Chapter 210 Volume 6 Chapter 20 Preparations for a new meeting

The advance of the Red Army, the battle in Italy, the political problems of Eastern Europe, the correspondence between the President and Stalin concerning Poland, the need for a conference of the three powers, and I agree with this initiative, my telegram to Mr. Roosevelt and his reply on January 1, and my efforts to arrange a joint staff Long Committee meeting January 21 Harry Hopkins to London Doubts about Yalta location January 29 I fly to Malta February 26 Port of Valletta British and American Chiefs of Staff Discussion of going to Saky's wintry flight drove straight to Yalta. The advance of Soviet troops to the borders of Poland and Hungary has been described in previous chapters.The Russians, after taking Belgrade on October 20, had penetrated again into the Danube valley, but when they pushed deeper into the Hungarian plain, they met with stubborn resistance.On November 29th they approached a bridgehead on the Danube eighty miles south of Budapest, and marched northward, and by the end of December the capital was completely surrounded and endured for six weeks some extremely cruel attacks. street fighting.On the shores of Lake Balaton, the tenacious German resistance and fierce counter-offensive also stopped the Russian advance until the next spring.

The Russians devoted the autumn months to regrouping their troops after a massive summer advance in Poland.By January they will be ready.Striking westward from the forward position of Sandomer, by the end of the month they had crossed the frontier and plunged deep into the great industrial basin of Upper Silesia; The city was captured in seven days, and, while besieging Posen, advanced in a fan formation down the Oder towards Stettin and Danzig.They invaded East Prussia simultaneously from the east and south.By the end of January they had taken the whole of the country, except the fortress of Königsberg, which was heavily guarded by the enemy.Here the garrison, like that at Danzig, continued to put up a tenacious and hopeless resistance until April.The German troops cut off from Courland remained there until Germany surrendered because Hitler would not allow them to withdraw.

The Soviet High Command, with perhaps a three-to-one ratio of superior army strength and superior air force, employed a strategy reminiscent of Foch's final victory in 1918.A succession of battles, now here, now there, drove successive gaps along a broad front, until at last the whole line of the enemy was forced back. Our own campaign on the Western Front, though on a smaller scale, also brought us to the frontiers of Germany.So by the end of January 1945, Hitler's army, except for a few weak strongholds in Hungary and northern Italy, was practically compressed within its borders.In Italy, as has already been said, Alexander's hopeless offensive, though ingenious but cut off, was brought to a halt.In November, the Strategic and Tactical Air Forces began a six-month air campaign against the railway line from Germany to Italy.With the transformer station destroyed, much of the Brenner Line had to be powered off of electricity and replaced by steam, while enemy reinforcements and supplies elsewhere were severely hampered.It is impossible to record the tense daily combat situation of the Allied Tactical Air Force under the command of General Cannon, the commander-in-chief of the US Air Force.Their suppression of the enemy in bad weather was of great help to the autumn campaign, and so greatly deserved the commendation of General Alexander in his telegram:

I cannot praise enough General Cannon's gifts as a leader, and the encouragement I have been given by his constant help and support.To measure his merits, look only at the complete immunity from enemy air attack and the close and vigorous support of our ground forces.When our troops enter enemy territory, there is everywhere to be seen a succession of wrecked enemy vehicles, bombed bridges, and useless railways. However, the liberation of Italy will not be completed until next spring. The above is the military situation on the eve of the upcoming three-nation meeting. The political situation, at least with regard to Eastern Europe, is by no means all that satisfactory.

Greece has achieved only an uneasy calm, as if a free and democratic government could be formed in due time, on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot.But Romania and Bulgaria have fallen into the hands of the Soviet military occupation.Hungary and Yugoslavia were already in the shadow of the battlefield.The liberation of Poland from the Germans was only the exchange of one conqueror for another.The future of this vast area, once Germany has been defeated, cannot be dictated or affected by the informal and temporary arrangements agreed upon with Stalin when I visited Moscow in October, and, as far as I am concerned, it was never intended to be so .

The whole shape and structure of postwar Europe urgently needs to be revisited.What should happen to Germany once the Nazis are defeated?What help do we expect from the Soviet Union in the final defeat of Japan?Once the military objectives are achieved, what measures and organizations can the three major allies provide for the future peace and effective management of the world?Discussions at Dumbarton Oaks ended without agreement on some issues.Negotiations between the Soviet-sponsored Lublin Poles and their compatriots from London, brought about by Mr. Eden and I overcoming many difficulties during our visit to the Kremlin in October 1944, were Although the scope is small, the importance is not small, but the result is the same as the Dumbarton negotiations.There was a dry correspondence between the President and Stalin (Mr. Roosevelt kept telling me) after Mikoleichek broke away from his colleagues in London, and on January 5th the Soviets went against the Anglo-American The desire of both countries to recognize the Lublin Council as the provisional government of Poland.

The President has told me that he exchanged some telegrams with Stalin as follows: Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt December 27, 1944 Several things that have happened since Mikoleček's last visit to Moscow, in particular the radio communications we have intercepted with the Mikoleček government from secret agents of the Polish government-in-exile terrorists arrested in Poland, It is evident that Mikoleček's negotiations with the Polish National Council were used as a kind of smokescreen to direct behind Mikoleček's heinous terror against Soviet officers and soldiers in Poland.Terrorists were ordered by Polish exiles to kill Red Army officers and soldiers in Poland, to lead a criminal struggle against the Soviet Army that liberated Poland, and to directly help our enemies, who were in fact their allies, and we cannot tolerate such a situation .Alciszewski's succession to Mikoleček, and the general change of Polish government-in-exile ministers, had exacerbated the situation and created a crisis in relations between Poland and the government-in-exile.During this period, the Polish National Council has achieved some major achievements, such as strengthening the Polish state and the governmental authority in Poland, expanding and strengthening the Polish army, implementing many important administrative measures, and above all the land reform in favor of the peasants .All this has led to the consolidation of the democratic forces in Poland, and has greatly increased the prestige of the National Council among the broad masses of Poland and among the broad circles of Polish society abroad.

In my opinion, our concern now is to support the Polish National Council and all those who are willing and able to cooperate with it, which is especially important for the Allies and for our common task to speed up the solution to defeat Hitler's Germany.As far as the Soviet Union has taken full responsibility for the liberation of Poland from the hands of the German occupiers, the question of its relations with Poland, in the present circumstances, is to establish a relationship with the Polish people on its own soil. The regime in Germany, which had always maintained close and friendly relations, had grown and had an army of its own which was fighting alongside the Red Army against the Germans.

I should say frankly that if the KNL were to change itself into the Polish Provisional Government, there would be no serious reason for the Soviet government to postpone the question of its recognition, in light of the above.It must be remembered that the Soviet Union, more than any other country, was more concerned with strengthening a pro-Allied and democratic Poland, not only because the Soviet Union bore the main burden of the war for the liberation of Poland, but also because Poland was a close neighbor of the Soviet Union, and therefore the Polish question had nothing to do with the Soviet Union's Security concerns are inseparable.I should add that the success of the Red Army against Germany in Poland depended largely on the existence of a peaceful and secure Polish rear.The Polish National Council is fully aware of this situation, while the government-in-exile and its secret agents are using terror to neutralize the Red Army's victory by creating the threat of civil war in the Red Army's rear.

On the other hand, in the present situation in Poland, there is no reason to continue to adopt a policy of supporting the government-in-exile, which has completely lost the confidence of the Polish people at home and which threatens civil war in the rear of the Red Army, thereby compromising our victory over the German common interest.I think it would be very important if the governments of the Allied Powers agreed to immediately exchange representatives with the Polish National Council as a first step, so that after a period of time after the National Council changed into the Polish Provisional Government, it could be recognized as the legitimate government of Poland. Our common cause will be as natural as it is just and beneficial.Otherwise, I am afraid that the confidence of the Polish people in the Allies will be weakened.I don't think we can have the Polish people accuse us of sacrificing Polish interests for the benefit of a small group of Polish exiles in London.

Mr. Roosevelt gave me his reply in his telegram to me. President Roosevelt to Prime Minister December 30, 1945 I have sent the following letter to Stalin today.You'll see we're in lockstep. I am disturbed and deeply disappointed by your December 27th telephone call concerning Poland, in which you told me that you could not suspend the recognition of the Lublin Council as the Provisional Polish Government until we had the opportunity to hold a meeting. The whole issue will be discussed thoroughly at the meeting.If you were able to postpone the purely legal act of recognition for a month, that short period before we meet, I do not think it would cause serious inconvenience to your Government and military. In my request I did not ask you to reduce your de facto relationship with the Lublin Committee, nor did I intend to oblige you to deal with or recognize the Polish government presently in London as it is structured.The reason why I urge you to delay this step is because I think you will appreciate that if your government formally recognizes another government in Poland, while most of the members of the United Nations, including the United States and Britain, continue to What an extremely unfortunate, even extremely serious, effect on world opinion and on the morale of the enemy, at the present stage of the war, to recognize the Polish government in London and to maintain diplomatic relations with it. I must tell you as frankly as you do that my government will not follow you in recognizing the Lublin Council in its present state, apart from the Polish government in London it now recognizes.This is not because of any special relationship or affection for the London (Polish) government.The fact is that the U.S. government and people have found no basis, either in terms of the way in which the Lublin Committee was created or in its subsequent development, to conclude that the Lublin Committee, as constituted at present, is, of course, representative of the Polish people.I cannot ignore the fact that so far only a small part of Poland proper west of the Curzon Line has been liberated from German tyranny; so that the Polish people have had no opportunity to express their views on the Lublin Committee, which is a There is no doubt about the actual situation. If one day in the future, after Poland is liberated, a Polish provisional government is established with the support of the people, our government's attitude will of course depend on the decision of the Polish people. I completely agree with you that Mikoleček has exacerbated the situation since he left the Polish government in London.I am sure that Mikoleček is sincerely willing to settle all disputed issues between the Soviet Union and Poland, and I have always felt that he is the only Polish leader who at present seems to have the possibility of a real solution to the difficult and dangerous Polish question.As far as I know personally about Mikoleček, the conversations I had with him in Washington, and his subsequent efforts and policies during his visit to Moscow, it is extremely difficult for me to believe that he would have any serious concerns about any terrorist orders. know. I am writing to you now to let you know the position of my Government with regard to the present recognition of the Lublin Council as the Provisional Government.I am more convinced than ever that when the three of us get together we will be able to settle the Polish question, so I still hope that you will hold off on formally recognizing the Lublin Council as the Polish government until then.From a military point of view, I don't think a month's delay will be much of a hindrance. Stalin replied as follows: Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt January 1, 1945 I have received your call of December 30th. I deeply regret not being able to convince you that the attitude of the Soviet government to the Polish question was correct.I hope, however, that developments will convince you that the Polish National Council has been and continues to be of great assistance to the Allies, and especially to the Red Army, in the struggle against Hitler's Germany, while the Government-in-Exile in London, during the war Create a division to help the Germans. I certainly understand very well your suggestion that the recognition of the Polish Provisional Government by the Soviet Government should be postponed for one month.There is however one circumstance which makes it impossible for me to grant your wish.The fact is that as early as December 27 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in reply to Poland's inquiries on this question, informed them of its intention to recognize the organization of the Polish Provisional Government as soon as it was formed.This circumstance makes it impossible for me to grant your wishes. Let me congratulate you on the new year and wish you good health and success in your work. I am now getting a direct call from Stalin about Poland. Marshal Stalin to Prime Minister January 4, 1945 You are of course aware of the announcement of the Polish National Council in Lublin that it has decided to transform the Polish National Liberation Council into the Provisional Government of the Polish Republic.You are also well aware of our relationship with the Polish National Council, which, in our opinion, already enjoys great authority in Poland and is the legitimate representative of the Polish national will.The transformation of the Polish National Council into a provisional government seems to us very timely, especially since Mikoleček is no longer a member of the Polish government-in-exile, which therefore no longer looks like a government.I don't think it is possible for Poland not to have a government.Therefore the Soviet government has agreed to recognize the Polish Provisional Government. I deeply regret that I have not at all been able to convince you that the attitude of the Soviet Government with regard to the Polish question is correct.I hope, however, that subsequent developments will prove that our recognition of the Polish government at Lublin is in the interests of the common cause of the Allies and will help hasten the defeat of Germany. Enclosed are two telegrams from me to the President concerning Poland.for your information. I know that the President has your consent that the three of us will meet at the end of this month or early February, and I will be delighted to see you and the President on our soil.Hope our joint work will be successful. Take this opportunity to congratulate you on the New Year and wish you good health and success at work. In my opinion, it will not be of much use to continue the correspondence.There is only hope for face-to-face meetings. Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin January 5, 1945 Thank you for enclosing two of your telegrams to the President concerning Poland.My colleagues in the War Cabinet and I are of course troubled by the current course of events.I knew very well that the best way would be for the three of us to meet together and discuss all these issues, not just as isolated issues, but in relation to the whole world situation of war and transition to peace.During this period, our attitude, as you know, has not changed. The President was convinced of the need for another tripartite meeting and spent some time discussing the arrangements for this meeting.Usually a debate about the location of the meeting ensues.The President said: If Stalin cannot manage to meet with us in the Mediterranean, I am going to go to Crimea and have a meeting in Yalta, which seems to be the most suitable place on the Black Sea, with the best landing facilities on the shore and the best flying conditions most favorable.My entourage was the same as when I arrived in Tehran, about thirty-five people.I still hope that the military situation will induce Marshal Stalin to come to terms with us. I reply as follows: prime minister to president roosevelt December 28, 1944 I sent the Admiralty report on Yalta.If this site is selected, it would be desirable to have several destroyers available for our lodging if necessary.Flying from Caserta's large air base and weather central station will have no difficulty. I myself landed at Simferopol in a Yorke.However, I expected Stalin to make arrangements ashore.Our entourage will be kept to a minimum.I think we should be at the end of January.I must take Anthony and Leathers with me. On the 30th, Mr. Roosevelt called to say that as soon as the presidential inauguration ceremony was held, he would sail to the Mediterranean on a warship and then fly to Yalta.I immediately agreed to this, and promised to send a steamer to Sevastopol to supplement our lodgings ashore.I myself intend to fly directly via Caserta.On December 31, I called and said: What name do you give this operation?If not, I suggest Argonaut [1], a name that has only local significance and no inferential associations. [1] According to ancient Greek legend, a group of about fifty warriors sailed from Iorkus in Thessaly to Colchis (between the Caucasus and Armenia) on the Argo ship under the leadership of Jason. Find the Golden Fleece.Argonot refers to these warriors.translator But those around the president advocated flying from Caserta instead.His advisers, doctors and others deemed him unfit to fly high in the mountains between Italy and Yalta.Admiral Hewitt suggested taking the sea route to Malta and from there by air.I agree too. prime minister to president roosevelt January 1, 1945 We would be delighted if you come to Malta.I'll meet you at the pier.You will also see an engraving of the excellent inscription you wrote for Malta a year ago.Everything can be properly arranged for you.Let's not hesitate any longer!Just go from Malta to Yalta!Don't change anyone! I have carved this meaning into a sentence for my own amusement: Let us not change, waver or ambiguity. From Malta to Yalta; from Yalta to Malta. Perhaps it is the same if I do not send a telegram. President Roosevelt to Prime Minister January 2, 1945 We expected to arrive in Malta by boat in the early noon of February 2nd, and hoped to fly there immediately, so we did not hesitate to waver.What a pleasure it will be to meet you at the docks! A special welcome to your proposed name of Argonaut.You and I are direct descendants. Lord Halifax reported from Washington that he had seen the President the day before, and he thought the President looked ill.But Mr. Roosevelt told him he was fine and was looking forward to seeing us.He said he thought our action in Greece to be of great value; and he regretted not being able to visit England on this trip.He was extremely concerned about the suicide planes of the Japanese in the Pacific Ocean, because it meant that forty or fifty Americans would often be sacrificed in exchange for one Japanese. He did not have much hope for an early end to any war. These remarks, and other considerations, made me very tempted to arrange a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in which the two of us could chair or attend before the meeting with Stalin.So I send the following telegram: prime minister to president roosevelt January 5, 1945 Is it possible for you to spend two or three nights in Malta and have the staff talk together unobtrusively?Eisenhower and Alexander will also be there.We think it is important to have some discussions about things that do not affect the Russians, for example, about Japan and about the future use of Italian troops.We can make all arrangements as long as you say so. 2. We regret that you will not be able to come to our island during this journey.We should be deeply sorry, and a very unpleasant impression should be created, should you visit France before you go to Britain; indeed it would be considered a slight to your closest ally.But I guess you'll only go to the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.If so, it would be nothing more than a repeat of the trip to Tehran. 3. The Chief of the Reich General Staff and I have spent two very interesting days at Eisenhower's headquarters in Versailles.It so happened that de Gaulle also arrived there at the same time.He is here for the matter which has been telegraphed to you and me as Heads of Government, concerning the South (Strasbourg).We had an informal meeting, and as far as he was concerned, the matter had been satisfactorily adjusted.Eisenhower was very generous to him. 4. Now I am going to visit Montgomery on Eisenhower's train, but the weather is bad and I cannot fly.The whole country is covered with snow.I hope to be back in England on Saturday.Wish you all the best. At first the President thought it impossible for us to have a caucus in Malta. He said that if the weather at sea was good, he could get there on February 2, and he had to take off that day and keep going so as not to miss the date agreed with Stalin.He called and said: Due to the timing of this trip, I regret that it is impossible for us to accept your proposal to hold a meeting of the British and American Chiefs of Staff in Malta before we go to Argonott.I don't think any opportunity is lost by not meeting in Malta nor in Yalta.I envy you that you can go to the big front for inspection. I can't get such an opportunity because of the long distance.However I stand by my proposal.The reader will recall that in my telegram to the President of December 6[1] I expressed my apprehensions concerning our military operations in Northwest Europe.I still worry about these issues.The chiefs of staff of the United Kingdom and the United States need to talk before we reach Yalta. I also hope that their main members will arrive in Malta two or three days earlier than we do, and they will inspect the battlefield together.I also hope that the President will invite Eisenhower, and if he is able to leave the field for a while, I want Alexander to come too.It seems that the foreign ministers should have a similar meeting, which is consistent with the purpose of this military preparatory meeting.I don't know if the President will come with the newly appointed Stettinius, and I don't know if Molotov will come, but I hope that a week or so before the President and I arrive in Yalta, Eden, Stettinius and Titinius and Molotov could have a meeting in Alexandria or the Pyramids. 【1】Chapter Seventeen, Two Hundred and Thirty-Four｜Page 6 (translator of the original page number). So I sent another telegram on January 8th, and after making this suggestion I went on: I still think it is very important that our military personnel should have a few days of meetings together before we reach Yalta.No doubt they will have the opportunity to talk together in Sevastopol on days when we discuss politics without consulting military-technical experts.Nevertheless, there are still a large number of issues that must be studied in advance, and indeed should be considered on our agenda. How long should we stay in Yalta, what do you think?This may well be a fateful meeting, coming at a time when the great allies are so divided and the shadow of war stretches before us.At the moment I think the end of this war may be a lot more disappointing than the last one. The President replied that he had directed Marshall, King, and Arnold, with their aides, to arrive in Malta in time for a meeting with the British staff on the morning of January 30, but explained that he could not send Stettinius to the meeting. Preparatory meeting of foreign ministers.As long as he himself needs to go abroad, his secretary of state cannot be away from the country for a long time at the same time.He himself will join us in Malta and go to the Tri-Nation Conference together. Finally he said: As to the length of the stay in Yalta, my opinion is that it should not exceed five or six days.If possible, I am very much looking forward to keeping the date agreed with Uncle Joe. It would be better than nothing, but in my opinion, I'm afraid there won't be enough time, so I stand by my opinion. prime minister to president roosevelt January 10, 1945 1. Regarding the preparatory meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, I would like to express my gratitude to you. 2. Eden once specifically asked me to suggest to you that Stettinius and the chiefs of staff of the United States could come to Malta 48 hours in advance so that (Eden) could briefly discuss the agenda with him in advance.Even if Molotov hadn't been invited, I'm sure it would have been of great use.I see no other way of realizing our hopes for a world organization in five or six days.Even Almighty God needs seven days.Please forgive my stubbornness. 3. I have now carefully read your message to Congress, and allow me to say that it is a most brilliant document. Wish you all the best. But the President replied that Stettinius could not arrive in Malta before January 31 because Washington was too busy.But he agreed to send Harry Hopkins to England to talk with Aiden and me.On January 21, Hopkins flew to London to discuss several issues that we might face in the Tripartite Conference, as well as the differences that had arisen between us in the last month regarding Greece, Poland, and Italy.During these three days, we had many very frank conversations.Hopkins said on the record that my remarks were vehement, but the visit was extremely satisfying. According to him, I once told him that, from all the reports I had of the situation at Yalta, even if we had been looking for ten years, we could not have found a worse meeting place.In any case, it seems that the President's advisers were not without scruples, for on the day of my departure I received the following telegram: President Roosevelt to Prime Minister January 29, 1945 Getting to Argonot seems to be a lot harder than it was initially presented. I will consult my advance staff as to what I should do when I leave Malta. I agree that, based on current intelligence, Uncle Joe should be informed as soon as we are able to decide on our schedule. Mr. Roosevelt was now at sea and no one could do anything, but his premonition was soon confirmed. I left Northolt on the 29th of January in a Skymaster given to me by General Arnold.My daughter Sarah and the official entourage and my private secretaries, Mr. Martin and Mr. Ron, and Lieutenant Commander Thompson are all with me.The rest of my personal entourage and some officials from the various ministries were carried in two other planes.We arrived in Malta just before dawn on January 30th, and there I learned that one of the two had crashed near Banterella Island.Three crew members and two passengers on board the plane survived.This is the inconceivable destiny. During the journey I developed a high fever, so at Lord Moran's orders I remained in bed in the plane until noon.Then I moved to the Orion warship, where I rested all day.I felt better in the evening, and the Governor of Malta and Mr. Harriman dined with me. On the morning of February 2, the President's entourage sailed into the port of Valletta on the USS Quincy.It was a warm day.From the deck of the Orion under a cloudless sky, I gazed at the scenery ahead.I could see the silhouette of the president sitting on the bridge as the American cruiser rolled past us and approached the moorings next to the pier, and we waved to each other.With Spitfire escorts in the sky, gun salutes and the Harbor Steamship Company band playing the American national anthem, it was a magnificent spectacle.I thought I was well enough to dine on the Quincy, and at six o'clock that evening we had our first official meeting in the President's cabin.Here we review the report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting and the debriefing of the military discussions that took place in Malta during the previous three days.Our staff has done a very good job.Their discussions centered around Eisenhower's operational plan, namely: Pushed his army to the Rhine and crossed it.There are different opinions on this question, which shall be dealt with in another chapter. [1] This opportunity, of course, is to be used to examine the entire course of operations, including operations against German submarines, future campaigns in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and the situation in the Mediterranean.We reluctantly agreed to withdraw two divisions from Greece as soon as they could be withdrawn.But I made it clear that we cannot do this until the Greek government builds up its own army.The Italian side will also withdraw three divisions to reinforce Northwest Europe, but I emphasize that it is unwise to withdraw a large number of amphibious troops.Wherever the Germans surrendered in Italy, it was of the utmost importance that we should follow.I also told the President that we should occupy as much of Austria as possible, because it would not be desirable to have too much of Western Europe occupied by the Russians, except as necessary.On most of these military issues we were in agreement, and the discussions had the useful result of getting the Joint Chiefs of Staff to clarify their respective positions before meeting with their Russian counterparts. [1] Chapter 24 "Crossing the Rhine". We all dined aboard the Quincy that evening to informally discuss the political issues that had been held between Eden and Stettinius the previous few days and which should still be brought up in Yalta.We started off that night.The President originally planned to have thirty-five entourages, but we both increased that to ten times as many.Transport planes took off every ten minutes to transport the approximately 700 people who made up the British and American delegations to Saki airfield in the Crimea over 1,400 miles.A detachment of the British Air Force had been stationed there two months earlier for technical preparations.After dinner, I boarded my plane and went to bed.After a long and cold flight, we landed at the airport covered in deep snow.My plane arrived before the president's, so we stood for a while waiting for him.When he was helped down the ladder from the Sacred Cow, he looked weak and unhealthy.We reviewed the guard of honor together, the president in the convertible and I walking beside him.Then our delegation followed Molotov, who had come to meet us, and the Russian delegation, into a large tent for refreshments. Soon we were driving a long way from Saki to Yalta.Lord Moran, Mr. Martin and I were in the car.We had been careful with our sandwiches, but no sooner had we eaten than we came to a house.We were told there that Molotov was waiting for us.We were invited to a great lunch for about ten people.The President's entourage apparently passed undetected, so it was only Molotov himself and two of his officials.He was very happy, and entertained his guests with all the delicacies of the Russian banquet.We tried our best not to let each other know that we had already eaten, so we didn't have much appetite now. We spent almost eight hours on the road, often lined with Russian soldiers, some of them women, standing shoulder to shoulder in the streets of the village, also on the main bridges and mountain trails, and scattered in other places. Some independent detachments on point.As we crossed the mountains and descended towards the shore of the Black Sea, we were suddenly bathed in warm, bright sunshine and an extremely mild climate.