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Chapter 220 Volume Six, Chapter Thirty, The Final March

Memoirs of the Second World War 邱吉爾 10737Words 2023-02-05
The Situation at the Time of Mr. Roosevelt's Death The Red Army's Winter Offensive The Fall of Vienna The Ninth U.S. Army Crossed the Elbe on April 12 The First American Army Joined the Russians The Fall of Prague May 9 A Review of the Early Plans for the Occupation of Germany 19 Quebec agreement in September 1944 Changes after Yalta Do not withdraw from the agreed zone until consultation with Stalin April 5th I telegraphed President Roosevelt to be vigilant April 7th Memorandum to the Committee of Chiefs of Staff April 18th April 27th My Telegram to Stalin His Reply May 2nd The Russians in Vienna Blocking the Convergence of the Three Fronts The end of the hasty march to capture Denmark draws near up.

President Roosevelt's death came at a time when the most important political and military objectives were at stake.Hitler's Western Front had crumbled.Eisenhower had crossed the Rhine and made his way into Germany and Central Europe.The enemy in front of him is still putting up stubborn resistance in some places, but it is obviously unable to stop the onslaught of our victorious army, and it seems impossible to prevent the Western Allies from taking Berlin.The Russians were only thirty-five miles from the city to the east, but they were not yet ready to attack.Between them and Berlin lies the Oder.The Germans were fortified in front of the river, so there would be some heavy fighting before the Red Army could force the cross and push on.Vienna is another story.Our chance of advancing from Italy to this ancient capital before the Russians had been abandoned eight months earlier, when Alexander's troops had been drawn away to support the landing in the south of France.Prague is still within our reach.

In order to understand how this military situation came about, we must go back a few weeks.The Russian winter offensive took them across Germany's eastern frontier into Silesia (an industrial region second in importance only to the Ruhr) and Pomerania.During the next two months they reached the lower Oder from Szczecin to Gvogov, and crossed the river further south to establish a stable position.The besieged German defenders at Obering, Posen, and Schneidermeer had surrendered, and Danzig was captured by the end of March.The modern fortress of Koenigsberg was indeed very strong, and it was not taken until April 9th ​​after four days of very violent attack.Only in Breslau and distant Courland did large numbers of German troops hold out behind the Russian lines.On the Danube front, the massacre in Budapest had ceased by February 15, but the German counterattacks on both ends of Lake Balaton continued for some time into March.When these counterattacks were repulsed, the Russians entered Austria.They pressed on Vienna from the southeast, completely occupied the city by April 13th, and marched up the Danube to Linz.

Stalin had told Eisenhower that his main attack would start about the second half of May, but he was able to start it a full month earlier.Perhaps the rapid approach of Western armies to the Elbe had something to do with this. After crossing the Rhine and encircling the Ruhr, Eisenhower left the flank armies of the First and Ninth U.S. Armies to subdue the defenders there.Bradley's Twelfth Army Group, the Ninth, First, and Third Armies, advanced on Magdeburg, Leipzig, and Bayreuth.The resistance was sporadic, but fierce in the first two cities and in the Harz Mountains, but by April 19 all three places had fallen, and the vanguard of the Third Army had already stepped into the Czechoslovakia.The Ninth Army was indeed moving very quickly, so that by April 12 they had crossed the Elbe near Magdeburg, about sixty miles from Berlin.

On the 16th of April, the Russian army, strong on the Oder, attacked along a front 200 miles wide at a distance of 35 miles from the capital, and by the 25th of April surrounded the Berlin.On the same day, the vanguard of the American First Army from Leipzig joined the Russian army near Torgau on the Elbe.Germany has been cut in half, and the Ninth and First Two Armies stayed on the spot, facing the Russian army across the Elbe and Mulder rivers.The German army is disintegrating before our eyes.Over a million prisoners were taken in the first three weeks of April, but Eisenhower believed that the deranged Nazis would try to gain a foothold in the mountains of Bavaria and Western Austria, so he ordered the U.S. Third Army to turn around South.Its right wing advanced down the Danube and reached Linz on May 5, where it joined the Russians from Vienna.Its left wing penetrated into Budejovice, Pilsen and Carlsbad in Czechoslovakia.There was no agreement to prevent them from taking Prague, if militarily possible.

So I propose to the President. Prime Minister to President Truman: April 30, 1945 There is no doubt that the liberation of Prague and as much of western Czechoslovakia as possible by your troops would make a complete difference in the post-war situation in that country, and perhaps considerably in the post-war situation in neighboring countries as well.Conversely, if the Western Allies did not play a major role in the liberation of Czechoslovakia, that country would go the way of Yugoslavia. Of course, Eisenhower's behavior in this respect must not hinder his major combat operations against the German army, but I think the very important political considerations mentioned above should be brought to his attention.

President Truman told me on May 1 that General Eisenhower's present plan of military operations in Czechoslovakia was as follows: The Soviet General Staff is now considering a military operation into the Vltava valley.It is my intention to press on and destroy any remaining organized German forces as soon as the present military operation permits. If it is then deemed appropriate to enter Czechoslovakia, and conditions here permit, our logical first move will be to advance towards Pilsen and Carlsbad.I will refrain from attempting an action that I consider militarily unwise. The president added that this plan has my permission.It looks like it's been decided.However a week later I came back to that problem.

Prime Minister to General Eisenhower: May 7, 1945 I hope your plan will not prevent you from advancing to Prague, if you have enough troops and have not joined the Russians earlier.If you have enough troops and the country is still in a vacuum, I don't think you intend to tie yourself down. No need to telegraph me, just tell me when we next meet. Eisenhower's plan, however, was generally on the west bank of the Elbe and stopped along the 1937 Czechoslovakian frontier.If the situation permits, he will cross the river and reach the Carlsbad | Pilsen | Budejovice line.The Russians agreed to this, and so acted.But on 4 May the Russians reacted strongly to a new proposal by the U.S. Third Army to advance to the Vltava River, which flows through Prague.

This approach does not suit their appetite at all.As a result, the Americans halted their advance while the Red Army cleared the east and west banks of the Vltava and occupied Prague. [1] That city fell on the 9th of May, two days after the general instrument of surrender was signed at Reims. [1] Eisenhower: "Report to the Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff", p. 140. A review is necessary at this point.The occupation of Germany by the main allies had been studied for a long time.In the summer of 1943 a cabinet committee headed by Mr. Attlee which I set up, with the concurrence of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, recommended that, in order to effectively disarm Germany, the whole of Germany should be occupied; The forces are distributed in three main areas of roughly equal size, namely the British in the northwest, the American in the south and southwest, and the Russians in the east; Occupy part of it respectively.These proposals were approved and sent to the European Advisory Committee, which at the time included the Soviet ambassador Guzhav, the American ambassador Winant, and Sir William Strong of the Foreign Office.

At this time, discussing the subject seems purely empty talk.No one can foresee when and how the war will end.The German army still occupies a large area in the European part of Russia.It took a year for the British and American armies to set foot in Western Europe, and about two years before they entered Germany.The recommendations of the European Advisory Committee were not considered urgent and realistic enough to be presented to the War Cabinet.Like so much other laudable work with an eye to the future, they were put aside while the war was in full swing.In those days, the common perception about Russia was that it would not continue to fight once its borders were restored, and at that point the Western Allies would probably have to try to persuade it not to relax.The question of the Russian territories in Germany therefore did not occupy an important place in our thinking or in the Anglo-American discussions, nor was it raised by any of the leaders at Tehran.

When we met in Cairo on our way home in November 1943, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff raised the issue, but not at the behest of Russia.In the Russian-occupied areas of Germany, it is still an empty concept. It seems that such a thing is too good to be realized.But someone told me that President Roosevelt wanted to switch the occupied areas of Britain and the United States.He wanted all the communications of American troops in Germany to go directly to sea without going through France.This issue involves many detailed technical debates and is related to many issues of Overlord's operational planning.This led to little resolution in Cairo, but has since sparked frequent correspondence between the President and myself.The British General Staff thought the original plan was better, but saw that a change of plan would cause much inconvenience and confusion.It is my impression that their American colleagues quite agree with this view.A definite agreement was reached between us at the Quebec Conference in September 1944. The president, apparently convinced by the military's point of view, spread a large map on his lap.One afternoon, in the presence of the majority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he verbally agreed with me that the existing arrangement should remain the same, except that the American forces should be given a direct sea exit across the British occupation at a nearby location.Bremen, with its subsidiary Bremerhaven, seemed to suit the needs of the United States, and we agreed to their control of the strip.This resolution should be marked on the attached map.We all felt that it was premature to have a French zone in Germany, and no one even mentioned Russia. In February 1945, at Yalta, we adopted the Quebec formula without further consideration and used it as the basis for many fruitless discussions on the future of Germany's eastern border.The question was then left to the conference of the peace treaty.At this very moment, Soviet troops are swarming across the pre-war borders, and we wish them great success.We propose an agreement on the Austrian occupation.After some persuasion, Stalin agreed with my strong appeal that a part of the American and British occupation zone should be allocated to the French, and they should be given a seat on the Allied Control Council.It is clear to everyone that the occupied areas determined by agreement should not hinder the military's combat operations. Berlin, Prague and Vienna, whoever gets there first gets to take it.When we parted in the Crimea, we were not only allies; we were also friends, and we all faced an enemy that was still very strong, against which our entire army was fighting in a fierce, non-stop battle. In the two months since then, we've seen amazing changes that have been breathtaking.Hitler's Germany is over, and he himself is about to perish.The Russians are fighting in Berlin.Vienna and most of Austria are within their grasp.The entire relationship between Russia and the Western Allies is in flux.Every question concerning the future hangs in the balance between us.The Yalta agreement and understanding, as it was then, has now been torn up and brushed aside by the victorious Kremlin.New dangers, perhaps as dire as the ones we've already overcome, have loomed and stared at the torn and tormented world. My apprehension about these ominous developments was evident even before the president's death.He himself, so far as we can see, was disturbed and vexed.See above for his outrage at Molotov's accusations about the Bern events.Despite the triumphant advance of Eisenhower's troops, President Truman found himself facing a dire crisis in the second half of April.For some time in the past I have tried my best to give the US government the impression that major changes are taking place, both military and political.When the front lines of the Allied forces of the East and the West approach each other and attack the German army, our Western armies will soon greatly exceed the boundaries of our occupied areas. The following telegrams show that I will never advocate the cancellation of our commitments to the agreed occupied territories if the other agreements are also respected.However, facts gradually convinced me that before our troops stopped advancing or even retreated, we should try to meet Stalin face to face in order to actually reach an agreement on the whole status quo.It would be a catastrophe if we kept strictly to all the agreements and the Soviets grabbed everything they could get without any regard for their obligations. As early as April 5th, I sent a letter to Roosevelt, solemnly asking him to be vigilant. I know quite well that the leaders of the Soviet Union, whoever they were, were amazed and dismayed at the rapid advance of Allied forces in the West and the near-annihilation of the enemy on our front.Especially since they have said that they will not be able to launch a decisive offensive until the middle of May.All the more important was the fact that we should join forces with the Russians as far east as possible, and, if the situation permitted, into Berlin. I may remind you that we suggested and thought we had agreed on temporary occupation zones in Austria six weeks ago, but since Yalta the Russians have not sent a document of ratification for these occupation zones.Now that they are on the eve of taking Vienna, and it is probable that they will occupy the whole of Austria, it is prudent for us to occupy as much ground as possible in the north. We should always watch to see whether the brutality of the Russian telegrams indicates that they are preparing for some far-reaching change in policy.On the whole, I think it's just their natural annoyance or jealousy.It is for that reason that I think it is extremely important that, at this time, our two countries take a firm and candid stand and clear the air so that they realize that there are limits to how we can tolerate insults.I believe this is now the best chance to save the future. If they always think we are afraid of them, and can scare us into submission, then I really despair of our future relationship with them and many other things. General Eisenhower once suggested that since the armies of the East and the West should advance without being bound by the dividing line, when the two armies meet in any area, either side should be able to suggest that the other side retreat to the line of their occupied area. within.The decision to make requests and order withdrawals should rest with the commander-in-chief of the army group.At this time, in addition to operational needs, the retreat began immediately.I think this suggestion is premature and exceeds current military needs.I therefore send the following memorandum to the Committee of Chiefs of Staff so that they and their American counterparts have a guideline when discussing General Eisenhower's proposal. Prime Minister to General Ismay, Transfer to the Chiefs of Staff Committee April 7, 1945 When the armies of the two sides meet, after the initial mutual greeting, they should stay in their respective positions facing each other, unless the actual military operation nearby requires them to make coordinated actions.Thus, if we cross the Elbe and advance to Berlin, or on a line between Berlin and the Baltic (which is entirely within Russian territory), we should not dismiss it as a military problem .It was a matter of state, to be considered between the three governments, and to be considered in connection with the actions of the Russians in the south, where they were about to occupy not only Vienna but all of Austria. We should not withdraw from any place we have gained so hastily that we have not even had a few days to consult the governments in Washington and London.I attach great importance to this matter, and do not agree to let this kind of suggestion be handed over to the staff level (to decide).You have to ask the President and me for instructions. I am very pleased to see the stalling action suggested in our Chiefs of Staff telegram.That's exactly what I mean. And so it went. The death of President Roosevelt on April 12 obliged me to seek the approval of the Chiefs of Staff to resubmit to his successor the entire proposal concerning the occupied territories. Prime Minister to General Ismay, Transfer to the Chiefs of Staff Committee April 14, 1945 I propose to you the following policy: We believe that before the British and American troops retreat from the land they have seized from the enemy beyond the scope of the originally proposed occupation zone, the heads of government of the three countries should first discuss the political disputes that will have an impact at that time, and especially pay attention to the overall situation. , we must focus on the relations among the governments of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain.It is up to those Governments to ascertain whether their previously agreed occupation agreements have in fact been carried out amicably and fairly.For these reasons we consider such matters to be outside the purely military discretion of the commander at the front. I raised this issue again directly with the new President on April 18th.Mr. Truman, of course, has only just had an indirect knowledge of all the disputes before us, and must therefore draw heavily upon his advisers, so that a purely military view carries more weight than it should. Prime Minister to President Truman April 18, 1945 Your army will soon be there, and our army will soon meet the Soviet army.Directions for action should be given to the Supreme Commander as soon as possible by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. I have two regions in mind: (1) Tactical areas.In this zone our troops must remain on the line they have reached, unless both sides agree that a better tactical disposition is required to meet the continued resistance of the enemy.This should be arranged by the Supreme Commander through our military representatives in Moscow, or it can be settled on the field by both sides of the line of defense.The Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has already begun work on issuing directives in this regard. (2) Occupied areas.In this area, President Roosevelt and I agree with the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee.In my opinion, this area should be occupied for a period of time from VE Day, no matter when the date is declared.As for the far greater lands won by the courageous and vigorous actions of our allies, we may withdraw from them only without loss of dignity. 2. I am certainly prepared to abide by the Occupation Agreement, but I do not want our Allied troops or your American troops to be driven out at any point by the rude words of a local Russian general.This sort of thing had to be prevented by intergovernmental agreement so that Eisenhower could be sure to settle it on the spot in his own remarkable way. 3. The occupation zone was decided in quite haste in Quebec in September 1944.At that time, it was not foreseeable that General Eisenhower's army would invade Germany with such a large force.These occupied areas cannot be changed unless an agreement is reached with the Russians.When the day of European victory comes, we should try to establish an Allied Control Council in Berlin, and we should insist on a fair distribution among the various parts of Germany of the food produced in Germany.According to the current situation, the occupied areas of Russia have the smallest proportion of the population but the largest proportion of food produced.In the area occupied by the Americans, the proportion of food and conquered population is not very satisfactory; but our scarce British have to take over the entire dilapidated Ruhr area and large industrial areas.Those areas, like our own, need to import a lot of food in normal times.I propose that this troublesome question should be settled in Berlin by the Allied Control Council before we abandon the tactical positions we have now acquired.It is natural for the Russians to mean to transport these great quantities of grain from the German grain-growing regions for their own consumption, but what I would argue is that the food supply for the German population must be treated as a Available supplies must be divided proportionally among the occupied territories. 4. I would be very grateful if you could tell me your opinion on these issues.According to information I have received from various sources, the implications of these problems are extremely significant and the matter is very urgent. Mr. Eden is now in Washington, and he fully agrees with the comments I have given him in the telegram. Prime Minister to Mr Eden (Washington) April 19, 1945 This telegram is for your viewing only.It seems that the Western Allies are not currently able to force their way into Berlin.The Russians now have an army of 2.5 million on that part of the front that attacks the city.The Americans have only their vanguard, which means twenty-five divisions, and they have a long, long front to look after, and are fighting the Germans at many points I think the most important thing is that Montgomery should take Lübeck as quickly as possible, and also get a corps of American reinforcements if he needs it.We arrived in Lübeck before our Russian friends came from Stettin, so we could save a lot of talking later.There was no reason why the Russians should occupy Denmark, a country awaiting liberation and restoration of sovereignty.If we can get Lübeck, our position there will be decisive in this matter. I think it would be best then to advance to Linz and join forces with the Russians there (this operation has been partly carried out simultaneously with the former) and use the American encirclement to take the area south of Stuttgart.In this area are the main facilities for German atomic research, and it would be best if we could have access to them in order to obtain particularly confidential material on this subject. Mr. Eden replied as follows: Foreign Secretary (in Washington) to Prime Minister April 21, 1945 I strongly agree that Montgomery should take Lübeck.If the Russians take Denmark, it will cause us a lot of inconvenience.The fear in the Scandinavian countries would be greatly increased, and I seem to recall that one of the reasons for the dispute between the Russians and the Germans on their honeymoon in 1940 was due to certain Russian claims to control of the Kattegat. I believe you must still have Prague in your heart.If the United States can occupy the capital of the Czech Republic, it may be of great benefit to the Russians. At that time, they will definitely be willing to invite the Soviet ambassador to join the United States and us. This will be in contrast to how the Russians treat us But Mr. Truman's answer did not help the overall situation.He suggested that, as soon as the military situation permitted, the Allies should withdraw to the previously agreed occupied areas in Germany and Austria.He asked for my opinion on a draft of a telegram to Stalin for this purpose. My reply to his call is as follows: Prime Minister to President Truman April 24, 1945 Thank you for calling me back.I agree with your previous generalizations, but the following sections simply leave the Russians to order us to retreat into the occupied areas at the point they decide, without necessarily taking into account the general situation on the various fronts.In this way, it will be your army that will suffer the most in the future.You will be pushed back about 120 miles in the center, leaving a large area to the Russians advancing unimpeded.At the same time our sphere of influence in Vienna, or the three-power occupation of Berlin, remained unresolved. On April 27, after discussions with the President, I sent this telegram to Stalin: Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin April 27, 1945 British and American troops will soon join forces with Soviet troops in Germany.German resistance is about to cease, and therefore the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union should establish an orderly procedure for the imminent occupation of their troops in the German and Austrian occupied areas. 2. Our most urgent task is to completely defeat the German army.During this period, the boundaries between the armies of the three Allies must be determined by the commander at the front, and should be determined by operational considerations and requirements.It is inevitable that at this stage our troops will find themselves occupying lands beyond the boundaries of the final zone of occupation. 3. When the war was over, the next task was to establish Allied Control Councils in Berlin and Vienna and to redeploy the Allied forces so that they would each take over their occupied territories.The boundaries of the occupied territories in Germany have already been determined, and now we need to reach an agreement on the occupied territories in Austria at the earliest possible meeting in Vienna, which you propose. 4. Now it seems that there will be no signed letter of surrender soon.If this is the case, the Allied Governments should decide to establish various Allied Control Councils and give them the authority to work out the detailed procedures for the withdrawal of the armies of the various countries into the areas they have agreed to occupy. 5. In order to meet the needs of the situation mentioned in the second section above, we have issued instructions to General Eisenhower for temporary and emergency measures specially established for combat areas.These instructions are as follows: (1) In order to avoid confusion between the two armies, and to prevent the expansion of either side into the territory already occupied by the other, the two sides should stop advancing at any time where they meet.However, it should not affect the necessary geographical adjustments in the rear or on the flanks to be made by the commanders of the two local parties to meet any remaining resistance. (2) With regard to the adjustment of troops after the cessation of fighting in an area, your troops should be deployed according to military needs, regardless of the boundaries of the occupied areas.Your major adjustments (as opposed to partial adjustments for operational and administrative reasons) should first seek the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee to the extent that the urgency of the situation still permits. 6. Please also issue similar instructions to your front-line commanders. 7. I am sending this telegram to both you and President Truman. The answer is cautious. Marshal Stalin to Prime Minister May 2, 1945 I have received your call of April 27th concerning the procedure for the occupation of Germany and Austria by the Red Army and the Anglo-American armed forces. I should tell you that as far as we are concerned, the Soviet Supreme Command has issued an instruction that when the Soviet Army joins forces with the Allied Forces, the Soviet Army headquarters should immediately establish contact with the U.S. or British Army headquarters, and they should work together. Negotiate: (1) draw a temporary tactical demarcation line, and (2) Take measures to subdue any resistance of the German troops within their provisional demarcation line. Not long after the Russian army arrived in Vienna, we had already had a first taste of the territory occupied by the Russian army.They announced that a provisional Austrian government had been formed and that our delegation was not allowed to fly to Austria.All this aroused my apprehension that they were deliberately taking advantage of the opportunity of being there first to organize the country before we arrived, and I therefore wired Mr. Truman on April 30th as follows: It seems to me that unless we take a strong stand together now, it will be very difficult for us to influence Austria during its liberation from the Nazis.Would you like to join me in a telegram to Stalin in the following terms: We are very concerned to hear from our chargé d'affaires in Moscow that, despite your invitation to Mr. Harriman on April 13th, the Soviet government now does not agree to the occupation and temporary control of Vienna in the European Advisory Council. Before the agency reached an agreement, let the delegation of the Allies set off for Vienna.It is also to our displeasure and astonishment that, in spite of our pleas, which we need to consider from time to time, you have announced in Vienna a Provisional Government for Austria. It has always been our understanding that the handling of Austria, as of Germany, is a matter of common interest to the four Powers which occupy and govern these two countries.We consider it important that representatives of Great Britain, the United States and France should be allowed at once into Vienna to debrief on the ground before the European Advisory Council can make a final decision on questions concerning the occupation and control of that country, and especially concerning Vienna itself. solution.We would like you to give Marshal Dolbchen the necessary instructions so that the delegations of the Allies can be flown in immediately from Italy. On May 3 President Truman replied that he fully agreed with the contents of my telegram and that he himself was protesting to the Soviet government.This protest reminded the Russians that Stalin had advised representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and France to go to Vienna immediately to settle the problem of the occupied territories.The deputies were already planned to go there, and now the Soviet government said that it was inappropriate for them to go there until the European Advisory Council had reached an agreement on the occupied territories.Part of the reason why the Advisory Committee was unable to reach an agreement was a lack of intelligence.The only way to do that was to go to the local area and study the problem, so the Soviet Union didn't let us do that, it blocked the work of the Advisory Committee.Mr. Truman's telegram concluded by asking the Soviet government to fly representatives of the Allies to Vienna immediately. These protests are very powerful. Meanwhile the Allied forces continued their advance with increasing momentum.The U.S. Seventh Army of General Devers' Army Group passed through Munich on April 30 and reached Innsbruck on May 3.After advancing along the northern shore of Lake Constance, the First French Army turned south and also crossed the Austrian frontier.A detachment was sent from Innsbruck to the Brenner Pass, and on the 4th of May a few miles to the south joined the advance of the American Fifth Army, which had come from the Came from Italy.Thus all three fronts, west, east, and south, once separated by thousands of miles, finally came together to annihilate the German army.Together with Montgomery's army in the north, they formed their encirclement.The vanguard of the Eighth Army, the vanguard of the British Second Army, reached the upper Elbe, twenty miles from Hamburg, on April 19.The Twelfth Corps on their left was met with staunch resistance mainly by hastily formed units drawn from the nearby officers' school, but they took Zoltau on April 18 and advanced on Hamburg. The XXX Corps also went through some heavy fighting on its way to Bremen.The advance of the whole British army was delayed by the need to repair hundreds of bridges spanning many waterways which had been damaged by the enemy.Bremen fell on April 26.The Eighth Army, with the Twelfth Corps on the left and the protection of the Eighteenth US Airborne Corps on the right, crossed the Elbe on April 29.They marched towards the Baltic in order to cross the Danish border.The 11th Armored Division arrived in Lübeck on May 2, and Denmark was liberated by our army, immersed in carnival.Our 6th Airborne Division joined the Russians at Wismar.The next day, the Twelfth Army entered Hamburg.North of the Elbe the area was filled with vast numbers of refugees and disintegrated armies fleeing from the Russians and surrendering to the Western Allies.The war is coming to an end.
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