Chapter 21 Volume 1, Chapter 17, The Tragedy of Munich

Chamberlain takes power He visits Berchtesgaden His talks with Hitler The end of the Runcimann mission Anglo-French pressure on the Czech Republic Knopf's strong statement at the League of Nations General disregard of Soviet power Condors rally around doomed country Chamberlain and Hitler at Goldesberg Hitler's ultimatum Rejection of British and French cabinets Wilson's mission to Berlin I in September 26th visit to Downing Street Halifax Bulletin British navy mobilization behind the German front Removal of General Baker Hitler's struggle with the German Army Staff Biographical reasons September 26 German Army Staff’s opinion letter to Hitler Admiral Raeder’s remonstrance Hitler’s sway Appeal to the Sept. 28 House of Commons drama Munich Conference A scrap of paper Burren's triumphant return Field Marshal Keitel's testimony at Nuremberg Hitler's judgment reaffirms some common principles of morality and conduct France and England are on a deadly path .

Mr Chamberlain controlled British foreign policy, and Sir Horace Wilson was his chief confidant and agent.Lord Halifax is increasingly puzzled by the affairs of his Foreign Office, but follows the Prime Minister.The cabinet was deeply disturbed, but still listened to Chamberlain.The government majority in the House of Commons is dominated by the party's parliamentary leader.One, and only one, runs the affairs of our country.This is a man who does not shrink from either his responsibilities or his personal efforts. In the middle of the night from September 13th to 14th, Daladier got in touch with Chamberlain.The French government thought that it might be beneficial for the leaders of France and Britain to meet Hitler together if they came out in person.But Chamberlain had ideas of his own.He took the initiative to send a telegram to Hitler, suggesting to visit him.He reported the matter to the cabinet the next day, and that afternoon he received a telegram from Hitler inviting him to Berchtesgaden.So, on the morning of September 15th, the British Prime Minister arrived at Munich Airport by plane.In all respects, the choice of this time is not very suitable.When the news reached the Czech capital, Czech leaders could hardly believe it was happening.They felt very strange: just when they had just controlled the internal situation in the Sudetenland for the first time, the British Prime Minister went to visit Hitler in person.They felt that this would weaken their position in dealing with Germany.Because Hitler's provocative speech on September 12, and the subsequent German incitement to Heinlein's partisan mutiny, did not win the support of the local people.Henlein had fled to Germany, and the Sudetenan Germanic party, having lost its leadership, apparently did not agree to direct action.In its so-called Fourth Plan, the Czech government formally proposed to the leaders of the Sudeten Germans an administrative plan for local self-government. In full agreement with Chamberlain's speech of March 24th, and with Sir Simon's statement in his August 27th speech.But even Lord Runciman saw that a mutually satisfactory agreement between the Sudeten leaders and the Czech government was the last thing the Germans wanted.Chamberlain's trip gave the Sudeten party an opportunity to make further demands; the party's extremists publicly demanded annexation of Germany in accordance with Berlin's directives.

The prime minister's plane arrived at Munich Airport on the afternoon of September 16, and he took the train to Berchtesgaden.At this time, all radio stations in Germany broadcast Henlein's statement demanding that the Sudetenland be merged into Germany.That was the headline heard after Chamberlain got off the plane.This was apparently planned to let him know about it before meeting Hitler.Regarding the issue of annexation, neither the German government nor Henlein himself has ever raised it; and a few days ago, the British Foreign Office had declared that this was not an acceptable policy for the British government.

The surviving transcript of the meeting between Chamberlain and Hitler has now been published by Feiling.We can get the outstanding impression of Chamberlain from his narration as follows: I thought that, though I read in his face a ruthless man, I got the impression that this man was a man who could be relied upon after his assurances. 【１】 [1] Feiling, op. cit., p. 367. In fact, we have seen that Hitler had made up his mind and prepared to launch an invasion of Czechoslovakia months ago, and was only waiting for the final signal.The Prime Minister returned to London on Saturday, September 17, and immediately called a Cabinet meeting.Lord Runciman had returned by then, and his report, of course, attracted everyone's attention.His health had been poor these days, and the mission had made him extremely stressed and thinner.He suggested a policy of straightforward action, the transfer of the Germanic majority to Germany.This approach has at least the advantage of simplicity and clarity.

Both the Prime Minister and Lord Runciman were convinced that only the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany could dissuade Hitler from ordering an invasion of the Czech Republic.Chamberlain felt strongly that Hitler was full of fighting spirit during his talks with Hitler.His cabinet also believed that France was hopeless; so there was no question of resisting Hitler's demands on the Czechs. Some ministers even raised the right of national self-determination, minorities demanded fair treatment and other arguments to comfort themselves, and even showed a look of support for the little people against the Czech mobs.

Concerted steps of retreat must now be taken with the French government.On September 18, Daladier and Bonnet came to London.Chamberlain had decided in principle to accept the demands Hitler had stated in Berchtesgaden.All that remained was to formulate proposals to be presented to the Czech government by the British and French representatives in Prague.The French cabinet sent a draft that was indeed more thoughtful.They were not in favor of a plebiscite because they saw that the Slovakia and Lucinia regions might also ask for the same.They were in favor of a straightforward cession of the Sudetenland to Germany.

But they added that the British government should work with France, plus Russia (with whom they never consulted), to secure new borders for the fragmented Czech Republic. Many of us, even outside cabinet circles, felt that Bonet was at heart a defeatist, all his rhetoric aimed at a single line of peace at any cost.In a book he wrote after the war, he naturally tried to place all the blame on Chamberlain and Halifax.Everyone knew what he was thinking at the time.He was willing to pay any price to deprive France of its recently reaffirmed solemn and unequivocal obligation to fight for the defense of Czechoslovakia.At this moment, the cabinets of Britain and France looked like two overripe watermelons squeezed together and crushed; but what they really needed were swords out of their sheaths.However, unlike the Czechs to discuss this point, Britain and France are completely consistent.Czechs should follow the decisions of their protectors.These simple-minded people like children were treated in the worst possible way.

Britain and France, presenting their decision or ultimatum to the Czechs, said: Both the French and British Governments realize how great the sacrifices required of Czechoslovakia are.They all feel it their duty to state frankly how necessary these conditions are for security. The Chancellor must meet again with Herr Hitler no later than Wednesday, if possible earlier, and we therefore feel obliged to ask for your reply as soon as possible.Therefore, on the afternoon of September 19, the Czech government received a proposal to immediately hand over to Germany the areas in the Czech Republic where Germanic people accounted for more than half.

Britain, after all, had no treaty obligation to protect Czechoslovakia, nor did it offer informal guarantees, but France did have a treaty obligation to fight Germany if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia.For two decades, President Benes remained a loyal ally and almost a vassal of France, supporting French policies and interests in the League of Nations and elsewhere.If there are so-called sacred and solemn obligations in the world, then the current Fajie relationship is it.The statements of Bloom and Daladier still ring in my ears.It is a portent of doom for the French government to back down on its own words.I always thought Benes' submission was wrong.He should defend his line of defense.According to my opinion at that time, once the war broke out, France would definitely rise to help when the people of the whole country were enthusiastic, and Britain would immediately take concerted action with France.At the height of this crisis (September 20) I went to Paris for two days to visit my friends in the French government, Renault and Mandel.Both ministers were very distressed and even wanted to quit Daladier's cabinet.I object to their resignation, because their sacrifice would not have changed the course of events, but would have made the French government weaker by losing two of its most able and decisive men.I even took the liberty of telling them exactly what I meant.After this harrowing visit I returned to London.

From late night on September 20th to 2:00 am on September 21st, the British and French envoys in Prague visited President Benes, told him that there was no hope of arbitration based on the 1925 German-Czech Treaty, and strongly urged him to settle in France. Before the situation that the United Kingdom and the United Kingdom cannot bear the responsibility has not emerged, the proposals of Britain and France must be accepted.The French government, at least a little ashamed of itself, asked its envoy to make it verbally.Under this pressure, the Czech government succumbed to the British and French proposals on September 21.At that time there was a French general named Fauche in Prague.He had been a member of the French military delegation to the Czech Republic from 1919 and was promoted to head it in 1926.He has now applied to the French government to leave his post and immediately enlisted in the Czech army.He also acquired Czech citizenship.

France has advanced the following defense, which we cannot dismiss lightly.They said that if the Czechs refused to yield and war ensued, France would do its duty; but it would do no harm to France's honor if the Czechs yielded when pressure was exerted.On this point, we have to leave it to history to judge. On the same day, September 21st, I made a statement about the crisis to the London press: The partition of Czechoslovakia under pressure from Britain and France was tantamount to the total capitulation of Western democracies to the threat of Nazi force.Such a failure would not bring peace or security to Britain and France.On the contrary, it would make both countries weaker and more dangerous.Simply neutralizing the Czech Republic would have meant twenty-five German divisions could be used to threaten the Western Front; moreover, it would have opened a route to the Black Sea for the victorious Nazis.It is not only Czechoslovakia that is at stake, but the freedom and democracy of all countries.It is a fatal fallacy to think that security can be obtained by throwing a small country into the jaws of a tiger.Germany's war potential would grow rapidly in the short term much faster than France and Britain could complete the necessary defensive measures. At the League of Nations Congress on September 21, Litvinov issued a formal warning: Now, the Czech Republic is being meddled in its domestic affairs by its neighbours, and threatened with a public bluster of attacks, talking of adding force.One of the oldest, most civilized, most industrious peoples in Europe has gained independence after centuries of oppression; today, or tomorrow, may decide to take up arms and fight for its independence The League of Nations did not care about the important event of the elimination of Austria.The Soviet government was well aware of the importance of this event to the fate of Europe, especially the Czech Republic, so immediately after the merger of Germany and Austria, it formally proposed to the major European countries to conduct collective consultations immediately in response to the possible consequences of this event, so as to adopt collective measures. Precaution.Unfortunately, our advice has not received the attention it deserves.This suggestion, if carried out, might save us from the shock that is now taking place around the world over the fate of the Czech Republic. A few days before I left for Geneva, the French government asked us for the first time what our attitude would be if the Czech Republic were to be attacked. .On behalf of the Government, I offer the following very clear and unequivocal answer: We are ready to fulfill our obligations under the treaty, and together with France we will assist the Czech Republic in whatever way we can.Our Ministry of Defense is ready to participate immediately in a meeting of representatives of the French and Czech Ministries of Defense to discuss appropriate measures to be taken only two days before the Czech Government made the following formal inquiry to our Government to grant the Czech Republic additional Direct and effective aid, is the Soviet government prepared to give the same aid to the Czech Republic in accordance with the Soviet-Czech Treaty?To this question, our government has given a clear affirmative answer. It is strange that such a public and unqualified statement by such a great power concerned should have had no effect on Chamberlain's negotiations and France's handling of the crisis.I have heard people say that it is geographically impossible for Russia to send troops to the Czech Republic, and that in the event of a war, Russia's assistance can only be limited to small-scale air support.Of course, this required the consent of Romania, and to a lesser extent Hungary, to allow Russian troops to pass through their territory.Mr. Maisky told me that, at least for Romania, if it was pressured and assured by a large coalition backed by the League of Nations, it might well be able to get its assent.There are two railways from Russia through the Carpathians to the Czech Republic: the northern one from Chenowitz through Bukovina and the southern one from Debrecen through Hungary.Thirty divisions of Russian troops can be transferred to the Czech Republic by using these two railways, which are at a considerable distance from Bucharest and Budapest.These possibilities are the forces that keep the peace, and will hold Hitler back a great deal, and in the event of war it will almost certainly lead to farther consequences.Some people tried their best to say that the Soviet Union was duplicity and dishonesty. Therefore, the Soviet Union's proposal was actually ignored.The Soviet proposal was not weighed against Hitler but was treated with indifference, not to mention contempt, which left a trail in Stalin's mind.The development of the situation is as if the Soviet Union does not exist in the world.For this, we later paid a great price. On September 21, Mussolini delivered a rather important speech in Trevizzo, in which he said: If Czechoslovakia feels that its position today can be called a delicate situation, it was ours. Perhaps it is possible to use the word was. The reason I will tell you right away includes not only Czechoslovakia but also Czechoslovakia, Germany, Poland, Magyar, Lucinia, Romania, and Slovakia. Now that this problem has occurred , then I would like to solemnly declare that it must be solved with a comprehensive approach. 【１】 [1] See Lipka: "Munich and Beyond", page 117. The Czech government was forced to resign following a joint British-French proposal, and a separate non-partisan government was formed under General Selovy.Selovy was commander of the Czech Army in Siberia during World War I.On September 22, President Benes made a solemn appeal to the people to remain calm in a national broadcast.By the time Benes prepared to broadcast, Chamberlain had flown to Germany for a second meeting with Hitler.The meeting was held in Godesberg, a city in the Rhineland.The British Prime Minister brought with him details of the Anglo-French proposals, which had been accepted by the Czech government, as a basis for final discussions with the Führer.The two men met at the hotel in Goldesberg, the same hotel that Hitler had hurriedly left four years earlier to purge Rohm.As soon as the session began, Chamberlain found himself in what he described as a completely unexpected situation.He described the situation in the House of Commons after his return: While in Berchtesgaden, I heard that if the principle of self-determination of nations was accepted, Herr Hitler would discuss with me the methods and steps for its implementation.He later told me that it had never occurred to him that I would come back and profess to accept the principle.I don't want the House of Commons to think he's trying to trick me. I don't think so myself, but for my part, I thought that when I got back to Goldsberg, I'd just talk quietly with him about the advice I took with me. , things can be resolved smoothly.To my great shock, he began the meeting by saying that these proposals were unacceptable and that they should be replaced by another set of proposals that had never occurred to me. I figured it would take some time to figure out what I should do, so I walked out.My heart is full of ominous premonitions about whether I will be able to accomplish my mission.But before leaving the field I had Mr. Hitler agree to extend his previous pledge not to mobilize his troops until the negotiations were concluded.For my part, I promised to ask the Czech government to refrain from any action that would cause accidents. The discussion thus stopped and was not resumed until the next day.Throughout the morning of September 23, Chamberlain paced the hotel balcony.He sent Hitler a letter after breakfast saying that he was ready to forward new German proposals to the Czech government, but suggested that there were serious difficulties in them.Hitler offered no concessions in his reply that afternoon, and Chamberlain demanded a memorandum with maps be presented at the final meeting of the evening.At this time the Czech Republic had begun to mobilize, and the British and French governments officially notified their representatives in Prague that they had previously been responsible for persuading the Czech Republic not to mobilize, and that they could no longer bear this responsibility.At 10:30 that evening Chamberlain met again with Hitler, and the status of the talks is best described in his own words: During my last meeting with the Chancellor of Germany, he handed me the memorandum and the map.The talks began at half past ten that night and continued until two or three o'clock the next morning. The German Foreign Minister was present, as well as Sir Henderson and Sir Wilson.For the first time, I found a time limit on the memorandum.So at this point I'm being very frank.I cannot stress enough that these conditions would be dangerous if they were maintained; war would have dire consequences if they broke out.I say that the language and attitude of this document, more like an ultimatum than a memorandum, will shake public opinion in neutral countries.I sharply blame the German chancellor for not responding to my efforts for peace. I must add that Hitler earnestly reiterated to me what he had said in Berchtesgaden: that this was his last territorial ambition in Europe, he did not mean to include non-Germanic races in Germany within.Second, he also said very earnestly that he hopes to get along with Britain in a friendly way. If the Sudetenland issue is resolved peacefully this time, he is very willing to resume negotiations.Of course he also said: there is another difficult question, the colonial question; but it is a question that will not lead to war. On the afternoon of September 24, Chamberlain returned to London.The next day, the cabinet held three meetings.At this time there was an increasingly hardening public opinion in both London and Paris.As a result of the discussion, it was decided to reject the conditions proposed at Goldsberg and to pass the news on to the German government.The French cabinet agreed with this decision and immediately carried out partial mobilization, which was indeed surprisingly efficient.On the night of September 25, the French Prime Minister and Ministers came to London again and reluctantly accepted their obligations to the Czechs.The next afternoon, Sir Wilson was ordered to take the Prime Minister's personal letter to Berlin to meet Hitler. At that time, it was three hours before Hitler was going to give a speech in the stadium.The only answer Sir Wilson could get was that Hitler would not give up the deadline set in Goldsberg's ultimatum, Saturday, October 1, unless he received a letter by 2:00 p.m. Czech agreed to the notice, otherwise he will march to this area on this day. That night, Hitler gave a speech in Berlin.When he mentioned Britain and France, he spoke softly and cordially, but he attacked Benes and the Czechs roughly and mercilessly.He said with absolute certainty that the Czechs had to leave the Sudetenland by the twenty-sixth, and that he was no longer interested in whatever happened in Czech territory after the matter had been settled.This is my last territorial claim in Europe. As in similar situations, as the crisis worsened, my contacts with the government became more frequent and closer.On September 10, I visited the Prime Minister at his Downing Street residence and had a long talk.I went again on September 26, and he either invited me or was very willing to see me.On this critical day, at half-past three in the afternoon, he and Lord Halifax received me in the Cabinet Room, and I urged them to carry out the Policy, that is, a joint statement issued by Britain, France and Russia, expressing the unanimous sentiment and determination against Hitler's aggression.We discussed a communiqué at length and it appears that there is complete agreement.Halifax agrees with me, and of course I take it that the Prime Minister fully agrees.At that time, an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was present, and he drafted the draft.When we parted, I was extremely satisfied and relieved. At about eight o'clock that night, the Director of the Information Department of the Foreign Office, now Sir Reginald Lepper, submitted to the Foreign Secretary a communiqué which would read as follows: If Germany still launches an attack on the Czech Republic despite the efforts of the British Prime Minister, the direct result will be that France will inevitably assist the Czech Republic, and Britain and Russia will certainly support France. The communiqué was published immediately after it was approved by Lord Halifax. When I returned some time earlier to my lodgings in Morpeth House, I found fifteen gentlemen assembled there.They were all Conservatives: Lord Cecil, Lord Lloyd, Sir Edward Grieg, Sir Robert Horne, Mr Boothby, Mr Bracken, Mr Low.Everyone's emotions are extremely warm.Everyone's opinions converge on one point: we must involve Russia.I am deeply moved and amazed at the intensity of opinion within the Conservative Party, which shows that they have completely put aside ideas such as class, party or ideological interests, and shows the height of their emotions.I told them what happened in Downing Street and explained the nature of the communiqué.Everyone was relieved to hear that. French right-wing newspapers expressed skepticism and contempt for the communiqué. The Morning Post said it was a clever lie.Mr Bonet was busy showing how progressive his actions were. He told several MPs that he could not confirm the British communiqué in order to give them the feeling that it was not the British guarantee he had hoped for.He certainly had no difficulty conveying this impression. That evening Mr. Cooper and I dined at the Admiralty.He told me that he was asking the Prime Minister to mobilize the British fleet immediately.This brings me back to my own experience twenty-five years ago when the situation was very similar. The moment of conflict seems to have arrived, and the armies of both sides have lined up to face each other.The Czechs had one and a half million men armed and ready behind the strongest defensive line in Europe, equipped with highly organized and efficient industrial machinery.The French army has been partially mobilized, and the French cabinet is prepared, albeit reluctantly, to fulfill its obligations to the Czech Republic.Before midnight on September 27, our Admiralty sent a warning telegram to our fleet, ordering the fleet to mobilize the next day.The news was distributed simultaneously to British newspapers (at 11:38 P.M.).At 11:20 am on September 28, the Admiralty officially issued an order to mobilize the British fleet. We can now look behind the hard front that Hitler presented to the British and French governments.The Chief of the General Staff, General Beck, was appalled by Hitler's plan, which he totally disapproved of and was prepared to prevent.In March, after Germany invaded Austria, he sent Hitler a memorandum, citing detailed facts to prove that the continuous conquest plan would inevitably lead to worldwide disaster and bring the newly revived Germany into collapse again.Hitler made no reply.stopped for a while.Baker was unwilling to share the historical responsibility for the Führer's decision to go to war.By July, there was a rivalry between the two.When the attack on Czechoslovakia was about to materialize, Baker asked Hitler for an assurance that there would be no more war risks.So the two of them broke up.Hitler told Baker that the army is a tool of the country, and he is the head of state, so the army and other armed forces must obey his will unconditionally.Baker therefore asked to resign.His resignation has never been answered.The general's decision will not change.Since then, he has not worked in the War Department.Hitler had to dismiss him and appointed Halder to succeed him.Baker later had a tragic but honorable fate. All these things are known only to secret insiders.Now also began a serious and ongoing struggle between the Führer and his expert advisers.Baker is a person who is unanimously trusted and respected by the Army Staff. Not only do they have the same professional opinions, but they also have an aversion to civilian and party orders.The September crisis appeared to have created a situation that worried the German generals.With thirty to forty Czech divisions deployed on Germany's eastern frontier, the French began to press heavily on the Western Wall by about eight to one.A hostile Russia might use Czech airfields for military action, and Soviet troops might advance through Poland or Romania.Finally, the British navy is said to be mobilizing in the final stages.With all these developments, emotions rose to fever pitch. First, we have a report from General Halder about a plot to arrest Hitler and his main cronies.The evidence of the incident is not limited to Halder's detailed account.There must be a plan, but we cannot accurately judge how big the determination was at the time.The generals had repeatedly planned a rebellion, but at the last minute they were always dismissed for various reasons.After they were captured by the Allied forces, it was natural for their own interests to explain in detail how they had worked for peace.No doubt there was a plan of this kind at that time, and some serious measures were taken to carry it out. By the beginning of September (says Halder), we had taken the necessary steps to rid Germany of this madman.At that time, most Germans were terrified by the prospect of war.We did not want to kill the Nazi leaders, but to arrest them, form a military government, and declare to the people: We acted only because we believed that our people were being led to a certain disaster. Participated in this conspiracy: General Halder, General Beck, General Stipnagel, General Witzleben (Garrison Commander of Berlin), General Thomas (Chief of Armaments), General Brockdorf (Potsdam Garrison Commander) and General Herdorf, Chief of the Berlin Police.They also secretly told the commander-in-chief, General Brauchitsch, who also agreed. As part of the military operation against Czechoslovakia and the normal movement of troops, they successfully moved an armored division close to Berlin, and it only took one night to drive to Berlin.The proof is clear, since at the time of the Munich crisis the 3rd Armored Division under General Heppner was stationed south of Berlin.General Heppner's secret mission was to seize the capital, the Chancellery and important Nazi departments at the first signal.For this purpose, the division was later assigned to the command of General Witzleben.According to Halder's confession, Berlin police chief Herdorf made extremely careful arrangements for the arrest of Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, and Himmler.There could be no surprises.As long as Hitler was in Berlin, all the conditions for a complete success of the coup were in place.Hitler arrived in Berlin from Berchtesgaden on the morning of September 14.Halder received the news at noon and immediately went to see Witzleben to finalize the plan.It was immediately decided to implement it at 8:00 pm that day.By 4 p.m., according to Halder, Witzleben's office received word that Chamberlain was flying to Berchtesgaden to meet with the Führer.He immediately called a conference, at which Halder told Wizleben that if Hitler's blustery intimidation succeeded again, it would be inappropriate for him, as chief of the general staff, to dismantle it.So it was decided to suspend the action and wait for the development of the situation. This is the story of the internal crisis in Berlin told by General Halder, the chief of the general staff at the time, and whether it is true, historians will investigate.It was later confirmed by General Miller-Hilebrandt, and also by some authorities who had investigated the matter and found it to be reliable.If this incident is finally accepted as historical fact, it is yet another example of a tiny accident changing the fate of human beings. Beyond this there was no doubt that there were other, if less drastic, but still zealous efforts on the part of the General Staff to try to restrain Hitler.On September 26, a delegation composed of General Hanneken, General Loeb, and Colonel Bodenschatz went to the Chancellery to request an audience with Hitler, but was sent away.At noon the next day, the main generals met at the Ministry of War.They unanimously prepared a submission, which was sent to the Prime Minister's Office.This document was published in France in November 1938. [1] The opinion paper is divided into five chapters and three appendices, with a total of 18 pages.The first chapter focuses on describing the differences of opinion between the political and military leaders of the Third Reich, and showing that the morale of the German people is too low to support a European war.He also said that in the event of war, extraordinary powers must be delegated to the military authorities.Chapter II describes the dire conditions in the Wehrmacht and states that the military authorities had to ignore many serious breaches of discipline.The third chapter enumerates the various shortcomings of the German armaments, and emphasizes in particular the shortcomings of the hastily completed Siegfried Line and the lack of fortifications in the area between Eixample-Chapelle and Saarbrücken.The opinion also stated that the French army concentrated in Givay might invade Belgium.Finally, he emphasized that there are too few officers, saying that in order for the army to reach combat strength, at least 48,000 officers and 100,000 sergeants are needed. If all mobilization is carried out now, at least 18 divisions will lack trained subordinate commanders official. [1] Published by Professor Lavergne in the "Annals of French and Foreign Politics", November 1938.See Lipka, op. cit., pp. 212ff. This document also gives reasons why, except in strictly local wars, defeat is inevitable, and it is certain that not one fifth of the army officers believe in the possibility of German victory.In the appendix there is a commentary on the Czechoslovak military, saying that the Czechoslovak army can fight for three months even without the aid of the Allies, while Germany needs sufficient covering troops on the Polish and French borders, in the Baltic and North Seas defense.In Austria, at least 250,000 troops are needed to prevent popular uprisings and possible Czech attacks.Finally, the Staff considered it highly unlikely that the conflict would be localized within a three-month period. The warnings raised by the Army were finally reinforced by the German Navy Minister, Admiral Raeder.At ten o'clock in the evening on September 27, the Führer received Raeder. Raeder made a strongly worded appeal.A few hours later news of the mobilization of the British fleet added strength to his appeal.Hitler wavered.At 2 o'clock in the morning, German radio officially denied the news that Germany was preparing to mobilize on the 29th, giving further force to his appeal.At 11:45 a.m. on the same day, the official German news agency sent a statement to the British press, again denying the news that Germany was preparing to mobilize on the 29th.The strain on the man and his prodigious willpower must have been extremely violent at this time.Clearly he has reached the brink of all-out war.Facing unfavorable public opinion, and being severely warned by the generals of the land, sea, and air forces, can he resolutely change his policy?On the other hand, can he, who has long relied on prestige to maintain his rule, now withstand retreat? 正當元首和他的將領之間進行搏鬥的時候，張伯倫自己又準備向英國人民廣播了。在九月二十七日晚上，他說： 現在我們為了一個遙遠的國家中我們完全不了解的民族之間所發生的爭吵，在這裡挖掘戰壕，試帶防毒面具，這真是多麼可怕，多麼不合理，多麼不可思議！如果我認為還有所裨益的話，我將毫不猶疑地進行第三次德國訪問 我這個人，從心底裡就是一個愛好和平的人。國與國之間的武力衝突，對我來說，好比一場惡夢；但是，如果我確信有一個國家決心要用武力恐怖來統治整個世界的話，那我就認為非進行反抗不可。因為在這種統治下，信奉自由的人是不值得活下去的；但戰爭總是一件可怕的事情，在我們投入戰鬥之前，我們必須明白，這是一個生死攸關的大問題。 張伯倫發表了這一篇和戰兩可、四平八穩的廣播演說之後，收到了希特勒對他上次讓威爾遜爵士轉交的信的答覆。這封信帶來了一線的希望。希特勒主動提出德國願意參加對捷克斯洛伐克的新國界的聯合保證，他還表示願意對實行新的公民投票的方式提出進一步的保證。這時，時間非常緊迫。戈德斯貝格德國的最後通牒，在次日（即九月二十八日，星期三） 的下午二時，就到最後的期限了。張伯倫於是寫了一封個人的信給希特勒：拜讀來信，使我深信你可以不經戰爭就立即得到你所有的基本要求。我願立即親自來柏林，同你以及捷克政府的代表討論移交的問題，如果你願意的話，法、意兩國的代表也可以參加。我深信我們能在一個星期之內達成協議。 【１】 【１】法伊林，前引書，第三百七十二頁。 與此同時，他又打電報給墨索里尼，告訴他已向希特勒提出了這個最後呼籲。電文是：我希望閣下通知德國總理，說你願意派代表出席。我還希望你盡力促使希特勒先生同意我的建議，使我們的人民不致陷於戰爭。 這次危機的最顯著特點之一，就是倫敦和巴黎之間似乎沒有進行密切的、彼此信任的磋商。雖然雙方的意見大體上是一致的，但很少或者說沒有什麼個人接觸。當張伯倫未經同法國政府和他自己內閣的同僚商議就寫出這兩封信的時候，法國內閣正沿著與此相平行的路線採取他們自己的措施。 我們已經知道，法國新聞界是極力反對同德國較量的；我們也知道，經法國外交部授意的巴黎報紙又如何影射那個曾提到蘇聯的英國強硬公報，說它是偽造的東西。法國駐柏林大使在二十七日晚奉命提出一項進一步的建議，準備把立即移交德國佔領的蘇台德地區加以擴大。當弗朗索瓦｜蓬塞先生正同希特勒在一起時，希特勒收到墨索里尼的來電，勸告希特勒應該接受張伯倫的舉行會議的意見，並說意大利也願意參加。 九月二十八日下午三時，希特勒通知張伯倫和達拉第，建議在第二天加上墨索里尼一起到慕尼黑舉行會議。這時張伯倫正在向下院演說，報告最近事件的一般情況。在他的演說快要結束時，坐在樓上貴族席的哈利法克斯勳爵把希特勒邀請他去慕尼黑的電報傳下來交給了首相。張伯倫那時正在敘述他給墨索里尼去信以及他採取的這一步驟所得的結果： 墨索里尼先生在回信中告訴我，他已發出通知說意大利雖然準備完全履行支持德國的保證，但他考慮到英國政府向他提出的要求的重要性，因而他希望希特勒先生設法把他通知威爾遜爵士本來要在今天下午二時採取的行動至少延遲二十四小時。我看這就可以使墨索里尼先生對當前形勢重行考慮，設法找出一個和平解決的辦法。希特勒先生在其回答中說，他同意把軍隊動員令推遲二十四小時這還沒有完。我還有些事要報告下院。我現在接到希特勒先生的邀請信，他請我明晨到慕尼黑同他會晤。他也邀請了墨索里尼先生和達拉第先生。墨索里尼先生已接受他的邀請。我可以斷定，達拉第先生也是會接受的。我的回信就不必說了我深信下院會同意我現在就立即動身，看看我在這最後的努力中能做到些什麼。 就這樣，張伯倫第三次飛去德國。 關於這次值得紀念的會議，已有過許多記述，在這裡，只能強調幾個重要特點。會議並沒有邀請俄國參加，捷克自己也沒有獲許出席。二十八日晚上，捷克政府只是收到措詞率直的通知，說是第二天歐洲四強的代表就要舉行會議。四巨頭迅速達成協議。會談在中午開始，一直開到次日凌晨二時。備忘錄寫了出來，在九月三十日晨二時簽字。它在基本各點上接受了戈德斯貝格最後通牒。蘇台德區由十月一日起分五批撤退，在十天內完成。最後的邊界由一個國際委員會來決定。這個文件交給奉准專程前來慕尼黑聽候發落的捷克代表。 當這四位政治家等待專家們草擬出最後文件的時候，首相問希特勒是否願意同他進行一次私人談話。希特勒欣然同意。 【１】 【１】法伊林，前引書，第三百七十六頁。 九月三十日早晨，兩位領導人在慕尼黑希特勒的寓所中會晤，除了譯員之外，沒有別人參加。張伯倫提出了他事先預備好的一個聲明，其內容如下： 我們，德國元首兼總理和英國首相今天繼續會晤，雙方一致認為英德關係問題是兩國和整個歐洲的最重要的問題。 我們認為，昨夜簽訂的協定以及英德海軍協定是我們兩個國家希望彼此之間不再發生戰爭的一個象徵。 我們決心以協商的辦法來處理有關兩國之間的任何其他問題，我們決定繼續作出努力，來消除可能引起分歧的根源，從而為確保歐洲和平作出貢獻。 希特勒讀完這個聲明就毫不猶豫地簽了字。 張伯倫回到英國，飛機在赫斯頓著陸，他下飛機時揮動著有希特勒簽字的這個聯合聲明，向前來歡迎的顯要人物宣讀。他的汽車由機場開出，在經過歡呼的群眾時，他對坐在身旁的哈利法克斯說：三個月後，這一切將成為過去。但他在唐寧街官邸的窗戶前又揮動那張紙說：在我國歷史上這是第二次把光榮的和平從德國帶回到唐寧街來，我相信這是我們時代的和平。 【１】 【１】都是愛國的人，他們切望祖國能在世界上重新獲得它的地位。 現在我們又有了凱特爾元帥在紐倫堡受審時對捷克代表提問的答覆： 艾格上校代表捷克斯洛伐克向凱特爾元帥問道： 在一九三八年的時候，如果西方各國肯幫助布位格，第三帝國會不會進攻捷克斯洛伐克呢？ 凱特爾元帥回答： Certainly not.那時我們在軍事上的力量還不夠強大。慕尼黑（按指在慕尼黑簽訂協定）的目的，就是把俄國趕出歐洲，爭取時間，完成德國的武裝。 【１】 【１】引自雷諾：《法國拯救了歐洲》，第一卷，第五百六十一頁註釋。 希特勒的判斷再一次得到了決定性的證明。德國參謀部不勝慚愧。元首畢竟又是對的了。他單靠了他的天才和直覺，準確地衡量了全部軍事、政治形勢。像在萊茵蘭一樣，元首的領袖才能又再度戰勝了德國軍事將領們的阻撓。這些將領他們日夜辛勤努力，用各種方法來加強德國的實力。當他們發現自己多麼地跟不上形勢的發展時，心裡感到十分痛苦；在許多情況下，他們對元首的憎惡和不信任常敵不過他們對元首高瞻遠矚的天才和神奇的幸運的讚美。毫無疑問，他成了一顆他們應該跟隨的明星，應該服從的領導。就這樣，希特勒終於成為不容非議的德國主人。鴻圖大略的道路已打開了。 陰謀反叛的人已銷聲匿跡，但也沒有被他們在軍隊中的同志們所出賣。 在這裡，不妨提出一些道德上和行為上的準則，也許對未來有些指導意義。要評判這類事情，絕不能離開當時的實際情況。某些事實在當時也許尚未為人們所知，因而對事情的估計，基本上只能是猜測，還可能受到試圖作出判斷的人的一般情緒和意向的影響。那些在氣質上和性格上喜歡對含糊曖昧而困難的問題尋求斬釘截鐵的解決方案的人，那些在一遇到外國的挑釁就立即準備應戰的人，並非都是對的。另一方面，那些傾向於低頭忍受、耐心而忠心誠意地尋求和平妥協辦法的人，也不一定是錯的。恰恰相反，在大多數場合下，後者可能是正確的，不論從道德上還是從實際效果上來看，都是如此。忍耐和堅持善意曾避免了多少次的戰爭！宗教和道德同樣都主張謙讓和卑遜。這不只限於人與人之間的關係，也包括國與國之間的關係。多少次戰爭是由於煽動者促成！多少次引起戰爭的誤會本來可以因延緩決定而得以消除！往往也有多少國家，彼此間進行過殘酷的戰爭，而在幾年和平之後，不僅成了朋友，而且結成同盟！ 登山寶訓是基督教義中的精義。我們每一個人都尊敬教友派【１】，然而，大臣們履行領導國家大事的責任，卻不是以這種教義為根據。他們的職責，首先是在與其他國家交往中避免引起衝突和戰爭，並避免各種形式的侵略行為，不論其目的是民族主義的還是意識形態的。但是，為了國家的安全，為了本國同胞的生命和自由（大臣們的職位是他們給的），在不得不而正確地採取最後手段的時候，或者經過深思熟慮，有了肯定而明確的判斷時，也不排除使用武力。如果情況證明確有使用武力的充分理由，那就可以使用武力。在這時，就應該在最有利的情況下來使用。如果把戰爭推遲一年，使自己在戰爭中處於更不利的劣勢，或將更難取得勝利，則推遲戰爭沒有什麼好處。這是有史以來人類所常遭遇到的痛苦的兩難情形。這類事情的最後評判，只能由歷史根據當時雙方所知道的並在其後獲得證明的事實來記載了。 【１】教友派為基督教的一支，此派反對在任何情形下使用暴力或訴諸戰爭。translator 但是，有一個有助於作出評判的準則，即一個國家要遵守諾言和遵守盟國的條約義務。這個準則叫作道義。人們所說的道義，往往同基督教的教義不完全一致，想起來實在令人難以理解。道義常常受自尊心的影響，而自尊心對於道義的激發又有著巨大的作用。當然過於誇大的道義規範會導致空虛迂腐而又不合常理的行為，不論它看來有多麼美好，也不足為訓。而在這一次，正是道義的準則已指出了責任之所在的時候，而當時對於事實又能作出正確判斷的話，就更能加強道義指令的力量了。 法國政府背棄忠實的盟國捷克斯洛伐克，使它任由命運擺佈，這實在是一個令人傷心的錯誤，由此還產生了許多可怕的後果。不僅是明智而公正的政策，還有俠義精神、道義感，以及對受威脅的小國的同情，是會形成一股不可抗拒的力量的，而英國如果有條約義務的約束，是一定會起而戰鬥的。但無論如何它已深深地捲入進去了，歷史只好遺憾地這樣記載：英國政府不僅默許而且鼓勵法國政府走上了這一條致命的道路。