Chapter 217 Volume 6, Chapter 27, Strategic Differences in the West

War and Politics A Deadly Disjoint Soviet Ambition A Few Practical Issues Eisenhower's Strategy His Telegram to Stalin March 31st Memorandum to the Committee of Chiefs of Staff American Rebuttal March 31st My Telegram to Eisenhower Telegram to President Eisenhower's reply again Correspondence to Eisenhower to save Holland. As a joint-action war draws to a close, political issues gradually rise in importance.Especially in Washington, a far-sighted view will prevail.To be sure, such things as acquiring territories are not at least in the American mind.But when there are wolves around, the shepherd must protect his flock, even if he doesn't like mutton himself.At this time none of the issues in dispute seemed to the chiefs of staff of the United States to be of extreme importance.The masses are of course unaware that there is an argument, nor do they know what the problem is.Soon, the tide of victory overwhelmed everything, and the matter was forgotten for a moment.Today, however, no one will argue that these issues dominate Europe's destiny and that they could well deprive us of the lasting peace that we have all fought so long for.We can now see a fatal disconnect between the gradual decline of President Roosevelt's power and President Truman's gradual grasp of the world's problems.In this sad vacuum, one president can't function, and the other can't understand the situation.Neither the military chiefs nor the State Department got the guidance they needed.The former confine themselves within the confines of their profession, the latter fail to appreciate the problems involved.

Indispensable political guidance was lacking at the most critical juncture.The United States on the stage of victory is the master of the destiny of the world, but it lacks a real coherent vision.Although the United Kingdom is still very strong, it cannot act decisively alone.At this stage, I can only offer warnings and appeals.This moment, therefore, at the culmination of an apparently vast triumph, turned out to be a most unpleasant one for me.I walked among cheering crowds, or sat at tables with telegrams of congratulations and blessings from all parts of the Grand League, while my heart ached and my mind was filled with ominous foreboding.

The destruction of German military power has brought about a fundamental change in the relationship between Communist Russia and the Western democracies.Both sides had lost their common enemy, which was almost the only bond between them.Henceforth, neither Russian imperialism nor the communist creed required constraints on their progress and final territory.After more than two years of this situation, they again encountered an evenly matched force of will to compete with them.If I had not known, had felt, when all was still in the twilight, when glorious victories had only deepened the darkness within human affairs, I would not have known now, when all was manifest. Let's talk about it.On this point, the reader must judge for himself.

Some decisive practical issues concerning strategy and policy to be discussed in this chapter are as follows: First, Soviet Russia has become a mortal danger to the free world; Second, a new front must immediately be established to stop her advance; Thirdly, the new European front should go as far as possible to the East; Fourth, Berlin was the first and real objective of the British and American forces; Fifth, the liberation of Czechoslovakia and the entry of American troops into Prague were of great significance; Sixth, Vienna and the whole of Austria must be under the control of Western powers, they should be at least on an equal footing with the Soviet Union;

Seventh, Marshal Tito's aggressive demands on Italy must be regulated. Last but not least, before the armies of the democracies are disbanded, or before the Western Allies give up any part of German territory which they have captured or (as will shortly be said) liberated from totalitarian rule, A solution must be reached between the East and West of Europe on all the major problems. Rumors of all kinds about Hitler's future plans were rife, but only a fraction of the reports we got were confirmed.I think it is prudent to scrutinize the rumors carefully, because I heard that they were taken very seriously in Eisenhower's headquarters.Indeed, the move of the German administration to the south from Berlin is palpable.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, Transfer to the Chiefs of Staff Committee March 17, 1945 I wish to ask the Intelligence Committee to examine the question of the possibility of Hitler, having lost Berlin and northern Germany, retreating to the mountains and forests of southern Germany in order to prolong the war there.His strange resistance at Budapest, and the resistance which is still going on at Balaton, and his keeping Kesselring's army in Italy for so long, seem to be consistent with such an intention.But since he was so foolishly stubborn about everything, maybe there was no sense behind these actions as well, and yet those possibilities should be examined.

Although things cannot be determined with certainty, the general conclusion of our Chiefs of Staff Committee is that: The Germans waged a long war, or even a guerrilla war, in the mountains, probably not on a very appreciable scale.So we dismissed that possibility, as it turns out, and it did.On this basis I inquired what the strategy of the advance of the Anglo-American armies was, as foreseen by Allied Headquarters, and I received this answer: General Eisenhower to Prime Minister March 30, 1945 When the U.S. Ninth and First Armies join forces and the enemy surrounded in the Ruhr area can no longer attack, I advocate advancing eastward to join the Russians or reach the entire front of the Elbe River.As long as the Russians agree, the Kassel-Leipzig axis is the most suitable for attack, since it guarantees the capture of that important industrial area into which we believe the German ministers are moving.This cut the German army almost in half.It also saves us from having to cross the Elbe.The plan was to separate and annihilate the main remaining enemy forces in the west.

Such will be my main offensive, and until it becomes quite clear that we do not need to concentrate all our forces here, I am ready to devote all my strength to ensure its success.This main attack is in Bradley's combat area. He will let the third, first, and ninth armies implement this plan, and the fifteenth army will also be under his command, and he will wipe out the remaining enemies when the opportunity arises later.Montgomery would protect his left flank with the British and Canadian armies north of the entire Hanover-Wittenberg line, and Devers would protect his right flank with the Seventh Army and the First French Army.

Once the success of the main offensive is assured, I advocate immediate action to clear the northern ports, which, like Kiel, would require a forced crossing of the Elbe.Montgomery will undertake these tasks, and if this is necessary for the purpose, I advocate an increase in his strength. In addition, when the above requirements have been met, the Sixth Army Group should also be ready to advance southeastward along the Nuremberg-Regensburg axis to prevent the German army from concentrating its troops in the south, and prepare to join forces with the Russian army in the Danube Valley. I trust this supplementary information to clarify my current plans.These plans are, of course, flexible and can be modified at any time to accommodate unforeseen circumstances.

At the same time we hear that Eisenhower telegraphed his tactics directly to Marshal Stalin on March 28 without informing his deputy, Air Force Admiral Ted, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.We all felt that doing so went beyond what was previously understood by both sides as the European Supreme Commander negotiated with the Soviets.General Eisenhower believed that he was doing the right thing by communicating directly with the Russian head of state, because Stalin was also the supreme commander of the Red Army.But he did not communicate directly with the President of the United States, who is also the Commander-in-Chief, but with General Marshall.

In this telegram, Eisenhower said that after the Ruhr was cut off, he advocated moving his main offensive along the Erfurt|Leipzig|Dresden axis.In this way, after joining forces with the Russian army, the remaining German army can be cut in half.The secondary offensive was from Regensburg to Linz, where he also hoped to join forces with the Russians to prevent the Germans from building up their resistance in the South German ramparts.Stalin readily agreed.He said that this suggestion was in line with the plan of the Soviet Supreme Command.Again: Berlin has lost its former strategic importance.Therefore, the Soviet Supreme Command is going to place inferior troops in the direction of Berlin.This statement does not match the facts that followed. The British Chiefs of Staff expressed concern about the pros and cons of the new plan, and that Eisenhower was overreaching without consulting the highest military and constitutional authorities.They drew up an extremely long telegram to their colleagues in Washington, which I did not see in draft until after it had been sent.This kind of thing is very common when the staff officers of the two sides discuss it.In principle I fully agree with our Chiefs of Staff.And we have the same thought.Still, I think they got a lot of frivolous extraneous stuff in their cables instead of debating the US Chiefs of Staff on the best grounds.To that end, I give them the following memo: Prime Minister to General Ismay, Transfer to the Chiefs of Staff Committee March 31, 1945 I have considered your cable, and I think it is certainly a good thing to present the military arguments to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.However, I wish we could realize that we accounted for only one quarter of the forces attacking Germany, and how dramatically the situation has changed since June 1944 3. In my opinion, the main criticism of Eisenhower's new plan is that it shifts the axis of the main attack on Berlin to the direction via Leipzig to Dresden, which raises a problem, It is whether the 21st Army Group will lose its offensive power due to such a stretched front, especially after it has been drawn away from the U.S. Ninth Army.Our forces in the north may thus be reduced to an almost stationary role, which practically prevents us from crossing the Elbe until the fighting reaches its final stage; and precludes any expectation of the British entering Berlin with the Americans . 4. Whether such criticism is valid depends on the degree of resistance of the enemy.If the resistance had all but collapsed, there was no reason why the main force and the 21st Army Group should not be advancing on a wider front than they were at present.On this point the Supreme Commander should have the final say. 5. Again, General Eisenhower's assumption that Berlin has lost much of its military and political importance may be wrong.Even though the ministries of the German government had been largely moved to the south, the fall of Berlin was a fact of paramount importance in the minds of the Germans and should not be ignored.Leaving Berlin aside and letting the Russians take it later doesn't seem right to me.As long as Berlin can hold on to its resistance in the besieged ruins (which is not hard to do), the German resistance will be encouraged, and the fall of Berlin will probably deprive almost all Germans of hope. 6. We weaken our argument for an increased concentration of forces between the Hannover-Berlin line and the sea by suggesting that we wish to turn around and deal with Denmark, Norway, and the Baltic coast. 7. In conclusion, I think that our cable gives the Joint Chiefs of Staff some arguable arguments, which they can seize upon for a tactful and forceful rebuttal to us.It must be remembered that Eisenhower enjoyed great prestige among them.He probably thought he had correctly estimated the present resistance of the enemy, and had done so by military action: (a) approaching (i.e. reaching) the entire line of the Rhine; (b) Have the power to go both ways, instead of all the power going north. These things, plus the steady flow of reinforcements from the U.S. military, have greatly increased the power and prestige of General Eisenhower, and the Americans will feel as a victorious supreme commander , he had the right, and indeed the great need, to seek the opinion of the Russians as to where the East and West would best meet. 8. Finally, the capture of Danzig and the subsequent destruction of one of the three major German submarine bases was a new event of great relief to the Admiralty.It is now clearly impossible for Germany to resume submarine warfare on the scale they predicted. So if the dispersion of forces would reduce the speed and power of the 21st Army Group, then I would disagree with the existence of Any emergency would be enough to require us to send troops to the left to clear the Baltic ports. P.S. The words above were dictated by me before I saw the rebuttal from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. Now the rebuttal has arrived.The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff responded to the general effect that, according to their opinion, the procedures for Eisenhower's correspondence with the Russians were necessary for work.And any change can only be made by him, not by them.As for the course of action outlined in his plan, it appears to be in line with the agreed strategy and instructions given to him.They said Eisenhower was deploying the maximum force at his disposal north across the Rhine.In the South, secondary efforts are also achieving a remarkable result and are being extended as far as supplies allow.They believed that taking the ports and everything else that the British pointed out would be faster and more sure by the method of the Supreme Commander than by the plan emphasized by the British. They said the war in Germany had reached a stage where it was up to the commanders in the field to play it cheap.It seems inappropriate not to deliberately take advantage of an enemy's weakness. The only goal is quick and complete victory.The Joint Chiefs of Staff, while recognizing factors not directly relevant to the Supreme Commander, believed that his strategic concept was sound and deserved full support, and that he should continue to communicate with the Soviet Supreme Commander. However, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff also advocated that General Eisenhower should be required to elaborate on his telegram to Marshal Stalin and send them a copy, and that he should postpone answering when Moscow asks us to provide new information in the future and ask the United Nations for instructions first. Committee of the Chiefs of Staff. In full agreement with my military colleagues, I am restating the gist of my memorandum to General Eisenhower. Prime Minister to General Eisenhower: March 11, 1945 Thanks a lot.Personally, I think that if the enemy's resistance had not collapsed, but shifted the axis of advance considerably southward and removed the U.S. Ninth Army from the Twenty-First Army Group, it would stretch Montgomery's front so wide that he would The offensive role gradually disappeared.I don't see why it would be an advantage not to cross the Elbe.If the enemy's resistance weakens, as you obviously expect (which is quite possible), why shouldn't we cross the Elbe and go as far east as possible?There are important political implications in this, because it seems certain that the Russian army in the south will enter Vienna and travel all over Austria; Things that may have made the Russians more confident than ever that all the credit goes to them. 2. Also, I personally do not think that Berlin has lost its military significance, and certainly not its political significance.The fall of Berlin would have a major psychological impact on resistance throughout Germany.While Berlin held on, large numbers of Germans felt it was their duty to keep fighting.I dare not share the opinion that it would be of great advantage to capture Dresden and join forces with the Russians there.Institutions belonging to the various ministries of the German government that have already moved south can quickly move south again.But as long as Berlin remains under the German flag, it is impossible, in my opinion, not to be one of Germany's most decisive locations. 3. I would therefore rather insist very much on the plan upon which we have crossed the Rhine, namely that the U.S. Ninth Army should advance with the Twenty-First Army Group to the Elbe and across Berlin.This has nothing to do with the great central breakthrough offensive which you are now developing so correctly due to the brilliant successes your army has achieved south of the Ruhr.This is nothing more than moving the strength of an army group to the northern flank. I also summarized the situation in a telegram to the President. prime minister to president roosevelt April 1, 1945 You must have seen the telegrams between the British Chiefs of Staff and their American counterparts.I think there are some misunderstandings on both sides, and I would very much like to clear them up as soon as possible. 2. We are very grateful that the communication from the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States allowed time for a reasonable exchange of views between the two chiefs of staff committees. 3. But I have seen people think that in the increasingly important contacts between General Eisenhower and the Russian field commanders, we have the slightest intention to discredit and demean his reputation.This makes me sad.General Eisenhower wishes to make several major changes to the plan previously agreed upon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Malta and approved by both of you and me, and all we ask is for some time to consider this issue.The British Chiefs of Staff are naturally apprehensive about the apparent decision to decide the fate of the British Army (which, though only a third your size, is nevertheless well over a million), without consulting the British authorities. .Nor did they fully understand what General Eisenhower's telegram really meant.At this point we can perhaps be forgiven, since General Dean was equally confused and had delayed sending General Eisenhower's telegram to Stalin for twenty-four hours for context.In such a case, I fully agree with the procedure suggested by your Joint Chiefs of Staff, which we did not think of ourselves.I feel sorry. 4. Having said this, I would like to make it clear that the British Government has complete confidence in General Eisenhower, that we are delighted that our troops are fighting under his command, and that we are grateful for his ability to deal with all the difficulties of an Allied command I express my admiration for the great and superior character and personality shown in the book. Also, I would like to express to you, Mr. President, as I have expressed verbally to General Eisenhower on the field, my heartfelt congratulations to the American Center Armies on their recent advances and battles across the Rhine for their glorious victories and progress V. Having settled and believed to have dispelled these misunderstandings among the most sincere friends and comrades who have ever fought alongside the Allied Forces, I would like to consider the changes that General Eisenhower now intends to make to our original plans In terms of pros and cons, I take the liberty to offer you some personal considerations.It seems to me that the points of disagreement are minor and, as usual, not in principle but in emphases.Obviously, if all obstacles could be removed and all dispersal of forces avoided, the Allied forces on the northern and central routes should now be able to advance towards the Elbe at the highest speed.The axis of operations so far has been towards Berlin.General Eisenhower, on the basis of his estimate of enemy resistance (which I attach most importance to), would now move the axis slightly southward in order to pass Leipzig and perhaps even as far south as Dresden.He drew the U.S. Ninth Army from the Army Group on the North Road, and as a result stretched the latter's front southward.I shall be sorry if enemy resistance should destroy the force and momentum of the attack of the British 21st Army Group, so that, once they reach the Elbe, they will be almost immobilized by the river.I can say frankly that Berlin is still of high strategic importance.Nothing could match the desperate psychological effect of the fall of Berlin on all German resistance.For the Germans this would be the highest signal of defeat.On the other hand, if it were to hold out against a Russian siege amidst the ruins, it would encourage all armed Germans to resist as long as the German flag flew there. 6. There is another point that you and I should consider.There is no doubt that Russian troops will travel all over Austria and enter Vienna.If they take Berlin again, will it not form in their minds an incorrect impression that they themselves have contributed most to our common victory; Add serious and terrible difficulties?So I think from a political point of view we should try to go as far east as possible into Germany.If Berlin is within our grasp, of course we should take it.From a military point of view, this is also a matter of course. 7. In conclusion, what seems to be a possible disagreement between Eisenhower's new program and what we advocate, which we have previously agreed upon, is whether the emphasis should be on the axis pointing towards Berlin. , still placed on the axis pointing to Leipzig and Dresden.For matters like this, when making a final agreement with the Russians, of course, there should be a leisurely discussion between the two chiefs of staff committees. 8. I hardly need to say that although this is a cable from me personally to you and not to the General Staff, I would very much like you to show it to General Marshall. In fact, since the President was already very weak, it was General Marshall who was there to deal with these major problems.Although I haven't realized it yet. Eisenhower responded immediately to my March 31st telegram. General Eisenhower to Prime Minister April 1, 1945 After reading your telegram yesterday, I know that you still have some misunderstandings about what I want to do. First, let me reiterate that I have not changed any plans.I divided this force into groups.I placed my main attack to the north specifically to isolate the Ruhr and divide, encircle, or annihilate the German forces guarding that area.This is the strategic goal of this force approved by me.Obviously, after we have achieved such a victory against the German forces in the west and dealt such a blow to their industrial power, new situations will inevitably arise, which must be studied and analyzed before we can accurately draw up the general plan for the next operation. plan. The situation that is developing is exactly the situation that I have advocated before the staff for more than a year as what we are striving for.This means that we should concentrate our forces across the Rhine by the two routes of Wesel and Frankfurt, approximately in a large triangle whose apex is in the Kassel region.From there onwards, the problem was to decide which direction to strike in order to promote the greatest disintegration of the remaining German forces and German resistance.I have never lost sight of the high importance of the advance to the northernmost coast, although your telegram has brought to me a new appreciation of the political importance of reaching certain objectives early.I can see your position on this issue very clearly.The only difference between your proposal and my plan is that of timing. In order to ensure the success of every combat effort I have planned, I concentrate first on the center to obtain the positions I need.As I now see it, the next step in the future should be to get Montgomery across the Elbe, supported if necessary by American troops, at least as far as a line including the Gulf of Lübeck along the coast.If in the future German resistance tends to gradually and surely break down, you will see that there will be very little, if any, difference in time between the acquisition of the center position and the crossing of the Elbe.On the other hand, if the resistance had a tendency to become obstinate, I also realized the great necessity of concentrating on the gradual completion of the task, rather than having all these plans at the same time distract my own attention. Quite naturally, if at any moment the enemy collapsed across the board, we would rush forward, and Lübeck and Berlin would be among our important objects. I immediately reply as follows: Prime Minister to General Eisenhower April 2, 1945 Thank you again for your very kind call. As stated in section 3 of Moscow's reply to you, Berlin has lost its former strategic importance. It made me feel even more important to enter Berlin, and the city is likely to be open to us.This should be understood from the meaning of the politics I mentioned.I think the farther east we shake hands with the Russians, the better, this is extremely important 4. The apprehension of our staff officers has been greatly reduced after receiving your supplementary briefing, and they have already telegraphed to their counterparts in Washington to that effect.I am sure you will understand that we have heard absolutely nothing about this matter, either formally or from our Deputy Marshal [1], before reading your telegram to Stalin, which Make them think that great changes have been proposed. [1] Refers to Air Force Admiral Ted at Eisenhower's headquarters. 5. I think that this matter has gradually subsided to a considerable satisfaction, although there is still some correspondence between our two Chiefs of Staff committees. 6. Once again, let me congratulate you on this great progress.There will be many changes in the situation in the West before the days of Stalin's general offensive begin. I feel obliged to bring this correspondence between friends to a close. prime minister to president roosevelt April 5, 1945 I still regret that Eisenhower telegraphed Stalin without informing our Chiefs of Staff, or our Deputy Marshal, Air Force Admiral Ted, or our Commander in Chief, Field Marshal Montgomery.It now appears that there have been far fewer changes in the master plan than we initially expected.My personal relationship with General Eisenhower could not have been more cordial.I count the matter over, and to prove my sincerity I quote one of the few Latin idioms I have ever learned: Amantiumiroeamorisintegratioest (A lover's quarrel is precisely the rebirth of love). Certainly these discussions were not allowed to impede our military progress, and it was about this time that we accomplished a notable step towards the liberation of Europe.We had received many dire reports of the wretched condition of the Dutch in Fortress Holland, and ordered the First Canadian Army to rescue them.Its second army then drove the enemy out of the Wilhelm peninsula and the north-east of Holland, while its first army captured Arnhem and turned to Amsterdam.Then their advance was blocked south of the Zuiderzee.The commander of the German army, as long as the German army in other places is still fighting, will not lead the army to surrender.If we turned this whole low-lying and partly flooded area into a battlefield, the suffering of the inhabitants would increase to unbearable proportions.I personally appeal to the President: prime minister to president roosevelt April 10, 1945 The tragic situation of the civilian population in the areas of the Netherlands occupied by the enemy is desperate.Two to three million people face hunger.We believe that the daily mass of people dying and the fact that communication between Germany and Holland has been virtually cut off must rapidly deteriorate.I am afraid that we will soon face a tragedy. 2. Eisenhower has made plans to provide relief to the civilian population in the west of Holland when it is liberated, and we have stockpiled supplies for this purpose in suitable locations nearby.But if we must wait until the liberation of the Netherlands, such assistance may be too late.Action must be taken for immediate relief, which should far exceed Sweden's relief package in scale. 3. I therefore ask you to join me in informing the German government through the Swiss government as the guardian state, to the following effect: The German government is responsible for maintaining the life of the inhabitants of the territory of the Netherlands which is still occupied by Germany.Since the German government has not fulfilled that responsibility, we are going to deliver food and medicine with the assistance of the International Red Cross for distribution to the residents there.We are prepared to increase the amount of limited supplies already shipped from Sweden.If we can negotiate and obtain the necessary pass, we are also prepared to transport supplies by sea or directly from the areas under the military control of the Allies.We ask the German government to facilitate this to be done. 4. Under the current situation, I think the German government is likely to agree to this request.If they refuse, I suggest that we should warn the German commander in Holland and all the troops under his command at this time that they will not allow us to try to relieve the residents in this area, that is, they will mark themselves as murderers in front of the world. , we hold them responsible with their lives for what happened to the Dutch people.This warning was to be widely publicized so that all German troops stationed in the Netherlands were aware of it. 5. If we can, we must avoid this tragedy.If we cannot do this, we should at least make it clear to the world who bears this responsibility. 6. The wording of the note sent to the German government by the guardian state is being drafted and should be sent to you tomorrow.At the moment I hope you can agree in principle. This matter has generally been agreed, and negotiations with the senior Nazi official Seth Inquart began.It was agreed that we should stop going west.For his part, he would stop further flooding, all repressive measures against the population, and help bring in relief supplies.We have stockpiled great quantities of these reliefs, and are sending them hastily by land, sea, and air by all means.This is of course the best arrangement that can be made.The Dutch nation has since thanked us in words and deeds with the utmost graciousness for the help we have given them after their heroic enduring, of which we are so proud.