Chapter 216 Volume 6, Chapter 26, Suspicion of the Soviet Union

Unconditional and Military Surrender March 8th General Carl Wolf in Switzerland Meeting with Mr. Allen Dulles Second meeting on March 19th Molotov's insult Eisenhower's anger March 25th My Memo to Eden April 3rd Stalin's Telegram to the President April 5th Mr. Roosevelt's Rebuke April 6th My Telegram to Stalin April 7th His Reply as an Apology Mr. Roosevelt April 10th telegram of the second day. At a time when all the troubles caused by the Soviet Union's abandonment of the spirit of Yalta became the subject of the long correspondence mentioned in the previous chapter, far more acute and important negotiations took place between the British and American governments and the Soviet Union.Our chapter-by-chapter approach to these matters has its advantages, but it must not be forgotten that the events described in each chapter follow one another and influence each other powerfully.

By mid-February, the Nazis realized that defeat was imminent.The Soviet advance, Alexander's victory in Italy, the defeat of the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, and Eisenhower's march on the Rhine, all but Hitler and his closest followers believed that surrender was imminent and inevitable up.The question is to whom to surrender?Germany can no longer fight on two fronts.Negotiating a peace with the Soviet Union was obviously impossible.Germany's rulers were too familiar with totalitarian oppression to invite it in from the East.Then there are only Western allies.They debated whether it was possible to negotiate with Britain and the United States?If a truce can be reached on the Western Front, they can concentrate their forces against the Soviet advance.Only Hitler was stubborn.The Third Reich was finished, and he wanted to die with it.Yet several in his henchmen tried to reach out to the English-speaking allies in secret.All these proposals were of course rejected by us.Our demand is unconditional surrender on all fronts.At the same time, we have always vested in field commanders carte blanche to accept the purely military surrender of the enemy forces with whom they are fighting.While we were still fighting on the Rhine, an attempt to make such an arrangement gave rise to a serious confrontation between the Russians and the President, whom I supported.

In February, General Karl Wolf, the commander of the Nazi SS in Italy, got in touch with the US intelligence agency in Switzerland through an Italian intermediary.At that time, it was decided that in order to verify the identity documents of the relevant persons, the crossword puzzle was used as the contact code.On March 8, General Wolf came to Zurich in person to meet with Mr. Allen Dulles, the head of the American agency.Dulles told Wolfe bluntly at the time that there was no need for negotiations, and that if things were going to proceed, they could only be based on unconditional surrender.The news quickly reached Allied Command in Italy and the governments of the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union.On March 15th, the British and American chiefs of staff in Caserta, General Airey and General Lanitzer, came to Switzerland in disguise. Four days later, on March 19th, they held a second meeting with General Wolff. A tentative meeting.

I realized at once that the Soviet government would suspect a separate military capitulation in the south, which would allow our advance with little resistance as far as Vienna and beyond, or even as far as the Elbe or Berlin.Furthermore, since our various fronts around Germany are part of the overall Allied operation, if anything happens on any of the fronts, the Russians will of course be affected.So if there is any formal or informal contact with the enemy, they should be notified in time.We strictly abide by this rule.Therefore, on March 12, the British ambassador in Moscow notified the Soviet government of the connection with the German emissary, and stated that negotiations would not take place without a reply from Russia.The question of keeping anything from the Russians had never occurred at any stage before.Allied representatives in Switzerland at the time even tried to sneak a Russian officer into the meeting if the Soviet government agreed to send someone.Arrangements for a tentative meeting in Bern for Soviet representatives were ultimately unsuccessful, however.The Russians were therefore notified on March 13 that we would welcome their representatives to headquarters in Alexandria if the contact was of any importance.Three days later, Mr. Molotov informed the British ambassador in Moscow that the Soviet government considered the reluctance of the British government to facilitate the sending of Soviet representatives to Berne completely inexplicable and incomprehensible.A similar note was sent to the US ambassador.

On March 21, our ambassador in Moscow was ordered to inform the Soviet government again that the sole purpose of the meetings was to determine whether the Germans had the right to negotiate a military surrender, and that he was going to invite Russian representatives to the Allied Commander at Caserta department. He did it.The next day Molotov handed him a written reply containing the following words: Representatives of the German command on the one hand and the Anglo-American command on the other have been negotiating in Bern for two weeks, with the Soviet Union, which bears the brunt of the war against Germany behind their backs.

Sir Archibald Clarke Kerr, of course, explained that the Soviet Union had misunderstood the matter and that these negotiations were merely a review of General Wolfe's qualifications and powers, but Molotov's comments But reckless.In his written reply, he wrote: As far as this matter is concerned, the Soviet government believes that it is not a misunderstanding, but something worse than a misunderstanding.He was equally harsh on the Americans. Faced with such an astonishing accusation, I felt it better to remain silent than to compete in insults, and I therefore sent Mr. Eden an abridged copy on the 24th of March:

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary March 24, 1945 Those talks, which have now been stalled, may resume today in a more important region than Italy.There, military issues and political issues will be entangled.The Russians probably had a legitimate fear that we had made a deal on the Western Front to keep them far away on the Eastern Front.In general, it is best not to answer (Molotov) until we have studied it with Washington. You should copy the call from Russia to Washington. At the same time, it is necessary to remind our military commanders on the Western Front.I therefore gave the insulting letter from Moloteau to Montgomery and Eisenhower, with whom I was watching the operation across the Rhine.

General Eisenhower was quite shocked. He seemed to be deeply indignant that our good intentions should be accused of the most unfair and baseless accusations.As a military commander, he said, he would accept the unconditional surrender of any enemy unit on his front, from a company to an entire army group.He considered it a purely military matter, and he had the full power to accept such a surrender without consulting anyone.However, if a political issue arises, he will discuss it with governments immediately.He was worried that if he discussed with the Russians issues such as the surrender of Kesselring's troops, things that he could solve in an hour might take three or four weeks to solve, which would cause serious damage to our troops. loss.He made it clear that he would insist that all the troops of the capitulating officers lay down their arms and stand still pending further orders, so that it would be impossible to transfer them out of Germany to fight the Russians.At the same time, he will use these surrendered troops to advance to the Eastern Front as soon as possible.

I personally think that these matters should be decided by him, and governments of various countries only ask when there are political issues.If, because of the mass capitulation of the enemy forces on the Western Front, we reached the Elbe or beyond before Stalin, I see no reason to be sad.Jock Colville reminded me that I had told him that night that I was very reluctant to consider the partition of Germany until my doubts about Russian intentions had been removed. On March 25th, I handed Mr. Eden a memorandum: After much deliberation, I decided that we should not answer Molotov's offensive letter.I expect you sent a copy of the letter to the State Department, noting in a noncomplaining tone that it was they who were particularly reluctant to let the Russians come to Switzerland, leaving Alexander to deal with the matter on a purely military basis.I believe that the correct course at present is to achieve absolute agreement with the United States, which should be easily achievable, and let Molotov and his masters wait.

I agree with you that the whole issue of the San Francisco meeting is still up in the air. The appointment of Gromyko in place of Molotov was an act of publicity.I imagined the President would be disgusted by this. We crossed the Rhine and spent a happy day together.Tomorrow we are going across to the Scottish Fifteenth Division.I think it is by no means impossible that the whole German front on the Western Front tends to fall apart.At present, fierce fighting is still going on on the northern front, and this unstoppable momentum seems to come from the left hub formed by us as usual. Next day I wrote:

We must ask the United States what attitude they intend to adopt. Will they agree now that the President and I should send a telegram to Stalin?Secondly, should this telegram, as you say, include other topics, such as the question of access to and from Poland, the disposal of our prisoners, our good intentions being discredited in the Berne question, the Rumanian question, etc. Molotov's refusal to go to San Francisco undoubtedly expressed Soviet dissatisfaction.We must make it clear to Roosevelt that in this case the whole question of going to San Francisco for a conference has been objected to, and therefore it is necessary at present that the United Kingdom and the United States stand very firmly together if such a conference is to produce anything of value. Address violations of the Yalta understanding. However, I must point out that we cannot persist against Russia any further than we can get the United States to act together.Nothing could bring them more on our side than any intention of the San Francisco Conference being jeopardized.Could you please send me a draft based on the comments above?After I receive it, I can send you back a telegram addressed to the President in my own person by this time tomorrow.Also, no answer to any correspondence from Russia must be made, even if the delay is to our disadvantage.When it comes time for us to pay them back, our two countries will act in unison.These things are not ripe for debate before Easter. We had a great day here and I hope its impact will be far-reaching.Tomorrow I will visit Eisenhower at his invitation.I showed Montgomery Molotov's impudent letter, since it was obvious that the venue for the negotiations might be changed to his theater of operations.I know very well the Russians' apprehension that we should accept a military surrender on the western or southern front, so that our advance would reach the Elbe with little or no resistance, and even reach Berlin before the bear.Therefore, if the military negotiations take place on this front, which is not a secondary one, as in Italy, it is impossible to separate the military situation from the political situation.In my opinion, the Russians should have been involved from the outset, and we should act according to our duty, our obvious advantages, and our legitimate rights.They demand that everything be accommodated to them, and they themselves refuse to help others except to increase military pressure.Even this military pressure is only willing to use it for their own interests.They should feel that we, too, have a point of view.In my opinion, if the military side disagrees in the negotiations, they must consult their respective governments before any agreement can be reached. My wife was preparing to visit the Soviet Union for her Russia aid fund, but since the Russians were so skeptical of the Bern talks, I even considered postponing her trip. Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary: March 25, 1945 Followed by a memo I just sent.I think it's perfectly fine for Cramer to move under the circumstances.Let me hear your unbiased opinion, whether it would be better to delay for a few days or weeks, or if doing so would be considered a personal gesture of kindness.I'm inclined to let her go as planned. She went anyway, and received the kindest welcome.At the same time I watched carefully the progress of the negotiations so that the Soviet Union would not be unfairly excluded. Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary: March 30, 1945 Haven't we already told the Russians the following things?Namely: the sole purpose of the contact in Switzerland was to arrange a meeting at our headquarters in Italy; If the Russians wish, they can send a representative to the meeting to discuss military issues; and at any time if political issues are involved in the meeting, the entire issue can be consulted with the governments of the three countries.It appears as if the Swiss conversation will go beyond that, although it has not in fact so far.We have decided to ignore Molotov's rude call.That doesn't mean, however, that we abdicate our responsibilities as allies on any issue involving peace negotiations. Please take this into consideration and let me know if I have any other information to send you. On April 5, I received a telegram between the President and Stalin. The content was astonishing. The telegram is as follows: Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt: April 3, 1945 I have received your call regarding the negotiations in Berne.You are quite right in saying that the negotiations between the British and American commanders and the German commanders somewhere in Berne or elsewhere have created an atmosphere of uneasiness and distrust which should be regrettable. But you insist that there have been no negotiations so far. It may be argued that you have not been given sufficient information, and as for my military colleagues, they are convinced from the information they have at hand that negotiations took place and concluded with an agreement with the Germans.According to this agreement, Marshal Kesselring, the commander of the German army on the western front, had agreed to open the front to allow the British and American troops to advance eastward, and the British and American sides had also agreed to relax the terms of peace with Germany in exchange. I think my colleagues are close to the truth.Otherwise, it would be difficult for people to understand the fact that the British and American sides refused to allow the Soviet Army Command to send representatives to Berne to participate in the negotiations with Germany. I am also puzzled by the silence of the British, who have allowed you to correspond with me on this unpleasant matter, while they themselves have kept silent, although it is known that the whole affair of the Berne negotiations was initiated by the British. I understand that the outcome of separate negotiations in Berne or elsewhere would be of some benefit to the Anglo-American troops, who would be able to enter the heart of Germany with almost no resistance from the Germans.But why is it necessary to keep this matter from the Russians and not let your allies, the Russians, know? As a result of this negotiation, German forces currently on the Western Front have virtually ceased fighting against Britain and the United States, while at the same time German forces continue to fight against Russia, the ally of Britain and the United States.It goes without saying that this situation is in no way conducive to the continued strengthening of trust between our nations. As I said in my last letter to you, and I think it is necessary to reiterate here, that I and my colleagues would never have taken such a risky step at the time, because we knew the If there are any temporary advantages, they will pale in comparison with the main interest of maintaining and strengthening the trust between the allies. Such a denunciation enraged the president.His physical strength did not allow him to draft the reply himself.General Marshall drafted the following reply, and Roosevelt agreed.The answer is certainly not without courage. President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin: April 5, 1945 I was surprised to receive your letter of April 3rd.You claim that Field Marshal Alexander and Kesselring made an arrangement at Berne to allow Anglo-American troops to advance eastward, and that in exchange the Anglo-American side had agreed to ease the terms of the peace with Germany. In my last telegram to you I told you about the attempt to arrange a conference in Berne to discuss the surrender of the German troops in Italy: (1) No negotiations were held in Berne; (2) The meeting did not contain any political content; (3) Any surrender of the enemy forces in Italy shall not violate the principle of unconditional surrender agreed upon by us; (4) Soviet officers are welcome to attend any meeting agreed to discuss surrender. To the benefit of our joint effort to fight against Germany, which now promises to bring about an early collapse of the German army, I must, as always, continue to assume that you have as high a confidence in my honesty and trustworthiness as I have always placed in you with the same high level of trust. I also fully appreciate the role your heroic troops played in making it possible for General Eisenhower's troops to cross the Rhine, and your troops' future role in bringing about the final defeat of German resistance in our combined German offensive. I have complete confidence in General Eisenhower to let me know before making any deal with the Germans.He was ordered to demand the unconditional surrender of any potentially defeated enemy on his line, and he was bound to do so.Our advance on the Western Front was the result of military action, the rapidity of which was mainly due to the heavy hits of our Air Force which destroyed German traffic, and also to Eisenhower's presence while the Germans were still west of the Rhine. At that time, most of their main force can be destroyed. I am sure there were no negotiations in Berne at any time, so I feel that information of your kind must have been obtained from the German side, who are trying to create a divide between us in order to escape to some extent own war crimes.If that's what Wolff was aiming for in Bern, your call confirms that he's already somewhat successful. Since I believe you to be credible in my personal reliability and my determination to work with you until the Nazis surrender unconditionally, it is surprising that it seems that the Soviet government has believed that I have reached an agreement with the enemy without first obtaining your full consent. agreement. In conclusion, I would like to say: If, at this moment of victory, after such a great loss in life, goods and treasure, such doubts, such lack of trust, should be allowed to mar our whole cause, That would really be a great tragedy in history. Frankly speaking, I cannot help but feel disgusted that your whistleblowers, whoever they may be, have made such vile slanders of my actions or those of my trusted staff. I was so moved by that last sentence that I put an emphasis on it.It seems to me that Mr. Roosevelt, although he did not draft the entire cable, probably wrote the final touch himself.It looks as if the stroke was appended, in other words a summary, and just like Roosevelt in anger. I immediately wrote to the President: Prime Minister to President Roosevelt: April 5, 1945 I am horrified that Stalin should send you such a telegram insulting the honor of America and Britain.The British Government sincerely supports your reply, and the War Cabinet has entrusted me with sending the following telegram to Stalin. The next day I personally wrote to Stalin. Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin April 6, 1945 The President has sent me his correspondence with you concerning a British and American officer in Field Marshal Alexander's staff who made contacts in Switzerland with a German general named Wolff concerning the The question of the possible surrender of troops in Kesselring, Northern Italy.I therefore think it appropriate to give you an exact overview of the actions taken by His Majesty's Government.We informed the Soviet Government on March 12th as soon as we heard of these contacts, and we and the American Government have been faithful to keep you informed of all that has taken place.The only thing talked about or involved in any way in Switzerland was the examination of the qualifications of the German emissary and the attempt to arrange a meeting with Field Marshal Alexander at the headquarters of Field Marshal Kesselring or at some convenient point in Northern Italy. .Even the military surrender of Kesselring's troops was not negotiated in Switzerland.Nor did we think of any political-military conspiracy as you charged in your telegram to the President, and our thoughts are by no means as despicable as you imagine. 2. Then immediately invite your representatives to the meeting we want to arrange in Italy.If there was a meeting and your representatives were there, they would have been able to hear every word of the conversation. 3. We consider Field Marshal Alexander to be fully entitled to accept the surrender of the twenty-five German divisions against which he was confronted on his line in Italy, and to discuss such matters with the German emissary authorized to negotiate the terms of surrender.However, if such discussions are held, we still take special care to invite your representative to come to his headquarters to participate in this purely military meeting.In fact, however, the contacts in Switzerland did not produce any results.Our officers returned from Switzerland without success in arranging a meeting in Italy for Kesselring's emissary.All this has been communicated step by step to the Soviet Government by Field Marshal Alexander or Sir Archibald Clarke Kerr, and to you through American channels.I reiterate once again that no negotiations, formal or informal, were held or even touched in Switzerland. 4. However, the whole incident of German General Wolff's request for negotiations this time may be one of the enemy's plots to sow distrust among the Allies.Field Marshal Alexander made this point in his telegram of March 11, in which he wrote: Please note that two of the main characters are Nazi SS members and Himmler's people, this Things make me very suspicious.The telegram was repeated on March 12 to the British ambassador in Moscow, who informed the Soviet government.If the Germans intended to drive a wedge between us, they have indeed succeeded in doing so. After quoting some particularly insulting phrases from Molotov's letter, I continued: In the interest of Anglo-Russian relations, the British Government has decided to ignore and ignore this insulting and baseless accusation.This is the justification for what you called the silence of the British in your telegram to the President.We thought it better to keep silent than to answer such a call from Molotov. But to tell you the truth, we were shocked by the call and insulted that Molotov should have imposed such behavior on us.None of this, however, affects our instruction to Field Marshal Alexander to keep you informed of all circumstances. 6. You told the president that this incident was entirely initiated by the British, which is also inconsistent with the facts.In fact, the message to Marshal Alexander that the German General Wolf requested to contact an American institution in Switzerland. 7. Any contact, whether in Berne or elsewhere, had nothing to do with the total collapse of the German army on the Western Front.In fact, they fought very tenaciously. From the beginning of our February offensive to March 28, they caused us and the American side to suffer more than 87,000 casualties.However, because the number of our ground troops exceeds that of the enemy, the British and American air forces have an overwhelming advantage in the air. In March alone, the British and American air forces dropped more than 200,000 tons of bombs on Germany. decisive destruction.The reason why their ground troops on the western front are far less than ours is due to the great offensive and strong pressure of the Soviet army. 8. As for the denunciations in your telegram to the President of April 3rd which also slandered the British Government, my colleagues and I support the last sentence of the President's reply. On April 7 Stalin responded to the president's condemnation. Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt April 7, 1945 Call received on April 4th. My telegram of April 3rd was not about honesty and trustworthiness.I never doubted your honesty and trustworthiness, nor Mr. Churchill.My opinion is that it can be seen in our correspondence that we have different views on what can and cannot be done between the allies.We Russians believe that, judging from the current situation on all fronts, when the enemy's surrender is inevitable, if any representative of an Allied country wants to meet with the Germans to discuss surrender, then the representative of the other Allied country should be allowed to surrender. Delegates have the opportunity to participate in such meetings.In any case, it is absolutely necessary if the said ally so demands.The Americans, however, thought differently from the British and believed that the Russians were wrong.They therefore denied the Russians the right to attend meetings with the Germans in Switzerland.I have already written to you, and I think it must be reiterated, that the Russians would never deny the Americans and the British the right to participate in such conferences under similar circumstances.I still think the Russian point of view is the only correct one, because it eliminates all possibility of mutual suspicion, and makes it impossible for the enemy to sow discord between us. 2. It is difficult to agree that the Germans' non-resistance on the Western Front was entirely due to their defeat.The Germans had one hundred and forty-seven divisions on the Eastern Front. They could send fifteen to twenty divisions from the Eastern Front to reinforce their troops on the Western Front without weakening their position.The Germans, however, did not do this and do not do so now.And yet they continued their frenzied struggle with the Russians over an insignificant railway station in Czechoslovakia, Zelianica.The station was of no use to them, like a poultice on a dead body, but they gave up without the slightest resistance to the important cities of central Germany, Osnabrück, Mannheim, and Kassel. up.I think you'll agree that this behavior of the Germans is more than weird and incomprehensible. 3. As for my intelligence officers, I can solemnly tell you that they are extremely honest and humble people who carry out their duties consciously and with no intention of offending anyone.We often put these people to the practical test.Please judge for yourself.Last February, General Marshall sent several important reports to the Soviet General Staff. Based on the materials he had, he warned the Russians that in March there would be two fierce German counter-offensives on the Eastern Front. One would be from Pomerany. Ya pointed to Torun, and the other was to attack Lodz from Moravska Ostra.In fact, the main attack that the Germans were preparing at that time was not directed against the above-mentioned place, but a completely different area, that is, the area around Lake Balaton southwest of Budapest.It is now known that the Germans had concentrated thirty-five divisions in this area, including eleven tank divisions.It was one of the most violent attacks of the whole war, and because of the participation of such a large concentration of tank troops, Field Marshal Dolbuchen was able to avoid a disaster and deal a head-on blow to the Germans later, among other reasons In addition, it was because our intelligence officers detected (albeit a little belatedly) the German plans for a major offensive and immediately warned Field Marshal Dolbuchen.This allowed me to reaffirm myself how cautious and well-informed the Soviet intelligence officers were. He also sent me a copy of this telegram, enclosing the following personal call to me: Marshal Stalin to the Prime Minister: April 7, 1945 I am sending you a copy of my telegram to the President of April 7th.I have answered all the essential points about the Swiss negotiations raised in your call.As for the other issues raised in your call, I think it is necessary to make the following clarifications. 1. Neither Molotov nor I had any intention of slandering anyone. This is not a matter of discrediting anyone, but a matter of our differing views on the rights and duties of an ally.You can see from my telegram to the President that the Russians are right about this matter, because it guarantees the rights of each of the allies and leaves no possibility for the enemy to try to drive a wedge between us. 2. My telegram is personal and strictly confidential.Doing so allows us to be open and honest and to speak freely.This is the benefit of secret communication.Still, this style of communication is difficult if you take every blunt statement I make as an offense.I can assure you that I did and do not intend to offend anyone. I sent this telegram to Roosevelt with the following comment: prime minister to president roosevelt April 11, 1945 I think that's about as much as we can get from them, and indeed it's as close to an apology as they can get.However, before considering any reply from the British Government, please let me know your opinion on the matter, so that you and I can keep pace. The next day the President replied by telegram that he would send Stalin the following telegram: Thank you for your candid explanation of the Soviet point of view on the Berne incident, which now seems to be a thing of the past and has not had any effect. In any case, there should be no mutual suspicion, and small misunderstandings of this nature should not occur in the future.I am convinced that the day you and I join forces in Germany and attack side by side with full force will be the day when the Nazi army falls apart. Later he sent another telegram: President Roosevelt to the Prime Minister: April 12, 1945 I would like to keep the general Soviet problems as narrow as possible, because such problems, in one form or another, occur almost every day, and yet most of them have to be resolved like Berne. But we must be firm that the path we have taken so far is the right one.