Chapter 224 Volume Six, Chapter Thirty-Four, The Beginning of Disagreement

Threat of the Soviet Union Pressures and policies in Washington necessitating a meeting with Stalin May 12th I send a telegram about the Iron Curtain I try to preserve the military power of the Western democracies Telegram from Smuts May 26th Joseph Day Mr Weiss came to visit and teamed up May 27th with my memorandum and the president's friendly reply Stalin suggested a meeting in Berlin Harry Hopkins went to Moscow for his efforts to break the deadlock in Poland Anglo-American in July Five days to recognize a new Polish interim government. When I walked among the cheering London crowd, I saw people who had suffered from hardships and were immersed in hard-won joy, but my heart was full of worries about the future and many perplexities.Hitler's peril, and the trials and hardships that followed, seemed to most to have been lost in the flames of glory.For more than five years, the mighty enemy they had fought against had surrendered unconditionally.The unfinished work of the three mighty victorious nations is nothing more than to establish a just and lasting peace secured by a world institution, to send soldiers home to their long-awaited kin, and henceforth to enter a prosperous and progressive golden era.Indeed, that is what the people of these countries think, no more, no less.

Yet there is another side to that picture.Japan has not been conquered yet.The atomic bomb has not yet been built.The world is still in chaos.The one chief bond which united the great allies by a common danger was dissolved overnight.In my view, the threat of the Soviet Union has replaced the threat of the enemy of the Nazis, but the partnership to counter it has not yet been formed.At home, too, the foundations of national unity on which the war cabinet had stood firm were gone forever.Our strength, which has weathered so many storms, can no longer sustain in the bright sun.How, then, can we arrive at a final solution that alone can make amends for the bitterness of this struggle?I cannot escape the fear that the victorious armies of the democracies are about to be disbanded, and that the real and severest test lies ahead of us.I've seen all this before.I recall the joyous day nearly thirty years ago when my wife and I drove from the Commissary to Downing Street through a similarly enthusiastic crowd today to congratulate the Prime Minister.Then, as now, I had an understanding of the whole situation in the world, but then at least there were no armies strong enough for us to fear.

My main consideration is a meeting of the three major powers, and I hope that President Truman will come to London first on his way to the meeting.In the future, we will see that all kinds of very different opinions are being raised against the new president from various powerful parties in Washington.The mood and perception that we had noticed in Yalta before had been intensified.It was argued that the United States must be careful not to allow itself to be drawn into any anti-Soviet actions.Such anti-Soviet action, they believed, would fuel British ambitions and create a new divide in Europe.On the other hand, the correct policy would be for the United States to stand between Britain and Russia, acting as a friendly mediator, or even an arbitrator, trying to narrow the differences between these two countries about Poland or Austria, so that the problem can be resolved , to achieve a stable and happy peace, thus allowing the United States to concentrate its forces against Japan.The pressure of these opinions on Truman must have been very strong.Judging by his historically famous actions, his instinctive response may have been very different.Of course I could not weigh the forces which were at work in the nerve-centres of our closest allies, though I soon became aware of them.I just feel that the soviet and Russian imperialism with their huge momentum are sweeping forward on the lands that can't do anything.

Obviously the first objective was to have a conference with Stalin.Within three days of Germany's surrender, I sent a telegram to the President: Prime Minister to President Truman May 11, 1945 I think we should jointly or separately invite Stalin to meet with us in July in a mutually agreed unspoiled German city to convene a tripartite conference.The meeting should not take place anywhere in the area currently occupied by Russian troops. We have traveled twice to meet him.They have concerns about us because of the civilization and all the technological gadgets we have.But once our military is disbanded, this concern will be greatly reduced.

2. Now I don't know when our general election will be held, but I think that as long as the public office requires it, there should be no reason for this to affect your and my actions.If you intend to come here at the beginning of July, His Majesty will extend you the most cordial invitation, and you will receive a grand welcome from the British nation.If it weren't for the fact that you mentioned your country's fiscal year (June 30th), I would have suggested that it be held in mid-June, because I don't think a minute can be easily missed.Then, we can go to the agreed meeting place in Germany and carefully discuss some major problems in the world in the near future.I will of course take representatives from both parties of our country, and both parties will say the exact same thing on foreign affairs, because we are closely aligned.I therefore urge you to come here during the first few days of July, and then we will meet Uncle Joe at any most suitable place outside the Russian occupation that will attract him.At the same time, I earnestly hope that the U.S. front will not withdraw from the now agreed tactical front.

3. It is hard for me to imagine anything that could urge Stalin to propose a tripartite conference.But I think if he was invited, he would agree to come.Otherwise what should we do? 4. I am glad that your present intention remains to uphold our correct interpretation of the Yalta agreement, and to uphold the attitude recently declared on all matters of contention. Mr. President, in the next two months we will be deciding some of the biggest issues in the world.I would like to add that I have gained a great deal of confidence through our mutual correspondence. 5. As you wish, we are drawing up a list of questions for discussion among the three of us. This will take a few days, and will be sent as soon as it is ready.

He immediately replied that he would prefer Stalin to propose a conference, and that he would like our ambassadors to induce him to do so.Mr. Truman added that he and I should go to the conference separately to avoid suspicion of a gang, and that after the conference he wished to visit England, if his duties permitted. It is not difficult for me to see the different views expressed in this telegram, but I accept the procedure proposed by the President. Prime Minister to President Truman May 13, 1945 F‧D‧R‧【１】had promised me that he would visit England first before going to France or, as it has now become Germany.We will be disappointed if you don't come to our side.But in view of the seriousness of the months ahead, any question of decorum should not interfere with the order of priorities.Therefore, I hope that the three-nation conference will be as soon as possible, and it can be anywhere.

[1] The first letter of Roosevelt's name.translator Two. Under the circumstances, I think we should try to put the meeting in June, and hope that it will not be delayed because of your fiscal year.We very much hope that you will come to England afterwards. 3. I agree to let our ambassadors do their best to induce Stalin to initiate a meeting, and we shall issue instructions accordingly.I doubt he would agree.If he is consolidating his position just as our power is melting away, time will be in his favour. 4. I hope you will meet with Aiden. In just a few days, I sent President Truman what might be called a cable about the Iron Curtain.Of all the public papers I have written on the subject, I prefer to have this telegram by which I should be judged.

Prime Minister to President Truman May 12, 1945 I am very worried about the situation in Europe.I learned that half of the US air force in Europe has begun to move to the Pacific theater.The newspapers were full of news of the massive departure of American troops from Europe.Our army is also likely to be greatly reduced according to the methods previously drawn up.Of course the Canadian Army is going.The French were weak and not strong enough to cope.Anyone can see that our armed forces on the Continent will disappear in a very short time, except for a small number of troops left for the control of Germany.

2. What will happen to Russia at the same time?I have always worked hard for friendly relations with Russia, but, like you, I am deeply concerned about their misinterpretation of the Yalta decision, their attitude towards Poland, their overwhelming share in the Balkan countries, with the exception of Greece. Power, the difficulties they created in Vienna, their combination of Russian power with the areas they controlled or occupied, combined with the Communist tactics they played in many other countries, especially because they were able to spread in the vast The huge military strength maintained in the region for a long time.A year or two later, when the British and American armies have dispersed, and the French army has not yet been established on a large scale, we may have only a few divisions, mostly French, while the Russians can keep the active two or three hundred at will. Teacher, how will the situation be at that time?

3. They will pull down an Iron Curtain on the frontiers.We don't know what's going on behind this Iron Curtain.The whole area east of the line of Trieste and Corfu at Lübeck looks beyond doubt that it will soon be completely in their hands.In addition, a large area between Eisenach and the Elbe River captured by the US military must be added. As far as I can imagine, when the US military withdraws, this area will be occupied by the Russian army again within a few weeks. .When the Russian army was marching toward the center of Europe, General Eisenhower had to make all arrangements to prevent another large number of Germans from fleeing westward.At that time, the Iron Curtain will again fall on a large scale, if not completely.Thus there will be a vast expanse of Russian occupation several hundred miles wide separating us from Poland. 4. At the same time, our people's attention is focused on severely punishing Germany, which has been destroyed and broken, and has surrendered. This has given the Russians an opportunity. You can come in. 5. It is true that it is very necessary now to come to an understanding with Russia or to see what our relations are with Russia, before our troops are reduced to the extreme, or retreated into occupied territories.To do this, the only way is to meet in person.Yu will be very grateful for your comments and advice.Of course we could also take the view that Russia's conduct would be justifiable, and that undoubtedly provided the most convenient solution.All in all, it seems to me to be the overriding priority to settle with Russia before our power dissipates. From the outset, I have taken all practical steps within my power to preserve our position against the dissipation of Western armies. Prime Minister to General Eisenhower (in France) May 9, 1945 I am concerned to hear that the Germans intend to destroy all their aircraft on the spot, and I hope that this policy will not be followed with respect to weapons and other forms of equipment.One day, we may need these things again, and even now, in France, and especially in Italy, they will be useful.I believe that everything worth preserving should be preserved.The heavy guns I had saved from the last war were frequently used in this war on the heights of Dover. We are celebrating here. General Eisenhower to Prime Minister May 10, 1945 It was our policy in the terms of surrender that the Germans should not destroy aircraft, and this policy also applies to German action on all other equipment.If the Germans were destroying equipment, that was a violation of the terms of surrender, and I would welcome details on such things so that the offenders can be punished. (We here) are also celebrating enthusiastically. Prime Minister to Mr Eden (in San Francisco) May 11, 1945 Today's newspaper has a notice that the US military will withdraw in large numbers month by month from now on.what should we do?We (at home) will soon be under great pressure for partial demobilization.In a short time our armies will be scattered, while the Russians may still maintain several hundred divisions, occupying that part of Europe from Lübeck to Trieste, and reaching the Greek frontier on the Adriatic.All these things are far more important than the revision of the world constitution.A world constitution will probably never be drawn up until, after a period of appeasement, there will be a third world war, and constitutional amendments will be unnecessary. Mr. Eden asked General Marshall and Mr. Stimson in Washington on the 14th, in accordance with my wishes, about the withdrawal of American troops from Europe.On the whole, what the general said was reassuring.The actual number of evacuations in the next few months will be less than 50,000 a month out of a total of 3 million.Eden then turned to the question of the withdrawal of British and American troops from areas previously agreed to be assigned to Soviet occupation.Marshall had seen my telegram to the President and seemed to sympathize with my proposal.He said that the Russians had already withdrawn from the small part of Austria they had occupied that was assigned to the American occupation.He believed that they did this on purpose so that they would be able to justify their demands on us to withdraw from the Russian-occupied areas we occupied in the future. I would at least be able to maintain the effective strength of the RAF. Prime Minister to General Ismay, Transfer to the Chiefs of Staff Committee May 17, 1945 All reductions in Bomber Command should cease.All compression of the Capital Air Force, with the exception of the Coastal Command, should cease.In the above two aspects, leave can be given when necessary, but the organization and number of squadrons cannot be reduced unless otherwise ordered by the cabinet in non-wartime. Prime Minister to Air Secretary and Chief of Air Staff May 17, 1945 The air force in Italy must not be weakened, nor can it be demobilized for the time being. Prime Minister to Chief of Air Staff and General Ismay and to all concerned May 17, 1945 No operationally useful German aircraft under British control, including spare parts, may be destroyed by the Germans or by us without the prior permission of the Cabinet. PM sends General Ismay to Chiefs of Staff Committee May 20, 1945 It has been about a week since I issued instructions that there should be no more demobilization in the Air Force, and that demobilization in the Army should proceed steadily.I naturally trust the Chiefs of Staff to work out the best measures for carrying out these necessary procedures. Smuts was in San Francisco at the time, and I had informed him of all the circumstances, and he and I were in complete agreement in mood and action.On May 14, he called and said: The letters confirmed the dangerous premonitions that had been building up in me for some time, when Russia had already shown itself in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Austria.The same thing is now happening in an even more dramatic form in Yugoslavia, where the voice is Tito's but the wrist is Russian.To this must be added Stalin's insolent reply to your friendly letter.It seemed as if Russia saw the elimination of Germany as an opportunity for Russia, or as if it wanted Russia to cooperate against Japan and demanded an exorbitant price. I don't think the reason about Japan is well founded, but I think the State Department may be overweight, so I send a telegram to our ambassador: Prime Minister to Lord Halifax (in Washington) May 14, 1945 We count on the Soviet Union to join the war against Japan as soon as possible.In view of their own important interests in the Far East, others do not need to beg them, nor should they pay the price of concessions for their participation, which will damage the free and just rule of Central Europe or the countries of the Balkan Peninsula. I have not heard from Mr. Truman for a week on those important questions.Later, on May 22, a telegram came saying that he had sent Mr. Davies to see me before the tripartite meeting, and that he could handle many matters better without telegrams. Davis was the U.S. ambassador to Russia before the war and was known for his deep sympathy for the Soviet regime.In fact he once wrote a book about his mission to Moscow, and that book was made into a movie, which seems to have a lot of justification for the Soviet system.I was of course immediately ready to receive him.He spent the night with me at Checkers on the twenty-sixth.I had a long talk with him.The problem he had to ask was that the President had to meet Stalin somewhere in Europe before meeting me.I am indeed surprised by such a suggestion.I'm also not happy that the President used the words "as a party" in a telegram before when he talked about his meeting with me.Britain and the United States are united by a bond of principle and agreement in many areas of policy, and our two countries are deeply at odds with the Soviet Union on many of the most important issues.Having the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom negotiate together on this common ground, as we did from time to time in Roosevelt's time, should not now bear the contemptuous language of forming a gang.On the other hand, the president bypassing Great Britain and meeting the head of state of the Soviet Union alone is certainly not an example of ganging up because that is impossible, but it is after all an attempt to agree individually on the main issues on which we and the United States are united. Russia reached an understanding.From the first day of the war our nation has sworn allegiance to the cause of liberty.In any case, I cannot agree to an insult to our country, even if it is unintentional.I object to the implication that the new quarrel with the USSR exists only between Britain and Russia.Like us, the United States is also very concerned and responsible.I made this very clear to Mr. Davies in the conversation, which covered the whole range of Eastern and Southern European affairs. To avoid misunderstanding, I am writing a formal memorandum to Mr. Davies, after having obtained the good faith consent of the Foreign Secretary, who is now back in London. Memorandum from the Prime Minister Concerning Messages Delivered by Mr Davies May 27, 1945 It is necessary to convene a conference among the three major powers at the earliest possible date.The Prime Minister is ready to attend the meeting at any date and any place agreed by the other two powers.But he hoped that the United States and Great Britain would not find it necessary to meet in Russia or the Russian-occupied territories.We have visited Moscow many times, and the last Yalta Conference was also held on Russian soil.The Prime Minister claimed that London, the largest city in the world, which had been badly damaged in the war, was the natural and appropriate venue for the triumphant meeting of the three powers.However, if there is disagreement on this point, His Majesty's Government is still willing to discuss with the United States and the Soviet Union the designation of a most suitable site. 2. Mr. Davies communicated that President Truman would hold a meeting with Premier Stalin at an agreed place, and that representatives of His Majesty's government were not invited to the meeting until a few days later. The Prime Minister was somewhat surprised at the suggestion.It must be understood that representatives of the British Government will not be able to participate in any meeting unless they participate as equal partners from the outset, and this is undoubtedly regrettable.The Prime Minister does not understand why it is necessary to ask such a sentimental question about Britain, the British Empire and the Commonwealth. Meetings like this always require two or three days of preparatory meetings in order to set the agenda and allow time for ceremonial exchanges between the heads of state of the three countries.Under such circumstances, the three major powers can freely contact each other according to their own wishes and at their own time. 3. The Prime Minister realized that President Truman must like to get acquainted with Prime Minister Stalin, which he had never enjoyed before.At these conferences, none of the allies attempted to impose the slightest restriction on the extremely free intercourse between heads of government or foreign ministers.The Prime Minister himself was counting on meeting and acquainting President Truman for the first time.He also hopes to have a few private conversations with the president before the official meeting begins.However, in such a meeting, everything is completely free. The leaders can meet how, when and for how long they want to meet, and they can discuss any issues they want to discuss.This, of course, did not prevent certain lunches and banquets, where the strong bonds which had always united the three powers were enlivened by pleasant company, and were often the subject of congenial toasts.In the prime minister's experience, these things are easily accomplished on the spot. 4. It would certainly be more convenient for the prime minister if the meeting of the three major powers is held after July 5, when the voting in the British election will be over.But he considered such considerations to be trivial compared with the vital importance of meeting before most of the American troops in Europe were disbanded.Therefore, if Prime Minister Stalin's consent can be obtained, he is very willing to hold the meeting on June 15 as soon as possible. 5. It must be remembered that Britain and the United States at this time are united by the same ideology, namely liberty, and that proclaimed in the United States Constitution, and summarized in a modern changed way, reproduced in the Atlantic Charter. item principle.The Soviet government had a different philosophy, communism, and made full use of the methods of police rule, which they applied to every country that fell into the hands of their liberating forces.The Prime Minister could not take lightly the view that the American position was that Great Britain and the Soviet Union were two foreign powers that were equal to each other and that they needed to adjust some of the disputes in the war.Except in terms of power, there is no equivalence between right and wrong.The great cause and principles for which Great Britain and America have suffered and won are not merely a matter of balance of power.In fact, it contains the problem of saving the world. VI. The Prime Minister has worked day and night for many years to establish a true friendship between the peoples of Russia and Great Britain.And within his purview, the same is true for the United States.In making this effort he resolved to persevere against all odds.He will never give up a satisfactory solution that will allow the Soviet Union to gain enormous benefits while at the same time granting sovereign independence and freedom of internal affairs to the many countries and peoples now ravaged by the Red Army.The freedom, independence and sovereignty of Poland brought the British people to war for it, though they were ill-prepared for it.It was now more a matter of honor for a nation and empire better armed.The rights of Czechoslovakia are very dear to the hearts of the British people.The status of the Magyars in Hungary, maintained through many centuries of painstaking efforts, must always be regarded as a complete European entity.It is now submerged in the flood of Russia, and it will inevitably become either a source of conflict, or a spectacle of national subjugation, to the horror of every noble heart.Austria, with its culture, and its historic capital, Vienna, should become the free center of European life and progress. VII. The Balkan states have survived so many centuries of war and have built their own solid civilization.Yugoslavia is currently ruled by Tito, a leader trained by the Communist Party, but he gained power mainly because of the advance of British and American troops in Italy.The downfall of Romania and Bulgaria was mainly due to the fact that they were next to Soviet Russia and that they were on the wrong side in several wars.Yet these countries should have the right to exist.As for Greece, thanks to the hard work of the Greeks and the British army, the right has been won for the Greek people to express, without fear of being thwarted, in the forthcoming elections, on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot Their unrestricted, free choice of regime and government. 8. The Prime Minister believes that it would be unwise to leave all these issues aside in order to satisfy the imperialist demands of Soviet Communist Russia.As much as the Prime Minister hoped that a good, friendly and lasting arrangement would be reached and that a World Organization could be established and function to some extent, he was convinced that some of the major issues of European relations contained in the above summary could not be ignored.Therefore, he strongly advocated (1) the meeting should be held as soon as possible; (2) the three major powers should be invited to participate on an equal footing. He emphasized the fact that it would be impossible for Great Britain to take part in any conference of another nature, and of course the resulting controversy would oblige him to publicly defend the policy to which His Majesty's Government was committed. The President accepted the memorandum in a spirit of friendship and understanding, and replied on May 29 that he was considering possible dates for a tripartite meeting. On May 27th Stalin suggested, and our dear friend did not dismiss our views of justice. On May 27th Stalin suggested that the three of us should meet in Berlin in the near future.I replied to him that I would be very happy to see him and the President in the remnants of the city, and hoped that the meeting would take place in mid-June.I am now receiving the following telegram: Marshal Stalin to Prime Minister May 30, 1945 A few hours after I received your telegram, Mr. Hopkins called and told me that President Truman considered the most convenient date for this tripartite conference to be July 15th.I have no objection to that date, if you agree with it. With best wishes! About the time President Truman sent Mr. Davis to see me, he had sent Harry Hopkins to Moscow as his special envoy to make another attempt to reach an enforceable agreement on Poland.Despite his poor health, Hopkins bravely set off for Moscow with his new wife.His friendship with Russia was famous, and he received a very friendly welcome.Indeed, for the first time, some progress has been made.Stalin agreed, in accordance with our interpretation of the Yalta agreement, to invite Mikoleček and his two colleagues from London to Moscow for consultations.He also agreed to invite several important non-Lublinist Poles from within Poland. The President said in a cable to me that he thought this was a very encouraging and positive phase in the negotiations.Most of the captured Polish leaders were apparently charged only with illegal use of radio transmitters, and Hopkins was urging Stalin to grant them an amnesty so that the conference would proceed in the best possible atmosphere.He asked me to press Mikolecik to accept Stalin's invitation. We certainly agree with these suggestions, however valuable they may actually be. Prime Minister to President Truman June 4, 1945 I agree with you that Hopkins' loyal efforts have broken the ice.If more progress cannot be made at present, I would like to see invitations sent to non-Lublinist Poles on that basis.I also agree that the question of the fifteen or sixteen arrested Poles should not prevent these discussions from starting.Yet we cannot stop working for them.I therefore resolve to stand with you, either jointly or separately, by calling Stalin to accept the best possible outcome from Hopkins, provided, of course, that once the talks resume, on the question of inviting participants, Our ambassadors can still press for more improvements. While it is prudent and appropriate to do so at the present time, I am sure you will agree that these proposals do not go further than Yalta.They have only made some progress in breaking the deadlock, but we should now have a representative Polish government in the light of the Yalta Conference and its spirit.All we have got is a few concessions to the Poles abroad, enabling them to participate in the caucuses, which may lead to some improvements in the Lublin government.So I think we can only see this as a milestone on a long mountain road that we shouldn't have to trek.I think we should be wary of any newspaper assumption that the Polish problem has been resolved, or that the entanglement between the Western democracies and the Soviet government on this issue has gone far beyond détente.We can only think that there is hope again, and we can't rejoice My congratulations to Hopkins.He called back the next day: Thank you very much for your kind personal telegram. I hope you will agree: the release of the prisoners (the release of sixteen Polish prisoners) can only be listed as an offer, and not as a condition for the beginning of negotiations here.I will do my best to get these people out of prison, but it seems to me that the more important thing is to get these Poles to come to Moscow together at once. Then there are special intonation words: I will leave Moscow this morning for a little sightseeing in Berlin and then return home.Things are sort of sorted out here, and Al and I feel hopeful that at least some of these prisoners will be released. I tell you I have no idea what the word amnesty means, and hope the British Cabinet will not spend too much time debating it.All I said to Stalin was to release these poor Poles from prison.If you can find a specific definition of amnesty, could you please let me know? I persuaded Mikoleček to go to Moscow, and as a result a new Polish provisional government was established.This government was recognized by Britain and the United States on July 5, at Truman's request.It's hard to see how much more we could have done.For five months, the Soviets fought for every inch of land.They use procrastination to achieve their goals.During this period, the Lublin government under Beirut, backed by the strength of the Russian army, enabled them to completely control Poland, with frequent expulsions and purges.They never let our observers in, even though they had promised to do so.All Polish parties, with the exception of their own Communist puppets, constituted a hopeless minority in the newly recognized Polish Provisional Government.We are far from any real hopeful effort to express the will of the Polish nation through free elections.But there is one hope, and the only hope, of a possible real and honorable settlement from the forthcoming conference of the three major powers.The results we have achieved so far are as insignificant as dust, and that is all that is left to us today regarding the Polish national freedom.