Chapter 223 Volume 6, Chapter 33, A Disturbing Interlude

Tito's Army Enters Trieste Correspondence with President Truman Issue an order to the troops in Europe to hold the ground Washington's indecision has more difficulties in Trieste The president and I issue a joint instruction to Eisenhower and Alexander June 21 Stalin's call and my reply Mediterranean The Crisis of the States on the East Coast February 27th My Speech in the House of Commons Battles in Beirut, Aleppo and Damascus May 31st British Commander-in-Chief Restoring Order Disputes with France in the Alpes-Maritimes Mr. Truman indignation and General de Gaulle's reply. When the German army withdrew from Italy, Tito's army had quickly advanced into the territory of northeastern Italy.They hoped to seize the lands they claimed in this district, and especially to occupy Trieste before the arrival of the British and American troops.The Americans and we are not only determined to prevent the frontier question from being settled in this way before peace is signed, but also intend to acquire Trieste with its excellent port as a basis for our future occupation in Austria. Necessary supply points.We are clear on these matters that General Alexander, who visited Tito in Belgrade in February, authorized him to take the necessary steps to stabilize the situation there.

I had already raised the question of Trieste with President Truman before the Germans surrendered.As I said on April 27th, it seemed to me that the acquisition of Trieste was of great importance, provided that we could proceed in the easy way suggested and at the risk inherent in such political-military operations. The dangers of doing this while doing so.The late president always attached great importance to Trieste. He believed that it should be used as an international port and an outlet for various areas in the Danube basin to the Adriatic Sea.There are many questions to consider in this matter, but the question that the South should have an export seems to have an interest in the trade of many countries concerned.The important thing is to get there first before Tito's guerrillas occupy it.Therefore, it seems to me that there is no room for a minute's delay.The definite status of Trieste can be left to the future and I would be very grateful if you would come and inquire about this matter yourself.

On the 30th Mr. Truman replied that he agreed to take military action without first consulting the Russians.Before entering Venetia Giulia, Alexander will explain his intentions to Tito and make it clear that any Yugoslav forces in that area must come under our command.The instructions to Alexander were that if Yugoslavia refused to cooperate, it should correspond with the Joint Chiefs of Staff before taking further action.The president thought it was important to do so because he wanted to avoid using the Americans to fight the Yugoslav army, or to fight in the Balkans. On May 1 Alexander told me that he expected the troops of the Eighth Army to reach Trieste within twenty-four hours.They were ordered to seize the moorings of Trieste and Pula, and the lines of communication between Italy and Austria.Great care should be taken in contact with regular Yugoslav forces to avoid armed conflict.

At the same time Alexander telegraphed Tito, telling him his plan."Those plans are broadly in line with what we discussed in Belgrade," he said. I think that if there are any units of yours within my sphere of operations, they should come under my command, as you suggested during our recent discussions in Belgrade, and you can now issue orders in that sense. He reported to me: May 1, 1945 Tito's regular troops are now fighting in Trieste and have taken most of Istria.I am quite sure that if his troops were ordered to withdraw he would not do so unless the Russians told him to.

If the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered me to take the whole of Venetia Giulia by force if necessary, we would of course be responsible for fighting the Yugoslav troops, who at least had the moral support of the Russians.Before we take responsibility for this, I think we'd better consider how our own troops feel about it.They admired Tito's guerrillas and sympathized with their struggle for freedom.We must therefore be very careful before turning them from a common enemy to attack an ally.Of course, I should not presume to speculate on the reactions of our domestic people, you are much more familiar with them.

In fact Tito's troops had already entered Trieste on April 30, not only wishing to seize that city and its environs, but also to accept the surrender of the 7,000 German garrison with all their equipment.It was not until the next afternoon that the Yugoslav army came into contact with the vanguard of the 2nd New Zealand Division west of Monfalcone.On 2 May General Freiberg and his New Zealand troops entered Trieste, accepted the surrender of the German garrison and occupied the dockyard area. On May 5, Alexander called and said: Tito himself felt that his military status was stronger than what he had foreseen when I was in Belgrade, so he wanted to cash out the winning chips for cash.He had hoped that he would enter Trieste after I had finally left.Now he's going to take over there and only allow me the right to use it.

We must remember that he has been to Moscow since our last meeting.If I could assure him that, when I no longer need Trieste as a base for our Austrian army, I can let him join his new Yugoslav side, I am sure he will abide by our original agreement. of. The last sentence in Alexander's telegram obliges me to state our political views. On 6 May I replied: I am completely satisfied with all your correspondence with Tito.I'm glad you've entered Trieste, Gorizia and Monfalcone, you put your foot on the threshold just in time.Tito has the backing of Russia, and he wants to push forward as hard as he can, but I don't think they dare to attack you in your current situation.Unless you can negotiate a satisfactory work arrangement with Tito, if there is any dispute, it must be handled by the relevant government.There is no question of what agreement you make with him to incorporate Istria, or any part of pre-war Italy, into his new Yugoslavia.You must let him know that the fate of this part of the world should be left at the peace table.I added:

To avoid any delusions from Tito or the Yugoslav commanders, the best thing to do is to have a substantial army in the area, with a great advantage in modern weapons, and air demonstrations from time to time, but as far as possible Without prejudice to your march on Vienna, on that side, I believe you are speeding up at top speed. I presume you've cleared the entrance to Trieste so you'll have some strong navies there soon.Strength is security and peace. You have no doubt seen the telegrams expressing injustice at our treatment (by the Russians) in Vienna.You obviously have the right to advance as quickly and as far as possible into former enemy territory until you come into contact with Russian or Yugoslav armies, at which point you should adopt the method of friendly greeting that has proved successful on the Western Front.

A week later, on May 12, after some great events had taken place in the West, President Truman sent a most welcome and powerful telegram.He said he was increasingly concerned about Tito's actions in Venezia Giulia.Tito does not seem to have any intention of giving up that piece of land or waiting until after the war for a general settlement of this age-old problem.We must now decide, the President said, whether we should defend the fundamental principle that territorial issues should be settled by formalities against the use of force, intimidation, or blackmail.If Tito had his way, he might also claim southern Austria, Hungary and parts of Greece.Although this may jeopardize the stability of Italy and its relations with Russia, the question now is not which side to take in the dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia, or to become involved in Balkan politics, but to decide between Britain and the United States Are they prepared to allow their allies to engage in unfettered land grabs, or adopt a tactic reminiscent of those used by Hitler and Japan.The Yugoslav occupation of Trieste had far greater consequences than the immediate territorial issues involved.He urges that we should insist on the full and exclusive control of Marshal Alexander of Trieste and Pula, the lines of communication through Gorizia and Monfalcone, and a large area to the east, sufficient to Ensure proper management.Mr. Truman said we should be prepared to consider any steps necessary to induce Tito to withdraw troops.

He encloses a draft of a telegram to be sent to Belgrade by our ambassador. They advised us to inform Stalin of our plans in accordance with the Yalta agreement, and concluded with the following words: If we stand firm on this question, as we are doing in Poland, then we can hope to avoid a large number of other similar encroachment. Needless to say how relieved I am to have received such invaluable support from my new partner. Prime Minister to President Truman May 12, 1945 I agree with everything you say, and I will do everything in my power to follow the course you suggest. If we can manage the situation firmly before our forces are scattered, Europe may be able to avoid another big war. massacre.Otherwise, all the fruits of our victories may be wasted, and neither of the two goals of territorial aggression and future wars that the World Organization intends to prevent will be achieved.

I hope that there will be a cease and desist order for the US Army and Air Force moving from Europe (to the Far East), at any rate within a few weeks.We should do the same with demobilization.Even if the order to stop moving was known, it would do no harm but benefit. I am sending instructions to our ambassador in Belgrade as you suggested to talk to Tito along the lines you proposed, and to be in step with your ambassador at every stage, whether verbally or by delivering the same, parallel or joint diplomatic documents. I hasten to tell Alexander the good news. Prime Minister to Field Marshal Alexander May 12, 1945 You have just read one of the most determined and encouraging telegrams from the President regarding Tito that I have just received.I have assured him that we will support his policy and are instructing Stevenson in Belgrade to act in concert with the American ambassador there.Of the eighteen divisions concerned, I think you can count on using them.The six British and Anglo-Indian divisions were under the orders of the empire.I think the Brazilian division will probably act in unison with the seven American divisions.As far as I can imagine, there is nothing more desirable to the two Poles (the Polish division).The fact that the United Kingdom and the United States acted in unison should make it clear to all forces. You must be delighted to see so much help from our many great allies and this new President.If this kind of action is persisted, it can prevent the recurrence of world war.I certainly recognize that it affects every theater of war, so I'm sure President Truman did as well. Since the new president sent me the bold telegram, there seems to be some backlash in Washington. Don't keep us tied to Europe, the rhetoric has always been terrible.There is no doubt that in the past, the withdrawal of the United States caused the destruction of the League of Nations, which led to the Second World War.Now that the future is uncertain, that rhetoric plays an almost equally deadly role.At this time there is also a desire to concentrate all available and suitable forces on the Far East to destroy Japan.This desire is supported by a powerful faction which has placed the Far East ahead of Europe from the very beginning.My suggestion to issue a stop-movement or hold-your-ground order seems to have sparked this debate in the President's circle.In any case, his reply seemed to have had a slightly different tone than the previous call about Trieste. On May 14 he said that before considering whether the Western Allies should continue to occupy, even temporarily, the Soviet-occupied territories in Germany, he would rather wait to see how things turned out.As for the Yugoslavs, Mr. Truman said, we should wait for the report of the Belgrade telegram before deciding what strength to use if our troops were attacked.Unless Tito attacks, it is impossible to involve the United States in another war.Two days later he reiterated that he could not and would not want his country to be involved in a war against the Yugoslavs unless they attacked us.In that case we would be justified in driving them back far enough with the Allied forces to prevent any further aggression. At this time, the local situation surrounding Trieste became acute.At first Alexander thought it would be satisfactory if Tito could place his operational and logistical forces under the command of Allied Command, at least in our area of ​​operation, although we would have preferred their complete withdrawal.But Yugoslav defenders and sentries are limiting our movement.Their actions in Austria and Venetia Giulia created a bad impression among the British and American allies.Those on our side can only stand by and have no right to interfere with actions that offend their sense of justice, and therefore feel that they are condoning wrongdoing.Alexander called and said: As a result, the sentiment against Yugoslavia is now strong and growing day by day.We are now convinced that no solution would work by sharing an area with the Yugoslav army or partisans, or by allowing the Yugoslav administration to function. On May 19 I replied to the President as follows: Prime Minister to President Truman May 19, 1945 I very respectfully ask you to give some further consideration to these words about the war on the Yugoslavs and the attack on us, and I hope you don't mind.I don't expect a war with the Yugoslavs, and apart from war, I don't think our ambassadors should be withdrawn.It is in times of crisis that ambassadors should stay on the ground.At the same time Tito's answer has come, and it is completely negative.We clearly cannot let things go like this, and immediate action must be taken now. Otherwise it will appear that we have been making threats only when in fact we are scaring people away. I believe that we should guard against the rough treatment of our troops at the front, or the infiltration of what appears to be a peace that is in fact contrary to the instructions of the Allied Commander and of a magnitude sufficient to endanger the position in which our troops are now.Assuming, for instance, that they take a position about a certain British or American force, so that the fate of that force is in their hands, shall we not first require them to retreat beyond the proper line you may designate? , while waiting for them to fire on us?I'm sure you don't mean that, but I think that's exactly the sort of thing that might happen. I do not think that under these circumstances Alexander's actions to ensure that his junta functioned inherently constituted a war against the Yugoslavs.But I certainly think that pressure should be exerted to get them out of Trieste and Pula and back into the demarcated lines, and that pressure should be seen as a border event rather than as a major diplomatic decision.I do not think that our own troops should be allowed to be beaten and ill-treated in the territory which you and I believe to be entitled to occupy, on the grounds that they cannot fire under any circumstances.Already today many Yugoslavs are crossing Isonzo back, and their ferocity has abated a little.I rely on your telegram of May 12th. Mr. Truman said on May 21 that he, too, did not think we could let things go like this.We should reject Tito's reply and immediately strengthen our forces, so that the Yugoslavs can be sure of our intentions.He suggested that Eisenhower and Alexander should have a show of power on land and in the air and schedule it at the same time as we rejected Tito's request.The president thinks that a violent demonstration might bring Tito to his senses, but if there is a conflict, he doubts it will be treated as a border incident. He therefore gave me a copy of the corresponding instructions he had sent to Alexander and Eisenhower, but he revealed a sentence at the end of the telegram: I should have no avoidable hindrance to the transfer of American troops to the Pacific. Prime Minister to President Truman May 21, 1945 I fully agree with your telegrams to Alexander and Eisenhower, and our Committee of Chiefs of Staff will accordingly inform your Joint Chiefs of Staff so that the Joint Chiefs of Staff can issue the necessary instructions.In order to save time, I am secretly notifying Field Marshal Alexander. 2. I think that if we have a frightening front, then there is a good chance that we may be able to settle without a war.I believe that our resolute attitude on this matter will be of value when discussing with Stalin. It seemed to me that it was necessary for the three of us to meet as soon as possible.There may be a campaign for a general election in June, but since the parties agree on foreign policy, there will be no need for delay.Can you give me your opinion on the suitable date and place so that we can make separate requests to Stalin.I'm afraid that he will procrastinate, and when our army is disbanded, he can stay and dominate Europe Lieutenant General Morgan, Alexander's chief of staff, finally reached an agreement with the Yugoslavs on a demarcation line around Trieste. Friction with the Soviet Union and Tito continued to increase, so that a month passed before Stalin himself spoke to me about Yugoslavia. Marshal Stalin to Prime Minister June 21, 1945 Although the Yugoslav government had accepted the proposals of the US and British governments regarding the Istria-Trieste area, the talks in Trieste seemed to have reached a stalemate.The main reason was that the representatives of Allied Command in the Mediterranean were unwilling to take into account even the most minimal wishes of the Yugoslavs.However, the Yugoslavs were credited with liberating the area from the German invaders, especially since the Yugoslav population is the majority in this area.From the point of view of the Allies, this situation cannot be considered satisfactory. I have refrained from calling your attention to the conduct of Field Marshal Alexander in our correspondence, as I do not wish to aggravate matters, but now I must stress that I cannot accept that Field Marshal Alexander sometimes speaks of The condescending tone used by the Yugoslavs.In particular, it is absolutely intolerable that Field Marshal Alexander actually compared Marshal Tito with Hitler and Mussolini in a formal public letter.This comparison is unjustified and insulting to Yugoslavia. The Soviet government was also surprised by the ultimatum-like note sent to the Yugoslav government by the representatives of Britain and the United States on June 2.How can we get practical and positive results in this way? All this compels me to draw your attention to the situation that has arisen. As before, I hope that with regard to the Trieste/Istria question, the legitimate interests of Yugoslavia will be met.Especially since the Yugoslavs had already compromised with the Allies on major issues. My reply is as follows: Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin June 23, 1945 Thank you for your call on June 21st.Our common opinion in the Kremlin in October was that the affairs of Yugoslavia should be dealt with roughly 50/50 between Russia and Britain.At present the fact is that it looks like a 90 percent to 10 percent ratio, and even in that measly 10 percent, we are already under intense pressure from Marshal Tito.The pressure was so intense that the United States and His Majesty's government had to mobilize hundreds of thousands of troops to avoid being attacked by Marshal Tito. 2. The Yugoslavs were cruel to the Italians in this part of the world, especially in Trieste and Fiume, and in general showed a tendency to seize there by means of light troops already invading the entire territory of.Were it not for the welcome mass advance on your side from the East and the North, if Field Marshal Alexander had not seized twenty-seven enemy divisions on his Italian front and finally forced them to surrender, these There is absolutely no way that the lightly armed forces will make any progress.I don't think it can be said that Marshal Tito ever conquered this whole area.The conquest of this area was due to the actions of far stronger armies to the east and west, forcing the Germans to make a strategic retreat from the Balkans. 3. In any case, we have reached an agreement and propose to implement it. We believe that any permanent change of territory should be put on the table of the peace conference. Therefore, before the peace conference, Marshal Tito will never suffer any damage by accepting the current demarcation line we demand.During this period in between, we can discuss everything together in Berlin. 4. Most of the wording in Field Marshal Alexander's telegram was originally written by the President of the United States.We don't understand why we are attacked everywhere, especially by those we have helped.Those people, we helped before you were able to get in touch with them.It seems to me, therefore, that there is no reason to ask forgiveness for Field Marshal Alexander, although I do not know that he drafted his telegram in the manner you describe. 5. As I see it, the Russification of the frontier from Lübeck, via Eisenach and Trieste, down to Albania, is a matter of great debate between good friends things. 6. It is these things which we must discuss together at the coming conference. In the following pages we leave the question of Tito and Trieste aside for the time being. During the disturbing interval between the surrender of Germany and the Tri-Power Conference in Berlin, General de Gaulle was also determined not only to preserve the French position in Syria, which in this respect was contrary to our consistent policy of Syrian independence; Maintain his position in Italy, where he is at odds with the United States. Back on that day, 27th February, I stated our policy in plain terms in the House of Commons. I must set forth directly the position of His Majesty's Government with respect to Syria and Lebanon, and to the relations with the French allies.That position was bound by a declaration made in 1941 in which Britain and France explicitly declared the independence of these Levant countries.At that time and since, His Majesty's Government has made it clear that they have no intention of replacing French power with British power in the Levant countries.We are also determined to respect the independence of these countries, and we have done our best to maintain a special status for France, given the many cultural and historical ties France has long established with Syria.We hope that the French may maintain that special status.We trust that these states will be firmly established with the sanction of the World Organization, and that the rights of France will be recognized. I must say, however, that neither the independence of Syria nor Lebanon, nor the rights of France, can be defended by force alone.We seek both and do not consider them to be incompatible.Therefore, we must not let the UK shoulder the heavy burden alone.We should pay attention to the fact that Russia and the United States have recognized and favored the independence of Syria and Lebanon, but do not approve of any special status for any foreign country. The liberation of France caused a serious crisis on the part of the Levant countries.It has been evident for some time that a new treaty is needed to define French rights in this area.On my way home from Yalta, I met the Syrian president in Cairo and urged him to make peace with France.The Levant countries were reluctant to start negotiations, but we persuaded them to do so, and the talks began.The representative of France, General Bennet, went to Paris to consult, while all Syria awaited his proposal with anxiety and excitement.Due to the delays, the plans were not sent; then word spread that French reinforcements were on their way.On May 4th, I sent a friendly telegram to de Gaulle, stating that we have no ambitions for the countries on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea. Once the new treaty is concluded and implemented, we will withdraw all our troops from Syria and Lebanon.But I also mentioned that our wartime traffic throughout the Middle East must remain undisturbed or impeded.I explained to him that sending reinforcements there, however small in number, must be regarded as a means of coercion, and could have serious consequences.This advice was not accepted.On May 17th French troops landed in Beirut. Then anger exploded.The governments of Syria and Lebanon have broken off talks, saying the war is now over and that allies should withdraw all foreign troops.Strikes and demonstrations against the French began.Eight people were killed and 25 wounded in Aleppo.Syria's lower house orders conscription.On May 26, our foreign ministry's statement expressing regret over the reinforcements of the French army led to a reply from Paris the next day that the disturbance was caused by man-made causes, and that more British troops had been brought in, and that the Syrians and The Lebanese did not protest, nor did the French agree.In fact, we appealed to the Syrian government on May 25 to ask them to control the situation, but on May 28 they told us that the matter was too big to handle, so they could no longer be responsible for domestic order.French bombardment has begun in Homs and Hama; French armored vehicles are patrolling the streets of Damascus and Aleppo; French planes are flying low over the roofs of mosques where prayers are held and machine guns are mounted on the roofs of buildings superior. At about seven o'clock on the evening of May 29th, heavy fighting broke out between French troops and Syrians in Damascus, and continued for several hours into the night.French artillery fire killed many people and damaged property, and French troops seized the house of the Syrian parliament.The bombardment continued intermittently until the morning of 31 May, with about 2,000 casualties. The Governor of Homs has appealed to the British Ninth Army to mediate a truce. We cannot stand idly by now, so General Bernard Paget, Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East, was notified on May 31 to restore order.He communicated our request to the French commander, who, on instructions in Paris, declared a cease-fire.I have the following telegram to General de Gaulle: Prime Minister to General de Gaulle (Paris) May 31, 1945 In view of the serious situation that has taken place between your army and the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, and the intense fighting that has broken out, we deeply regret ordering the Commander in Chief Middle East to intervene in order to prevent further bloodshed for the sake of the entire Middle East safety, and it involves the line of communication for the war against Japan.In order to avoid conflict between the British and French armies, we ask you to immediately order the French army to cease fire and return to the barracks. Once a ceasefire is achieved and order is restored, we will prepare for a tripartite meeting in London. By miscommunication, and not by intentional insolence, the telegram was read by Mr. Eden in the House of Commons three quarters of an hour before it reached the General.He then felt compelled to issue a public reply in Paris on June 1st, to the effect that the French army had been attacked by the Syrians but was now in control, and that the French government had ordered a ceasefire of its own accord on May 31st. I have received a very impassioned protest from the President of the Syrian Republic.But the actions we took proved to be effective.I longed not to provoke the French unless absolutely necessary.I understood de Gaulle's views and state of mind about a cause with which he was deeply emotional, but he also uttered a statesmanlike tone.He said: "We feel no bitterness or outrage towards the British.France and I personally have the highest respect and deep affection for them.But since there are conflicting interests, they must be reconciled.I hope all this will not have too far-reaching consequences.There are too many common interests closely related to us.We must have peace. I agree with this point of view, and when I reported these deplorable events to the House of Commons on the 5th of June, I said it was a matter of the least. Prime Minister to General Paget June 3, 1945 Once you have the situation under control, you should show the French all your respect.In Europe we are very closely bound up with France, and your greatest victory is to produce a peace without bitterness.You should seek immediate advice on any point other than military operations. According to reports, some French soldiers were killed. Please do your best to protect them. As for the Syrian President, who I consider a reasonable and competent man, I telegraphed him: June 3, 1945 Now that we have done you a favor, I hope you will not make our work more difficult with fury and exaggeration.The French, like you, deserve a fair deal, and we English want nothing but your restraint and assistance in our unselfish service. Our intervention had an immediate effect.The French garrison in Damascus withdrew to a camp outside the city on June 3, brought in by the British warship Al-Shuze, and a British contingent that landed in Beirut entered the Syrian capital on the same day. On June 4, Mr. Sean, our Minister in Damascus, delivered my telegram to the Syrian President, who readily accepted it and gave the following reply: I was under the weight of the bombardment and very excited by the suffering of the Syrian people when I sent your telegram on May 31st.I assure you this is not an exaggeration.Since then, Your Excellency must have received my telegram of June 1 expressing the gratitude of the Syrian people for the intervention of the British Government, and that I and my Government have assured His Majesty's Minister and Commander-in-Chief that our only desire is to communicate with the British authorities Cooperate in their work to restore order and security in Syria.Your Excellency may be confident that such co-operation with the British authorities will soon yield good results. Mr. Shaw said that the President, who was ill in bed when the May 31st telegram was sent, is now up and appears quite calm.He agrees with you and is deeply grateful.On the subject of fair treatment to the French, he said they could keep their schools (if there were any Syrians who wanted to get into those schools) and their business interests, but since this incident neither the Syrian government nor the parliament nor the people, They must not be given any more privileges in this country. General Paget approached the situation with extreme caution.All went well, and thus this difficult and unfortunate episode in Syria came to an end. A minor and not insignificant dispute arose between de Gaulle and President Truman. In the closing days of the fighting, elements of the French First Army in the Alps advanced across the border into northwestern Italy, into areas within the province of Cuneo.General Eisenhower immediately issued an order for them to retreat.The French forces concerned, under the authority of their government, ignored these orders. On May 30, General Duyan, who commanded the French Army in the Alps, sent a letter to Major General Crittenburg, commander of the U.S. Fourth Army in northwestern Italy, about the intention to establish an allied force in the province of Cuneo. The question of the military government.The letter ends with the following passage: France cannot agree to a change of the status quo in the Alpes-Maritimes against its will.This would be detrimental to the honor and security of France.I have occupied and administered this district by order of the Provisional Government of the French Republic.This task is incompatible with the establishment of Allied military control in the same area, and I think it has to be protested.Any action that persists in this approach is obviously unfriendly, even hostile, and may cause serious consequences. On June 2, General Clitenberg received another letter from General Duyan: General de Gaulle instructed me to state as clearly as possible to Allied Command that I have been ordered to use all necessary means without exception to prevent the establishment of a military government by the Allies in the areas occupied by our troops and under our control. 在任何情況之下，用這樣的措詞是令人驚駭的。當亞歷山大報告這些事實時，我寫信給總統說：我們以犧牲美國人和英國人的鮮血和財富為代價，使戴高樂將軍得以在解放後的法國恢復政權，而他對我們卻說出這樣的話來，豈不令人大不愉快？我們對於法國的政策是一個友好的政策。 杜魯門先生是憤慨的。他發電報給戴高樂，指出這些信件含有幾乎令人難以相信的威脅，就是說手持美國武器的法國軍隊竟要攻打美國和盟國的士兵，由於他們的努力和犧牲，到最近才成功地幫助法國得到解放。總統說只要這種威脅存在，就不再有配備或軍火供應法軍。 這樣一來，立刻發生效果。戴高樂通過他的外交部長寫了如下的信： 顯然，無論在法國政府的命令中，或在指揮阿爾卑斯山陸軍分遣部隊的杜瓦揚將軍的命令中，從來沒有一種意圖要用武力來反對美軍留在法軍所佔領的位於一九三九年法、意邊界以東的一小塊地區。不僅如此，在這些地區裡，現在美軍跟法軍相處在一起，正如別處一樣，發揚著良好的夥伴關係 明天早晨朱安將軍將到陸軍元帥亞歷山大的總部去，本著極其和好精神來討論這件事情，以便得到一個解決。 這件事情就這樣結束，即使不愉快，至少不再有爭吵。英國公眾的注意力已經從世界大事轉移到大選上去，對於這些事情就不去關心了。