Chapter 219 Volume 6, Chapter 29, the growing friction with the Soviet Union

President Truman Suggests Joint Call to Stalin My Response April 16 Mikoleček's Important Statement His Additional Statement on the Curzon Line Discussions with Molotov in Washington Inconclusive USSR Signs Treaty with Warsaw Poles April 24th my telegram to Stalin and his reply Soviet security and Western directives a review April 29th my appeal to Stalin a bleak prospect sixteen Polish leaders are trapped five Stalin's horrific reply on 5 May The dark picture of Europe urgently calls for a tripartite conference. President Truman's first political action with regard to us was to tackle the Polish question as it stood when Roosevelt died only forty-eight hours ago.He suggested that we should send a joint statement to Stalin.The content of this document was of course prepared by the State Department long before the new president took over.In any case, in the midst of an inauguration and a predecessor's funeral, it was remarkable that he was able to take it up so quickly.

He admitted that Stalin's attitude was not very promising, but felt that we should try again, so he proposed to tell Stalin that our ambassadors in Moscow had undoubtedly agreed to invite the three leaders of the Warsaw government to Moscow for conferences, and to give He assures us that we have never denied that they will play an important role in the formation of a new provisional government of national unity.Our ambassadors do not claim the right to invite an unlimited number of Poles from Poland and abroad.The real question is whether the Warsaw government has veto power over the individual candidates who attend the conference.In our opinion, the Yalta agreement gave them no such right.

Mr. Truman then proposed to ask Stalin to agree to the following plan: (1) Beirut, Osobuka | Moraski, Rolla | Zimierski, Bishop Sapierha, a representative Polish leader nominated by Stalin who has nothing to do with the current Warsaw government, and London Mikolecik, Grabski and Stanchik on the other side should all be invited to Moscow immediately. (2) Once the invitation is issued, representatives from Warsaw may come first if necessary. (3) The leaders of Poland should immediately propose other candidates from Poland and abroad who can be invited to participate in the negotiations, so that all major groups are represented in the negotiations.

(4) We make no promises regarding the formation of a new government of national unity until the Polish leaders have been invited to participate in the consultations, and do not consider the Yugoslav precedent to apply to Poland. My immediate reply to this important suggestion is as follows: Prime Minister to President Truman April 15, 1945 It was with great pleasure that I received your first telegram, for which I am deeply grateful for the friendship and comradeship expressed.I most sincerely return the same friendship. 2. Just now I read the draft of your proposed joint telegram that we should send to Stalin.In principle I fully agree with the terms of it, but there is one point which Mr. Eden will raise with you, and since you and he can work out the whole thing together, I am sure that any detail can be amended.If the final draft gets here on Monday, I am prepared to discuss it with the Cabinet at that time.And I would like us to send the telegram on the same day in our joint name, because I quite agree with you that our reply is urgent.Also, it is important to express from the very first moment that we are on the same page in thinking and acting.

3. At the same time, Aiden will inevitably tell you about our impression of the actual situation in Moscow and Warsaw.As far as I understand, the Lublin government now senses the strong sentiments of the Polish nation, which, while not unfriendly to Russia, is strongly and resolutely demanding independence, and increasingly dislikes a Polish provisional government that is essentially a Soviet puppet pleasing to the eye.The government in Lublin is trying to organize a government more broadly based than the existing government, in line with the Soviet government, by adding some Polish figures (including, perhaps, Witos) who are already at their disposal, but The purpose of these people is what they are after and what they need.This is a step in the right direction, but it does not meet our demands or the resolutions of the Crimea Conference.

4. Eden met with Mikolecik before departure, and Mikolecik agreed to make the statement as requested by Stalin in a private telegram of April 7th to me proposing the initiative, which I have forwarded to President Roosevelt.I hope to see the contents of this statement this afternoon, which he intends to publish next Thursday in his own Polish newspaper here.This statement, if we are satisfied, can be sent to Stalin on Monday, or sent at the same time as our joint telegram, or as part of our joint telegram. If there is something unsatisfactory, I will continue to fight for him Do it until you are satisfied, and then I will forward it to you.

Mr. Eden, who was in Washington at the time, cabled me the next day to say that he could not agree to the first item of the President's proposal, which involved inviting the Polish leaders to Moscow for consultations.It is important that the representatives in Poland include those who can really make a difference and can speak for the Polish parties.We must have the right to nominate Polish candidates from within Poland, and we must not leave this choice entirely to the Russians.Unless the Poles selected from the country were truly representative, he doubted that Mikoleček and his friends would take part in such negotiations.

The joint telegram was sent out on the 15th after a slight modification in form.At the same time I got the following statement from Mikoleček (whom I met at Checkers): April 16, 1945 I believe that a close and lasting friendship with Russia, within the wider amity of the United Nations, will be the keystone of future Polish policy. 2. In order to dispel all doubts about my attitude, I would like to declare that I accept the Crimean resolution concerning the future of Poland with sovereign and independent status and the formation of a provisional government representing national unity. 3. I support the resolution made by Crimea to convene a meeting of Polish leaders, the purpose of which is to establish a national unity government that represents the Polish people as broadly and fairly as possible, and is recognized by the three major countries government.

After receiving this manifesto, Stalin replied to me: April 17, 1945 Mikoleček's statement certainly represents a big step forward, but it is unclear whether Mikoleček also accepts the part of the Crimea resolution concerning Poland's eastern border.I hope, first of all, to receive the full text of Mikoleček's statement.Secondly, I received his explanation as to whether he also accepted the terms of the Crimea resolution on the eastern border of Poland. I therefore sent Mr. Mikoleček a public statement to him on the 22nd.This statement was published in his own newspaper.I telegraphed: There is no doubt that he answered the question you put to me in the last sentence, namely, that he accepted the Curzon Line, including the cession of Lvov to the Soviet Union.I hope this will satisfy you.

Mikoleček's statement reads: According to Russia's request, the three major powers have declared that they agree to delineate Poland's eastern border according to the Curzon Line, but there may be some minor adjustments.My own opinion is that at least Lviv and the oil-producing regions should be left to Poland.However, considering, first, that the Soviet Union has absolute requirements in this regard; The so-called integrity is ready to reject it so as to endanger the entire interests of our country.The answer to this question must be no. As I have had no answer on this matter, it may be assumed that the dictator is for the time being satisfied.Other points remain unresolved.Mr. Eden telegraphed from Washington that he agreed with Stettinius that we should renew the request for observers to enter Poland and that we should once again get the Soviet government to stop negotiations for a treaty with the Poles in Lublin.But not long after this matter was decided, there was news that the treaty had been signed.

The next day, April 23, Mr. Stettinius and Eden discussed Poland with Molotov for an hour and a quarter.They haven't made any progress. Stettinius started by asking them whether to discuss Poland or San Francisco first, and Molotov immediately said San Francisco.Mr. Eden said that the issue of San Francisco depends on how progress can be made on the Polish issue, so they must first discuss Poland.This opinion was accepted.Eden went on to say that on April 15 the President and the Prime Minister had sent a joint telegram to Stalin concerning Poland.Could Molotov say something about his government's opinion on this telegram?Molotov said he was aware of the telegram, but he had not seen the full text, and the Russian ambassador said the Soviet embassy had not received it.If this is true, this indicates that Stalin's attitude towards this matter is more or less ominous.Then the telegram was read to Molotov.He asked to be given some time to think about it. He then referred to the treaty signed between the Soviet government and the Warsaw administration. Eden pointed out that this treaty was concluded before any progress had been made on the formation of a new Provisional Government of Polish national unity.Molotov said that he was willing to do whatever was possible, but any new government must be based on the existing government and must be friendly to the Soviet Union.He said he found it strange that the treaty should cause dissatisfaction.Because this was just an intention of the Soviet Union to promote pro-Soviet feelings in Poland.The Soviets made no difficulty out of any agreement between Britain or the United States and France or Belgium. Eden pointed out that all three of our countries recognize the governments of France and Belgium, but Poland has two governments, one recognized by the United States, us and most countries in the world, and the other recognized by the Soviet government.It is quite different to make a treaty with a government in Warsaw that we and the United States do not recognize, and it would make one think that the Soviet government is satisfied with the present Polish government.Stettinius agrees. Molotov argued that the United States and Britain were not neighbors of Poland, so it might as well postpone the decision, but Russia must conclude a treaty with the same place without delay, so that it can help coordinate the war against Germany. Eden said in the telegram: I think the meeting with Molotov tonight is not a good one.I don't see any sign that your joint cable with the President was taken seriously. So it doesn't look like there's much hope for progress tomorrow either.Furthermore, the Soviet government made no apologies for contracting the Warsaw Poles.My impression is that the attitude of the Soviet government is still arrogant, and it will not recognize the seriousness of the situation unless it is told to face reality sharply.We have only one way of dealing with it now, and that is to postpone the opening of the conference for a few days so that we can continue working on the Polish question in Washington.Unless the Russians are prepared to cooperate with us and the Americans on the basis of the Yalta resolution, there will be no tri-power unity on which the San Francisco Conference was based. I replied to him on the 24th: What I have always sought is the lasting friendship of the Russian people.I firmly believe that this can only be based on their recognition of the strength of Britain and the United States.I'm sure the new president won't be intimidated by the Soviet Union. On the same day I sent a telegram to Stalin: Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin April 24, 1945 I have seen the telegram concerning Poland which the President sent to you from Mr. Molotov.In view of its special importance I have consulted with the War Cabinet.It is now my duty to tell you that we have unanimously agreed to the above-mentioned telegram from the President.It is my fervent hope that measures will be found to resolve these serious disputes, otherwise allowing them to continue will overshadow the moment of triumph. Stalin's answer was in effect that we do not see the Polish Provisional Government as the nucleus of a future nationally unified Polish government, but only as one of several groups equal to any other of the Poles.He doesn't think it's a resolution we made at Yalta.He stated: During the discussion there, the three of us, including President Roosevelt, all decided that the Polish Provisional Government, which is actually exercising power in Poland, has the trust and support of the majority of the Polish people and should be a new government. The reshuffled national unity government is the core, in other words, the main part of it. You obviously disagree with such an understanding of the issue.Since you do not recognize the precedent of Yugoslavia as a model for Poland, you conclude that the Polish Provisional Government cannot serve as the basis and core of the future National Unity Government. Stalin also argued that Poland, unlike Great Britain and the United States, shared a common frontier with the Soviet Union.Her security was as important to the Soviet Union as the security of Belgium and Greece was to Great Britain.The USSR had the right to fight for a friendly government in Poland and never agree to a hostile one.For this, he writes, and everything else, we guarantee it with the blood of the Soviet people, who shed a great deal of blood on the Polish battlefield for the liberation of Poland.I don't know whether a truly representative government has been established in Greece, or whether the Belgian government is truly democratic.When they were established, the Soviet Union was not consulted and the Soviet Union did not claim the right to intervene because it understood the importance of Belgium and Greece to the security of Great Britain.For the United States and Great Britain to pre-negotiate an arrangement for Poland, with which the Soviet Union is most closely related, would put the Soviet Union in an intolerable position. He thanked me for sending him a copy of Mikoleček's statement on the Eastern Front of Poland, and promised to persuade the Polish Provisional Government not to object to his invitation to the negotiations. Stalin concluded by saying: In short, what is needed now is that the precedent of Yugoslavia should serve as a model for Poland. This does not become an answer.We went to Yalta in the hope that the Polish government in London and Lublin would be abolished together and a new government formed from among well-meaning Poles.Among them, members of the Beirut government could occupy a prominent position, but Stalin did not like this proposal, so we and the Americans agreed not to withdraw the Beirut government, but that it should become a new government, based on a broader democratic basis. Reorganized to include democratic leaders in Poland and abroad.For this purpose, it was decided that Molotov and two ambassadors would meet in Moscow to try to form such a government after consultations with members of the current provisional government and other democratic leaders in Poland and abroad. It was then up to them to pick the Poles who came to the negotiations.Each time we tried to find representative figures, and we were careful to exclude those who we considered to be extremely unfriendly to Russia.We selected three suitable candidates from the Polish government in London, Mikoleček, Stanczyk and Grabski, who all accepted the Eastern Front that Stalin and I agreed with. Other candidates, both in Poland and abroad, were put forward by the Americans and by us in the same spirit of service, but nine weeks of discussions in the Moscow committee have led to no progress.Molotov has always refused to comment on our Polish candidates, so not one of them was even allowed to participate in the preparatory round table discussions. On April 29 I presented the whole matter to Stalin. Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin April 29, 1945 We are all shocked that you think we would be in favor of a Polish government hostile to the USSR.This is exactly the opposite of our policy. It was for Poland that Britain rose to war against Germany in 1939.We see in the Nazis' treatment of Poland a symbol of Hitler's vile and criminal desire to conquer and enslave, and his invasion of Poland was the spark that ignited the mines.The English people did not go to war, as it is sometimes supposed, for purpose, but for affection.Over the years they have come to feel that all Hitler's aggressions and claims are a danger to our country and to the freedoms we hold dear in Europe; so when he broke his promise to Czechoslovakia so shamefully after Munich, even The extremely peace-loving Chamberlain also offered Poland an assurance of our defense against Hitler.When Germany invaded Poland and needed to invoke that pledge, our entire nation threw itself into the fight against Hitler, even though we were so unprepared then.There is a fire in the heart of your people, as it filled the heart of your people when they solemnly rose up in defense of their homeland in the face of a treacherous, barbaric, and once seemed almost overwhelming German onslaught.This fire of the British still burns on the island, and among its dominions, classes, and parties; and they will never feel that the war is justly ended, unless Poland, on the basis of friendship with Russia, be treated fairly with full recognition of its sovereignty, independence and freedom.I think what we agreed on in Yalta, is this. On the one hand, we have this strong feeling for the rights of Poland, which I believe is at least equally strong in all of America; Be friends with the mighty USSR on equal and honorable terms; despite our differences in ideology and political systems, we can still cooperate with you in bright and long years for the whole world, which is only us The three major powers can unite it.Having worked faithfully for this unity during my years of responsibility, I will of course continue to do so to the best of my ability, and I especially want to assure you that we in Great Britain will neither seek nor tolerate a war against Russia. Unfriendly Polish government.Likewise we cannot recognize a Polish government that does not really comply with what we have in the Yalta Joint Declaration, properly respecting the rights of individuals, as we understand these issues in the Western world. As for the Greek and Belgian issues you mentioned, I admit that you respected my opinion when we had to intervene heavily.To suppress the Greek National Liberation Front People's National Liberation Army's attack on the center of government in Athens.We have also repeatedly issued instructions that your interests in Romania and Bulgaria should be recognized as primary.We cannot be excluded entirely, however, and we do not like the way we are treated by your subordinates in these two countries, quite different from the favorable treatment we senior officers often receive from you.In Greece we ask for nothing but a long friendship, and all we desire is her independence and integrity, but we have no intention of trying to decide whether she should be a monarchy or a republic.Our only policy there is to get the situation back to normal as quickly as possible, and I hope within the next four or five months there will be fair and free elections. These elections will determine the form of government and then the constitution.The will of the people, expressed under conditions of freedom and universal suffrage, must prevail; that is our fundamental principle. If the Greeks decide to have a republic, it makes no difference to our relationship with them.We are going to use our influence with the Greek government to invite Russian representatives to freely observe what is actually happening in Greece, and hope that at election time the Russian, American and British commissioners will be at their disposal throughout the country to find out whether there is any opposition between the parties running for office. There is really no threat, or anything else, to prevent the free choice of the people. After this, our work in Greece can be said to be successfully completed. With regard to Belgium we ask no conditions, although we do hope that, whatever form of government their people decide to adopt, they will participate in the general system of resistance against a German attack westward.Belgium, like Poland, is a war zone and a corridor, so the importance of these considerations must be acknowledged by everyone, otherwise large armies cannot act. True, with regard to Poland, we had agreed with the Americans a definite course of action.This is because we naturally agree on this issue, and both countries feel in their hearts that we have been treated rather poorly since the Crimea conference.Doubtless these things appear differently from the opposite point of view.But we absolutely agree that we have pledged to have a sovereign, free and independent Poland, with a government that fully and properly represents all democratic elements among the Poles.This guarantee is a matter of honor and responsibility for us.I don't think there is any possibility of any change in the attitude of our two countries, and since we have agreed, we must say so.It was still early in 1944, after all, mainly on my own initiative, and together with you we declared the Polish-Russian border you demanded, namely the Curzon Line, including the ceding of Lvov to Russia.I think you should satisfy us on the other half of that policy, which you also announced with us, namely the sovereignty, independence and freedom of Poland, as long as it is a Poland friendly to Russia Moreover, the present difficulties are caused by various reports from Poland.Many members of Parliament are listening to the news, and there is always the possibility, though I do not approve of it, of raising questions violently in Parliament or in the newspapers.Regarding this information, Mr. Molotov gave us absolutely nothing, despite our repeated requests.For example, there is talk that fifteen Poles met with the Russian authorities for talks more than four weeks ago, and there are similar reports about Mr. Vitos, but more recently; there are many other The talk about deporting some people, et cetera.How can I refute such complaints, since you will not give me any information, and will not let me or the Americans send anyone to Poland to see for themselves what is really going on?There is no place in our occupied or liberated areas where you are not free to send delegations, and it is not understood why you would object to a similar visit by a British delegation to a foreign country you have liberated. The prospect of you and the countries you control, plus the communist parties in many other countries, on one side, and some English-speaking countries and their partners or dominions on the other, is not much consolation .It is clear that the quarrels between the two sides will tear the world apart, and all these leaders on both sides will be laughed at in the face of history if they have anything to do with these quarrels.Even a long period of mutual suspicion, mutual abuse, and hostile policies will be a disaster, hindering the great development of world prosperity and prosperity needed by the masses of the people, which can only be achieved by the unity of our three countries.I hope that not a single word in this heart-to-heart conversation of mine will inadvertently offend you.If so please let me know.But, my friend Stalin, do not underestimate the disagreements that are beginning to arise on issues that you may think are trivial for us, but which are emblematic of the views of life in English-speaking democracies. The incident of the disappearance of the Poles which I mentioned in my telegram now needs to be recorded, although this record seems to go back a little earlier than the usual account. In early March 1945, the Russian political police invited the Polish underground to send a delegation to Moscow to discuss the formation of a unified Polish government along the lines of the Yalta agreement.There was also a written guarantee of personal safety attached to the invitation, and there was an understanding that if the negotiation was successful, the party concerned could go to London to negotiate with the Polish government-in-exile.On March 27th General Leopold Okulitsky, who succeeded General Bor-Komarowski in command of the Underground Army, two other leaders and an interpreter, met with a Soviet representative on the outskirts of Warsaw.They were joined the next day by eleven leaders representing all major Polish parties.In addition, a Polish leader had already been controlled by the Russians.No one returned from the agreed meeting.On April 6th the Polish government-in-exile issued a statement in London outlining this insidious episode.The most respected representatives of the Polish underground have disappeared and their whereabouts are unknown, despite official passes issued by Russian officials.Some people in the parliament asked questions, and thereafter there were rumors that local Polish leaders were shot in the areas currently occupied by the Red Army, especially in Siedlce in eastern Poland.It was not until May 4 in San Francisco that Molotov admitted that the men were in Russian custody, and the next day an official Russian news agency announced that they were awaiting trial on charges of diversionary sabotage behind the Red Army. On May 18 Stalin publicly denied that the captured Polish leaders had ever been invited to Moscow and insisted that they were merely diversionary saboteurs who would be dealt with under a law similar to the British Defense of the Homeland Act.The Soviet government refused to change this position.Nothing was heard of the entrapped victims until June 18, when the trial against them began.The trial was conducted in the usual way of the Communist Party.The inmates were charged with subversion, terrorism and espionage.All but one of the defendants pleaded guilty in whole or in part to the charges against them.Thirteen people were convicted and sentenced to four months to ten years in prison, and three people were released.In fact, it was a judicial cleansing of the leaders of the Polish underground army who had fought so heroically against Hitler.Soldiers have long been buried in the ruins of Warsaw. I wrote to President Truman: May 5, 1945 I am very concerned about the fate of the fifteen Polish delegates, because Molotov told Stettinius in San Francisco that they had been arrested by the Red Army, and I think you and I should consult together on this matter very carefully. .If these Poles were lured into the hands of the Russians and are no longer alive, it is difficult to describe how far-reaching this crime would have been in the future.I totally agree with Aiden's views and measures.I count on him passing through Washington on his way home soon, and I hope you will have a full talk with him. I have now received a very depressing reply from Stalin to my long appeal of April 29th. Marshal Stalin to Prime Minister May 5, 1945 I have received your call of April 29th concerning Poland. I have to say that I fail to agree with the arguments you present in support of your position. 1. I take issue with your suggestion that the example of Yugoslavia be used as a model for Poland to be a departure from the procedures agreed between us for a unified Polish government.The importance of the example of Yugoslavia lies in the fact that it points to the most effective and practicable solution to the problem of how to establish a new unified government there. 2. In the call about the Greek issue, you suggested that the three major countries should supervise the election. I also disagree with your opinion.To carry out such surveillance on the people of an ally country can only be regarded as an insult to the people of that country and a gross interference in its internal affairs.Such monitoring is unnecessary even for countries that were formerly satellites and later declared war on Germany and joined the Allied side, as evidenced by the experience of the Finnish elections, for example, where elections were held without outside interference, and have yielded constructive results. Your comments that Belgium and Poland are war zones and transport corridors are completely unjustified.It is precisely because of Poland's special status as a neighbor of the Soviet Union that the future Polish government must actively strive for friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union, and this is also in the interests of all other peace-loving countries.This is another argument for following the example of Yugoslavia.The countries of the United Nations are concerned that there should be a firm and lasting friendship between Su and Poland.Therefore, if the candidates for the organization of the future Polish government are only those who are not fundamentally anti-Soviet as you said, or if, according to your opinion, only exclude those who are extremely unfriendly to Russia from participating in this work, that is our fault. unsatisfactory.Neither of these two criteria satisfies us.We are and will be insisting that only those who have been positively friendly to the Soviet Union and who are faithfully and sincerely prepared to cooperate with the Soviet Union should be invited to participate in the consultations on the organization of the future Polish government. 3. I have to say specifically about (another) point in the call, the difficulties you have mentioned due to the rumored arrest of fifteen Poles, deportation, etc. On this point, I can tell you that the group of Poles you are talking about is not fifteen but sixteen, headed by the famous Polish general Okulicki.The Polish general, who had disappeared along with fifteen other Poles who were said to be missing, was careful not to be discussed by British intelligence because of his particularly bad character.But we do not intend to remain silent on this issue.This group of sixteen people, headed by General Okulitsky, was arrested by the military authorities on the Soviet front and is now being interrogated in Moscow.General Okulitsky's group, and especially the general himself, were accused of planning and carrying out diversionary sabotage in the rear of the Red Army, which resulted in the loss of more than a hundred Red Army officers and soldiers, and of setting up an illegal radio station in our rear Telegraph station, this is not allowed by law.Depending on the outcome of the trial, all or some of this group will be brought before the courts.This is the way the Red Army must protect its troops and its rear from sabotage by diverting saboteurs and disturbers of the peace. British intelligence is currently spreading rumors that Poles were assassinated or shot at Siedlze.These reports from the British intelligence services are completely fabricated and apparently provided by agents of Alzyszewski [1]. [1] Alziszewski was the Prime Minister of the Polish government-in-exile. 4. It appears from your telegram that you do not intend to use the Polish Provisional Government as the basis for a future national unity government, nor do you intend to allow it to take its rightful place in that government.I must say frankly that such an attitude precludes the possibility of reaching an agreed solution to the Polish problem. I forward this aggressive telegram to President Truman with the following note: It seems to me that it is almost impossible to continue by correspondence, and therefore a tripartite government summit should be convened whenever possible.At the same time our troops should stand firm in Yugoslavia, Austria, Czechoslovakia, on the main U.S. central front and on the British front, up to Lübeck, on positions already taken or about to be taken, including Denmark.The armies of both countries will be very busy taking prisoners in the next few days, and we trust that the minds of the masses at home will also be focused on celebrating the European victory.So I feel that we must take our attitude towards the Soviet Union very seriously and show them how much we have to give and how much we cannot promise. But Stalin had already sent a copy to the President. While the San Francisco Conference was joyously laying out the foundations of a free, civilized, and united future world, and while the peoples of the Great Alliance were rejoicing in the victory over the tyranny of Hitler and the Nazis, my heart was quickly unfolding in my heart. Melancholy over the new and greater dangers that lie ahead of the horizon.Then there is the worry that the general election, whatever the outcome, will divide the country and weaken its attitude for a period in which all that we have won in this just war may be lost.It seemed most important that Stalin, Truman and I should meet as soon as possible without any delay.On May 4th I described what I had seen of Europe to Eden, who was at the San Francisco Conference, was in daily contact with Stettinius and Molotov, and would soon be in Washington for another audience with the President. I think the impasse in Poland can now probably only be resolved by a meeting of the three heads of state in some unspoiled town in Germany, if such a venue can be found.This meeting should be held by early July at the latest.I propose to send a telegram to President Truman, proposing to him a visit and the convening of this necessary conference of the three great powers. 二‧波蘭問題如果同現在許多極端嚴重而急需跟俄國人解決的突出問題聯繫在一起，或許要容易解決些。我擔心在俄國軍隊向德國推進到易北河時可怕的事情已經發生了。擬議中的把美軍撤退到我們在魁北克會議中跟俄國人和美國人所商定的佔領線以內，也就是我們在那裡研究地圖時在上面所劃成黃線的所在，那將意味著俄國人統治的勢力，將在一條三百至四百哩的戰線上向前推進一百二十哩之遠。此事如果實現，將成為歷史上最可悲的事件之一。這件事一辦完，這一地區被俄國人佔領之後，波蘭將完全被包圍起來並且深深地隱沒在俄國所佔領的地區之內。事實上，俄國的邊疆將從挪威的北角起，沿著芬蘭｜瑞典邊界，越過波羅的海到達呂貝克正東的一點，再沿著現在所商定的佔領線，然後沿著巴伐利亞到捷克斯洛伐克之間的邊界直到奧地利的邊界。奧地利名義上是由四國佔領的，然而俄國人越過該國的一半而達到了伊松措河，在該河的後面鐵托和俄國將對往東的一切地方提出要求。這樣在俄國控制之下的領域將包括波羅的海地區，到佔領線為止的德國全部，捷克斯洛伐克全部，奧地利的一大部分以及南斯拉夫、匈牙利、羅馬尼亞和保加利亞的全部，直到現正處於搖搖欲墜中的希臘為止。這將包括中歐所有的大都會，柏林、維也納、布達佩斯、貝爾格萊德、布加勒斯特和索非亞俱在其內。土耳其和君士坦丁堡的地位必然會立即要討論到。 三‧這就構成為歐洲史上沒有可以匹敵的一件事，也是盟國在他們長期而危險的鬥爭中所沒有面臨過的事情。俄國人對於德國的要求單就賠款一項來說就能使她幾乎無限期地延長佔領，至少要佔領好多年，在那個時期裡，波蘭和許多其它國家將陷在蘇聯控制的歐洲的大塊地帶之中，在經濟上儘管不一定蘇維埃化，但是必然是警察統治的。 四‧現在正好是把這些棘手的問題在主要的大國之間整個地來加以審查的時候了。在我們這一邊，有幾個可以進行討價還價的有力的籌碼，如果加以運用，或許可以達成和平的協議。第一，在我們對於波蘭，對於俄國臨時性質的占領德國，以及對於在多瑙河流域裡俄國化或經俄國控制的國家，特別是奧地利、捷克斯洛伐克，和巴爾幹國家裡面應該建立起來的情況感到滿意之前，盟國不應該從他們現在的陣地撤退到占領線。 第二，我們如把黑海和波羅的海的出口作為一個總的聲明的一部分或許能使他們感到高興。這一切問題，只有在歐洲美軍力量未經減弱以前才能得到解決。如果在美軍從歐洲撤退以及在西方世界收拾起他們的作戰機器以前，問題還得不到解決，我看就不會有滿意解決的希望，而且防止第三次世界大戰的希望也極微小。現在我們必須把我們的希望轉到及早和迅速跟俄國攤牌和解決上。同時我反對在波蘭問題上在任何方面降低我們對俄國的要求。我認為我們應該堅持總統和我的電報中所申明的立場。 第二天我補充說：沒有任何東西能夠挽救我們脫出那個大災禍，除非盡早開一個會來攤牌，地點則在德國境內某個受美國和英國控制的、能夠供應適當住宿設備的地方。