Chapter 107 Volume Three, Chapter Thirty-Four, The Combat Plan I Proposed and the Evolution of the War in the Future

My Three Papers for the President Part I, The Atlantic Battlefield Hitler's Defeats and Losses in Russia My Unreliable Hopes for General Auchinleck's Victory in Cyrenaica Need for Anglo-American reinforcements to North Africa Request for American troops to Northern Ireland Request for American bomber fleets to attack Germany from England Several main goals in 1942 Part II, the Pacific battlefield, Japan's naval superiority Their resources are a diminishing factor We have the need to restore maritime superiority The British provided the US aircraft carrier with the USS Nelson and Rodney for temporary warship construction Urgent need for an overly large United States Army and the danger of an overly large United States Army I advocate the necessity of large-scale military operations on the Continent Part III, The Campaign of 1943 Possible Situations in Early 1943 West and North Africa Under Anglo-American Control Central Turkey actually joined the Allied front and gained footholds in Italy and Sicily. Preparations for landings in Western and Southern Europe were necessary. The main offensive in 1943 was mostly amphibious operations. Bombing of Germany and Italy in constant preparation. Or the hope of ending the war in 1944. The staff agreed with me. All objectives were finally achieved. Fortunately, the final offensive was delayed.

The forced reduction of routine, the eight-day voyage without the need for cabinet meetings or audiences, enabled me to examine the whole situation in light of what I could see and feel from the sudden expansion of the fighting.I recalled Napoleon talking about the effect of being able to concentrate on things in the mind for a long time. He said: focus on things and think about them for a long time.I tried to do this, dictating my thoughts on the typewriter as usual.In preparation for my meeting with the President and negotiations with the United States, I have presented three documents on the future course of this war as I think it should be conducted.In drawing up these papers, I was sure of the fact that I had brought with me the two Chiefs of Staff, Pound and Porter, and General Deal, and that some relevant facts could be checked in good time by General Hollis with the Secretariat.Each document takes four or five hours, and lasts two or three days.Since I had a whole picture of the war in my mind, it wasn't hard to figure it all out, but it was slow.In fact, with ordinary writing, it is possible to write two or three times at the same time.As each document is checked and completed, I send it to my professional colleagues as a token of my personal conviction.They are also preparing their own papers for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.I was pleased to find that, although my subject matter was more general and theirs more specific, there was the same harmony we have always had in terms of principles and evaluations.There is no indication of any contentious dissent, and very little of the argument needs to be corrected.In this way, while no one is bound exactly or strictly, we all arrive at a constructive set of principles on which we clearly agree.

The first document summarizes the reasons why the main object of our 1942 campaign in the European theater should be the occupation of the entire coast of Africa and the eastern Mediterranean coast from Dakar to the Turkish border by British and American forces.The second document described the steps to be taken to restore control in the Pacific Ocean, and indicated May 1942 as the month by which this end could be achieved.It discusses in particular detail the need to augment aircraft carriers with temporary mass builds.The third document stated that the ultimate goal was to liberate Europe by landing large numbers of British and American troops at the most suitable places in the German-occupied zone, and designated 1943 as the period for this most important attack.

I gave these three documents to the President before Jesus Christmas.I state that these documents, although my own, do not preclude any formal exchange of views among staff officers.I wrote them in the form of a memorandum to the British Chiefs of Staff Committee.I further explained to the President that these documents were not written for his exclusive reading, but that I thought it important that he should know what I think, and what I wish to do and, as far as Great Britain is concerned, I will try to do it.He read it as soon as he received it and asked the next day if he could keep a copy of the documents.

I readily agree with this. To my letter of October 20, sent by Mr. Attlee concerning these matters,[1] although I have not received a formal reply, and indeed do not expect one, I feel that the The president is thinking a lot along the same lines as me about taking action in Africa.During October I could only explain to him the thoughts and plans that we Britons had when we were still fighting alone.We are allies now, so there must be joint and larger action.I'm sure he and I will come to a majority of agreement, the ground is ready.Therefore, I am hopeful. Part I Atlantic Battlefield

December 16, 1941 Hitler's defeats and losses in Russia were the overriding fact of the war at this time. We cannot say how much the devastation will befall the German army and the Nazi regime. This regime has always relied on easy and cheap success. What it now had to face was not the quick and easy victory it had imagined, but the onslaught of a winter of carnage and the greatest depletion of fuel and equipment. Neither Great Britain nor the United States have any business to undertake in this matter, except to see to it that the supplies we promise are delivered on time.Only in this way can we maintain our influence over Stalin and be able to bring the mighty efforts of Russia into the overall picture of the war.

II[1] The imminent victory of General Auchinleck in Cyrenaica is also, to a lesser extent, an injury to German power, and we can expect that before the end of the year the enemy's forces in Libya will clearly have been completely wiped out. The possibility of annihilation.Not only did this deal a severe blow to the Germans and Italians, but it also removed the main threat of invasion from the West which had long been present to our Nile forces.Of course, General Auchinleck was about to follow up as quickly as possible with a plan of operations known as the Acrobatics, which should enable him to capture Tripoli and thus his armored forwards to the French Tunisian border.He may offer a prediction before we part in Washington.

[1] This section has been disproven by the subsequent defeat of General Auchinleck.At this point, we have good reason to be hopeful. 3. The losses and defeats of the Germans in Russia and their expulsion from Libya will of course force them to make a great effort next spring to drive southeast into the Caucasus or into Anatolia, or both, to break through and surround them circle, but we should not assume that they necessarily have the combat capability to carry out this task.The Russian army, recovering from the winter, was about to deal a heavy blow to them all the way from Leningrad to the Crimea.

They could easily be forced to retreat from Crimea.There is no reason at present to think that the Russian Navy cannot control the Black Sea, nor should it be thought that Germany's present strength is sufficient to make an attack on Turkey and across Anatolia something the Nazi regime could afford under the present circumstances.The Turks had fifty divisions and were renowned for their combat prowess and for the natural defenses of their country.Even though Turkey is always concerned with security, the Russian control of the Black Sea and British successes in the Levant and North African coasts, combined with the proven weakness of the Italian Navy, will justify every effort on our part to make Turkey take Acting in unison, and certainly enough to encourage it to resist German invasion.While it would be rash to think that the danger of a German southeastward intrusion into the Persia|Iraq|Syria front had been eliminated, it certainly now appeared to be less likely than it had always been.

4. We should therefore strive for French North Africa, and now is the time to use every method of inducement and pressure at our disposal against the Vichy government and the French authorities in North Africa.The defeat of the German army in Russia, the British victory in Libya, the morale and military collapse of Italy, and above all the mutual declaration of war between Germany and the United States must have had a strong impact on the hearts of France and the French Empire.Now is the time to offer a blessing or a curse to Vichy and to French North Africa, the blessing being the United States and Great Britain's promise to rebuild France into a great state and keep its territory undiminished.This should be accompanied by the active assistance of the Anglo-American Expeditionary Force from the Atlantic coast of Morocco and from the landing points of Algeria, and from the eastward advance of General Auchinleck.

For the French and the loyal Moors, there should be sufficient munitions.Vichy should be required to move their fleet from Toulon to Oran and Bizerte, and to bring France back into the war as a principal belligerent. This meant that the Germans would take over all of France and rule it as an occupied territory.It does not appear that there is much difference between the situation in the occupied areas and the hitherto unoccupied areas.No matter what happens, it is inevitable that France in Europe will be completely blocked.Of course, there was always the possibility that the Germans, being kept in Russia, might not have cared less about taking over the unoccupied parts of France even if French North Africa were at war with them. 5. If we can get Vichy to even acquiesce in French North Africa coming to our side, we must be prepared to send large numbers of troops as soon as possible.Leaving aside the troops that General Auchinleck could have brought from the east had he been victorious at Tripolitania, we had about 55,000 men ready in Britain (Sportsman's plan of operations), consisting of two divisions and a Armored units, together with transport ships.These troops may accept the invitation to enter French North Africa on the twenty-third day after receiving the order to board.Major troops and air forces dispatched from Malta could reach Bizerte at short notice.We hope that the United States will also agree to send no fewer than 150,000 troops from Casablanca and other Atlantic ports in Africa within the next six months.What matters is that a substantial number of American troops, say 25,000, should go at the earliest possible moment with the consent of either Vichy or French North Africa. 6. We also demand that the United States send the equivalent of three divisions and one armored division into Northern Ireland.These divisions can complete their training in Northern Ireland if necessary.The presence of U.S. troops there will be known to the enemy and may cause them to overestimate the actual number of troops stationed there.The presence of American troops in the British Isles would be another powerful deterrent to German invasion attempts.This will allow us to fill out the French North Africa campaign with two additional divisions and a full armored division.If such a series of troops could be added to the French forces already in North Africa, with proper air support, the Germans would have to make a very difficult and difficult conquest of North Africa by means of seas which they did not control. Lost a lot of battle.Since our access across the Atlantic is direct and easy, while the enemy's access to the Mediterranean is severely hampered, as happened in their Libyan venture, the Northwest African theater is the most favorable theater for British and American operations . 7. It may be mentioned here that we would very much like the American bomber fleet to base its operations against Germany in the British Isles.The bombing plans of our own bombers did not live up to our expectations.The program is vast, and its projects are growing, but its full development has been delayed.It must be remembered that we have great hopes of affecting German production and morale by bombarding German cities and ports with increasing intensity and precision, and this, combined with their defeat in Russia, may It had an important impact on the German people's will to fight, which caused an internal reaction to the German government.This process would be intensified and accelerated if the United States sent, say, twenty bomber squadrons to the United Kingdom, and it would also be the most direct and effective reply to Germany's declaration of war on the United States.Arrangements are to be made within Great Britain to enhance this process and develop the British and American bombing of Germany from now until the end of the war without ceiling. 8. But we must take into account the refusal of the Vichy to act as we wish and, on the contrary, that they may incite active resistance in French North Africa.They might assist German troops into North Africa; the Germans might force their way through Spain, or be allowed to pass; the French fleet at Toulon might come under German control, and Vichy might have France and the French Empire actively cooperating with Germany against us, though This does not seem likely to be done effectively.The vast majority of the French are on the side of Britain, and now even more are on the side of the United States.Admiral Darlan may not hand over the complete fleet of Toulon Port to Germany.The last thing that happened was that French soldiers and sailors would seriously fight the United States and Britain.Even so, we cannot by any means rule out the possibility that the defeatists in France and North Africa will join forces with Germany in a half-truth.Sure enough, our work in North Africa was much more difficult. A campaign must be fought to occupy or conquer the entire North African coast, including Morocco's ports on the Atlantic coast, within 1942.Dakar and other ports in French West Africa must be captured before the end of the year.However, although the invasion of French North Africa is urgent in order to prevent the German invasion, it is also likely to obtain eight or nine months of preparation time for the control of Dakar and the French West African ports. Plans should be made immediately.These latter operations present no insurmountable difficulty, given sufficient time and preparation, and proper equipment provided. 9. Our relations with General de Gaulle and the Free French movement need to be examined.Until now, the United States has not assumed obligations like those contained in my correspondence with him.Through no particular fault of his own, his movement had created new hostility in the hearts of the French.Any action which the United States now feels able to take against him should have the effect of redefining our obligations to him and to France so as to make them more closely dependent on what he and the French nation might do to avenge the national humiliation .Assuming Jowichy is going to do what we want with French North Africa, America and Britain will have to try to broker a reconciliation between Free France (the Gaullists) and the rest of the French who will once again take up arms against Germany.If, on the other hand, Vichy insists on collaborating with Germany and we have to go into French North and West Africa, then the Gaullist movement must be aided and fully exploited. 10. We cannot predict what will happen in Spain.It seemed probable that the Spaniards would not allow the Germans to pass freely through Spain to attack Gibraltar and invade North Africa.There may be infiltration, but a formal request to pass an army will be denied.Sure enough, winter would be the worst season for the Germans to try to force their way through Spain.Besides Hitler has almost all of Europe defeated and half starved to suppress by force, when it is likely not easy to take over the unoccupied regions of France and the sullen, ferocious and starving people trapped in the Iberian peninsula In the fierce guerrilla warfare waged against him. Britain and the United States must do everything possible to strengthen the will of these people to resist.The current limited supply policy should continue. The port and base of Gibraltar are so valuable to us that unless the Iberian peninsula is taken or the Spaniards allow the Germans to pass through their frontiers, the Germans need not even think of occupying the Atlantic islands. 11. In summary, the main offensive efforts of the Western War in 1942 included British and American occupation and control of all French possessions in North and West Africa and further British control of the entire North African coast from Tunisia to Egypt, so that if If the ship situation allows, we can freely pass through the Mediterranean Sea to the countries of the Middle East and the Suez Canal.Such grand objectives could only be achieved if British and American naval and air superiority in the Atlantic were maintained, supply lines continued uninterrupted, and the British Isles were effectively safeguarded against invasion. My second paper on the war in the Pacific was completed after we were already ashore. Part II Pacific Battlefield December 20, 1941 The Japanese enjoyed naval superiority, which allowed them to move an army almost anywhere they wanted, capture it, and build bases to fuel their navy and air force.The Confederates would not have the ability to conduct general fleet combat for a period of time.Their ability to carry troops depends on the area of ​​ocean that reduces opportunities for interception.Even without a superior navy, we can carry out surprise attacks everywhere.But we can't sustain our attack across the ocean.We therefore had to expect to be taken one by one of our possessions and points in the Pacific, while the enemy could easily establish himself at each point one by one and destroy the local defenders. 2. During this interim period, it will be our task to resist staunchly at every point of attack, and to smuggle supplies and reinforcements across at every possible risk at the opportunity.If our army resists stubbornly, and we reinforce it as much as we can, the enemy will be compelled to assume ever-increasing overseas obligations far from home; his shipping resources will be strained, his communications will destroy targets, and all available navies and air forces of the United States, Great Britain, and Holland, especially submarines, should concentrate their combat efforts.The most important thing is that the enemy should not be allowed to easily obtain great benefits; he should be forced to support all the conquered lands, so that his front line will be stretched and resources will be exhausted. 3. Japan's resources are a consumptive factor.The country has been chronically overstretched by the costly war being waged in China.They were at their greatest on the day they attacked Pearl Harbor.If, as Stalin said, they had 1,500 German planes outside their own air force (he must have had the opportunity to learn how these planes were transported), then they are It is no longer possible to make up for their loss except for the tiny output of 500 aircraft to make up for the loss.It should be our policy to keep them in overseas conquests with the largest possible number of troops, and to keep them busy as uninterruptedly as possible, so as to saturate their traffic and cause a high rate of aircraft attrition.If we leave them at their ease by doing nothing, they will be able to extend their conquests cheaply and easily, and with the least number of troops abroad, the greatest advantage and the least obligation, thus leaving us suffered great damage.It is therefore right and necessary to fight them at every point in which we have a fair degree of certainty, and to keep them constantly attrition and expansion. 4. But we must firmly aim to restore maritime superiority as soon as possible.This can be achieved in two ways: first, by strengthening our capital ships.The two new Japanese battleships, built outside the treaty, must be seen as a factor not to be ignored affecting the entire Pacific theater.It is understood that two new American battleships will be operational by May.Of course, all planning in war must be conditioned by enemy actions, accidents, and mishaps, but if our numbers of battleships are no longer diminished, and if no new unforeseeable emergencies occur, we hope to put Nelson The USS and Rodney joined the two new American battleships to bring the number of modern capital ships armed with sixteen-inch guns to four.Backing up this fleet should be a sufficient number of serviceable old converted American battleships to enable a fleet battle to be planned at any time after May, under favorable circumstances.Restoration of our naval superiority in the Pacific would secure, if not a contest of strength, the entire west coast of America, and thus prevent those forces charged with offensive duties from being unnecessarily dispersed on large defensive efforts. Therefore, we must make the establishment of a battle fleet in the Pacific that will definitely prevail as a major strategic goal, and we must use May as the month to achieve this goal. 5. Not only then, but also during the transition period, the aircraft carrier war should be developed to the greatest possible extent.We ourselves are forming a fleet of three aircraft carriers with a considerable number of frigates to operate in the waters between South Africa, India and Australia.The United States already has seven full-fledged aircraft carriers, while Japan has ten, but the United States has larger aircraft carriers.In addition to this regular fleet of aircraft carriers, we must also greatly develop a number of temporary aircraft carriers of both sizes and sizes.Only in this way can we rapidly expand our command of the sea.Even though these motherships can only accommodate a few aircraft, they can be combined with other motherships to function.we should develop a floating air force facility sufficient both to enable us to gain and maintain localized air superiority over significant periods of time over aircraft based on the coast, and to cover the landing of troops to strike the enemy newly conquered areas.Unless this local air superiority is definitely obtained, or until it is obtained, even our relatively superior fleet will fight under a very unfavorable condition.We cannot acquire more battleships than are now in sight and will be built in 1942, but we can and must acquire aircraft carriers.It takes five years to build a battleship, but it is possible to improvise an aircraft carrier in six months.Here, then, is a field of invention and skill similar to that which produced those fleets and small fleets which fought on the Mississippi River in the American Civil War.It must be admitted that giving priority to the development of suitable types of carrier-based aircraft will necessarily delay the largest bombing offensive which we intend to be our principal mode of warfare against Germany.However, it is a matter of time and degree.We cannot hope to reach in 1942 the level of bombing in Germany that we set for that year, but we will exceed it in 1943.Our joint action plans may not come to fruition until later, but they always will.And in the interim, German cities and other targets won't disappear.Although every effort will have to be made to accelerate the rate of bombing of Germany until the enormous scale prescribed for 1943 and 1944, other needs may compel us to postpone our plans.It will therefore be all the more important that during this period a formation, if only a token one, of an American bomber squadron should be based in the British Isles against German cities and seaports. The following paragraphs deal with the acquisition of air bases, Russia's involvement in the war against Japan, escorts in the Pacific, and use of Singapore, and need not be published here.The last paragraph reads: 12. We need not fear that this war in the Pacific will attract a disproportionately large portion of the American forces after the first assault has passed.We should hope that the numbers of their troops committed to Europe in 1942 will not be so large as to be hindered by their operations in the Pacific, although these operations must be limited.What would be dangerous to us would be the creation of a massive United States Army of ten million men, which would absorb all available supplies during at least a two-year training period while doing nothing to defend the American continent.The best way to prevent this situation, and to make proper use of the large armies and plentiful supplies of arms which are soon to appear, is to enable the Americans to restore their command of the seas in the Pacific without hindering them from doing what they may intend to do. Clearly a minor overseas military operation. So much gossip has been made public about my consistent opposition to large-scale military action on the Continent that it is important to emphasize the truth.I have always believed that a decisive attack on the countries under German occupation on the largest possible scale is the only way to be successful, and that the summer of 1943 should be selected as the time period for this purpose.The reader will see that the size of the operation I planned before the end of 1941 stipulated forty armored divisions and a million troops of other arms as the basic army required in the initial phase.When I take note of the many books that have been written on the basis of a vain conjecture as to my attitude on the subject, I feel compelled to draw the reader's attention to those truly responsible documents written at the time, of which some other examples will be described listed in the process. the third part campaign fought in 1943 December 18, 1941 Had the operations outlined in Parts I and II been successfully completed in 1942, the situation at the beginning of 1943 might have been as follows: (1) The United States and Great Britain will have regained actual naval superiority in the Pacific, and all Japanese aggression overseas will be endangered by attacks on their lines of communication and by the sending of British and American expeditionary forces to recover lost ground. (2) The British Isles will remain intact and better prepared than ever to resist invasion. (3) The entire coast of West and North Africa, from Dakar to the Suez Canal, and from the Levant to the Turkish border, will be in British and American hands. Although Turkey may not be fighting, it will definitely join the US-British-Russian front. Russia's position will be firmly consolidated, and the material supplies promised by Britain and the United States will partially compensate for Russia's lost arms production capacity.A foothold may have been established in Sicily and Italy and a reaction within Italy may have been extremely favorable. 2. But all this is not enough to bring the war to an end.The war could not have ended by driving Japan back to her own territory and defeating her overseas forces.The war could only be ended by the defeat of German armies in Europe, or by internal turmoil in Germany caused by war disadvantages, economic difficulties, and Allied bombing offensives.When the power of the United States, Britain, and Russia begins to be recognized by the Germans, internal collapse of Germany is always possible, but we must not count on it.Our plans must proceed on the assumption that German land and air resistance will continue at the present level, and that their submarine warfare will be conducted by an increasingly numerous fleet. 3. We must therefore be prepared to liberate the occupied countries of Western and Southern Europe by landing, successively or simultaneously, at appropriate points, Anglo-American armies of sufficient force to enable the conquered peoples to revolt.It is impossible for these countries alone to rise up, owing to the cruel repressive measures taken by Germany, but if a sufficient number of properly equipped troops landed in the following countries, namely in Norway, Denmark, Landings in Holland, Belgium, France on the Channel and Atlantic coasts, in Italy, and possibly in the Balkans, the German garrisons would not be sufficient to cope with the strength of the liberating armies and the wrath of the insurgent people.As long as we retain the command of the sea required to choose the place of attack, it is impossible for the Germans to have in every such country a sufficient number of troops for effective resistance.In particular, they cannot move their armored forces from north to south or from west to east in flank; they will only have to distribute it among the various conquered countries, in which case it will be hopelessly dispersed; Or it would have to be transferred back to a central point in Germany, in which case it would not arrive until we had attacked from overseas and established a significant foothold. 4. Here we have to face the usual conflict between short-term and long-term plans.War is a constant struggle that must be waged day by day.Prepare for the future only with considerable difficulty and within certain limits. Experience shows that forecasts are usually false and preparations are always behind.Notwithstanding this, there must be a plan and theme in order to bring the war to a successful conclusion within a reasonable period of time.Planning is all the more necessary in modern times, when no large-scale offensive can be waged without the availability of elaborate and specialized equipment. 5. We must therefore now face not only the question of driving Japan back to her homeland and restoring her undisputed control over the Pacific, but also of the American and British forces in the summer of 1943 The question of landing on the shores of the conquered countries of Europe in order to liberate them.Plans should be made for landings in all the above mentioned countries.The question of which three or four countries should be chosen should, as far as possible, be left for later, in order to benefit from the evolution of the situation and to ensure secrecy. VI. In principle, landings should be carried out by armored and mechanized forces capable of disembarking on beaches rather than in ports, either by landing craft or from specially adapted sea-going vessels.The fronts of possible attack were thus so wide that the German forces holding down the individual countries could not be strong enough at all points.It is necessary to make a kind of landing equipment, so that this kind of large-scale landing can be completed quickly and safely.The vanguards of the Anglo-American expeditionary forces should be assembled by the spring of 1943 in Iceland, the British Isles, and, if possible, in French Morocco and Egypt.The main force will go straight across the ocean. 7. Do not think that this matter requires a large number of soldiers.If the invasion of the armored forces is successful, the uprising of the local people (who must bring their weapons) will be the main body of the liberation offensive.Forty armored divisions of 15,000 men each, or the tank brigades equivalent to these divisions (of which the British will endeavor to provide nearly half), would number 600,000.Behind this armored force was another million troops of all arms, which would be enough to retake large areas from Hitler's rule.But once such a campaign is launched, it will need to be supplied at great expense.By the end of 1942 our various industrial and training establishments should have reached a sufficient scale. 8. In addition to the control of the sea (without which nothing can be done), it is important for all these operations to have a superior air force, and for the landing, the aircraft loaded on the mother ship will be greatly developed. necessary.However, for the war of 1942, it was necessary anyway.In order to wear down the enemy and hamper his defensive preparations, the intensity of the bombing offensive from England against Germany and from Malta and, if possible, from Tripoli and Tunisia against Italy must be as high as possible.Considering that the strength of Britain's first-line aircraft is already slightly superior to that of Germany, the Russian Air Force has already established an advantage on most of the Russian front lines, and its strength can be considered to be three-fifths of that of Germany's first-line aircraft. Combined with American resources and future developments, there is no reason to think that we will not be able to establish a decisive air superiority even before the summer of 1943.What's more, during this period, severe and continuous punishment can be imposed on Germany.Noting the fact that bombing offensives are necessarily a matter of degree and that targets cannot be removed, it would be correct to give priority to the development of fighters and torpedo-carrying aircraft that are required on the many existing or must-be-created and temporarily converted motherships . 9. If we lay down these tasks now and take care that they do not encroach too much on present needs, we can hope for victory at the end of 1943 or 1944 even if Germany has not collapsed before .It may be useful to announce now our intention to send liberation troops into Europe in 1943.This would give hope to the conquered peoples and prevent them from having any contact with the German invaders.The very fact of making and keeping the minds of tens of millions moving in our direction is a powerful atmospheric influence. 我在航程中，在寫成這個文件的那天，對三軍參謀長宣讀了一遍。以下系摘自我們的會議記錄： 首相說，他希望三軍參謀長通篇審查這個文件，他打算用這個文件作為他和總統會談的根據。他認為讓英親國和美國的人民知道大規模入侵歐洲大陸是我們在一九四三年的目標是具有重要意義的。一般說來，戰爭的三個階段可以稱作（Ⅰ）緊縮包圍圈。 （Ⅱ）解放各國人民。 （Ⅲ）最後對德國城堡進攻。 我的專職同僚們完全贊同這些意見，並且廣泛地贊同在其他文件裡所陳述的意見，這些意見確實總括了我們就這時已經形成的關於戰爭問題的聯合研究和討論的結果。 把以後發生的事作為對照並把它作為一個整體來看，我對於這三個文件是感到滿意的；現在再看這些文件時，就會看出它們和英美兩國在一九四二年和一九四三年戰役中實際所做的事是非常符合的。我終於獲得總統對於遠征西北非（火炬作戰計劃）的同意，這就形成我們的第一次大規模的聯合登陸進攻。我殷切盼望渡過海峽並解放法國（這個作戰計劃當時稱作圍殲，以後改稱霸王），在一九四三年夏季實現。 但是計劃未來雖然重要，並且有時也可能在某些方面預測未來，卻沒有任何人能夠保證這樣重大事件的日程不會被敵人的行動和反擊打亂。這些備忘錄中的所有目標都曾由英美軍隊按照這裡所定的次序達到了。我對於奧金萊克將軍將在一九四二年二月肅清利比亞所抱的希望落空了。他遭受了一系列的重大挫折，關於這些情況即將敘述到。希特勒或許就是受到這種成就的鼓舞才決定作出巨大努力為保住突尼斯而戰，於是不久就經由意大利和越過地中海調了二十餘萬生力軍到達這裡。因此，英美軍隊就捲入了一場比我所籌劃的規模更大、時間更久的北非戰役了。由於這個原因，日程表被迫推遲了四個月。英美盟國到一九四二年年終的時候還沒有控制法國在北非和西非的全部屬地和由英國進一步控制從突尼斯到埃及的整個北非海岸（第一部分，第十一節）。我們在一九四三年五月才獲得這些結果。因此，我曾經殷切盼望和努力進行的越過海峽並解放法國這個最主要的計劃未能在那年夏季實行，而被迫推遲了整整一年，直到一九四四年夏季。 隨後的回顧和我們現在所獲得的全部了解的情況，使我確信，我們的計劃落空對於我們倒是一件幸運的事。那次遠征被耽擱了一年，免除了我們進行在那時充其量也不過是極其危險而且可能帶來震驚全世界的災難的一次冒險行動。如果希特勒是聰明的，他應該減少他在北非的損失而在新建立的美國軍隊和人員達到業務上充分成熟和優良時期以前，並在大隊登陸艇和那些浮動港口（桑葚）被特別建成的很久以前，以兩倍於他在一九四四年所保有的兵力來和我們在法國會戰。我現在確信即使火炬行動如我所希望那樣在一九四二年結束，或者即使從來沒有試圖這樣做，在一九四三年越過海峽的企圖也會導致一次最大的慘敗，並對戰爭結果產生不可估量的影響。我在一九四三年全年當中日益感覺到這點，因而承認霸王作戰計劃的延期是不可避免的，雖然我充分了解我們的蘇聯盟友的煩惱和憤怒。 我們要到一九四四年才能越過海峽這事一旦確定下來，需要強迫敵人在地中海作戰就成為很清楚的事了。我們只有在西西里島和意大利登陸才能夠與敵人打一場大規模的仗，並且至少把軸心國夥伴中較弱的一個打垮。我獲得總統的同意，讓馬歇爾將軍在一九四三年五月隨我從華盛頓到阿爾及爾來，就是為了要保證這項決定的執行這個明顯的目的。這一切將在實際事件發生時加以詳細敘述。