Chapter 215 Volume 6, Chapter 25, Controversy Concerning Poland

The USSR breaks the Yalta agreement Roosevelt's health is declining March 6 a Soviet-appointed government is imposed on the Romanian allies Protesting the dangers and difficulties Molotov blocks the Moscow talks on Poland March 8 My proposal to the President Is the telegram I sent on March 10 making the request directly to Stalin or is it negotiating through our ambassadors?Mr. Roosevelt proposes a political truce March 16 His call and my reply March 18 My private telegram to the President Mr. Baruch's visit to Moscow Deadlock continues March 27 My telegram We agreed to deal directly with Stalin. April 1st. My telegram. April 7th. Stalin's reply. His private telegram to me hoped for progress.

Several weeks into the Yalta Conference, it was already evident that the Soviet government had done nothing to fulfill the agreement's provisions to expand the Polish government to include all Polish parties and parties.Molotov categorically refused to take a position on the Polish candidates we had proposed, and did not even allow any of them to participate in the discussion of the round table preparatory meeting.He once suggested that we send observers to Poland, and was embarrassed because we accepted it so readily and quickly. When our ambassadors put this question to him, he deliberately put it in a difficult position, arguing that it especially might affect the prestige of the Provisional Government in Lublin.Talks in Moscow did not lead to any progress.Time was in the favor of the Russians and their Polish followers, who did not want outside observers to see the brutal methods they were using to tighten their grip on the country.For these brutal forces, the longer they delay, the more they will gain.

So I appeal to the President, and hopefully we can raise it together at the highest level to Stalin.Then we sent out a long letter outlining what the Anglo-Americans saw in Poland.Roosevelt's health and energy were failing at such critical times.In some of my long cables, I thought I was speaking to my trusted friends and colleagues, as I had done all these years.But he can no longer fully hear me.I don't know how ill he is, otherwise I might think it would be too cruel to press him any longer.The loyal aides around the president hoped that his health status would be known only to a very small circle of people, so the replies to the documents were drafted by many people and then issued in his name.Roosevelt's health was increasingly exhausted, and he could only give general instructions and approvals for these.It's a dedicated effort.The intention of the State Department was, of course, to avoid a sharpening of the situation at a time when the President was so weak, preferring to place the burden on the ambassadors in Moscow.Harry Hopkins could have provided some personal help, but he was seriously ill himself and was often absent or uninvited.How heavy these weeks have been for us all!

What the Russians did in Rumania the very night I spoke to the House of Commons about the results of our efforts at Yalta was the first violation of our agreement, both in spirit and form.According to the recently signed Declaration on a Liberated Europe, it is our duty to promote both free elections and democratic governments in the countries occupied by the Allies.On February 27, Vyshinski, who had suddenly appeared in Bucharest the day before, demanded an audience with King Mikael and insisted that the king dissolve the coalition government of all parties.This government had been established after the royal coup in August 1944 and had led to the expulsion of the Germans from Romania.The young king, backed by his foreign minister, Visoianu, rejected the request until the next day.Vyshinsky was called again, and the king begged to be at least allowed to consult with the leaders of the parties, but he ignored it, beat the table with his fist, barked at the king for immediate consent, slammed the door and went out.Meanwhile, Soviet tanks and troops filled the streets of the capital.On March 6, a government appointed by the Soviet Union came to power.

I was wracked with this news, because it foreshadowed a pattern of events to come.The Russians have established, by force and perversion, the rule of a Communist minority.Our protests were restrained because, when Eden and I visited Moscow in October, we had conceded that Russia had the majority of the voice in Romania and Bulgaria, while we were ahead in Greece.Stalin and those around him, although extremely unhappy at the six weeks of fighting in the city of Athens against the Communists and the People's Liberation Army, strictly adhered to this understanding.Now that peace has been restored, and in spite of the many difficulties that lie before us, I hope that within a few months we will be able to hold free and unrestricted elections, preferably under British, American and Russian supervision, And after the general election, a constitution and a government can be formulated in accordance with the indisputable will of the Greek people.

Stalin was at this time taking the opposite path in the two Balkan countries of the Black Sea, which completely ran counter to all democratic ideas.For the principles of Yalta, he once signed on paper, but these principles are currently being trampled underfoot in Romania.Yet if I push him too fast, he may say: I have not interfered with your actions in Greece, why don't you give me the same freedom in Romania?This will cause us to compare our purposes with each other.Neither side can convince the other.In view of my personal relationship with Stalin, I am convinced that it would be wrong to engage in such a debate.

Besides, I am fully aware that the Polish problem is much more important than that, and therefore I do not want to do anything to Romania in order not to hinder the future of the Polish problem. Even so, I think we should tell Stalin our anguish at the imposition of a government of minority communists, which contradicts the manifesto for a liberated Europe that we had agreed upon at Yalta of.I am more particularly concerned that the emergence of this government may lead to an indiscriminate purge of anti-communist Romanians who will be accused of fascist crimes, much like what happened in Bulgaria.I therefore suggested to Mr. Roosevelt that Stalin should be asked to give assurances that the new government would not immediately carry out a purge of anti-communists on the grounds that the Yalta Declaration had encouraged them to do so.

The news about Poland from Moscow was also extremely disappointing.The majority in the British government is completely out of proportion to the powerful undercurrent of public opinion in all classes and parties against Soviet Russian domination of Poland.Laborers reacted as strongly as Conservatives, Socialists and Catholics.In Parliament, I myself have been based on the belief that the spirit of the Yalta Declaration will be followed.Once it is seen that we have been deceived and that the familiar Communist tactics are being used behind closed doors by the Russians, directly or through their Lublin puppets, there will be a very serious reaction in British public opinion. situation.The opinion that there will be an open rupture between us and Russia at a time when all is going well militarily in Europe and the Far East is not confined to the government itself at least in England, but is deeply rooted among the masses of the people.

After a promising start, Molotov now rejected any interpretation of the Crimea program except his own extremely rigid and narrow interpretation.He is trying to exclude practically all of our candidates for negotiations, adopting a policy of exclusively supporting the views of Beirut and his cohort, and withdrawing our promise to send observers to Poland.He's obviously going to turn the negotiations with non-Lublinist Poles into a farce which means that the new Polish government is nothing more than a disguise of the existing government to make the ignorant look more respectable and before the elections, We are not allowed to see machinations like reckoning, deportations, and the establishment of a totalitarian political system even before the new government takes office.If we don't set things right, the world will quickly think that Mr. Roosevelt and I have undertaken a fraudulent scheme when we signed the Crimea Protocol.

In any case I assured the Parliament that if a new Polish government could not be established in the spirit of Yalta, I would tell them.I was convinced that the only way to resist Molotov's tactics was to send Stalin a private telegram stating exactly what we had to do so that I could avoid telling the Diet that we had failed.The scope involved is much wider than the Polish problem.This is a test case between us and the Russians about the meaning of the words democracy, sovereignty, independence, representative government, and free and unrestricted elections.So I emphasized these points to the President on March 8th and suggested that I should send Stalin the following telegram, and I hoped that he would also send a telegram containing the same minimum requirements.

The telegram I wish to send to Stalin reads as follows: I must tell you that if the committee in Moscow fails to come to an agreement on the following grounds, I shall have to declare to Parliament that we have failed: (1) Mr. Molotov still seems to be arguing that the terms of the Crimean Communiqué establish the absolute right of the present Warsaw Government to consult it first in all matters.The English texts of the relevant paragraphs in the communiqué were originally drafted by the United States and cannot be interpreted in this way.Therefore Molotov's explanation cannot be accepted. (2) All Poles nominated by any of the three governments, unless excluded by unanimous decision of the committee, shall be admitted for consultations, and every effort shall be made to submit their names to the committee as soon as possible.The committee should ensure that invited Poles have access to other Poles whom they wish to consult, whether in Poland or abroad, and have the right to nominate to the committee other Poles who should be invited to the meeting .The Poles who were present before the committee, while in Moscow, of course enjoyed complete freedom of movement and correspondence among themselves, and were free to leave where they wanted after the conclusion of the consultations.Molotov had objected to inviting Mikoleček, but his presence was indeed very important. (3) The Poles who are invited to participate in the consultation should discuss among themselves, with a view to reaching an agreement on the formation of a new government that truly represents the views of the Poles in all aspects, and present it to the committee.The discussion should also include the question of the presidency.The committee should chair the meeting as an impartial arbitrator during discussions. (4) Until the deliberations of this committee have been concluded, the Soviet government should do its best to prevent the Warsaw government from taking any further fundamental measures, legal or administrative, which would affect the social, constitutional, economic or political situation in Poland. (5) The Soviet government should make arrangements for Anglo-American observers to visit Poland and report on conditions on the ground, as Molotov had proposed at an early stage in the committee's discussions. We must not allow Poland to be a source of division and misunderstanding between our two peoples.For this reason, I am confident that you will understand how important it is for us to achieve a solution as soon as possible on the basis of the Yalta resolution, and it is precisely because I trust that you will do everything in your power to bring it about that I am sending you this telegram. Two days later I telegraphed Roosevelt again. prime minister to president roosevelt March 10, 1945 The Poles of the Lublin faction could well have used their old tricks to retort that their government alone could guarantee the highest degree of political stability in the country, that they already represented the majority of the democratic forces in Poland, and that they could not compete with Polish traitors in exile or with the Fascist collaborators and landlords joined hands. Currently they do not allow us to obtain information on the local situation in Poland or through other means.The long delays were extremely beneficial to the Soviets, as they or their puppets could take their time cleaning people they didn't like.Now if we propose, in very general terms, a political truce between the Polish parties (with which there is deep-seated animosity) in the spirit and intent of the Crimean resolution, this will encourage the continuation of this purge and may mean I would like to abandon the express demands I made in my last telegram to you.Therefore, I find it extremely difficult to agree with this political truce. I mentioned to you that the reaction here has been so strong that four ministers have declined to vote and two ministers have resigned.I therefore beg you to give my last telegram your due consideration. On March 11th the President assured me that our goal was the same, namely to prevent the Poles in Lublin from persecuting their political opponents and from their persecution.He said the only difference between us was strategy.I wanted to make the request straight to the Soviet government as it was, but he felt that we would have a better chance of success in proposing a general political truce.While in Yalta, Stalin highlighted the terrorism of the Polish government's underground forces in London against the Red Army and the Poles in Lublin.Whether anything happened is not the question, but that is what the Soviet government insisted on.If we simply asked it to force the Lublin Poles alone to stop persecuting their political enemies, Stalin would certainly refuse.We could also be accused of deliberately obstructing land reform, while the Lublin Poles pretended to be the only ones who could defend the peasants against the landowners. Mr. Roosevelt agreed to send observers in, but he thought it best to wait until our ambassadors had appealed to Molotov before either of us would deal with Stalin himself.He said in the telegram: I think it is better for us personally not to intervene until all other methods of bringing the Soviet government to submit have been exhausted.I therefore very much hope that you will refrain from writing to Uncle Jo at this time, especially since I feel that some parts of your telegram may provoke a reaction contrary to your wishes.Of course we must maintain close contact on this issue. As far as I know, things are at an impasse in Moscow.I'm only reluctantly accommodating the President's wishes, but we can't do much without America's help, and Poland is doomed if we don't keep pace.A month has passed since the Yalta conference ended without any progress.Time was entirely in Lublin's favor, and no doubt they worked very hard to establish their authority to the point of unshakable. So on March 13th I agreed not to write directly to Stalin for the time being, but I asked Mr. Roosevelt to let our ambassadors raise the points I had enumerated in my telegram.I am convinced that unless we can persuade the Russians to agree to these basic working procedures, all our work at Yalta will be in vain. When discussions began in Moscow after Yalta, we had the simple goal of bringing together representative Poles, both in Poland and elsewhere, to negotiate and to bring about the formation of a Recognizable, reorganized and fully representative of the new government of Poland.The test of progress was the invitation to Mikoleček and two or three of his friends, who had resigned to the Polish government in London because of the necessity of a good understanding with Russia. I am afraid that Mr. Roosevelt's directives to his ambassadors have done little, if any, to promote these matters, since their only definite proposal was a political truce between the Polish parties.In this way, both of us will be in a very disadvantaged position.The Russians would say almost immediately that the truce was being broken by the Poles opposing the Lublin faction, and therefore Lublin was not responsible.I don't doubt that some supporters of the Polish government in London, especially the far-right underground, the so-called Polish Right Underground, might give the Russians and the Lublin side an excuse for this argument.Since we are not allowed to go to Poland to find out the truth, we can only rely on what they say.After a fortnight or so of negotiations on a truce, we would be in a far worse position than we were in Yalta when the President and I agreed that Mikoleček should be invited anyway. I stated this in a private telegram, and concluded as follows: prime minister to president roosevelt March 13, 1945 In Yalta we have also agreed to adopt the Russian views on the border line.Poland has lost her borders, will she now lose her freedom?There is no doubt that this is a question that must be fought to the very end here in Parliament and among the masses.I hate to expose the differences between the British and American governments, but I must of course say that we are facing a catastrophic failure, that the events agreed at Yalta are all bankrupt, and that we, the British, do not have the requisite strength to further this event, We can say that we have reached the point of powerlessness.When Molotov saw that he had beaten us throughout the process of the Poles negotiating a new government, he knew that we would put up with anything.On the other hand, I believe that if we unite in the pressure, stick to the line we have always taken and the advice in my telegram to Stalin, we may succeed. This telegram elicited a strongly contested reply, no doubt prepared by the State Department after my long March 8th telegram was received in Washington. President Roosevelt to Prime Minister March 16, 1945 I cannot but be concerned about the views expressed in your call on the thirteenth of this month.I don't understand what you mean when you say that there are differences between our two governments regarding the negotiations on Poland.From our side, there is certainly no sign of any policy divergence.We have only been discussing the most effective strategy, and until we have made an effort to overcome the obstacles that occurred in the Moscow negotiations, I cannot agree that we are facing the bankruptcy of the Yalta agreement.I also have a hard time understanding your statement that the only explicit proposal in our instructions to (Ambassador) Harriman was a political truce within Poland.Those instructions, of which you also have a copy, not only state our understanding of the Yalta agreement, but also make it clear that the committee itself should agree to the list of Polish candidates invited to the consultations, as well as the three blocs that emerged from the reorganized government. In this case, no one group can specify which of the other two groups should be invited to Moscow. Our main objective remains to keep the negotiations going without making concessions and, first of all, to resolve the issues at which negotiations have stalled. It cannot be overemphasized that I urge you to agree to give immediate instructions to our ambassadors to resume negotiations.Based on this view, I have considered the points you intended to address to Stalin in your March 8th call, and I offer the following opinion: We agree with point (1) that the Warsaw politicians should not have the absolute right to negotiate first in all matters, and this is included in our instructions to Harriman. I do not believe that Molotov would agree with the suggestion contained in point (2) that any Poles could be invited to participate unless all three members of the committee unanimously object, and I would also object at this time to a proposal like this Suggestion, because it seems to me that this will almost certainly lead us to a stalemate, and will only benefit the Lublin Poles instead.I also think that calling for freedom of movement and communication would create unnecessary debate at this stage of the negotiations. On point (3), we agree that the Poles invited to the consultations should discuss the formation of the government among themselves, and that the committee should preside over it as an impartial arbitrator as far as possible.Harriman has been instructed to do so, but he feels, and I agree, that the requirement on point (3) seems to be put on hold later. Your point (4) (about the cessation of any major changes in Poland), which I included in the last telegram, I still think that the steps we are taking are best estimated to be can achieve our expected results. Regarding point (5) (sending observers), you will recall that Molotov agreed to this, but Clarke Kerr was taken aback when he revealed that you intended to send a large mission.I would like to include the wording you suggest in point (5) in the instructions to Al. Please tell us immediately whether you agree with the above considerations that our ambassadors can follow the instructions given to them I repeat my reply as follows: prime minister to president roosevelt March 16, 1945 I'm reassured that you don't see any fundamental differences between us, and I agree that we differ only in tactics.I'm sure as you know our great desire is to keep pace with you and we understand how hopeless Poland's position will be if it is seen that we are not perfectly in tune 3. Halifax will explain to you in detail our views on the points which I still consider necessary to include.I welcome your agreement on point (1) (i.e. the Warsaw government should not have priority over everything).Regarding point (2) (i.e. inviting the Poles to the negotiations) what if Molotov vetoed every one of our proposals?On a further level, what is the use if the person invited has no freedom of movement and correspondence!In fact we did not know that when we raised this latter point with Molotov earlier, he objected; but Mikolaichek made it a condition of his going to Moscow, and I very much doubt that we will be able to persuade He's leaving, unless we can convey some definite assurances to him.In the same way we should assure those Poles who oppose the Lublin faction that we wish to be invited, I would very much like to come to an agreement with Molotov on the nature of the negotiations and the arbitrator status of the committee (my point (3)) .If you strongly object to raising the question of the presidency at this stage, I will give in, although it is actually a very important matter which should not be denied to the Poles from discussion.As for point (4) (demanding that the Soviet government prevent the Warsaw government from making any further important changes in Poland), I have difficulty agreeing with you that the plan for a political truce will achieve the desired result.How can we ensure that the Russians do not exaggerate something said or done by supporters of the Polish government in Poland or here as a breach of the truce?I worry that the political truce plan will lead us to long delays and dead ends, and that at least some of the blame for this will likely fall on the Polish government in London.So I have a hard time agreeing to your proposal for a truce, because we think that would rapidly increase the danger.Once again I most sincerely ask you to consider whether you can accept (a modified proposal to prevent major changes in Poland).This will give us some basis for the work of the observers (point (5)), and I am glad to know that we agree with each other on point (5). 4. Currently our representatives are completely blocked from entering Poland.An impenetrable curtain hung across the scene.Even our British and American liaison officers who were helping to bring back rescued POWs were treated the same.According to our information, officials who had arrived in Lublin, whether American or British, were also asked to leave.I knew in my heart that the Soviets were terrified of what we saw happening in Poland.Except perhaps the Poles, they were treating the Germans very roughly.For whatever reason, we are not allowed to see it.This is not a situation that we can defend. Although I have no definite information on the President's health, I have the feeling that, save for occasional flashes of bravery and sagacity, none of the telegrams he sent us were his own.So I sent him a telegram with a personal tone, which made him feel at ease without the mountain-climbing effort that comes with business. March 18, 1945 So many difficulties and entanglements have obliged me to send you a considerable number of telegrams, which I hope will not bore you.Our friendship is the rock upon which we will build the world of tomorrow, as long as I remain among the builders.I often think of those earth-shattering days.Like your planning of Lend-Lease, our meeting at Argentia, your decision to attack Africa with my hearty approval, or your giving me three hundred Shermans to comfort me about the loss of Tobruk Tanks (subsequently famous at the Battle of Alamein).I remember the part our personal relations played in furthering the world cause, the first military objective of which was now approaching. Two. I am sending most of my colleagues out to Washington and San Francisco for one assignment or another, so at this time I will remain in my country.I have been looking forward to your long-promised visit.Cramer [1] works for the Red Cross and is due to leave for Russia next week on a trip as far as the Urals.It's an invitation from Uncle Jo (if we may boldly call him that), but she'll be back in time to welcome you and Eleanor.You all are in my thoughts all the time. [1] The author's pet name for his wife Clementine.translator 3. Making peace with Germany and Japan on our terms will not give you and me (if I am still in charge) much rest.As I commented last time, after the battle of the giants, the war of the gnomes begins.What will Uncle Joe and his successors think of what we both stand for in a world that is devastated and hungry and needs our help to recover?Talking about party politics a few days ago (made me) feel light and happy.It is like doing carpentry after the labor of making steel.Fortunately, this telegram had nothing to do with our own business, except that I had a useful conversation with Rosenman [1] about our livelihood. [1] Judge Samuel Rosenman, one of Roosevelt's close personal advisers, who had helped draft the President's report to Congress on the Yalta Conference, was visiting me in London. Wish you all the best! President Winston was evidently pleased with this telegram, for he sent me the following telegram two days later, which he knew I would also like from his: President Roosevelt to Prime Minister March 20, 1945 I would be most grateful if it would be convenient for you to see Bernard Baruch as soon as possible.I would likewise appreciate it if you would send him a telegram, for he regards you as one of his oldest friends, and hopes that it would be best to obtain your consent before departing. prime minister to president roosevelt March 21, 1945 I am eagerly looking forward to meeting Bernard, one of my oldest friends.I was just about to telegraph him that I would be very glad to have him come.I hope to know when he will come. In the past I have often wondered why he did not take fuller advantage of Baruch's vast knowledge and experience of American politics and wartime production. Mr. Baruch came as planned.We had a long, intimate conversation, which led to a further sympathetic exchange of views between the President and me.I had hoped for a new bond of correspondence and fellowship with my most important colleague and comrade in arms.Who knows, the time for our farewell is not far away! prime minister to president roosevelt March 30, 1945 I am pleased to learn from the many letters I have received from you this morning that you are back in Washington and in such good spirits.I saw Bernard yesterday and he is coming to spend the weekend with me this evening.He looked in good spirits.As you know, I think he's a very smart guy.Winant's coming tomorrow, Cramer's flight to Moscow, and her flying all over Russia for at least a month, all this has me in suspense. President Roosevelt to Prime Minister April 1, 1945 I have received your very pleasant telegram. Bernard is an experienced and intelligent man, and his efforts should be of great help to both of us. We hope that Cramer's long flight over Russia will be, first of all, safe and secondly fruitful, and I am sure it will be.From our point of view, the present war seems to be going well, and we can now hope that the day of the collapse of Hitlerism will come sooner than we previously expected. The strategies and methods of Britain and the United States finally came together.Meanwhile, the stalemate in Moscow continued, as we had foreseen in London.Soviet policy became increasingly apparent, as did their unbridled and invisible control over Poland.They demanded that Poland be represented in San Francisco only by the government of Lublin.When the Western countries did not agree to do so, the Soviet Union did not allow Molotov to attend.To do so threatened all progress in San Francisco, making even the Congress itself impossible.In his reply to our March 19th correspondence and March 23rd discussion agreed upon by our ambassadors, Molotov made a series of categorical negatives on every point he touched ; the other points are ignored at all.He insisted that the Yalta communiqué only meant that a few more Poles could be added to the current Russian puppet government, and that these puppets had to be consulted first.He insisted that he had the right to veto Mikoleček and any other Poles we might propose, and excused that he did not have enough information on the candidates we had already proposed.He didn't talk about the section where we suggested that the committee should chair the session in an arbitrator capacity while the Poles were discussing among themselves.Another suggestion we made: that any measures taken in Poland that would affect the future of the Polish state, and actions against certain individuals and groups that might disturb the peace, should be avoided, and he did not touch on it.Molotov ignored his suggestion of observers, but told us to talk to the puppets in Warsaw ourselves.Clearly, his strategy was to drag things out while the Lublin Council consolidated their power.The negotiations conducted by our ambassadors have no hope of a good-faith solution to the Polish question.Those negotiations only mean that our ultimatums are being set aside and time is wasted looking for formulas that do not help resolve important issues. Come March 27th, I feel we have to revisit this issue. prime minister to president roosevelt March 27, 1945 As you know, if we are completely incapable of reaching a satisfactory solution to the Polish question, and we are actually being tricked by Russia, Eden and I have undertaken to report this fact publicly to the House of Commons.In the House of Commons I advised critics of the Yalta resolution to trust Stalin.If I had to make a public statement of the facts in the House of Commons; the whole world would infer that such advice was wrong; especially our failure in Poland would result in an organization there again on the new Romanian model.In other words, Eastern Europe will appear to be excluded from the conditions laid down in the Declaration of a Liberated Europe, and any sliver of your and our influence in the region will be excluded as well. We must not be manipulated into being participants in the imposition of a Russian version of democracy on Poland and on Eastern Europe.Unless we admit that we have failed completely, there seems to be only one way to go.That is to uphold our interpretation of the Yalta Declaration.But I am convinced that it is useless to try to argue the matter with Molotov again.With this in mind, isn't it time for the two of us to send a telegram to Stalin on the Polish question?In my next telegram I shall give you my general opinion on this matter.I hope you can agree. As far as I can see, there is no other way to produce good results.If we were rejected and other actions of the Russians against the spirit of Yalta such as Molotov's rude questioning of our claims in the The combination of unsatisfactory handling, the coup in Romania, the Russian refusal to put into practice the proclamation of a liberated Europe, and the Russian blocking of all progress by the European Advisory Council would be a very ominous sign. 【１】見第二十六章，《蘇聯的懷疑》。 你對莫洛托夫退出舊金山會議又有什麼看法？這件事給我留下一個很壞的印象。這意味著俄國人要走開呢，還是他們要訛詐我們呢？依照我們兩個人的理解即將成為舊金山會議討論基礎的敦巴頓橡樹園的方案，就是以大國團結一致的設想為根據的。如果在波蘭問題上不存在這種一致，這個問題畢竟是戰後所要解決的一個重大問題姑且不說剛才所提到的其他事件那麼，我們可以合理地問一下：新的世界組織的成功的前景是些什麼呢？在這種情況下，豈不是十分明顯，我們將在沙灘的基礎上建立世界未來和平的整個結構？ 因此我相信，如果要使舊金山會議得到成功而不致嚴重受到危害，我們兩人現在就必須向斯大林提出關於波蘭的盡可能強烈的呼籲，而且如果必要，其他有損克里米亞和諧一致的事情也可以一併提出。只有這樣，我們才有機會使世界組織建立在我們各國輿論所贊成的路線上。誠然，我不能肯定我們現在應否向斯大林提出關於莫洛托夫不出席舊金山會議將會造成可悲的印象。 這一天晚些時候，我又加上一個積極的建議。 prime minister to president roosevelt 一九四五年三月二十七日 我們兩人可否告訴他（斯大林），我們感到苦惱，因為波蘭委員會的工作由於對雅爾塔決定的解釋彼此各執一見而停頓下來。在那些決定中一致同意的目標是，經過盧布林和波蘭其他民主人士代表的協商以後，建立一個全國統一的而且能為我們雙方政府所承認的新政府。我們所提名的那些波蘭人選沒有得到任何答覆，據說是因為缺乏情況了解。我們曾對他提供充分的情況資料。絕不應該由一個國家把全部提名加以否決。我們認為我們所提出的供討論的人選是本著適合於盟國之間互相信賴的精神才這樣做的，當然不存在允許盧布林方面出來阻擋他們的問題。我們將接受他所提出的任何人選，同樣相信蘇聯政府絕不會提出親納粹的或反對民主的波蘭人。集會在一起的波蘭人應該在他們中自行討論關於新政府的組成問題。委員會應該作為仲裁人主持會議，並監督他們公正行事。莫洛托夫要求首先跟盧布林人協商，公報中並沒有作這樣的規定。但是我們不反對他先去看他們。我們卻不能授權我們的代表這樣做，因為我們認為這同公報的精神相違背。還有，使我們感到驚奇和遺憾的是，莫洛托夫在早先一個階段原曾提議，我們也許樂意派遣觀察員到波蘭去，而現在卻收回了這一建議。的確，他竟裝作似乎從來沒有提過這樣的建議的樣子，並且還要我們向現在的華沙政府去提出申請。斯大林一定懂得，雅爾塔決定的整個要點就在於產生一個我們能夠承認的波蘭政府，因此我們顯然不能跟當前的政府打交道。我們深信他會尊重關於派遣觀察員的諾言，而且他對他的華沙朋友有這樣大的影響，即使他們有不願意的表示，他也可以不費力地加以克服。 二‧此外，斯大林一定會明白，正當三大盟國籌劃建立一個全國統一的新政府的時候，目前的波蘭當權者不應該損害其前途。我們已經要求蘇聯政府對他們在那裡暫時掌握政權的朋友們施加影響。我們相信斯大林將會採取以此為目標的步驟。 三‧斯大林將要看到，這一切已在三月十九日我們（大使們的）通牒中使用最合理的措辭予以闡明。他會不會撥冗一看，判斷一下究竟我們的建議是否與雅爾塔決定的精神根本不相符合，而且這些建議是否應全部為我們盟國所遵守，使得雅爾塔解決波蘭問題的目標即要建立一個英美兩國能夠予以承認的代議制政府可以不再拖延地予以實現。 總統回答說，自從克里米亞會議以後，他也一直抱著焦慮和關切注視著蘇聯態度的發展，他闡述了他的建議以供我們的大使們進一步談判之用，結尾說：可是，我同意你的看法，就是現在時機已到，我們應就蘇聯態度的比較大的方面（特別關於波蘭）跟斯大林進行直接交涉，因此我的下一封電報將包括我所建議的去電的全文。我希望你盡快讓我知道你的反應如何。 我當然大為放心，因為我們終於同意跟斯大林直接打交道。我一直深信，只有這樣才能得到任何實際的結果。我於三月三十日打電報給總統說：我感到高興，因為你同意時機已到，我們兩人應直接向斯大林交涉。你的電報稿是一個嚴肅而有份量的文件，儘管還不能完全表達我們的意見，我們一定誠懇地表示接受。在發給斯大林的一份相同的電報中，我也將說明我完全表示贊同。 四月一日我自己拍發電報給斯大林。 Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin 一九四五年四月一日 我希望你在這個時候已經接到美國總統的電報，承他的盛意，他在發出這個電報以前曾經給我看過。現在我有責任代表英國政府向你鄭重說明，我們戰時內閣要求我向你表示：我們衷心地贊同總統的這個電報，我們對這件事具有完全一致的見解。 二‧有兩三點意見我要特別強調一下，首先，我們不認為在莫斯科的討論中保持著雅爾塔的精神，而且在有些地方的確也沒有按照它的文字辦事。我們從來沒有想到經過我們三方面本著如此深厚的善意而指派出來的委員會竟不能迅速和順利地以互相遷就的精神執行他們的任務。的確我們曾經以為一個新的和改組過的波蘭政府到現在應該已經建立起來，而且為一切聯合國所承認。這樣才可以向全世界證明，我們具有為世界前途而協作的能力和決心。現在要達到這一目的為時還不太晚。 三‧無論如何，在還沒有組成這樣一個新改組的波蘭政府以前，委員會要先同意把波蘭國內外有代表性的波蘭人召集在一起，他們倒不一定要參加政府，但可以只參加自由和坦率的協商。甚至這個起碼的一步，都不能辦到，因為對於任何人的邀請，哪怕僅僅只是參加協商，只要蘇聯或盧布林政府不表同意，就認為有權加以否決。我們絕對不會同意我們三國之間的任何一國有這樣的否決權。這種否決權在米科萊契克先生的事例中竟達到了頂點。英美世界普遍地認為他是在國外的波蘭人中一個最傑出的人物。 四‧我們又驚奇又遺憾地得悉莫洛托夫前此曾自發地提出可以讓觀察員或代表團進入波蘭，現在又已撤回。在倫敦的波蘭政府幾乎每天送來許多極其令人痛心的消息，由於上述原因，我們卻被剝奪了親自核對這些消息的一切手段。我們不了解為什麼在波蘭舞台之前，要拉下這麼一幅保密的帷幕。 蘇聯政府如果要派代表團或個人到我們的任何軍事佔領的地區來訪問，我們總是給以最充分的便利。已經有過好幾起這種邀請曾被蘇聯人所接受，而且實際進行過訪問，彼此雙方都感到滿意。我們請求在這些事情上大家應遵守禮尚往來的原則，這樣可以有助於建立起我們持久合作關係的良好基礎。 五‧總統又給我看了他和你之間關於莫洛托夫未能出席舊金山會議的來往電文。我們曾希望三國外長的出席也許可以使在雅爾塔愉快而充滿希望的團結氣氛之後，在一場風暴中又降落在我們身上的許多困難得以清除，然而我們並不懷疑，使莫洛托夫羈留在俄國的那些公務上的理由的重要性。 六‧如果我們尋求波蘭問題達成協議的努力注定歸於失敗，那麼在議會在復活節後復會的時候，我將不得不向議會承認這個事實。沒有人曾像我那樣熱心地和有信心地力圖為俄國的事業而辯護過。一九四一年六月二十二日，第一個大聲疾呼的就是我。自從我向震驚的世界宣佈了俄國西部以寇松線為邊界線是公正的以後，一年多已經過去了，而且英國議會和美國總統都已接受這條邊界線。我是作為俄國的一個真誠的朋友，向你和你的同事們提出個人呼籲，要求你們就波蘭問題跟西方民主國家達成一個良好的諒解，而不要打落我們為了指導世界未來而伸出的友誼之手。 一星期以後，斯大林對於我們兩人都作了答覆。他責備英美大使們把波蘭事件引到一條死胡同裡去。我們在雅爾塔曾經同意利用盧布林政府作為核心加以改造，以便組成一個新的波蘭政府。相反地，我們的大使們卻想把它取消而建立一個完全嶄新的政府。在雅爾塔，我們又曾同意跟波蘭國內的五個波蘭人和從倫敦來的大約三個波蘭人協商。我們的大使們現在卻主張莫斯科委員會的每一個成員都可以從波蘭內外邀請無限多的波蘭人，蘇聯政府對於這件事自不能容許。 委員會應該作為一個整體來決定誰該邀請，而這些被邀請的人必須只限於接受雅爾塔決定的包括接受寇松線在內波蘭人，而且他們必須是真正切望保持波蘭跟蘇聯之間的友好關係的人。他這樣寫著：蘇聯政府堅持這樣主張，這是因為蘇聯士兵為了解放波蘭而流了不少血，並且由於過去的三十年間，敵人曾經兩次利用波蘭領土來侵犯俄國。然後斯大林總結出我們走出死胡同應採取的步驟。盧布林政府必須加以改造而不應一筆勾銷，需要的只是在現有的部長中，從外面掉換幾個新人進去；只應邀請八個波蘭人參加協商，其中五個來自波蘭本國，三個來自倫敦，所有這些人都必須接受雅爾塔決定，並且對蘇聯政府是友好的；應該先跟盧布林政府協商，因為它在波蘭有極大的影響，也因為任何其他辦法都可能是對波蘭人民的侮辱，使他們認為我們不徵詢輿論的意見，而把一個政府強加在他們身上。他結束說：我認為如果能夠採納上面所說的意見，那麼波蘭問題在一個短時期內就能夠達成一致的協議。 斯大林給我的一個私人電報。 Marshal Stalin to Prime Minister 一九四五年四月七日 擔任莫斯科委員會成員的英美大使們不顧波蘭臨時政府的意見，不考慮某些波蘭人物對克里米亞會議關於波蘭的決定和對於蘇聯的態度，硬要堅持邀請這些人來參加協商。例如他們絕對堅持要把米科萊契克邀請到莫斯科來協商，而且他們用最後通牒的方式來提出。在這種事情上，他們無視事實上米科萊契克已經公然出來反對克里米亞會議關於波蘭問題的決定。雖然如此，如果你認為有必要的話，我就準備利用我對於波蘭臨時政府的影響，使他們撤銷對邀請來科萊契克的反對，如果後者願意公開宣佈接受克里米亞會議關於波蘭問題的決定，並且擁護在波蘭和蘇聯之間建立友好關係的主張的話。 二‧你覺得奇怪為什麼軍事行動中的波蘭地區必須包藏在神秘之中，事實上這裡沒有神秘。你們不理會一個事實，就是如果英國的或其他外國的觀察員被派到波蘭去，波蘭人會認為這是對於他們民族自尊心的一種侮辱，而且他們心中還記住一件事，就是他們認為目前英國政府對於波蘭臨時政府的態度是不友好的。至於蘇聯它不得不考慮到臨時政府對於派遣外國觀察員到波蘭去的問題所抱的反對態度。還有，你也知道波蘭臨時政府並沒有阻礙對它持有另一種態度的其它國家的代表到波蘭去，而且一點也不加阻擋，例如對於捷克政府、南斯拉夫政府及其他政府的代表就是這樣。 三‧我跟邱吉爾夫人作了一次暢談，她使我大為感動。她帶給我你所送給我的禮物，讓我對此表示衷心的感謝。 這些仔細考慮過的文件至少提供一些進展的希望。我立刻開始跟米科萊契克和其他波蘭代表作很費周折的討論，以期徵得他們對於雅爾塔決定的無保留的同意。 總統於四月十一日來電說：我們將極其慎重地考慮斯大林態度的含意和我們的下一個步驟是什麼，我當然不會不跟你商量就採取什麼行動或說什麼話，我知道你也會是這樣。