Chapter 212 Volume 6, Chapter 22, Russia and Poland: The Promise of the Soviet Union

Lublin and London presidents see vistas British policy New borders and free elections Two rival Polish governments Stalin's address Letter of February 7th Molotov's new proposals for the removal of the population My telegram to the Cabinet of February 8th Anglo-American Draft Organization of a Polish Government Conference Decisive points Allied unity and public criticism A fresh start is needed in order to be adequately Intelligence again Lublin on London Poland on the USSR Stalin promises free elections Molotov proposes a plan on February 9th Moscow conference plans considerable progress on February 10th Eden and I confer with Stalin in secret Yalta Declaration final draft.

Poland was discussed in at least seven of the eight plenary meetings at Yalta, and there are some eighteen thousand words exchanged on this subject between Stalin, Roosevelt and myself in the British records.With the help of our foreign ministers and their subordinates, who also engaged in intense and detailed debates at their own meetings, we have finally come up with a manifesto which represents both our promise to the world and our agreements reached between them regarding future actions.The painful story is not over yet, and the truth of the matter is not fully understood.But the record here may help to do justice to our efforts at this last second war conference.All difficulties and problems have existed for a long time, are numerous and unavoidable.The Polish government in Lublin, or, as the Russians liked to call it, Warsaw, which was under the protection of the Soviet Union, was very hostile to the Polish government in London.Since our Moscow meeting in October, the relationship between them has only gotten worse, not better.Soviet troops were flooding across Poland, and the Polish underground was arbitrarily accused of killing Russian soldiers, sabotaging and raiding their rear and lines of communication.Western powers have neither access to the actual situation nor intelligence.More than 150,000 Poles in Italy and on the Western Front are fighting bravely for the final elimination of the Nazi army.They and many Poles elsewhere in Europe were eagerly looking forward to the liberation of their country from voluntary and honorable exile to their homeland.The large Polish population in the United States is eagerly awaiting a settlement between the three powers.

The issues we discussed can be summarized as follows: How to form a single Polish provisional government. How and when free elections will be held. How to solve the eastern and western borders of Poland. How to protect the rear and lines of communication of the advancing Soviet army. The reader will recall the important correspondence concerning Poland between the President and Stalin (in which I participated) recorded in the previous chapter.Poland was indeed the most pressing reason for the Yalta Conference, and would prove to be the number one cause of the downfall of the Grand Alliance.

When we met on February 6, President Roosevelt said at the beginning of the discussion that he came from the United States and saw a long-term perspective on the Polish issue.There are five or six million Poles in the United States, most of them second generation, and most of them are in favor of the Curzon Line. They knew they had to give up East Poland.They wanted East Prussia and part of Germany, something in return anyway.As Roosevelt said in Tehran, it would be easier for him if the Soviet government could make some concessions, such as compensating Koenigsberg for the loss of Lvov and certain oil-producing areas.But the most important point is that Poland has a permanent government.General public opinion in the United States was against the recognition of the Lublin government because it represented only Poland and a small part of the Polish nation.Calls for a government of national unity, likely to emerge from the five main parties.

He knew no members of either the Polish government-in-exile in London or the government in Lublin.When Mikolecik went to Washington, he was very impressed with him as an honest man.So he wants to see a representative Polish government, even if only a provisional one, that is supported by the majority of Poles.There are various ways to organize, such as establishing a small presidential council to temporarily govern, and then creating a more permanent body. I went on to say that it was my duty to state the British Government's position.I have stated repeatedly in the conference and in public that I am determined to support the Soviet Union's request for the Curzon Line (according to the Soviet government's interpretation), which means to include Lviv in The territory of the Soviet Union.I have been heavily criticized by Parliament and the Conservatives for this (as has the Foreign Secretary by Parliament).But I often think that since Russia suffered a lot in the Anti-German Patriotic War and made great achievements in expelling the German invaders and liberating Poland, their demands are not based on force but on rights.Nevertheless, if Russia shows her magnanimity to a much weaker country by ceding some territory, as the President suggests, we should admire and applaud the Soviet Union for its actions.

But a strong, free and independent Poland is far more important than individual territorial boundaries.I want Poland to be free and live their lives on their own terms.That goal is one I have often heard Marshal Stalin proclaim in the strongest of terms.Just because I trusted his statements about Poland's sovereignty, independence and freedom, I made the border question a secondary issue.This event is very important in the minds of the British nation and the British Commonwealth.It is because Poland should enjoy freedom and sovereignty that we are fighting against Germany.When we went to war in 1939 with inferior equipment, everyone knew what dangers we were running.This has cost us almost our lives not only as an empire but as a nation.Great Britain had no material interest in Poland.The only reason we have drawn our swords to help Poland against Hitler's brutal onslaught is out of honor, and therefore we will never accept any solution that does not give her freedom, independence and self-determination.Poland must be the master of its own country, the master of its own soul.This freedom in no way applies to Poland or any Polish group to adopt any hostile plan which may conspire with Germany against Russia; behavior.

There are currently two Polish governments, and our views on them are divided.I have not met anyone in the Polish government currently in London.We have admitted them, but have no intention of partnering with them yet.On the other hand, Mikoleček, Romer, and Grabski were extremely reasonable and honest people with whom we maintained an informal but friendly and intimate relationship.The three powers should be criticized if at this time, with their great tasks to undertake, and their common aspirations, two opposing governments are allowed to create a marked division between them.Can we create a government or governing body for Poland that everyone can recognize before universal and free elections are achieved?With such a government, it will be possible to prepare the Polish people for a free vote on their future constitution and government.If this can be done, we will take a big step towards the future peace and prosperity of Central Europe.I dare say that the lines of communication of the Russians, who are now advancing victoriously in pursuit of the Germans, can be protected and secured.

After a short recess, Stalin spoke.He said he understood the British government felt Poland was a matter of honor to her.But for Russia it was a question of honor as well as a question of security; a question of honor, because the Russians had had many conflicts with the Poles, and the Soviet government was willing to remove the causes of these conflicts; a question of security, not only because Poland It is on the border of Russia, and 334 Russia and Poland: the promise of the Soviet Union and because the enemies of Russia have always attacked her through the corridor of Poland.The Germans have passed through Poland twice in the past thirty years.They went through Poland because it was weak.Russia would like to see a strong Poland that can use its own strength to close this corridor.Russia cannot close it from the outside, it can only be closed from the inside by Poland itself, and for this reason, Poland must be free, independent and strong.For the Soviet Union, it was a matter of life and death.Their policy was very different from that of the tsarist government.The Tsar wanted to suppress and assimilate Poland.The Soviet Union has begun to adopt a friendly policy, especially with an independent Poland.That was the whole basis of the Soviet attitude, namely, that they wanted to see Poland independent, free and strong.

Then he talked about some of the points that Mr. Roosevelt and I had made.He said the President was arguing that certain changes should be made on the Curzon Line and that Lwów and perhaps some other areas should go to Poland, and I said that would be a gesture of generosity.But the Curzon Line was not invented by the Russians.It was drawn up at a conference in 1918 by representatives of Curzon, Clemenceau, and the United States; the Russians were not invited to that conference.The Curzon line was accepted against the will of Russia and had no basis in ethnographic data.Lenin disagreed with this dividing line.He was unwilling to assign the province of Bialystok to Poland.The Russians had backed away from Lenin's position, and now there were those who wanted Russia less than what Curzon and Clemenceau had promised.This is shameful for us.When Ukrainians come to Moscow, they will say that Stalin and Molotov are inferior defenders of Russia to Curzon or Clemenceau.It would be better to prolong the war a little bit. Although Russia will shed more blood, Poland can get compensation from Germany.When Mikoleček was in Russia in October, he asked where Russia thought Poland's western border should be.He was pleased to hear that Russia believed that Poland's western border should be extended to the River Ness.Stalin said that there are two rivers named after Nice, one near Breslau and the other further west.He was thinking of the River Ness to the west.He asked the meeting to support his proposal.

Then Stalin pointed out that we cannot create a Polish government without the consent of the Poles themselves.When I visited Moscow, Mikolecik and Grabsky also came to Moscow.They had met with the Lublin government and reached a sort of agreement.Mikoleček went back to London on the condition that he come back here again.This did not turn out to be the case, and he was dismissed by his colleagues just because he favored an agreement with the Lublin government.The Polish government in London was hostile to the very concept of the Lublin government, portraying it as a gang of bandits and criminals.The government in Lublin is dealing with its own way, so it is very difficult to do things in this area now.

The government of Lublin, or should now be called the government of Warsaw, wants no more dealings with the government of London.They had told Stalin that they would accept General Zeligorsky and Grabski, but they would never consider Mikoleček as Prime Minister.He actually said: talk to them if you want to.I could ask them to meet you here or in Moscow, but they are just as democratic as de Gaulle, and they were able to keep the peace in Poland and stop the civil war and the attack on the Red Army.The London government cannot do this.Their agents had killed 212 Russian soldiers who were connected to the Polish resistance underground, 534 Russia and Poland: the promise of the Soviet Union was obtained by robbing logistics warehouses for arms.Their radio stations were not licensed and operated without registration.The people of the government in Lublin have helped us, and the people of the government in London have done a lot of bad things.The Red Army needs a safe rear, which is very important, so as a soldier, he is only willing to support a government that can ensure their rear is safe. It was getting late now, and the president proposed to adjourn the meeting and reopen it the next day.But I think it should be stated that the UK and USSR governments had different sources of intelligence in Poland and therefore reported different facts.I said that, according to our information, not more than a third of the Polish people would be willing to support the Lublin government, if they had the freedom to express their opinions.This estimate is of course based on the best information we can get, but there may be errors in some details.I told Stalin that we feared a conflict between the Polish underground and the Lublin government.We fear that this will lead to misery, bloodshed, arrest and deportation, which is why we are desperate for common measures.We are afraid of the impact of all this on the already difficult Polish problem.Of course we think that the attack on the Red Army should be punished, but from the facts we know, I cannot think that the Lublin government has the right to say that they represent the Polish nation. The president was eager to stop the discussion at this point.He said Poland had been a source of trouble for more than 500 years.Therefore, I replied, we should all the more do our best to eradicate these troubles.So we broke up. That evening the President wrote a letter to Stalin, which he had consulted with us and revised, which urged that two representatives of the Lublin government and two representatives from London or from Poland representatives to come to the meeting and begin negotiations in our presence to form an interim government that we can all recognize, to hold free elections as soon as possible.I am in favor of this approach, and when we met again on February 7th, I supported the President's opinion.Mr. Roosevelt reiterated his concerns.Borders are important, he said, but it is our duty to help the Poles form a united interim government, or even us to form an interim government, until they can form their own government through free elections.He said: We should do some promotional work so that the current Polish problem, which is currently a smog, can get a burst of fresh air.He then asked Stalin if he had anything to add to what he had said the day before. Stalin replied that he had received the President's letter only about an hour and a half before, and that he had immediately sent for Beirut and Osobuka-Morarsky in order to have a telephone conversation with them.He had just learned that they were in Cracow and Lodz, and he promised to ask them how they could find the representatives of the opposing camp, since he did not know their addresses.In case it was too late to call them to the meeting, Molotov had studied diligently and made some proposals, which to a certain extent corresponded to those of the President. Then Molotov came on the stage and read the following theses: 1. It is hereby agreed to take the Curzon Line as the eastern border of Poland, and adjust five to eight kilometers to Poland in certain areas. 2. It is hereby decided that the western border of Poland shall be drawn from the city of Szczecin (which shall be designated 734 Russia and Poland: the promise of the Soviet Union to Poland), and from there south along the Oder River and Sines River demarcation. 3. After consideration, it is considered that certain democratic leaders in the Polish exile group should be admitted to the Polish Provisional Government. 4. It is hereby considered that the expanded Polish Provisional Government should be recognized by the governments of the Allied Powers. 5. After consideration, it is believed that the Polish provisional government expanded according to the third paragraph should hold a Polish people's vote as soon as possible, and establish a permanent institution of the Polish government through general elections. 6. To authorize Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Clarke Kerr to discuss the expansion of the Polish Provisional Government and to submit their proposals to the three Allied Governments for consideration. Mr. Roosevelt seemed encouraged and declared that we had made real progress, but he wanted to consult with Mr. Stettinius.Finally he said: I don't like the term exile.I don't know any of those concerned, except Mikoleček, but I don't think we need only contact with exiles.We should also find a few people in Poland itself.Stalin agreed to suspend the discussion, but I intervened at this time. The following exchange of views can be considered meaningful in view of what happened later. I said the President didn't like the term exile, and I felt the same way.The origin of the term refers to the French nobility expelled after the French Revolution, and it applies only to those who were expelled from their country by their own people.But the Poles abroad were expelled from the country by the Germans, so I propose that the exiles should be replaced by Poles abroad.Stalin agreed.With regard to the Ness River mentioned in the second article of Molotov's proposal, I reminded those present that in previous conversations, when I always spoke of the westward movement of the Polish border, I meant that Poland should move westward. Free to expand her territory, but no further than they wish or are able to administer well.Wouldn't it be a great misfortune if the Polish goose had been overstuffed with German food and died of indigestion.I know that a large portion of public opinion in Great Britain is unabashedly shaken by the news of the forced displacement of millions.After the last war, the knot of population quarrel between the Greeks and the Turks was successfully untied, and the two countries have been on good terms ever since; but not two or three million people were displaced then.If Poland took East Prussia and Silesia all the way to the Oder, that question alone would mean relocating six million Germans back to Germany.There is a moral issue in dealing with this matter which I must first obtain the consent of the people of my country to resolve. There were no Germans in these areas, Stalin said, because they had fled. The question, I replied, was whether there was room for the remaining Germans.Six or seven million Germans had died in the war, and perhaps a million more (Stalin estimated two million) would be wiped out before the war was over.So in a way there should be places to accommodate these immigrants.They may also be needed to fill vacancies.I have no qualms about immigration, as long as the Poles can manage it and Germany can accommodate it, one increase and one decrease, and the proportion is just right.But in this matter, what needs to be studied is not a matter of principle, but a matter of quantity that should be dealt with. In this general discussion the distinction between the East and West Rivers of Ness has not been used, nor has it been shown as clearly as it should.Nevertheless, this question will soon have to be clarified. I telegraphed Attlee early the next morning: Last night the President sent an impressive letter to Stalin after consultation with us and revisions made by us.The letter suggested that a new national Polish government should be established to replace the current Lublin government, including representatives of Poles at home and abroad.The Russians today (Wednesday) came up with a reply consisting of five or six items.There were no objections in principle to the general formulation.We ask that the discussion be postponed until tomorrow.The following counter-proposal, drafted by the Foreign Secretary, is sent to you by telegram together with the original Soviet proposal. The matter was not resolved at all.Our plan is to try to get a Polish government that we and the United States can recognize and that will attract the recognition of all the countries participating in the United Nations.In order to do this, we ask for real and strong representatives from among the Poles with whom we are presently associated, especially like Mikoleček, Grabski and Romer, but also those proposed by the Americans who are still Some Poles in Poland, like Vitos, Sapierha, etc.It would be to our advantage if eight or ten of these men could be placed in the Lublin government, and we would immediately recognize this government.Then we can send ambassadors and other missions to Poland so that we may at least know something about what's going on there and see if we can lay the groundwork for free, fair and unrestricted elections.For only such an election could give life to the Polish government and preserve it.We hope that you will give us full freedom of action and flexibility in this difficult matter. After describing the Soviet proposal, I went on: Here is our (Anglo-American) amendment proposal for Poland: (1) It is hereby agreed that the Curzon Line shall be taken as Poland's eastern border, with adjustments of five to eight kilometers to Poland in certain areas. (2) It is hereby decided that the territory of western Poland shall include the Free City of Danzig, the East Prussian districts west and south of Koenigsberg, the administrative district of Operin in Silesia, and the Oder River claimed by Poland land east of the line.It is understood that Germans in the above-mentioned areas shall be repatriated to Germany and all Poles in Germany shall be repatriated to Poland of their own volition. (3) In view of the fact that western Poland is now liberated by Soviet troops, it is time to try to establish a fully representative Polish provisional government, based on all democratic and anti-fascist forces in Poland, and including democratic leaders of Poles abroad.This government should be so constituted that it can be recognized by the governments of the three allied powers. (4) It is hereby agreed that the establishment of such a provisional government is primarily the responsibility of the Polish people.Pending the possibility of free elections, the representative Polish leaders should negotiate together on the composition of the interim government.Mr Molotov, Mr Harriman and Sir Archibald Clarke Kerr were empowered to approach these leaders and submit their proposals to the Allied Governments for consideration. (5) It is hereby agreed that the Polish Provisional Government thus established shall hold free and unrestricted elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot.In elections, all democratic parties shall have the right to participate and put forward candidates in order to ensure that the establishment of this government truly represents the will of the Polish people. When we met again on February 8, Mr. Roosevelt read out his proposal, as amended from Molotov's draft.He said: In the Soviet proposal, the Curzon Line was used as the eastern border of Poland, and some areas were adjusted to Poland by five to eight kilometers. We have no objection.Here is at least one thing we can all agree on, so that although I have asked the Russians to make some concessions, it seems best not to add to the difficulties, which are already serious enough.But the president's claim to the western border is firm and unambiguous.He agreed that Poland should get compensation from sacrificing Germany, including part of East Prussia south of the Koenigsberg line, Upper Silesia, and up to the Oder line. It just doesn't seem to make sense.My opinion, too, had always been the same, and when we met again in Potsdam five months later, I did my best to insist on it. The remaining problem is to form a Polish government that we can unanimously recognize and that is acceptable to the Polish nation.Mr. Roosevelt suggested that a presidential council composed of three Polish leaders should go to Moscow to form a provisional government including representatives from Warsaw, London, and Poland itself, and hold free elections as soon as possible. After a brief experience, Molotov stated that he disagreed.He said that the Lublin government is now the leader of the Polish people.Most Poles embraced it enthusiastically, and it enjoyed great power and prestige.The Poles from London can't talk about that.If we try to form a new government, the Poles will never agree, so it is better to expand the existing government.It is only a temporary body, because all our proposals have only one goal, to hold free elections in Poland as soon as possible.As for how to expand it, it is best to discuss it with the US and British ambassadors and himself in Moscow.He said he was desperate for a deal, and he accepted the President's offer to invite two of the five in his February 6 letter.He said that the Lublin government might at any time refuse to negotiate with some of them, like Mikoleček; but if they sent three representatives, two of whom were nominated by Mr. Roosevelt, Then, the talks can start right away. What about the Presidential Council, Mr. Roosevelt asked? He replied that it was better not to have it.That would mean dealing with two agencies instead of one. I said: This is the point of the meeting.The whole world is waiting for a solution.If we still each recognize separate Polish governments, the world will think that there are still fundamental differences between us.The consequences will be dire and will mark the failure of our conference.On the other hand, we certainly have different ideas about the basic facts about Poland, or at least about some of them.According to British intelligence, the Lublin government did not enjoy the support of the majority of the Polish people, and we felt that Poles abroad would not consider it to represent them.If this conference cast aside the existing Polish government in London and left the Lublin government alone with the responsibility of the country, it would provoke open opposition from all over the world.It was to be expected that Poles abroad would mount a virtual joint protest.At our command there is a Polish army of several hundred and fifty thousand men, who have gathered from abroad all who can come together.This army has fought valiantly in the past and still does.I don't believe it will submit to the Lublin government.It would be considered an act of treachery for Great Britain to turn away from recognizing the government it had recognized from the beginning of the war. I went on to say: as Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov are well aware, I personally do not approve of the behavior of the Polish government in London, what they are doing at every stage is stupid.But if we turn away from those we have always recognized and formally recognize this new government, it will invite the harshest criticism.One would say that the British government had utterly capitulated (as it did) on the eastern frontier and had accepted and supported the Soviet point of view.It will also be said that we have fallen out with the legitimate Polish government which we have recognized for five years of fighting, and that we are ignorant of what is really going on in Poland.We cannot enter that country.We can't see and hear opinions from over there.It will be said that we will only accept the opinion of the Polish people as the Lublin government professes, so that His Majesty's government will be accused in Parliament of having completely abandoned the just cause concerning Poland.Even if we could agree to my friend Mr. Molotov's proposal, the resulting debate would be painful and unfavorable to the unity of the Allies. I went on to say: I don't think the proposals are quite complete.If we abandon the Polish government in London, both parties should start over on more or less equal terms.Before the British Government ceased to recognize the Government of London in favor of another Government, they had to be able to ascertain that the new Government was truly representative of the Polish nation.I admit that since we do not have all the facts, this is only an opinion.If there were a free and unrestricted general election in Poland by secret ballot and universal suffrage with free election of candidates, all our differences would of course be resolved.Once this is done, the British government will welcome the new government to the disregard of the Polish government in London.It is the period leading up to the election that makes us very uneasy. Molotov said that perhaps the talks in Moscow would produce some useful results. The issue will be extremely difficult to deal with without the participation of the Poles themselves, who must have the right to express their own opinions.I agree with that, but I say that it is very important that if the meeting disagrees on any point of agreement, we all patiently try to reach an agreement.The president supports me.He said the big goal of the Americans is that Poland should have an early election.The only question was how the country should be governed at the same time, and he hoped that elections would be possible before the end of the year.So the problem is limited to the time aspect. Stalin now brings up the lack of and inability to obtain information that I complained about. I replied: I have some information. Contrary to my information, he replied in this way, then added another set of words, assuring us that the government of Lublin is very popular, especially Beirut, Osobuka | Moraski and General Zimierski .During the German occupation, they did not leave the country, but remained in Warsaw, working underground.This made a deep impression on the Poles, and at the same time one should remember the special psychology of those who lived under German occupation.He expressed sympathy for all those who had not left their country in hard times, and they thought the three men he was referring to were of that kind.He said he didn't think they were geniuses.There may be smarter people in the Polish government in London, but they are not welcome in Poland because they were not there when the people were suffering under Hitler's occupation.It may be a homely sentiment, but it exists. He said that the liberation of Poland by Soviet troops was a major event in Poland, which changed everything.It is well known that the Poles did not like the Russians in the past, because they took part in the partition of Poland three times.But the advance of Soviet troops and the liberation of Poland completely changed their mood.The hatred of the past was gone, replaced by kindness, even enthusiasm, toward the Russians.This is very natural.The people were happy to see the Germans flee and felt liberated.Stalin said he had the impression that the Polish people regarded the expulsion of the Germans as a great patriotic festival in Polish life, and they were surprised that the Polish government in London did not take part in this national Polish festival at all.They saw members of the Provisional Government in the streets and asked where the Poles in London were.This discredited the Polish government in London, and explained why the Provisional Government was popular with the people despite its lack of great personalities. Stalin believed that these facts cannot be ignored if we are to understand the feelings of the Polish people.I have said that I am afraid that the meeting will split before an agreement is reached.So what to do?Governments have different intelligence and therefore come to different conclusions.Perhaps the first thing that should be done is to bring together Poles from different camps and hear what they have to say. He went on to say that there are unsatisfactory things and that the Polish government is not elected.It would certainly be better to have a freely elected government, but until now because of the war this has not been allowed.Yet the day when elections are likely to be held is approaching.Until then, we should treat the Provisional Government as we did the Charles de Gaulle government in France.It should be noted that the de Gaulle government was not elected.He didn't know which had more prestige, Beirut or de Gaulle, but since it was possible to make a treaty with de Gaulle, why not do the same with an enlarged Polish government?It was no less democratic than the de Gaulle government.It is unreasonable to demand more from Poland than from France.So far, the French government has not made reforms that arouse France's enthusiasm, while the Polish government has formulated a land reform program that has aroused great enthusiasm in the country.If we approach things openly, we should be able to find a common ground.The situation is not as dire as I thought it would be, and it can be solved by concentrating on the main instead of overemphasizing the secondary. THE PRESIDENT QUESTION: How long will it take before an election is possible? Stalin replied: Within a month, unless there are any major setbacks at the front, but that may not happen. I said that we would of course be relieved and wholeheartedly support a freely elected government which would supersede everything else, but we should demand nothing that would interfere with military action.These are the highest purposes.In any case, if the will of the Polish people can be ascertained in such a short period of time, or even within two months, the situation will be completely changed, and no one will oppose such a government. So we agreed to let our foreign ministers discuss this matter. The three foreign ministers then met at noon on February 9th.They couldn't come to an agreement. But when the plenary session was held at four o'clock that afternoon, Molotov made some new proposals, which were closer to the American draft.The Lublin government should be restructured on a broader democratic basis, including democratic leaders in Poland and abroad.He and the British and American ambassadors should discuss together in Moscow how to proceed.盧布林政府一旦改組，就要保證盡快舉行自由選舉，那時我們應當承認由此產生出來的任何政府。斯退丁紐斯曾要求書面保證在華沙的三個大使能夠進行觀察並匯報選舉真是自由而不受限制的，但莫洛托夫反對這樣做，因為據他說，這將引起波蘭人的反感。除了這一點還有一些小的修改以外，他接受了美國的計劃。 這是一個相當大的進展，我也這樣說了，但是我覺得我有責任提出一個一般的警告。這個會議之後，我們只有一次會議了。 【１】 【１】我們二月十一日的會議只通過大會的報告。認真的討論於二月十日結束。 有一種彼此希望達成協議的氣氛，但是也有一種踩上馬鐙急欲離去的願望。我說道，我們不該為了不願再花二十四小時，而讓這些重要事情的解決草草收場，以致失去會議的成果。重大的收穫已在眼前，但作出決定切不可太過匆忙。這很可能是我們一生中最重要的日子。 羅斯福先生說道，我們跟俄國人之間的分歧現在主要是措辭上的問題，但是他跟我都切盼選舉真能做到公正而自由。 我告訴斯大林說，我們目下處於一種極為不利的境況之中，因為我們對波蘭國內現在的局勢了解得太少，卻又不得不負起作出重大決定的責任。例如我知道波蘭人相互之間存在著很深的惡感，奧索布卡｜莫臘斯基就曾用過極其粗暴的語言。還有人告訴我，盧布林政府曾經公開宣佈要把波蘭國內軍隊和地下運動的一切人員作為叛徒進行審訊。我說，這引起了我的不安和痛苦。當然我把紅軍的安全放在首位，但是我請求斯大林考慮我們的困難。英國政府不知道波蘭國內的局勢，除了用降落傘空投一些勇士以及帶出一些地下活動的人員之外，我們沒有其它方法，我們並不喜歡用這種方法來得到情報。在不妨礙蘇聯軍隊行動的條件之下，試問有沒有什麼補救的辦法呢？能否給予英國人某些方便（當然也給美國人）讓他們看到這些波蘭人之間的爭吵是怎樣解決的。鐵托曾經說過，當南斯拉夫進行選舉的時候，他不會反對俄國、英國和美國的觀察員出席，以便把公正執行選舉的情況向世界作公開的報導。關於希臘方面，英國政府將十分歡迎美國的、俄國的和英國的觀察員，使大家確信選舉是按照人民的願望來進行的。意大利也將發生同樣的問題。當意大利北部解放的時候，意大利的政治形勢將有一個極大的變化。在可能組成立憲議會或議會之前，必須舉行一次選舉。在那裡，英國的方式是一樣的俄國的、美國的和英國的觀察員應該出席，以便向世界報導一切事情都是秉公辦理的。我說公正地進行選舉的重要性，不可能已經是強調得太過分。例如米科萊契克能不能回到波蘭去，並組織他的政黨參加選舉呢？ 斯大林說：這件事就讓大使們和莫洛托夫會見波蘭人的時候去考慮吧。 我回答，我必須能夠告訴下議院說，選舉將是自由的，而且將有效地保證在執行中做到自由而公正。 斯大林指出，米科萊契克屬於農民黨，它不是一個法西斯黨，所以可以參加選舉並提出它的候選人。我說，如果農民黨在波蘭政府中已有代表，這件事就更加明確了。於是斯大林同意那個政府中應該包括他們的一個代表。 我說，我們就談到這裡吧，接著又補充一句道，我希望我所說的話不致見怪，因為我所說的都是心裡話。 他答道，我們必須聽聽波蘭人有什麼意見。我解釋道，我所要的是能夠使這個東部邊界問題在議會裡通得過，我認為如果議會對波蘭人已能自行決定他們所需要的東西一事感到滿意，這件事情是可以辦到的。 他回答，他們中間有些人是很好的。他們是優秀的戰士，他們出了一些好的科學家和音樂家，但是他們都很愛爭吵。 我回答，我無非要各方面都有發言的公平機會罷了。 總統說：選舉一定要做到像愷撒的妻子那樣無可批評。 我要對世界提供某種保證，而且我希望沒有人對於選舉的純潔性能夠提出疑問。這與其說是個原則問題倒不如說是個良好的政治問題。 莫洛托夫說：如果我們把美國的草案插進去，我恐怕波蘭人會感到對他們不信任。我們最好跟他們討論一下。 我對此感到不滿，決意以後向斯大林提出。第二天機會來了。 二月十日在最後給人印象極其深刻的會議剛要開始以前，艾登和我跟斯大林和莫洛托夫在約索波夫宮裡作了一次秘密會談。我再一次說明我們感到多麼困難，因為我們在波蘭沒有代表可以把那裡的情況報告給我們。可以選擇的解決辦法有兩個；或者派駐一個大使及其使館人員；或者派些新聞記者。後者不如前者。我又指出，議會有權問我關於盧布林政府和選舉的情況，而我一定要能夠說那邊的情況我是知道的。 斯大林回答，新的波蘭政府得到承認以後，就會向你們開放，你們就可以派遣個大使到華沙去。 他能夠在那個國家裡自由行動麼？ 就紅軍來說，不會干涉他的行動，我也保證發出必要的指示，但是你們也應該自己跟波蘭政府協商。 斯大林又指出戴高樂有一個代表在波蘭。 於是我們同意把下面的話加到我們的宣言裡去： 作為上述的結果，承認之後，即互派大使，各國政府有了大使的報告就可以了解波蘭的情況。 這就是我所能爭取到的最好的結果。 當四點三刻重行開會的時候，艾登先宣讀了三國外長同意的一項聲明。我關切地注意到這篇聲明中沒有提及邊界，因此我說全世界將會問起這是為什麼。我們在原則上已經對西部邊界取得同意，唯一的問題是那條邊界線究竟應該劃到什麼地方和我們應該作怎樣的說明。波蘭人應該得到東普魯士的一部分；如果他們願意的話，還可以一直伸展到奧得河線上。但是再前進一步，或者這個階段對這個問題提出什麼主張，我們表示十分懷疑。我也在會上說明我們曾從戰時內閣收到一封電報，他們竭力反對把邊界一直往西擴展到西尼斯河的任何條款，因為移民問題太大，無法辦理。 羅斯福先生說道他願意聽聽全國統一的波蘭新政府對這一方面的意見，建議把一切關於西部界線的條款全部刪除。 斯大林說：我們當然應該提到東部的邊界。 在這一點上我支持了他，雖然我知道這會招來許多批評。 關於西部的邊界；我說波蘭新政府的願望到底怎樣，應該首先弄清楚，而且邊界問題本身應該作為和平解決的一部分來決定。由於按照美國憲法，總統非經參議院許可無權解決這一類問題而使問題變得複雜化起來，經過進一步討論我們終於在做法上取得一致的意見。在會議結束時發出的公報因此包括了關於波蘭的聯合宣言，其文如下： 一九四五年二月十一日 我們前來參加克里米亞會議，決心解決在波蘭問題上的分歧。我們充分地討論了這個問題的各方面。我們重申我們的共同願望是要看到建立起一個強大、自由、獨立和民主的波蘭。商討的結果，我們對於一個可以得到三大國承認的全國統一的新波蘭臨時政府的組成條件，已經意見一致。 我們所達成的協議如下： 由於紅軍全部解放了波蘭，在波蘭出現了一種新的形勢。 這就要求建立一個比波蘭西部最近解放以前可能建立的基礎更廣大的波蘭臨時政府。因此現今在波蘭行使職權的臨時政府，應該在更廣大的基礎上實行改組，以容納波蘭國內外民主領袖。這個新政府因此應該稱為波蘭全國統一臨時政府。 莫洛托夫先生、哈里曼先生和克拉克‧克爾爵士受命以一個委員會的資格，首先在莫斯科與現今臨時政府的成員並與波蘭國內外其他波蘭民主領袖進行會商，以便根據上述方針改組現政府。這個全國統一的波蘭臨時政府應當保證：盡速根據普遍選舉與無記名投票方式舉行自由的和不受限制的選舉。在這些選舉中，所有民主的和反納粹的政黨都有權參加，並提出其候選人。 當全國統一的波蘭臨時政府已經依照上述原則正式成立時，目前和波蘭現在臨時政府保持外交關係的蘇聯政府以及聯合王國政府和美利堅合眾國政府，都要和新的波蘭全國統一的臨時政府建立外交關係，並且互派大使，各該政府根據大使的報告，將經常獲悉波蘭的情形。 三國政府的首腦認為，波蘭的東疆應依照寇松線，但在若干區域應作出對波蘭有利的自五至八公里的逸出。他們承認：波蘭必須在北方和西方獲得廣大的領土上的讓予。他們覺得關於這些領土上的讓予的範圍，當於適當時機徵詢新波蘭的全國統一的臨時政府的意見，關於波蘭西疆的最後定界，應待和會解決。