Chapter 226 Volume Six Chapter Thirty-Six A Destiny Decision

Stalin agrees to hold a tripartite meeting in Berlin in mid-July. I try to arrange an early meeting. I invite Mr. Attlee to go with him to Potsdam. He agrees that the American army is about to withdraw to its own occupied zone and that Europe needs to be prioritized. Today's situation is June 4th. My Telegrams to President Truman on June 14th and My Telegram to President Truman June 15th My Telegram to Stalin His Reply to the Retreat of the Western Allied Forces The Burden of the General Election The Soviet troops seized the area allotted to them. End of the San Francisco Conference. My views on the formation of a world body. Correspondence with Lord Halifax. Holiday at Hendaye.

On June 1 President Truman informed me that Field Marshal Stalin had agreed to hold what he called a triumvirate in Berlin on or about July 15.I replied at once that I would be happy to take the British delegation to Berlin, but I thought that the fifteenth of July, proposed by Truman, would be too late for the pressing issues that demanded our mutual attention, and that if we By allowing our individual or national needs to get in the way of an early meeting, we will also jeopardize the hope and unity of the world.I said in my reply that although I am in the midst of a hot campaign, I don't think my task here is comparable to a meeting between the three of us.If June 15th is not possible, why not July 1st, 2nd, 3rd?Mr. Truman replied that, after due consideration, July 15th was the earliest as far as he was concerned, and that arrangements were being made accordingly.Stalin was unwilling to bring forward the date of the meeting.

It is inconvenient for me to insist on this matter any further. Prime Minister to President Truman June 9, 1945 Although I agree in principle to a tripartite conference in Berlin on July 15th, I hope you will agree with me that the delegations of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union should each have their own completely separate quarters and have their own own guards, and a fourth place for our meetings.What we have agreed is that our three countries, or even France, will go to Berlin as an equal of the four countries to hold a meeting, and we cannot accept the principle that we were only treated as guests of the Soviet government and the army when we went to Yalta.We should prepare everything ourselves and meet on equal terms.I would like to know your opinion on this.

Stalin agreed that the delegations should arrange their own accommodation according to my suggestion.Each delegation should have its own restricted area, and it is up to its head to decide in what way it should be managed.The Palace of the German Crown Prince in Potsdam will serve as the common venue.There is a good airfield nearby. I have said how strongly I feel that every head of government, in times of crisis, should have a deputy who is involved in everything, so that if something unexpected happens, he can thus maintain continuity.In the war Parliament, where the Conservatives had a majority, I always regarded Mr. Eden as my successor, and I informed the King as such when he summoned him.But now there are elections for a new parliament, and the results are yet to be known.I therefore feel it justified to invite Mr. Attlee, the Leader of the Opposition, to the Potsdam Conference, so that he may become acquainted with all matters without being out of touch.On June 15th I wrote to him:

June 15, 1945 I now formally invite you to join us in the upcoming tripartite meeting in the near future. Since I announced this intention to Parliament, I have noticed that the Labor Party chairman, Professor Lasky, made a statement last night saying: "It is of course important that if Mr Attlee attends this meeting, he can only do so as an observer." Status to attend. The British Government is of course responsible for all resolutions, but I mean that you should go as a friend and adviser, and help us on all matters on which we have long agreed and by public declarations have been recognized as agreeing.I actually think that the British delegation should work as it does in San Francisco, except that, as I have already said, you have no formal responsibility to the King other than that of Privy Councilor.

If you only participate as a silent observer, I think it will damage your position as the leader of our party, and under such circumstances, I have no right to push this burden on you . In any case I would like you to tell me exactly whether you accept my invitation. Mr. Attlee accepted the invitation in his letter, in which he said that he had consulted with his principal colleagues in the House of Commons, and they agreed that he should accept my invitation on the basis indicated in his letter.Mr Attlee added that it was never suggested that he should attend meetings only as an observer.

This meeting is called the end point. The main reason why I have been anxious to hold the meeting as soon as possible is, of course, that the U.S. military is eager to retreat from the line that has been won in the war to the area stipulated in the occupation agreement.The origins of the occupation agreements, and the arguments for and against their alteration, have been dealt with in a preceding chapter. [1] My fear is that Washington will one day make a decision to cede this large area for four hundred miles, and the deepest point for one hundred and twenty miles.There are millions of Germans and Czechs here.To abandon it would have opened a wide gulf between us and Polish territory, and would have practically ended our ability to influence her destiny.The change in Russia's attitude towards us, the frequent breaches of the understandings reached at Yalta, its advance on Denmark fortunately foiled by the timely actions of Montgomery, the occupation of Austria, and the threatening presence of Marshal Tito in Trieste All this, in my opinion and that of my advisers, has created a completely different situation than it was two years ago when the occupation zone was defined.Indeed, all of these issues should be considered holistically, and now is the time.At this time, the armies and air forces of the United Kingdom and the United States are still a powerful armed force until they are separated by demobilization and overwhelming demands for the war against Japan. Therefore, now is the last time for a general settlement.

【1】See Chapter 30. A month earlier would have been better, but it's not too late yet.On the other hand, ruining the entire center and heart of Germany, no, the center and keystone of Europe as an isolated action, in my opinion, is a serious decision without regard to the future.It should only be done, if at all, as part of an overall and lasting solution.We will have nothing to bargain for when we go to Potsdam, and the prospects for future peace in Europe may be shattered by non-fulfillment of responsibilities.But things are not up to me.It does not matter that we ourselves retreat within the borders of the occupied areas.The U.S. military has three million, and we have only one million.The first thing I can do is to call for an early tripartite meeting.

Failing that, the next thing is to suspend the retreat until we can put all our problems face to face, on equal terms. After eight years, what does it look like now?The Russian occupation line stretches from Lübeck to Linz.Czechoslovakia has been swept.The Baltic states, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria have been reduced to satellite states under totalitarian Communist rule.The Austrian question remained completely unresolved.Yugoslavia has been like a runaway horse.Only Greece was saved.Our army has dispersed, and it will take a long time to muster another sixty divisions to deal with the Russian army, which is overwhelmingly superior in both armor and numbers.And that's not taking into account everything that's going on in the Far East.

Only the atomic bomb unfurls its murderous shield before us.Apart from this new and terrible weapon, the danger of the Third World War cast its dismal shadow over the free nations of the world from the very beginning, under gravely unfavorable conditions.And so this moment of triumph, our best and possibly our last chance for lasting peace in the world, was simply allowed to pass away.On June 4th I sent a telegram to the President with the following words, which are no longer being disputed: Prime Minister to President Truman June 4, 1945 I am sure you will understand my reasons for eagerly moving the date of the meeting up to the 3rd or 4th (July).I think it is a matter of great concern that the withdrawal of the American troops into our occupation lines in the center, thereby penetrating the power of the Soviet Union into the heart of Western Europe, and putting down an iron curtain between us and everything to the east.If it is necessary to withdraw, I hope that this retreat will be resolved in connection with the many important matters that will really lay the foundations of world peace.In fact, nothing of real importance has ever been resolved, and both you and I inevitably have great responsibilities for the future.So I still hope the date can be brought forward.

I reinforce this argument by referring to the high-handed tactics of the Russians in Vienna. Prime Minister to President Truman June 9, 1945 Our delegation to Vienna was ordered by Marshal Tolbukin to leave by June 10 or 11.They are not allowed to look beyond the city limits to see anything.And only one airfield is allowed to be used by allies.Here is the capital of Austria, which, according to the agreement, is to be divided into four occupation zones like the whole country; but there is no power, not even the usual diplomatic rights, for anyone but the Russians.If we make concessions on this matter, we must regard Austria as belonging to the Sovietized half of Europe. 2. On the other hand, the Russians demanded that the British and American troops in Germany withdraw to the occupation line, which was stipulated a long time ago under completely different circumstances, and Berlin must have been completely Sovietized by then. 3. Wouldn't it be better if we refused to withdraw on the main European front until the Austrian question was resolved?Wouldn't it be more secure that at least all the agreements on the occupied areas should be implemented at the same time? 4. A telegram has been sent to the State Department stating the true state of our delegation in Vienna.I presume they were ordered to leave on June 10 or 11 after protesting. Two days later, I sent an abridged copy to the Foreign Office, and since Mr. Eden was in Washington on business, I gave the following instructions to the Ministry at this time: June 11, 1945 I still hope that the withdrawal of US troops from the center to the occupation line will be delayed until after the tripartite meeting.And I think that if we move on a large scale so that France can take over the part of the occupied territory that it agrees to occupy, this will stimulate the Russians to occupy the heart of Germany.Of course, the Americans could accommodate the Russians at any moment, and we had to.Then it was time to make this partial arrangement with the French (regarding their occupation), not before, even if the delay would cause some inconvenience to the redeployment of the troops.We should not rush into a hasty decision on such a vital issue at stake. At the same time, he has no objection to referring the matter to the British Chiefs of Staff Committee for consideration. On June 12 the President answered my June 4 call.he said that the tripartite agreement on the occupation of germany had been approved by president roosevelt and me after long consideration and careful discussion, which made it impossible for them to delay the withdrawal of american troops from the soviet zone in order to facilitate the settlement of other issues .The Allied Control Council cannot begin to perform its duties until they withdraw, and the military government originally exercised by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces should end immediately, and Eisenhower and Montgomery should share their duties.He said that someone had suggested to him that if the withdrawal was postponed until our meeting in July, it would damage our relations with the Soviet Union. Therefore, he advocated sending a telegram to Stalin. The above-mentioned document states that we should immediately order our troops to occupy their respective occupied areas.With regard to the German-occupied areas, he was ready to order the withdrawal of all American troops beginning on June 21.The army commander should make arrangements for the simultaneous occupation of Berlin and for the free entry of American forces into Berlin from Frankfurt and Bremen by road, rail and air.In Austria, the local commanders could be responsible for demarcating the whole territory and the occupation zone of Vienna; in case of matters they could not solve themselves, they would refer to their respective governments for instructions; this arrangement could be completed more quickly and satisfactorily. The incident struck a death knell in my soul, but I had no choice but to obey. Prime Minister to President Truman June 14, 1945 Obviously we cannot but follow your decision and issue the necessary instructions immediately. 2. It is incorrect to say that the tripartite agreement in the German-occupied area was a matter of long consideration and careful discussion between President Roosevelt and me.At the meeting in Quebec, it was only briefly discussed, and it only involved the arrangements between the United Kingdom and the United States. Regarding this, the President was unwilling to bring it up for discussion in the correspondence in advance.These comments were later referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, which they did consider acceptable. 3. Regarding the unresolved problems in Austria, I do not think that the local commanders can be responsible for solving them.Marshal Stalin made it very clear in his telegram of May 18 that the agreement on the occupation and control of Austria must be settled by the European Advisory Council.I don't believe he would agree to a change, and our delegation would probably have left Vienna anyway.In the penultimate paragraph of your telegram to Marshal Stalin, I suggest redrafting it as follows for your reference: I think the resolution of the Austrian question is as urgent as the German affair.The redistributing of the troops to the occupied territories, the redeployment of the State Guard to Vienna, and the establishment of the Allied control committee for Austria should go hand in hand with those in Germany, in accordance with the principles already agreed upon by the European Advisory Council.I therefore attach the utmost importance to settling Austria's unresolved problems so that the overall arrangement of German and Austrian affairs can proceed simultaneously.I hope that the results of the recent visit to Vienna by the American, British and French delegations will enable the European Advisory Council to take without delay the remaining decisions necessary for this purpose. 4. As far as I am concerned, I attach great importance to the withdrawal of the British and American troops from the Russian-occupied areas of Germany at the same time that the Russians should also withdraw from the areas that were originally occupied by the British troops that they now occupy in Austria. 5. I sincerely hope that your actions will ultimately contribute to the lasting peace of Europe. The President accepted my suggested redrafting of the Austrian telegram as it was and sent it to Stalin on June 14.I have nothing more to do.I replied: I thank you for accommodating our views on Austria.As I have already told you, we are complying with your wishes, and I have told Stalin so. The next day I called Stalin: I have seen a copy of the letter from President Truman to you on the 14th of June concerning the general withdrawal of the American forces to their own occupation from the 21st of June by agreement between the various commanders concerned area to go. I am also going to instruct Field Marshal Montgomery to consult with his colleagues to make the following arrangements: the withdrawal of the British troops in Germany also to their own occupied territories; the simultaneous transfer of the Allied garrisons to Greater Berlin; Freedom of movement of British troops by air, rail and road between British occupation and Berlin was facilitated. I fully agree with President Truman about Austria.I especially believe that you will issue instructions that the withdrawal of Russian troops from the part of Austria assigned to British occupation will begin on the same date as the movement of troops in Germany will begin, in accordance with the principles agreed upon by the European Advisory Council. It should not be overlooked that President Truman did not participate in or consult with him when the occupation zone was originally drawn.Soon after he assumed power, the question before him was whether he would change, in a sense, the policy of the Anglo-American government agreed upon by his illustrious predecessor.I have no doubt that his actions were supported by his civil and military advisers.His responsibility in this matter is limited to deciding whether the situation has changed so fundamentally that he should take a completely different course of action, so as to be condemned for breaking promises, those who are only wise in hindsight. People, it's better not to open your mouth. Stalin's answer put an end to these questions. Marshal Stalin to Prime Minister June 17, 1945 I have received your telegram concerning the separate withdrawal of the Allied forces to their respective occupied territories in Germany and Austria. I am sorry but I must inform you that it will be difficult for the British and American troops to withdraw into their occupied areas starting from June 21 and to move the troops into Berlin, because from June 19 Zhukov The Field Marshal, and all our other field commanders, have been invited to Moscow to attend the Supreme Soviet Conference and to prepare for and attend the review on June 24.They will be able to return to Berlin between June 28 and 30.It should also be taken into account that the demining of Berlin has not yet been completed and will probably not be completed until the end of June. With regard to Austria, I have to repeat what I said above about the recall of certain Soviet commanders to Moscow, and the dates of their return to Vienna.It is also necessary that, in the near future, the European Advisory Council must conclude in the near future the work on the determination of Austria and the occupied areas of Vienna, which has not yet been resolved. On the basis of all the above, I propose to postpone until July 1st the date for the start of the mobilization and stationing of the troops concerned in their respective occupied areas in Germany and Austria. Furthermore, with regard to Germany and Austria, it would be best to ascertain now the occupied territories of the French troops in these two countries. In Germany and Austria, we will take all necessary measures according to the above plan. I have also telegraphed the whole situation to President Truman. On July 1, American and British troops began to withdraw into their assigned occupation zones, followed by large numbers of refugees.The Soviet Union has since gained a foothold in the heart of Europe.This is a milestone in the destiny of mankind. While all this was happening, I threw myself into the turmoil of the election.The general election began in earnest from the first week of June.So this month is not easy to get through.I had toiled in a car and traveled around the major cities of England and Scotland. In one day, I had to give three or four lectures to large and apparently enthusiastic crowds, plus four broadcasts which were laboriously prepared. time and energy wasted.All this time I have been feeling that much of what we in Europe have fought so long for is slipping away; and that hopes for an early and lasting peace are dimming.I spent the day in the tumult of the crowd; at night, exhausted, I returned to the train which was my headquarters.There again awaited me a great number of persons and a great pile of incoming telegrams, and I had to laboriously continue to work for many hours.How incongruous the exuberance and tumult of the party were with the gloomy and melancholy background that filled my mind, and this incongruity itself contradicted objective reality and a sense of balance.I'm so happy when polling day finally arrives and the ballots will be safely sealed in the ballot box for three weeks. Our San Francisco conference, single-mindedly devoted to the establishment of a world institution for peace, was reaching its conclusion when the Soviet troops were flooding into their designated areas of occupation without incident.Mr Eden and Mr Attlee had to leave for the election, but on the 26th of June I sent a congratulatory message to Lord Halifax, Lord Cranbourne and all the rest of our delegation, congratulating The success of their work and the quality of the results obtained under very difficult circumstances.With thoughtful wisdom and sincerity of conviction, the representatives of the United Kingdom had done much to achieve a consensus without which a world Organization would have little reality.You have contributed immeasurably to rebuilding a hopeful foundation for the future. Unfortunately, so far, few of these hopes have been fulfilled. I have always advocated that the foundation of a world institution should be found on the basis of regional organizations.Most of the major regions that come to mind are: America, United Europe, Commonwealth and Empire, Soviet Union, South America.Other parts are more difficult to draw boundaries at present, such as one or several Asian groups, or African groups, but conclusions can be drawn after research.But the purpose is that many of the hotly contested issues in the local areas are discussed and resolved in the district conferences, which then select three or four prominent persons to represent them in the highest group organization.This would constitute a supreme body of thirty or forty world statesmen, each charged not only with representing his own region but with the affairs of the whole world, chiefly with regard to the prevention of war.The measures we now have are not effective enough for such an eminent purpose.Calling all nations, big and small, strong and weak, into a central organization on an equal footing, is like organizing an army, and inviting all to the Same as in headquarters.All that has been achieved so far is a rowdy meeting place moderated by skilled side-events to pass or defeat resolutions.Nevertheless, we still have to make unrelenting efforts. A few days later I sent Halifax a telegram giving him some pertinent details that I thought the President and his staff would be happy to know. Prime Minister to Lord Halifax (in Washington) July 6, 1945 Naturally, I am very much looking forward to meeting the President.Political members of the British delegation will leave the (Potsdam) conference on July 25 to await the election results in Britain.This can avoid an embarrassing situation when the election is announced.I have reason to believe that the government can get a majority, but, as the President knows, there are many surprises in election campaigns.Unless the result of the vote amounts to an expression of extreme national discontent, I think it is in any event extremely unlikely that I will have to step down as a result of a declared defeat.I should wait for the result of the vote of confidence in the House of Commons after the King's Speech and accept my dismissal from Parliament.This will enable parties and individuals to express their positions by voting. 2. The British delegation was thus able to return to Berlin on the 27th, and I personally could remain there until the 5th or 6th of August if necessary.Parliament elects a Speaker on 1st (August) and is sworn in by members.But it will take until the 8th (Wednesday) to formally convene the Parliament by the Emperor, and the decisive group vote will not be held until the 10th (Friday).I think all these details, some of which are extremely secret, will be of interest to the President. 3. I am very happy to hear that the President is considering two weeks or even three weeks. I also think that no matter what happens in the UK, the meeting cannot be ended hastily. This is extremely important.In Crimea, the meeting was a bit cut short.Here we must try to resolve a multitude of issues of enormous consequence and prepare for a peace conference.That meeting will roughly be held later this year or early next spring. The next day he returned the following telegram, which showed how familiar he was with Washington's views. Lord Halifax (in Washington) to the Prime Minister July 7, 1945 The President had left for Potsdam when I received your telegram.Your call is immediately forwarded to his ship.I am sure you will find that Truman was eager to cooperate with us and fully aware of the long-term implications and temporary difficulties of the decisions we had to make.As far as I can tell, the American strategy for dealing with the Russians was to begin by expressing confidence in the Russians' willingness to cooperate.I also expected that the Americans, in dealing with us, would be more likely to respond to our judgments based on the dangers of economic dislocation in European countries than to our unabashed talk of far-left governments or the dangers of the spread of communism.They were slightly disturbed by my portrayal of Europe (regardless of the facts) as a place of clashes of ideas, where Soviet and Western powers might collide and confront each other.Behind their thinking, they also suspect that we support governments and countries only for the sake of right-wing governments or monarchies themselves.But this definitely does not mean that they are willing to stand up with us against the Russians when necessary.They may be playing it safe, though, and probably wish to play, or at least appear to be, an intermediary between us and the Russians. After a few years, it was the United Kingdom and Western Europe that were urged to play an intermediate role between the United States and the Soviet Union.This is the funny thing in fate. I resolved to give myself a week of balmy sunshine between the general election and the Potsdam Conference.On July 7th, two days after election day, I flew to Bordeaux with Mrs Churchill and Mary, and was made comfortable at the villa of General Brutinelle.That was Hendaye near the Spanish border.There are good bathing places and beautiful surroundings.I spent most of the mornings in bed reading a fine account by a distinguished French author of the Armistice at Bordeaux and its tragic end at Oran.Oddly, it has awakened my own memories of what happened five years ago, and learned many things that I didn't know at the time.In the afternoon, I even went out suddenly with exquisite painting tools and found moving subjects on the Nive River and beside the Bay of Saint-Jean-de-Luz.I found a gifted companion in painting, Madame Nairn, the wife of the British Consul in Bordeaux, whom I had befriended in Marrakech a year before.I dealt with only a few cables about the upcoming meeting and tried to put party politics out of my mind.Yet I have to admit that the mystery of the ballot box and its contents has a sinister illusion that knocks on my door and stares at my window.When I have my palette open and my brush in hand, it is easy to drive away these uninvited guests who enter my mind. Basques welcome visitors warmly everywhere.They had withstood the German occupation for a long time and were happy to be able to breathe again.I didn't have to prepare for that meeting because my head was already so full that it would be nice to get rid of it even as the days went by so quickly.The President was at sea at this time on the American cruiser USS Augusta, the same ship that took Roosevelt to our Atlantic Conference in 1941.On the 15th I drove through the forest to Bordeaux airport, where the Skymaster took me to Berlin.