum it up, I suggest that we should reach an agreement on this, that is, the arrangement proposed in my telegram on May 31 can be tried for three months, and will be reviewed by the three major powers after the expiration of the period. On June 13 the President agreed with this proposal, but added: We must be careful to state that we are not creating any post-war spheres of influence. I agreed with him and replied the next day: Thank you for your call.I have informed the Foreign Minister to convey this to Molotov and to state that the reason for the three-month trial period is so that we do not prejudge the question of establishing post-war spheres of influence. In the afternoon of that day, I reported the current situation to the war cabinet, and reached a consensus that the foreign minister should notify the Soviet government on the condition of a three-month trial period, and we agreed to divide the overall responsibility.The above is what was done on June 19th. But the president is not happy with what we've done.In his harrowing call to me, he said: We are disturbed that this matter was brought up to us by your people only after consultation with the Russians.I then responded to the President's accusation again on June 23, summarizing the situation as I saw it from London: prime minister to president roosevelt June 23, 1944 In Romania, the Russians are the only big powers that can do whatever they want.I think you and I agree that, in addition to the terms of reparations, on the basis of the terms of a reasonable truce, they should try to be as consistent as possible with regard to the events taking place in the country.In fact, the three of us worked closely together in Cairo on the recent tentative peace proposals from Romania.On the other hand, when we aided Greece in 1941, we lost 40,000 troops, in vain. Since then, Greece has become a burden, almost entirely on our shoulders.In the same way, although you let us play cards in Turkey, we have always consulted with you beforehand on matters of policy;According to the prevailing diplomatic practice, which is to adopt a general policy of sliding to the left, I can easily let the situation go its own way. At that time, the Greek king will probably be forced to abdicate, and the National Liberation Front will terrorize Greece. Many other classes of people organized security camps with the support of the Germans to avoid total anarchy.The only way I can prevent this from happening is to convince the Russians to stop supporting the FNL and do everything in their power to raise its value.So I proposed to the Russians a temporary working arrangement to better conduct the war.Of course, this is only a suggestion, subject to your consent. 2. I cannot admit that I am at fault in this matter.Three people in three different regions of the world, if one of them wants to make a suggestion to any other person, he must notify the third person at the same time, then it is impossible for the three to cooperate effectively.A recent instance suffices to illustrate this point: you have quite rightly informed Uncle Jo of the details of your talks with the Poles, but I have not heard anything about it from you so far.But I have no complaints about it, because I understand that our work has a general theme and purpose.I hope you will feel the same way about my approach to Greece. 3. I have also taken steps to try to align Tito's forces with those of Serbia, with all forces loyal to the Government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which both of us recognize.At each stage, we let you understand how we carry this heavy burden, which is currently mainly on us.On this issue, there is also the most convenient way, that is, to throw the king and the Yugoslav Kingdom government to the wolves, and let the civil war break out in Yugoslavia, which makes the Germans happy.In dealing with the affairs of these two countries, I always tried to hold the situation so that I could concentrate on the common enemy.I keep you informed of the situation constantly, and hope to have your trust and help as far as we have the initiative to take action. The President's reply of June 27 settled the friend's dispute.He said: It seems that both of us have acted alone in some way out of nowhere, and we both now agree that it was a temporary expedient.It is necessary that we should agree on all matters affecting the efforts of the Allied forces in the war. I gave the following reply on the same day: You can be sure that before, during and after each issue is dealt with, I will always pay attention to the principles we have agreed upon. However, difficulties remain at the government level.The Russians insisted on direct consultations with the United States. There is another issue that deserves our attention.Russia is marching on the Romanian border, and this is Turkey's last chance to join the war on the side of the Allies.If she enters the war at this stage, it will have a huge impact on the future of Southeastern Europe.At this time, Turkey even stated that it would sever relations with the Axis powers. I told Stalin my opinion of these events. Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin July 11, 1944 A few weeks ago, Eden suggested to your ambassador: the Soviet government should deal with the Romanian issue, and the British government should deal with the Greek issue.This was only a temporary working arrangement, designed to avoid as much as possible the embarrassing practice of paralyzing the operation through the three-way exchange of telegrams.Molotov then very appropriately suggested that I should inform the United States of this.I have notified the United States, as I always do.After several discussions, the President of the United States has agreed to the proposal for a three-month trial.Marshal Stalin: The three months of July, August, and September may be very important months.But now I understand that this approach has certain difficulties for you.I have the honor to inquire whether you agree to a three-month trial.No one can say that doing so will affect the future of Europe or lead to the division of spheres of influence in Europe; but we can have a clear course in each field, and we can inform both countries of the actions we are taking.But I don't blame you if you don't have any hope for this suggestion. 2. There is another matter I want to bring to you.Turkey is currently willing to sever diplomatic relations with the Axis powers immediately.I agree with you that Turkey should declare war.But I am concerned that if we ask it to do so, it will ask us for aircraft to defend its towns in self-defense, and we are having trouble finding aircraft to station in Turkey at the same time as it is asking for joint action in Bulgaria and the Aegean Military action; we are not in a position to do that at the moment.In addition, it will again ask for all kinds of munitions assistance, which we cannot support; because the munitions we prepared for it at the beginning of the year have been used for other purposes.So it seems to me that the smarter way is to see the severance of relations with Germany as the first step, and then we can send some equipment to help it deal with the enemy's retaliatory air attacks; It is likely that this will lead to war.During World War I, Germany valued its alliance with Turkey.Therefore, if Turkey cuts off relations with Germany, it will be a death knell for the German soul; and it seems that now is a good time to ring that death knell. 3. I am just presenting to you my personal views on these issues, and Aiden is also passing on my thoughts to Mr. Molotov. 4. We have about 1.05 million troops in Normandy, equipped with a large amount of equipment, and increase our troops by 25,000 every day.The battle was extremely difficult.Our country and the United States have lost 64,000 people, and the casualties in recent battles have not yet been counted.But all indications were that the number of enemy casualties was at least as high; besides, we took 51,000 prisoners. In view of the fact that we have been on the offensive and have landed by sea, I believe that the enemy has been severely damaged.The front continues to expand, and the battle will continue. 5. Alexander is also advancing hard in Italy. He hopes to break through the Pisa-Rimini defense line and enter the Po River Valley.This move can make the German army either transfer more divisions to fight him, or be forced to give up valuable strategic positions. 6. Londoners are bravely defending against missile attacks.Casualties so far stand at 22,000; it appears that the bombing will be prolonged. 7. Once again, I would like to congratulate you on your glorious march to Vilna. Stalin's reply was noncommittal: Marshal Stalin to Prime Minister July 15, 1944 On Romania and Greece.One thing is clear to me, that is, the U.S. government still has some doubts about this issue, and it is best to wait for the U.S. to answer our questions before discussing this matter.As soon as I get the opinion of the U.S. government, I will definitely write to you for further discussion on this issue. 2. With regard to the Turkish question, consideration must be made in the light of the facts already known when the governments of Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States were negotiating with the Turkish government at the end of last year.You must recall that, as early as November and December 1943, our three governments strongly suggested that Turkey join the Allies in fighting Hitler, but to no avail.As you know, at the initiative of the Turkish government, we negotiated with the Turkish government again in May and June this year, and once again proposed to it the proposal put forward by the three allied governments at the end of last year. This time, however, there was no result.As for the various expedient measures proposed by Turkey, I do not yet see any benefit to the allies. In view of the ambiguous attitude of the Turkish government towards Germany and prevarications, it is best not to intervene in it, let it do its thing, and refrain from exerting new pressure on it.This meant, of course, that Turkey, which shunned fighting Germany, could not claim any special rights when dealing with postwar issues. As a result, we were unable to reach any final agreement on the division of responsibilities in the Balkans.In early August, the Russians found an excuse to send a delegation from Italy to northern Greece to contact the People's Liberation Army.Given the official reluctance of the United States and the Russians' bad faith in the matter, we stopped working on a major understanding until my meeting with Stalin in Moscow two months later. By then, the Eastern Front had changed dramatically. The Russian Summer Offensive is a story of unrelenting triumph.Here I can only give a brief account. The offensive began with an auxiliary offensive against the Finns.The Finns deepened and fortified the former Mannerheim Line from Lake Ladoga to the Baltic Sea, creating an impenetrable defense system.However, the quality and equipment of the Soviet army at this time were quite different from those they fought here in 1940. Therefore, after 12 days of fierce fighting, they broke through the defense line and captured Vyborg on June 21.On the same day, military operations began again, sweeping the northern shore of Lake Ladoga.By the end of the month, the Soviets had driven the enemy back home and resumed rail traffic from Leningrad to Murmansk, the terminus of our Arctic convoy.The Finnish army, with the support of the German army, resisted for a short time, but after all they could not resist, and finally requested a truce on August 25. On June 23 the attack on the German line between Vitebsk and Gomel began.In these two places, as well as in many towns and villages such as Bobruisk and Mogilev, the German army has established strong positions and arranged circular fortifications; but when the Soviet army poured into the gap between these towns, These positions were surrounded and cleared one after another.Within a week, the Soviet army had advanced 80 miles; then they seized the opportunity to take advantage of the victory and advance, conquering Minsk on July 6, blocking the retreating enemy forces in a hastily formed line of defense.This line of defense stretched south from Vilna to the Pripyat Marsh area; from there, the German army was quickly wiped out by the overwhelming and surging Soviet army.At the end of July, the Red Army marched into Kovno and Grodno and reached the Neman River.After advancing 250 miles in five weeks, the Soviet army stopped temporarily to rest here.The Germans suffered heavy losses, twenty-five divisions were destroyed, and an equal number of troops were besieged at Courland. [1] On July 17 alone, 57,000 German prisoners passed through Moscow, and no one knew where they would be taken. [1] See Guderian: "The Chief of Armored Forces", page 352. The Soviet army in the south of the Pripyat Marsh area also did a good job and achieved brilliant results.On July 13 they launched a series of attacks on the front between Kovel and Stanislav.Ten days later, the German army collapsed on all fronts, and the Russians advanced another 120 miles westward to Yaroslaw on the San River.Stanislav, Lemberg, and Przemyšl were isolated during the massive Soviet attack and were soon captured.Taking advantage of the victory, the Russians crossed the Vistula south of Sandomer on July 30.At this time, the Soviet army suspended its advance due to the need for supplies.The crossing of the Vistula was seen by the Polish resistance in Warsaw as the signal to launch the unfortunate Warsaw Uprising.This unfortunate uprising will be dealt with in another chapter. The Russians won much more than that in this great battle.Their victories extended as far south as Romania.Until after August, the German defense line from Chernivtsi to the Black Sea blocked the roads to Romania and its Ploiesti oil fields and the countries of the Balkan Peninsula; The line of defense that was about to fall, this line of defense was weakened, and then under the fierce attack launched by the Soviet army on August 22, the line of defense collapsed rapidly. The Russians, supported by the landing force at sea, quickly overwhelmed the enemy.The Germans lost sixteen divisions.On August 23, the young King Michael led a coup in Bucharest, which brought about a fundamental change in the entire military situation.All the officers and soldiers of the Roman army followed the king in unison.In the three days before the arrival of the Soviets, the Germans were either disarmed or retreated across the northern border.By September 1, all German troops had withdrawn from Bucharest.The Romanian army collapsed and Romania was occupied.The Romanian government surrenders.Bulgaria was conquered despite a last-minute attempt to declare war on Germany.The Russian army marched westward, drove straight into the Danube River basin, crossed the Transylvanian Alps, and reached the Hungarian border; at the same time, the left wing of the Russian army on the south bank of the Danube also sent troops to the Yugoslav border to prepare for the westward advance of the army.This westward advance would bring them to Vienna in due course.